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Foreword
World Report 2017 is Human Rights Watch’s 27th annual review of human rights
practices around the globe. It summarizes key human rights issues in more than
90 countries and territories worldwide, drawing on events from late 2015
through November 2016. 
The book is divided into two main parts: an essay section, and country-specific
chapters. 
In his keynote essay, “The Dangerous Rise of Populism: Global Attacks on
Human Rights Values,” Human Rights Watch Executive Director Kenneth Roth ex-
amines the rise of leaders who, claiming to speak for “the people” amid rising
public discontent over the status quo, reject rights as an impediment to their
perception of the majority will. Roth sees such unrestrained majoritarianism and
assaults on government checks and balances as “perhaps the greatest danger
today to the future of democracy in the West.” The past should serve as our
guide he warns: leaders who have claimed insight into the will of the majority
have gone on to crush the individual who stands in their way. “We should never
underestimate the tendency of demagogues who sacrifice the rights of others in
our name today to jettison our rights tomorrow when their real priority—retaining
power—is in jeopardy,” he writes. Rather than taking on this surge of populist at-
tacks on human rights, he says, too many Western leaders are lying low, “hoping
the winds of populism will blow over.” Some seem to think that echoing pop-
ulists’ positions will mitigate their rise rather than reinforcing their message.
Others, such as Russia’s Vladimir Putin, Turkey’s Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Abdel
Fattah al-Sisi of Egypt, and Syria’s Bashar al-Assad, appear emboldened in their
repressive path by the rise of Western populism, and by the West’s muted re-
sponse. 
This global assault on human rights, Roth says, requires “a vigorous reaffirma-
tion and defense” of its basic values, with media, civil society, and government
all having important parts to play. But the real responsibility, he says, lies with
the public, who via nongovernmental organizations, political parties, and tradi-
tional and social media, offer the best antidote to demagogues’ lies by demand-
ing “a politics based on truth and the values on which rights-respecting
democracy has been built.” “Rights by their nature do not admit an à la carte ap-
proach,” Roth says. “You may not like your neighbors, but if you sacrifice their
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rights today, you weaken your own tomorrow, because ultimately rights are
grounded on the reciprocal duty to treat others as you would want to be treated
yourself.” 
In the second essay, “When Exposing Abusers Is Not Enough: Strategies to Con-
front the Shameless,” Akshaya Kumar examines the traditional human rights
strategy of “naming and shaming” those who violate human rights. Increasingly,
she notes, that approach is being undermined by human rights abusers who
revel in their atrocities, rather than hide them, and even use them to entice new
followers. Human rights activists, Kumar argues, need to adapt their own tactics
accordingly, by taking on those who enable abusers— financial backers, arms
suppliers, and other networks that make their rights violations possible—and
drawing on the expertise of those who map such systems. “There is no one-size-
fits-all approach,” she concludes. But unmasking and holding to account those
on whose shoulders the shameless stand is an investment the human rights
movement needs to make if it is to take on those for whom exposure is a boost,
not a blow. 
Fears of extremist armed attacks continue to drive legal and policy change in
much of the world. Suicide bombers and gunmen have killed hundreds of people
and injured thousands more outside of traditional conflict areas in recent years.
Governments are responsible for protecting their populations from such attacks,
but, as Letta Tayler writes in "Overreach: How New Global Counterterrorism
Measures Jeopardize Rights," many attempt to do so by adopting laws and poli-
cies that are dangerously overbroad or intrusive, and thus counterproductive.
Tayler focuses on two recent trends: a proliferation of counterterrorism laws,
many aimed at so-called Foreign Terrorist Fighters (“FTFs”); and declarations of
states of emergency. Rather than providing greater security these measures to
often risk violating basic rights, incarcerating the wrong people, and alienating
populations that could play a positive role in helping to curtail attacks. The solu-
tions, she says, include reforming counterterrorism laws—for example, narrow-
ing the definition of terrorism and mandating rigorous oversight of potential
abuses—and limiting the scope and duration of emergency powers to the mini-
mum that is genuinely necessary. As Tayler concludes, effective responses to ter-
rorism do not sideline human rights; rather they uphold them.
In “The Internet is Not the Enemy: As Rights Move Online, Human Rights Stan-
dards Move with Them,” Dinah PoKempner identifies a troubling dichotomy be-
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tween the principles of internet freedom that governments publicly support, and
the practical steps they take back home that run counter to them, particularly in-
trusive surveillance. She presents three features of online speech that make it
particularly powerful, and hard to regulate—its lack of inhibition, its longevity,
and its cross-border reach—challenges that she says demand a “doubling down
on privacy and freedom of speech, rather than giving up on them.” Noting that
some rights-limiting steps are sometimes warranted, indeed necessary, she
stresses the evaluation of “necessity and proportionality” in regulation, as well
as the requirements of transparency, independent oversight, and avenues of ap-
peal and redress. Failure to follow these time-tested standards, she warns, can
lead to discrimination, persecution, and even undermine national security or
public order by eroding trust in government and protection of minorities. “Soci-
eties that deprive their inhabitants of online privacy and means of digital secu-
rity are deeply vulnerable" she concludes; rights need to be part of the digital
age. 
Education is often a casualty for children caught up in conflict and persecution.
For older children, particularly, it has become an “impossible dream.” Today,
less than a quarter of the world’s nearly 2 million secondary school-aged refugee
adolescents attend school. Girls are often most affected. In the final essay, “The
Lost Years: Secondary Education for Children in Emergencies,” Bassam Khawaja,
Elin Martinez, and Bill Van Esveld identify the causes of these “lost years” as pri-
mary-school focused funding, and restrictive refugee policies that limit the abil-
ity of displaced children to attend and stay in school. To address them, they say,
humanitarian actors and donors need to place more emphasis on secondary ed-
ucation, and address the physical, social, economic, policy, and linguistic barri-
ers that make it hard for older children to get an education. The stakes, they
argue, could not be higher: the personal growth, safety, and sense of hope of
displaced older children, and the economic and social well-being of their host
and home countries—if and when they return.
The rest of the volume consists of individual country entries, each of which iden-
tifies significant human rights abuses, examines the freedom of local human
rights defenders to conduct their work, and surveys the response of key interna-
tional actors, such as the United Nations, European Union, African Union, United
States, China, and various regional and international organizations and institu-
tions.
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The book reflects extensive investigative work that Human Rights Watch staff un-
dertook in 2016, usually in close partnership with human rights activists and
groups in the country in question. It also reflects the work of our advocacy team,
which monitors policy developments and strives to persuade governments and
international institutions to curb abuses and promote human rights. Human
Rights Watch publications, issued throughout the year, contain more detailed
accounts of many of the issues addressed in the brief summaries in this volume.
They can be found on the Human Rights Watch website, www.hrw.org. 
As in past years, this report does not include a chapter on every country where
Human Rights Watch works, nor does it discuss every issue of importance. The
absence of a particular country or issue often simply reflects staffing or resource
limitations and should not be taken as commentary on the significance of the
problem. There are many serious human rights violations that Human Rights
Watch simply lacks the capacity to address. 
The factors we considered in determining the focus of our work in 2016 (and
hence the content of this volume) include the number of people affected and the
severity of abuse, access to the country and the availability of information about
it, the susceptibility of abusive forces to influence, and the importance of ad-
dressing certain thematic concerns and of reinforcing the work of local rights or-
ganizations. 
The World Report does not have separate chapters addressing our thematic work
but instead incorporates such material directly into the country entries. Please
consult the Human Rights Watch website for more detailed treatment of our work
on children’s rights; women’s rights; arms and military issues; business and
human rights; health and human rights; disability rights; international justice;
terrorism and counterterrorism; refugees and displaced people; and lesbian,
gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) people’s rights; and for information about
our international film festivals.
More than 200 Human Rights Watch staff contributed to World Report 2017;
Danielle Haas, Senior Editor, oversaw the editing; Aditi Shetty, Program Office
Associate, managed the logistics.
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The Dangerous Rise of Populism
Global Attacks on Human Rights Values
By Kenneth Roth, Executive Director
Human rights exist to protect people from government abuse and neglect. Rights
limit what a state can do and impose obligations for how a state must act. Yet
today a new generation of populists is turning this protection on its head. Claim-
ing to speak for “the people,” they treat rights as an impediment to their concep-
tion of the majority will, a needless obstacle to defending the nation from
perceived threats and evils. Instead of accepting rights as protecting everyone,
they privilege the declared interests of the majority, encouraging people to
adopt the dangerous belief that they will never themselves need to assert rights
against an overreaching government claiming to act in their name.  
The appeal of the populists has grown with mounting public discontent over the
status quo. In the West, many people feel left behind by technological change,
the global economy, and growing inequality. Horrific incidents of terrorism gen-
erate apprehension and fear. Some are uneasy with societies that have become
more ethnically, religiously and racially diverse. There is an increasing sense that
governments and the elite ignore public concerns.
In this cauldron of discontent, certain politicians are flourishing and even gain-
ing power by portraying rights as protecting only the terrorist suspect or the asy-
lum seeker at the expense of the safety, economic welfare, and cultural
preferences of the presumed majority. They scapegoat refugees, immigrant com-
munities, and minorities. Truth is a frequent casualty. Nativism, xenophobia,
racism, and Islamophobia are on the rise.  
This dangerous trend threatens to reverse the accomplishments of the modern
human rights movement. In its early years, that movement was preoccupied with
the atrocities of World War II and the repression associated with the Cold War.
Having seen the evil that governments can do, states adopted a series of human
rights treaties to limit and deter future abuse. Protecting these rights was under-
stood as necessary for individuals to live in dignity. Growing respect for rights
laid the foundation for freer, safer, and more prosperous societies. 
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But today, a growing number of people have come to see rights not as protecting
them from the state but as undermining governmental efforts to defend them. In
the United States and Europe, the perceived threat at the top of the list is migra-
tion, where concerns about cultural identity, economic opportunity, and terror-
ism intersect. Encouraged by populists, an expanding segment of the public
sees rights as protecting only these “other” people, not themselves, and thus as
dispensable. If the majority wants to limit the rights of refugees, migrants, or mi-
norities, the populists suggest, it should be free to do so. That international
treaties and institutions stand in the way only intensifies this antipathy toward
rights in a world where nativism is often prized over globalism.  
It is perhaps human nature that it is harder to identify with people who differ
from oneself, and easier to accept violation of their rights. People take solace in
the hazardous assumption that the selective enforcement of rights is possible—
that the rights of others can be compromised while their own remain secure. 
But rights by their nature do not admit an à la carte approach. You may not like
your neighbors, but if you sacrifice their rights today, you jeopardize your own to-
morrow, because ultimately rights are grounded on the reciprocal duty to treat
others as you would want to be treated yourself. To violate the rights of some is
to erode the edifice of rights that inevitably will be needed by members of the
presumed majority in whose name current violations occur.  
We forget at our peril the demagogues of yesteryear—the fascists, communists,
and their ilk who claimed privileged insight into the majority’s interest but ended
up crushing the individual. When populists treat rights as an obstacle to their vi-
sion of the majority will, it is only a matter of time before they turn on those who
disagree with their agenda. The risk only heightens when populists attack the in-
dependence of the judiciary for upholding the rule of law—that is, for enforcing
the limits on governmental conduct that rights impose.  
Such claims of unfettered majoritarianism, and the attacks on the checks and
balances that constrain governmental power, are perhaps the greatest danger
today to the future of democracy in the West.
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Spreading Threat and Tepid Response
Rather than confronting this populist surge, too many Western political leaders
seem to have lost confidence in human rights values, offering only tepid sup-
port. Few leaders have been willing to offer a vigorous defense, with the notable
exception, at times, of German Chancellor Angela Merkel, Canadian Prime Minis-
ter Justin Trudeau, and US President Barack Obama.  
Some leaders seem to have buried their heads in the sand, hoping the winds of
populism will blow over. Others, if not seeking to profit from populist passions,
seem to wish that emulation of the populists might temper their ascendancy.
British Prime Minister Theresa May denounced “activist left wing human rights
lawyers” who dare to challenge British forces for torture in Iraq. French President
François Hollande borrowed from the National Front playbook to try to make de-
priving French-born dual citizens of their nationality a central part of his coun-
terterrorism policy, an initiative he later abandoned and said he regretted. The
Dutch government supports restrictions on face veils for Muslim women. Many
European leaders now back the call of Hungary’s Prime Minister Viktor Orbán to
close Europe’s borders, leaving refugees in the lurch. Such mimicry of the pop-
ulists only reinforces and legitimizes the politicians attacking human rights val-
ues.
A similar trend can be found outside the West. Indeed, the rise of Western pop-
ulists seems to have emboldened several leaders to intensify their flouting of
human rights. The Kremlin, for example, has eagerly defended President
Vladimir Putin’s authoritarian rule as no worse than the West’s increasingly trou-
bled human rights record. China's Xi Jinping, like Putin, has pursued the tough-
est crackdown on critical voices in two decades. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan
of Turkey took advantage of a coup attempt to crush opposition voices. President
Abdel Fattah al-Sisi of Egypt intensified the crackdown begun after his own coup.
President Rodrigo Duterte of the Philippines has openly called for summary exe-
cutions of suspected drug dealers and users—and even of human rights activists
who defend them. Prime Minister Narendra Modi of India tried to shut down criti-
cal civic groups as he closed his eyes to intimidation and hate crimes by Hindu
nationalist groups against religious and ethnic minorities.  
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Meanwhile, confident that there is little to fear in the West’s occasional protests,
Syrian President Bashir al-Assad, backed by Russia, Iran, and Lebanon’s Hezbol-
lah, has shredded the international laws of war, ruthlessly attacking civilians in
opposition-held parts of the country including eastern Aleppo. Several African
leaders, feeling vulnerable to domestic or international prosecution themselves,
have harshly criticized the International Criminal Court and, in three cases, an-
nounced their intention to withdraw from it.  
To counter these trends, a broad reaffirmation of human rights is urgently
needed. The rise of the populists should certainly lead to some soul-searching
among mainstream politicians, but not to an abandonment of first principles, by
officials or the public. Governments committed to respecting human rights serve
their people better by being more likely to avoid the corruption, self-aggrandiz-
ing, and arbitrariness that so often accompany autocratic rule. Governments
founded on human rights are better placed to hear their citizens and recognize
and address their problems. And governments that respect human rights are
more easily replaced when people become unhappy with their rule.  
But if the appeal of the strongman and the voices of intolerance prevail, the
world risks entering a dark era. We should never underestimate the tendency of
demagogues who sacrifice the rights of others in our name today to jettison our
rights tomorrow when their real priority—retaining power—is in jeopardy. 
Trump’s Dangerous Rhetoric
Donald Trump’s successful campaign for the US presidency was a vivid illustra-
tion of this politics of intolerance. Sometimes overtly, sometimes through code
and indirection, he spoke to many Americans’ discontent with economic stagna-
tion and an increasingly multicultural society in a way that breached basic princi-
ples of dignity and equality. He stereotyped migrants, vilified refugees, attacked
a judge for his Mexican ancestry, mocked a journalist with disabilities, dis-
missed multiple allegations of sexual assault, and pledged to roll back women’s
ability to control their own fertility.
To make matters worse, there was also a practical emptiness to much of his rhet-
oric. For example, a large part of his campaign was built around attacking trade
deals and the global economy, but he also scapegoated undocumented migrants
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as responsible for stealing American jobs. Yet the mass deportation of migrants
that he threatened, including of many with established ties in the United States
and a record of contributing productively to the economy, will do nothing to
bring back long-lost manufacturing jobs. US job growth continues to rise, but to
the extent there is economic stagnation for some, it can hardly be blamed on un-
documented migrants whose net numbers have not changed significantly in re-
cent years and who are often willing to perform jobs that most US citizens will
not. 
Candidate Trump’s plan for confronting terrorism by Muslims was equally futile—
even counterproductive—as he demonized the very Muslim communities whose
cooperation is important for identifying tomorrow’s plots. He portrayed refugees
as security risks even though they are subjected to far more thorough vetting
than the vastly larger number of people entering the US for business, education,
or tourism. Trump also showed no willingness to limit overbroad measures such
as mass surveillance, an enormous invasion of privacy that has proven no more
effective than judicially supervised, targeted surveillance.
Trump even toyed with reintroducing torture such as waterboarding, apparently
oblivious to the bonanza for terrorist recruiters provided by President George W.
Bush’s “enhanced interrogation techniques.” His belated post-election discov-
ery of torture’s ineffectiveness after a conversation with the general he later
nominated to head the Department of Defense offers little solace because he si-
multaneously declared a willingness nonetheless to order torture “if that’s what
the American people want.” He, presumably, would be the privileged interpreter
of that desire, while ignoring the laws and treaties that prohibit inflicting such
brutality and pain regardless of the circumstances. 
The Populist Wave in Europe
In Europe, a similar populism sought to blame economic stagnation on migra-
tion, both to and within the European Union. Yet those who hoped to stop migra-
tion by voting for Brexit—perhaps the most prominent illustration of this
trend—risk making Britain worse off economically.  
Throughout the European continent, officials and politicians harken back to dis-
tant, even fanciful, times of perceived national ethnic purity, despite established
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immigrant communities in most countries that are there to stay and whose inte-
gration as productive members of society is undermined by this hostility from
above. There is tragic irony in the anti-refugee policies of some leaders, such as
Hungary’s Orbán: Europe welcomed Hungarian refugees from Soviet repression
but today Orbán’s government does everything it can to make life miserable for
the latest people fleeing war and persecution.  
No government is obliged to admit everyone who comes knocking at its nation’s
doors. But international law limits what can be done to control migration. People
seeking asylum must be given a fair hearing and, if their claims are found valid,
a refuge. No one should be returned to war, persecution, or torture. With narrow
exceptions, immigrants who have spent many years in a country or developed
family ties should be given a route to legal status. Detention should not be arbi-
trary, and deportation procedures must afford due process.  
With those caveats, governments can bar and send home economic migrants.  
Yet contrary to the appeals of the populists, immigrant communities living law-
fully in a country should have their rights fully respected. No one should face
discrimination in housing, education, or employment. Everyone, regardless of
legal status, is entitled to protection by the police and fairness within the justice
system. 
Governments should invest to help immigrants to integrate and fully participate
in society. Public officials in particular have a duty to reject the hatred and intol-
erance of populists and affirm their faith in independent and impartial courts
tasked with upholding rights. Those are the best ways to ensure that, even as na-
tions become more diverse, they maintain the democratic traditions that histori-
cally have proved the best route to prosperity.
Particularly in Europe, some politicians justify hostility toward immigrants—es-
pecially Muslims—by suggesting that these communities want to replicate the
suppression of women or gays and lesbians in certain of their home countries.
But the proper response to these repressive practices is to reject them—they are
the reason many immigrants have fled—and to ensure that all members of soci-
ety respect the rights of all others. The answer is not to reject the rights of one
segment of the population—in the current climate, typically Muslims—in the
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name of protecting the rights of others. Such selectivity in the application of
rights undermines the universality of rights that is their essence.  
Rising Authoritarianism in Turkey and Egypt
Erdoğan’s increasingly dictatorial rule in Turkey illustrates the dangers of a
leader trampling on rights in the name of the majority. For several years, he has
shown diminishing tolerance for those who would challenge his plans, whether
to build over a park in central Istanbul or to amend the constitution to permit an
executive presidency. 
In the past year, Erdoğan and his Justice and Development Party used a coup at-
tempt and its hundreds of victims as an opening to crack down not only on the
plotters he alleged had been associated with the exiled cleric Fethullah Gülen
but also on tens of thousands of others deemed to be his followers. A declared
state of emergency became an opportunity to turn on other perceived critics as
well, closing down much of the independent media and civil society groups. In
addition, in the name of pursuing the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, or PKK, the gov-
ernment jailed the leaders and parliamentarians of the main pro-Kurdish party in
Parliament and removed its local mayors. 
There was broad cross-party support for Erdoğan’s government in the wake of
the coup, given the collective sigh of relief that many in Turkey felt after the at-
tempt failed. But with the precedent of repression established, and the inde-
pendence of the courts and other institutions of law decimated, there was
nothing to stand in the way of Erdoğan’s widening crackdown. A firm and timely
response from Western leaders might have been expected, but other interests,
whether curtailing the flow of refugees to Europe or fighting the self-described
Islamic State, or ISIS, often stood in the way.  
Egypt under the Sisi government underwent a similar evolution. Unhappy with
the brief rule of the Muslim Brotherhood under President Mohamed Morsy, many
Egyptians welcomed the military coup that Sisi led in 2013. But he has pro-
ceeded to rule far more repressively than even the long dictatorship of President
Hosni Mubarak that was overthrown during the Arab Spring. For example, Sisi
oversaw the killing of at least 817 Muslim Brotherhood protesters in a single day
in August 2013—one of the largest massacres of protesters in modern times. 
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Many Egyptians assumed that only Islamists would be targeted, but Sisi has
overseen the radical closing of political space, with human rights groups, inde-
pendent media, and opposition political parties all shut, and tens of thousands
of prisoners held, often after torture and with little if any judicial process.
The Shallow Appeal of the Strongman
The rising tide of populism in the name of a perceived majority has paralleled a
new infatuation with strongman rule that was apparent particularly prominently
during the US presidential election campaign. If all that matters are the declared
interests of the majority, the thinking seems to go, why not embrace the autocrat
who shows no qualms about asserting his “majoritarian” vision—self-serving as
it may be—and subjugating those who disagree.  
But the populist-fueled passions of the moment tend to obscure the longer-term
dangers to a society of strongman rule. Putin, for instance, has presided over a
weakening Russian economy plagued by massive crony corruption and a failure
to diversify when oil prices were high, leaving it vulnerable to the decline that
followed. Fearful that popular discontent of the sort seen on the streets of
Moscow and several other large cities beginning in 2011 might revive and
spread, Putin has sought to preempt it, introducing draconian restrictions on as-
sembly and expression, setting out new, unprecedented sanctions for online dis-
sent, and crippling civil society groups.  
The Kremlin bolstered Putin’s autocracy and boosted his dwindling approval rat-
ings by mobilizing public nationalism in support of Russia’s occupation of
Crimea, which triggered European Union sanctions and only deepened economic
decline. In Syria, his military backing of Assad’s slaughter of civilians, with Russ-
ian bombers joining in, made the lifting of those sanctions, as a political matter,
all the more remote. Until now, the Kremlin’s skilled propagandists have tried to
justify increasing economic hardship by claiming the need to counter alleged ef-
forts by the West to weaken Russia. However, as the economy deteriorates fur-
ther, it gets harder for Russian apologists to sell that message to the Russian
public.
China’s President Xi has embarked on a similar path of repression. China en-
joyed remarkable economic growth as earlier leaders freed the Chinese people
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economically from the whims of Communist Party rule that had brought the dis-
astrous Great Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution. But economic liberalization
was not accompanied by political reform, which was left stillborn in the crushing
of the 1989 Tiananmen Square democracy movement. Ensuing governments
made economic decisions guided mostly by the party’s desire to sustain growth
at any cost in order to keep popular discontent under wraps. Corruption flour-
ished while social inequity soared and the environment deteriorated. 
Worried as well that popular discontent would rise as economic growth slowed,
Xi, too, has embarked on the most intense crackdown since the Tiananmen era,
leaving his government even less accountable. Despite anointing himself with a
lengthening list of leadership titles, this strongman looks increasingly fearful,
while not delivering on the Chinese people’s demands for cleaner air, safer food,
a just judicial system, and an accountable government. 
Similar tendencies have characterized other autocrats’ rule. The Bolivarian revo-
lution in Venezuela, initiated by the late President Hugo Chávez and now stew-
arded by his successor, Nicolás Maduro, has become an economic disaster for
the worst-off segments of society whom it ostensibly serves. Their reward has
been hyperinflation, severe food and medicine shortages, and a nation with the
largest proven oil reserves on the planet reduced to penury. The government has
also launched military and police raids in immigrant and low-income communi-
ties that led to widespread allegations of abuse, including extrajudicial execu-
tions, arbitrary deportations, evictions, and destruction of homes. 
Meanwhile, President Maduro, who controls the judiciary, deployed the intelli-
gence services to arbitrarily detain and prosecute opposition politicians and or-
dinary critics, undermined the ability of the opposition majority in the National
Assembly to legislate, and used his allies at the electoral authority to obstruct a
recall referendum.  
Indeed, there is a long history of autocrats delivering results for themselves but
not their people. Even supposed models of authoritarian development like
Ethiopia and Rwanda are plagued upon closer examination by government-im-
posed suffering. The Ethiopian government forced rural farmers and pastoralists
into service-deprived villages to make room for agricultural megaprojects. The
Rwandan government rounded up street vendors and beggars and beat them in
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filthy detention centers in the name of clean streets. Central Asia is filled with
strongmen whose countries have stagnated under enduring Soviet-style rule.
Even relatively vibrant countries in Southeast Asia now see their economic
progress put at risk by the stultifying rule of the Thai military junta and the cor-
ruption-heavy government of Malaysian Prime Minister Najib Razak.
Civic Groups and the International Criminal Court Under Attack
In Africa, some of the most alarming attacks on human rights protections stem
from strongmen who, refusing to transfer power peacefully, curb criticism
through violence and legislation. A disconcerting number of African leaders have
removed or extended term limits—the so-called constitutional coup—while oth-
ers have launched violent crackdowns to suppress opposition and public
protests over flawed or unfair elections. Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo of
Equatorial Guinea, Yoweri Museveni of Uganda, and Robert Mugabe of Zim-
babwe—each in power for more than 30 years—have amended their nations’
constitutions to remain in office.  
In recent years, the wave of presidents seeking additional terms sometimes suc-
ceeded through suppression of any opposition, as in Rwanda, or through violent
repression of protests, as in Burundi and the Democratic Republic of Congo.
Many of these governments used similar tools to restrict civil society groups and
independent media, cut access to social media and the internet, and shut down
political opposition. The attacks on civic groups have targeted foremost their
funding—Ethiopia was a leader in this tactic—as governments that actively so-
licit foreign aid, trade, and investment suddenly balk at civic groups seeking
contributions from abroad.  
This backdrop of strongmen refusing to relinquish power occasionally intersects
with concern over potential prosecution for crimes committed while in office. Bu-
rundian President Pierre Nkurunziza was the first to announce plans to withdraw
from the International Criminal Court (ICC), because violent repression under his
rule had made him a prime target for prosecution. He was soon joined by Gam-
bia’s President Yahya Jammeh, a notoriously brutal dictator, although a short
time later he was voted out of power, and his elected successor, Adama Barrow,
said he would reverse Jammeh’s decision to leave the court. South Africa had
long been an African leader on human rights and justice, but President Jacob
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Zuma started the process to withdraw from the ICC as he was being hounded by
corruption allegations and an embarrassing domestic legal challenge to his deci-
sion to flout a court order by letting Sudan’s President Omar al-Bashir flee the
country rather than answer ICC charges for genocide and crimes against human-
ity. Meanwhile, Kenya’s President Uhuru Kenyatta, whose ICC charges were
dropped amid pressure on witnesses and government obstruction of the prose-
cution’s investigation, fueled attacks on the ICC by the African Union.  
That these few African leaders do not speak for all Africans was reinforced by
civic groups across the continent that reaffirmed their support for the ICC. They
were backed by such states as Nigeria, Tanzania, Senegal, and Ghana. These
Africans saw through the fallacious claim that the ICC, led by an African chief
prosecutor who is fighting to end the impunity that has caused so many African
people to suffer atrocities without recourse, is somehow anti-African. 
The ICC, which through 2015 had focused its investigations on only African vic-
tims, is challenged by the failure of powerful states, including the United States,
China, and Russia, to have joined the court. As of November 2016, it had yet to
open formal investigations in several important non-African situations that it
had under preliminary examination, such as those implicating US officials for
unprosecuted torture in Afghanistan or Israeli officials for their policy of illegally
transferring Israelis to settlements in the occupied West Bank.  
If the opponents of the court really want equitable justice, they should lead ef-
forts to encourage completion of these investigations, or to press Russia and
China to stop using their veto at the UN Security Council to block ICC jurisdiction
over the atrocities being committed in Syria. Their silence on this broader quest
for justice reveals their main concern—undermining prospects for justice at
home. That several African nations want to substitute an African court that would
exempt sitting presidents and other senior officials speaks volumes.  
The attacks on the ICC were not only in Africa, but they had in common an inter-
est in impunity. Russia had never joined the court but deactivated its signature—
a move of symbolic, not practical significance—after the ICC prosecutor opened
an investigation into crimes allegedly committed during the 2008 Georgia-Rus-
sia conflict and placed the situation in Ukraine under examination. Philippines
President Duterte dismissed the ICC as “useless” after its prosecutor warned
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that Duterte’s encouragement of summary executions could fall under her juris-
diction. 
The ICC, with its mandate to deliver justice for the world’s worst crimes when na-
tional courts fail, will inevitably rub up against powerful political interests op-
posed to accountability. It needs countervailing political and practical
assistance from supporters to succeed. 
Attacks on Civilians in Syria
Syria represents perhaps the deadliest threat to rights standards. There is no
more fundamental wartime rule than the prohibition against attacking civilians.
Yet Assad’s military strategy has been to fire deliberately and indiscriminately at
civilians who live in areas of the country held by the armed opposition, as well as
civilian structures there, such as hospitals. 
With devastating aerial bombing including “barrel bombs,” cluster munitions,
artillery barrages, and occasional chemical weapons, Assad has laid waste to
vast stretches of Syria’s cities, with the aim of depopulating them to make it
harder for opposition forces to operate there. That strategy has been supple-
mented by deadly sieges designed to starve the civilian population into surren-
der. 
Since September 2015, despite these blatant war crimes, Assad has been joined
by Russian forces that have substantially reinforced his firepower but have not
altered his strategy. Indeed, the strategy looks remarkably similar to the one
used by the Kremlin to devastate Chechnya’s capital, Grozny, in 1999 and 2000,
in an effort to crush an armed rebellion there.  
These war-crime attacks on civilians, committed with little global effort to bring
the authors to justice, are the primary reason why so many Syrians have been
displaced. Half the population has been forced from its home, and some 4.8 mil-
lion have fled for neighboring countries, mostly Lebanon, Turkey, and Jordan,
with some 1 million moving on to Europe. Yet when it comes to Syria, the West re-
mains focused primarily on ISIS. ISIS is responsible for unspeakable atrocities,
and it represents a threat well beyond its haven in Syria and Iraq, but its civilian
toll in Syria is vastly exceeded by Assad’s. Local sources estimate that Assad’s
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forces and his allies are responsible for some 90 percent of Syrian civilian
deaths.  
Because Assad’s political survival today depends on Russia’s military support,
Putin has enormous potential leverage over his conduct. But there is no evi-
dence that the Kremlin has used that leverage to stop the slaughter of civilians.
On the contrary, Russian bombers have regularly joined in, as in the tragic case
of Aleppo.  
Yet the Obama administration in particular has been disappointingly reluctant to
press Russia to use that leverage, focusing instead on Russia as a partner in
peace talks—even though the negotiations have dragged on endlessly with little
to show for the effort, while the attacks on civilians make the prospect of Syrian
opposition forces coming to terms with the government even more remote. 
Judging by his campaign rhetoric, President-elect Trump seems determined to in-
crease this US focus on ISIS, and is even proposing to join with Putin and Assad
in that effort, evidently ignoring how little of their energy has been directed to
ISIS and the role their atrocities play as a driver of ISIS recruitment. Even if ISIS is
ultimately defeated militarily, these atrocities could easily breed new extremist
groups, just as similar atrocities helped to fuel the emergence of ISIS from the
ashes of Al-Qaeda in Iraq.  
The Need to Reaffirm Human Rights Values
What is needed in the face of this global assault on human rights is a vigorous
reaffirmation and defense of the basic values underpinning these rights. 
There are important roles for many to play. Civil society organizations, particu-
larly groups that fight to uphold rights, need to protect civic space where it is
threatened, build alliances across communities to show the common interest in
human rights, and bridge North-South divides to join forces against autocrats
who are clearly learning from each other. 
Media outlets should help to highlight the dangerous trends underway, temper-
ing their coverage of today’s statements and conduct with analysis of the longer-
term ramifications. They should also make a special effort to expose and rebut
the propaganda and “fake news” that certain partisans generate. 
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Governments ostensibly committed to human rights must more regularly defend
basic principles. That includes democracies in Latin America, Africa, and Asia
that now regularly vote positively on country initiatives at the UN led by others
but rarely take the lead, whether at the UN or in their direct relations with other
countries.   
Ultimately, responsibility lies with the public. The demagogues traffic in casu-
istry, building popular support by spinning false explanations and cheap solu-
tions to genuine ills. The best antidote is for the public to demand a politics
based on truth and the values on which rights-respecting democracy has been
built. Populists thrive in a vacuum of opposition. A strong popular reaction,
using every means available—civic groups, political parties, traditional and so-
cial media—is the best defense of the values that so many still cherish despite
the problems they face.  
Lies do not become truth just because propagated by an army of internet trolls or
a legion of partisans. Echo chambers of falsehoods are not inevitable. Facts re-
main powerful, which is why autocrats go to such lengths to censor those who
report inconvenient truths, especially about human rights abuse.
Values are fragile. Because the values of human rights depend foremost on the
ability to empathize with others—to recognize the importance of treating others
the way we would want to be treated—they are especially vulnerable to the dem-
agogue’s exclusionary appeal. A society’s culture of respect for human rights
needs regular tending, lest the fears of the moment sweep away the wisdom that
built democratic rule.  
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When Exposing Abusers Is Not Enough
Strategies to Confront the Shameless
By Akshaya Kumar, Deputy United Nations Director
“I don't care about human rights," Rodrigo Duterte boasted in August 2016,
shortly after becoming president of the Philippines. In just a few months since
coming to power, Duterte’s self-proclaimed anti-drug campaign has resulted in
police and “unidentified gunmen” killing thousands of Filipinos, without any
semblance of due process. Promising medals to those who join his effort,
Duterte has compared himself to Hitler and declared that he would be “happy to
slaughter” the more than 3 million Filipinos he describes as “drug addicts.” 
This kind of braggadocio makes it difficult to try to change Duterte’s actions by
simply showing how his tactics violate basic human rights. In this he is not
alone. Groups like the Islamic State (ISIS), autocrats like Syria’s Bashar al-Assad,
and populists vying for political influence in Europe and the United States are
distinguishable from one another in many important ways, but they all share a
common feature with Duterte: a public embrace of policies that flout interna-
tional human rights law.
“Naming and shaming,” an important tool for human rights advocacy, works
best if advocates can raise the reputational costs of problematic behavior by dis-
closing that their targets are breaking the rules or highlighting the devastating
impact of their actions. But increasingly it seems that some actors are almost
completely immune to this kind of pressure. The “shameless” do not seek to
hide their abuses or the policies that underpin them, but instead flaunt them as
electoral or recruitment tools. 
This essay outlines strategies to challenge those actors by shifting the focus
from them onto their networks of financial enablers and, for those implicated in
violations in armed conflicts or security operations, their arms suppliers. By un-
derscoring their enablers’ complicity in abuses and seeking to impose punitive
measures on these enablers directly, human rights advocates have a chance to
affect the calculations of the shameless too. Some of those financing or arming
abusers may be more vulnerable to being exposed publicly than their clients. 
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But since enabling alone can amount to a serious international crime or human
rights abuse, advocates should also make clear that coercive tools like sanc-
tions and punitive measures like prosecutions apply directly to enablers as well. 
The Special Court for Sierra Leone, for example, convicted Liberian president
Charles Taylor in 2012 for aiding and abetting the war crimes of a brutal rebel
group in neighboring Sierra Leone. The court pointed to Taylor’s role in providing
arms and assistance to the abusive Revolutionary United Front (RUF) and his par-
ticipation in the blood diamond trade, which helped to fund the RUF during
Sierra Leone’s armed conflict. More recently, US government lawyers weighing
the risks of assisting the Saudi-led coalition in its aerial bombardment of Yemen,
are reported to have considered the legal precedent set by the Taylor decision
when evaluating their own role as enablers.  
Of course, like all advocacy strategies, these tactics need to be calibrated to ad-
dress the scale and nature of abuses being perpetrated and the degree to which
enablers are complicit. There is no one-size-fits-all approach. But focusing on
the networks of the complicit, instead of just frontline abusers or their com-
manders, offers an important vehicle to protect and promote rights. 
“Naming and Shaming”
Human rights advocates are adept at leveraging shame to press for change.
Once exposed, governments or corporations can become so ashamed to be in
the spotlight they quickly switch tactics to avoid further criticism. 
For example, within days of an October 2016 report on his government’s role in
the rape and sexual exploitation of women and girls displaced by Boko Haram,
Nigeria’s President Muhammadu Buhari ordered a special investigation into the
allegations. Similarly, the Central African Republic government’s June 2016 deci-
sion to suspend the director of an abusive police unit came after researchers
documented his role in at least 18 unlawful executions.
Sometimes condemnation or abusers’ fears of prosecution secure rights advo-
cates a seat at the table to define how policy makers should remedy the situa-
tion. Extensive research on the use of child labor in mining, for example, has
given advocates an opportunity to shape the due diligence guidance promul-
gated by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development for re-
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sponsible investment. In Japan, research on the harassment and bullying of
youth based on their sexual orientation and gender identity laid the foundation
for a push to revise the country’s national curriculum to be more inclusive of the
needs and perspectives of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender students.
Counterintuitively, the energy that some abusive governments devote to silenc-
ing critics, even as they continue to commit abuses, also reveals that naming
and shaming has power. 
Bahraini human rights defender Nabeel Rajab, for example, faces up to 15 years
in prison for his tweets about alleged torture in Jau prison and airstrikes by the
Saudi-led coalition, of which Bahrain is part, in Yemen. And in June 2016, days
after the United Nations added the Saudi-led coalition to its “list of shame” for
attacking schools, and hospitals, and killing and maiming children in Yemen,
Saudi Arabia and its Arab allies launched an unprecedented diplomatic cam-
paign to get off the roster, including by threatening to stop funding key humani-
tarian programs. While UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon made this blackmail
public, leaving the Saudi-led coalition with a diplomatic black eye, the campaign
worked. Powerful abusers can often evade criticism, even when it is based on
well-documented patterns of abuse. 
More worrying is the fact that some abusers attempt to draw power from public
attention to their abuses. When ISIS broadcasts its executions, it covers the
faces of its fighters, but not their acts. This is not accidental. ISIS seems to have
designed its fighters’ rape of Yezidi women in Iraq and the brutality of its rule in
Libya in part as a magnet for recruits. A recent UN report on ISIS concluded: “By
publicizing its brutality, the so-called ISIS seeks to convey its authority over its
areas of control, to show its strength to attract recruits and to threaten any […]
that challenge its ideology.” 
There are many other less egregious cases where the same principle applies.
Australia’s offshore detention processing centers for asylum seekers seem to be
designed to be so inhumane that they dissuade others from seeking refuge on
its shores.  
In Hungary, Prime Minister Viktor Orbán is not shy of publicly advancing policies
that violate basic norms. He emphasizes, “European identity is rooted in Christi-
anity” and points to the so-called “right to decide that we do not want a large
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number of Muslim people.” Orbán’s government erected razor-wire fences and
prosecuted asylum seekers who bypassed them. It purposely stoked anti-
refugee sentiment by spending millions of taxpayers’ money on a smear cam-
paign to bolster a referendum to reject a binding EU duty to relocate asylum
seekers to Hungary from overstretched Greece and Italy. These policies may ap-
pear to be aimed at keeping asylum seekers and migrants away but they also
mobilize popular support for the government. 
During his campaign for the US presidency, Donald Trump openly urged policies
that would amount to war crimes under international humanitarian law. For ex-
ample, he repeatedly lauded the benefits of waterboarding and “worse,” dis-
missing those who disapprove of using such techniques as “too politically
correct.” When reminded that torture is illegal, Trump promised that he would
work to change the law. Governing, of course, is different than campaigning. Fol-
lowing his election, Trump told “60 Minutes” and the New York Times that torture
“is not going to make the kind of a difference that a lot of people are thinking.” 
Rhetoric like this is hugely problematic. Trump’s focus on whether the tactic is
effective misses the point. International law makes it clear that that no national
emergency, however dire, ever justifies torture. Further, Trump’s choice of retired
Lt. Gen. Michael Flynn as his National Security Advisor demonstrates a disturb-
ing disregard for human rights principles and the laws of war since, even when
asked directly, Flynn did not repudiate proposals such as waterboarding that
would constitute torture. 
For many populist politicians, publicity of their tactics or condemnation as being
abusive is not seen as something to avoid. Instead, it is viewed as an effective
deterrence strategy and an electoral argument. These governments justify harsh
policies that violate rights as necessary to counterterrorism or stem migration
and dismiss rights groups’ criticism by pointing to the broad-based popular sup-
port of their citizens. Indeed, leaders need followers and any comprehensive
strategy to address the enablers of shameless leaders should consider how and
why these messages resonate with voters, recruits and supporters. 
Similarly, it is also worth considering the role of allied governments in offering
shameless abusers political cover and protection from scrutiny at inter-govern-
mental bodies, like the UN. Russia, for example, has used its power as a perma-
nent member of the UN Security Council to cast five vetoes to shield the Assad
government’s crimes in Syria. 
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Confronting Enablers
Naming and shaming has limits when dealing with the shameless. But that does
not mean that these actors are untouchable or unmovable. While condemnation
in the press or public may not restrain them or change their calculations, these
actors do not operate in a vacuum. In regions with effective regional human
rights courts like the European Court of Human Rights, litigation can offer an im-
portant vehicle for redress. But in many other regions, to effectively confront the
shameless, advocates must look beyond shining a spotlight on what abusers are
doing wrong. Human rights groups need to shift some of their focus onto those
who are enabling these shameless actors to continue that wrongdoing. 
A dynamic whole-systems approach, which confronts enablers, is not uncharted
territory. In 1997, advocates seeking to end the abuses of Joseph Kony’s Lord’s
Resistance Army (LRA), an armed group founded in northern Uganda that also
reveled in its own brutality, appealed to the government of neighboring Sudan to
end its support for the group. In 2003, researchers connected the weapons
being used in unlawful attacks by Liberians United for Reconciliation and
Democracy (LURD) to neighboring Guinea. Pointing to these ties, which flouted a
UN arms embargo on Liberia, Human Rights Watch called for a suspension of US
military assistance to Guinea. 
Efforts to challenge the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam’s (LTTE) use of child sol-
diers did not stop at Sri Lanka’s borders. In 2006, Human Rights Watch exam-
ined coercive practices the LTTE used to extract money from the Tamil diaspora in
Canada. While urging the Canadian government to take steps to end that intimi-
dation and extortion, the report also recommended that the diaspora itself seek
to ensure that funds provided for humanitarian causes not be used to benefit the
LTTE while it committed serious abuses. 
This research strategy involved showing both that the tactics being used to ex-
tract money in Canada were abusive and that the funds themselves helped to
further abuses back in Sri Lanka. The Canadian government and others subse-
quently prohibited LTTE fundraising on their soil. Almost a decade later, a Court
of Appeals in The Hague found that five people who had raised millions of euros
for the LTTE were part of a criminal organization with the intent of committing war
crimes, including recruiting child soldiers. In this case, the enablers were not
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just exposed, they were also convicted for their role as a part of the broader
“criminal organization.” 
Research in 2013 on abuses by armed groups in their offensive to take parts of
Latakia province in Syria—dubbed “Operation to Liberate the Coast”—took this
approach a step further. Researchers used social media postings to identify indi-
viduals who actively raised funds to support the operation. Unlike previous work
on the LTTE, this research did not unearth any evidence of coercion or abusive
tactics to extract money. Unlike the situation involving the LURD, there is no
arms embargo on Syria. Nonetheless, by pointing to the abuses being conducted
by groups financed by those donations, Human Rights Watch suggested restrict-
ing or blocking money transfers from Gulf residents to groups responsible for the
operation. Noting that funders were potentially liable for the group’s abuses if
they continued to provide money after the operation’s abusive tactics became
public, this advocacy strategy emphasized that enablers were at risk of complic-
ity. 
Financiers of Abuses
Drawing on research into ISIS crimes in Libya, Human Rights Watch has called on
the UN Security Council to impose sanctions, not just on ISIS and its members
but also “those who intentionally finance or otherwise assist abuses.” This rec-
ommendation is grounded in the idea that sanctions on those knowingly financ-
ing abuses might stop them from continuing to enable these atrocities. 
Of course, even before human rights groups made this recommendation, global
efforts to curb the spread of ISIS were already seeking to choke its financial net-
works. Similar tactics have been used to respond to North Korea and Iran’s nu-
clear programs. 
Some of these inter-government initiatives are motivated by policy considera-
tions that go far beyond the scope of human rights organizations work and man-
dates. Others straddle both arenas. The UN Security Council’s many sanctions
committee panels of experts have long held mandates that included a duty to re-
search and identify those responsible for human rights abuses and war crimes,
and to investigate arms sales, the illegal exploitation of natural resources and fi-
nances. 
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Human rights research typically does not extend to doing the painstaking finan-
cial forensic analysis required to identify those financiers and enablers. Ventur-
ing into this area will require harnessing the research expertise of accountants,
arms experts, and others who specialize in mapping these networks, and learn-
ing from effective techniques that others are using to target networks that sup-
port shameless perpetrators. For example, The Sentry, a new initiative led by
George Clooney and John Prendergast seeking to explore this space, follows the
money and then makes policy recommendations that seek to alter the incentive
structures that let enablers benefit financially and politically from abusive con-
flict and mass atrocities in east Africa. 
But even if human rights groups can successfully harness this expertise, there is
no guarantee of success. For example, the 2015-2016 ISIS attacks in France cost
relatively little, just tens of thousands of euros. The Bastille Day attack on Nice
cost Mohamed Lahouaiej-Bouhlel no more than €2,700. Still, in some cases,
adopting a wider lens could provide important leverage for those seeking to
change the behavior of shameless abusers.
One example of the potential opened by adopting this wider lens is recent work
applying the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights
to violations of international law in the West Bank. In its January 2016 report,
Human Rights Watch concluded that it is impossible to do business in Israeli set-
tlement communities without contributing to injustice and discrimination
against Palestinians. Rights campaigners have long engaged with companies to
ask them to voluntarily stop their activities in settlements and screen their sup-
ply chains for settlement-related activities. Based on a business and human
rights analysis, Human Rights Watch was able to join them in arguing, for exam-
ple, that by advertising, selling, and renting homes in settlements, the Israeli
franchise of the real estate company RE/MAX contravenes best practices for cor-
porate social responsibility and its responsibilities to uphold human rights.
One lesson from this kind of work is the importance of piercing the veil of plausi-
ble deniability. Human rights groups have an important role to play here by in-
forming corporations of their possible complicity in distant abuses and war
crimes. 
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In June 2015, the Swiss government prosecutor declined to move forward with a
case brought by TRIAL International, an NGO that fights against impunity for in-
ternational crimes, against a Swiss gold refiner for its role in processing conflict-
affected gold from the Democratic Republic of Congo. Charges that the refiner
had unlawfully abetted a pillaging Congolese armed group were dropped be-
cause the prosecution did not find evidence that the refinery knew enough
about abuses happening at the gold’s real point of origin. If evidence had been
available that the refiner was notified about abuses and proceeded with busi-
ness anyway, this kind of a defense, based on ignorance of complicity, would not
have been valid. 
The use of tools of coercion like targeted sanctions or asset freezes inevitably
raises questions about unintended consequences, possible violations of due
process, and mistaken identity. These risks are heightened because enforce-
ment actions frequently occur without any kind of legal proceeding. There are
also legitimate concerns about the proportionality of these measures, particu-
larly considering the impact that these sanctions can have on family members
and business partners of sanctioned individuals and entities.  
Some sanctions mechanisms, like the ones established by the UN Security Coun-
cil to combat terrorism, now include a means to appeal these measures, but the
appeals process remains deeply flawed. Outside the counterterrorism realm,
other sanctions regimes enforced by the UN Security Council do not even have
those limited safeguards. 
Additionally, fear of penalties for violating sanctions restrictions can lead inter-
national businesses to aggressive de-risking, where they simply stop doing busi-
ness in “high risk” jurisdictions. This can unintentionally marginalize
communities by limiting their access to financial services, preventing them from
accessing critical remittances and atrophying their economic development.
Oxfam has campaigned against the US government’s restrictions, for example,
on informal money transfers to Somalia, pointing to the impact it had on Somalis
access to the remittances they rely on to meet their basic needs. 
There is a human rights case for caution, but also one for thoughtful sanctions
enforcement against enablers who aid and abet or are knowingly complicit in
abuses. These measures can play a powerful role in influencing behavior and
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should always be reversible, giving enablers who focus on their bottom line a
reason to stop supporting abusers. Finding ways to effectively freeze assets of
enablers while not giving short shrift to due process and other fundamental
rights is a challenge. However, it is one that human rights advocates should see
as part of their work. 
Arms Suppliers 
Financial backers play a role in enabling the shameless, but for those conduct-
ing abusive military campaigns in Syria, South Sudan, or Yemen, arms suppliers
remain among their most important enablers. 
Although not impossible, it is much more difficult to continue to commit abuses
on a large scale without the influx of new weapons and ammunition, either from
abroad or through domestic production. Many human rights groups’ mandates
do not extend to stopping wars, which conflicts with a policy of neutrality in all
armed conflicts. Instead, advocates push for hostilities, when they occur, to be
conducted according to international humanitarian law. 
Nonetheless, in places like Syria, rights advocates have argued the UN Security
Council to impose arms embargoes to stop further sales and transfers of
weapons to known abusers and war criminals. In 2016, following years of advo-
cacy at the UN by arms control, humanitarian, and human rights groups, the Se-
curity Council considered a resolution that would have imposed an arms
embargo and limit future weapons transfers to South Sudan. In the US, rights ad-
vocates campaigned against a US$1.2 billion arms sale to Saudi Arabia pushing
the US Congress to debate and vote on the issue in September 2016. In the
United Kingdom, the Campaign Against Arms Trade brought a lawsuit challeng-
ing the export licensing of weapons sales to Saudi Arabia in light of abuses
being committed by the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen. 
In November 2016, Turkey decided to gradually stop sales and production of fer-
tilizer, despite its many legitimate uses in agriculture, due to concerns about ter-
rorism. The decision came after brisk cross-border fertilizer sales from Turkey to
Syria triggered speculation that ISIS was using the fertilizer to build explosives. 
In places where police or law enforcement are responsible for widespread
abuses, like the Philippines, Burundi, or Egypt, rights groups have worried that
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bilateral donor assistance, especially to the security sector, could be contribut-
ing to abuses. In March 2015, in the wake of heavy criticism from human rights
groups for resuming weapons sales to the Sisi government in Egypt, the US de-
cided to wind down its longstanding policy of allowing the Egyptians to buy US
equipment on credit starting in FY2018. 
In June 2016, the UN peacekeeping mission in the Central African Republic de-
cided to stop accepting Burundian police due to concerns about “serious and
ongoing” human rights violations by police back in Burundi. The Burundian gov-
ernment, like many developing countries, benefits from the salaries paid to their
troops and participating in UN missions. In November 2016, the US State Depart-
ment suspended a planned sale of 26,000 assault rifles to Duterte’s Philippines
following an objection raised by US Senator Ben Cardin about Duterte’s abusive
“war on drugs.” 
Since 2012, human rights groups have pointed to the role of Russia’s state-
owned arms dealer, Rosoboronexport, in selling the Syrian government weapons
and urged responsible governments and corporate actors to avoid all new busi-
ness dealings with the company. Campaigners have also asked arms fairs in
Paris and London to stop featuring Rosoboronexport as an exhibitor. 
Human rights groups have also directly challenged UK-based BAE Systems and
the US-based Boeing and General Dynamics for their role in supplying Saudi Ara-
bia with weapons that enable abuses in Yemen. BAE is currently engaged in dis-
cussions around a possible five-year contract to supply Saudi Arabia with
Eurofighter Typhoon combat aircraft. The recent arms sale to Saudi Arabia ap-
proved by the US Congress included Abrams tanks produced by General Dynam-
ics to replace tanks that had been damaged as a part of combat operations in
Yemen. 
In August 2016, Textron, the last company manufacturing cluster munitions in
the United States, decided to end its involvement in that business. Shame cre-
ated by the international ban on these weapons did not achieve this victory
alone. Mounting concerns over civilian casualties from the use of the weapons
by the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen were instrumental. The company’s own ex-
planation of its decision to stop producing cluster munitions came on the heels
of the US government’s May suspension of cluster munitions sales to Saudi Ara-
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bia and made clear that it had become “difficult to obtain approvals” needed for
its sales to foreign customers.
But those more conventional tools are not the only paths to halt the flow of
weapons into places where they may be used to commit further abuses. In 2012,
the UK invoked EU sanctions to stop the delivery of repaired attack helicopters to
the Syrian government by calling on the ship’s British insurer, Standard Club, to
revoke its coverage of the vessel. Although an insurance company is not the first
entity that comes to mind when thinking about the arms trade, by looking be-
yond the usual suspects, the UK was able to turn the ship around before it could
deliver its cargo. Pushing the insurance company to stop its coverage of the ship
due to its cargo’s problematic destination required treating them as a complicit
enabler. 
More recently, in October 2016, NATO’s secretary general warned Spain against
allowing Russian warships headed for Syria to refuel in its ports. By cautioning
that the ships could “be used as a platform for more attacks against Aleppo and
Syria, and thereby exacerbating the humanitarian catastrophe,” NATO raised the
reputational stakes for the Spanish government. Although Spain did not formally
rescind the permission to dock, the Spanish chose to request a clarification from
Russia about the nature of their mission in light of ongoing abuses in Syria.
Shortly after, Malta made clear that it was unwilling to let Russian ships stop and
refuel in their ports either.
Focusing on the Complicit
One of the more frustrating moments human rights advocates face is when per-
petrators issue denials. The Sudanese minister who refuses to believe that his
government’s troops could use chemical weapons or rape hundreds of Darfuri
women, or the Chinese Communist Party official who called the Tiananmen
Square massacre in 1989 “much ado about nothing” are paradigmatic exam-
ples. 
Blanket denials of months or even years of painstaking research are an everyday
hazard of human rights work. But the shameless do not even bother with denials
of this kind. They revel in being criticized. For human rights advocates and those
who fight to civilize the conduct of war, these shameless actors pose an undeni-
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able threat. Responding will require expanding the frontiers for human rights ad-
vocacy. 
Human rights research typically focuses on those who have blood on their hands
or should have used their power and authority to prevent injustice. But in situa-
tions where exposing abuses alone is not enough to effect change, advocates
need to consistently adopt a wider lens and devote more energy to better under-
standing the expansive networks of financial backers and arms suppliers who
enable abusers to continue their wrongdoing. That kind of analysis may require
more specialized expertise that falls outside of human rights documentation.
But it is worth the investment.
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Overreach
How New Global Counterterrorism Measures 
Jeopardize Rights
By Letta Tayler, 
Senior Researcher, Terrorism and Counterterrorism
News from the terrorism and counterterrorism fronts has been grim of late. Ex-
tremists—with or without the support of armed groups—have staged a horrific
run of attacks on the general population. From a stadium in Paris to a café in
Dhaka, from a hotel in Bamako to a beach in Côte d’Ivoire, from a government of-
fice party in California to a gay nightclub in Florida, and from airports in Brussels
and Istanbul to a park in Lahore, suicide bombers and gunmen have killed hun-
dreds of people and injured thousands more since late 2015. On the beachfront
in Nice, one man ran down 85 Bastille Day celebrants with a cargo truck. 
While the group Islamic State (also known as ISIS) was seemingly in retreat from
Middle Eastern battlefields at time of writing, thousands of its foreign members
have begun returning to their homes around the world, including both the disil-
lusioned and those perhaps intent on carrying out attacks on their native soil.
Additional ISIS members may have never left home to begin with. Other armed
groups continue deadly strikes on civilians, including Al-Shabab in Somalia, and
Al-Qaeda offshoots such as Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. So-called lone
wolves, sympathizers who do not have the direct backing of extremist armed
groups, remain a potent threat.
In response to these immense challenges, dozens of governments are adopting
an array of counterterrorism laws and measures that are separate from any
planned or potential military operations. States have a responsibility to protect
their populations from harm, but many of these recent national laws and meas-
ures are dangerously overbroad, vague, or intrusive. Rather than providing
greater security, they risk violating basic rights, incarcerating the wrong people,
and alienating minority populations that could play a positive role in helping to
curtail terrorist attacks.
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Two major developments are especially pertinent today: the proliferation of
counterterrorism laws, many aimed at so-called Foreign Terrorist Fighters
(“FTFs”); and declarations of states of emergency to combat a terrorist threat. 
In many cases, governments have rushed through such measures in the immedi-
ate aftermath of tragic attacks with scant debate, which past experience has
shown creates a serious risk that exceptional measures will become norms with-
out sufficient public scrutiny or consideration of their long-term impact.
Those who could or do bear the brunt of overly broad or vague counterterrorism
measures include not only terrorism suspects but also peaceful protesters, jour-
nalists, political opponents, human rights defenders, and members of ethnic or
religious groups. In operations against Islamist armed groups, many of those
who risk being wrongfully targeted or stigmatized are Muslims. 
A rise in xenophobia and Islamophobia in Western countries, stoked in part by
political figures capitalizing on both Islamist extremist attacks and a global
refugee crisis that has displaced millions—particularly from predominantly Mus-
lim countries such as Syria, Afghanistan, and Somalia—risks further conflating
Muslims with armed extremists. Yet many victims of Islamist armed attacks are
themselves Muslim and many refugees are fleeing the atrocities of extremist
armed groups like ISIS. And as the United Nations special rapporteur on coun-
terterrorism and human rights has noted, there is little if any evidence to suggest
that refugees or asylum seekers pose a greater security threat than other groups. 
Properly conceived and implemented, many of the recent counterterrorism meas-
ures could advance both security and fundamental values. Yet too often they are
framed or implemented in ways that could erode the rule of law and human
rights, including in democratic governments that should be at the vanguard of
protecting them.
New “Foreign Terrorist Fighter” Measures
Counterterrorism laws and regulations in a growing number of countries include
one or more “FTF” provisions. Human Rights Watch research shows that at least
47 countries have passed “FTF” laws since 2013—the largest wave of counterter-
rorism measures since the immediate aftermath of the attacks of September 11,
2001. 
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While many earlier counterterrorism laws contained similar and equally problem-
atic provisions, such as expansions of police and intelligence powers without
adequate legal safeguards, this second wave exacerbates the potential for
abuse.
Countries that have enacted new counterterrorism laws or toughened pre-exist-
ing ones include Algeria, Austria, Australia, Bahrain, Belgium, Bosnia and Herze-
govina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cameroon, Canada, Chad, China, Denmark, Egypt,
France, Germany, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya,
Kosovo, Libya, Macedonia, Malaysia, Morocco, the Netherlands, New Zealand,
Norway, Pakistan, Poland, Portugal, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, Spain, Swe-
den, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Tunisia, Uganda, the United Arab Emirates, the
United Kingdom, the United States, and Uzbekistan.
Many countries are enacting these measures to comply with UN Security Council
Resolution 2178 of 2014, which aims to stem the “acute and growing threat”
posed by “FTFs” at home and abroad. Drafted primarily by the US, Resolution
2178 requires all UN member countries to prosecute as “serious criminal of-
fenses” an array of acts, such as training or fighting with foreign terrorist groups,
recruiting for these groups, or financing their operations.
The US estimated in October 2016 that 40,000 foreign fighters from over 120
countries had gone to Syria over the preceding five years, although the flow ap-
pears to have ebbed.
In a grave omission, Resolution 2178 does not limit the actions that governments
may designate as “terrorism” or “terrorist”—terms for which no universal legal
definition exists. This has left governments to craft dangerously open-ended
laws and regulations that could be used to criminalize internationally recognized
activities including peaceful protests, critical speech, and freedom of movement
and religion. They also risk infringing on due process guarantees, the right to pri-
vacy, and even the right to life.
“FTF” measures can also put humanitarian assistance at risk by criminalizing im-
partial aid deliveries and life-saving medical treatment by foreign volunteers and
nongovernmental organizations. 
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Overbroad and vague laws run counter to the basic principle in international
human rights law that laws should be precisely drafted and understandable,
both as a safeguard against their arbitrary use and so that people know what ac-
tions would constitute a crime. 
A large number of foreigners joining groups such as ISIS are teenage children, in-
cluding some who were forcibly recruited. How countries apply “FTF” laws in
such cases is of particular concern. Recruitment of children under the age of 15
is a war crime. Governments should generally treat child soldiers foremost as
victims who need rehabilitation and social reintegration, not detention or prose-
cution. 
Adults whose actions abroad did not include direct involvement in armed vio-
lence also should be considered for reintegration services in lieu of criminal in-
carceration. Such programs can involve monitoring suspects, provided the
measures are not overly invasive and are subject to effective review.
Overbroad or Vague Definitions of “Terrorism”
Countries including Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, Egypt, Israel, Saudi Arabia,
and Tunisia have enacted counterterrorism laws criminalizing non-violent activi-
ties that fall far short of material support or participation, such as singing a
banned group’s anthem or participating in anti-government protests. 
China’s definition of “terrorism” as of January 2016 includes a term that can
mean to “propagate” but also to “advocate,” potentially creating a new tool to
outlaw thought or speech.
Canada’s counterterrorism law of 2015 creates a criminal offense of knowingly
“advocating or promoting the commission of terrorism offences in general,”
without defining the term “terrorism offences in general.”
The list of offenses in Israel’s counterterrorism law of 2016 includes expressing
support for a listed terrorist group: acts such as waving the group’s flag, or
singing its anthem are punishable by up to three years in prison.
Countries are also creating or stepping up use of pre-existing “glorification” of
terrorism offenses regardless of whether such praise amounts to incitement. In
February 2016, a Spanish court charged two puppeteers with “glorifying terror-
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ism” for staging a carnival show that included violent scenes and a puppet hold-
ing a sign that referenced Al-Qaeda and the Basque armed group ETA. A judge
dismissed the charges four months later, but the puppeteers were jailed for four
days in the interim and barred from leaving the country. 
In the wake of the Charlie Hebdo attacks, France has applied its “glorification” of
terrorism penal code provision broadly, convicting 385 people in 2015. In at least
four of the cases, prosecutors interrogated children, some as young 13, for refer-
encing ISIS in social media or during altercations with police.
Travel Bans
Many “FTF” measures include imposing travel bans—often implemented through
suspending passports and national identity cards—on people suspected of in-
tending to travel abroad to join or train with groups the government considers to
be foreign terrorist organizations. Suspensions generally range from six months
to two years. 
The United Kingdom restricts not only departures but also returns of citizens and
residents suspected of terrorism-related travel if they refuse to participate in a
deradicalization program. Tunisia and Egypt have enacted sweeping foreign
travel bans on males under ages 35 and 40, respectively. Countries including
Egypt and Kenya have used such travel bans to bar travel of opposition figures
and academics, as well as civil society members invited to training workshops. 
While travel bans may be warranted in certain cases, blanket bans risk violating
the international right to leave or return to one’s country and could harm the sus-
pect’s family members. Of particular concern is the fact that many countries do
not require prior judicial approval to ban travel or suspend passports and iden-
tity cards. 
Citizenship Revocation
Countries also are passing laws that can revoke citizenship of dual nationals
convicted of terrorism-related offenses. 
Australia’s Allegiance Act of December 2015 allows immigration authorities to
strip Australian citizenship from dual nationals as young as 14, without requiring
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a criminal conviction, if they believe the individual engaged in serious terrorism
offenses abroad. Other countries that have passed citizen-stripping laws include
Austria, Australia, Bahrain, Belgium, Canada, the Netherlands, and the UK. 
International law affirms that everyone has a right to a nationality. While most
countries only allow for revocation of citizenship where the individual in ques-
tion has a second nationality, the UK allows for revocation of citizenship from
naturalized British citizens who do not hold another nationality, creating a risk of
statelessness. Bahrain has reportedly revoked the citizenship of more than 300
people since 2012, including civil society activists, journalists, and religious fig-
ures—many via a 2014 counterterrorism amendment that allows authorities to
strip citizenship from Bahrainis who “cause harm to the state” or fail in their
“duty of loyalty.” This reportedly has rendered several of them stateless. 
Expanded Police and Intelligence Powers
Belgium, Canada, China, France, Israel, Pakistan, Poland, Russia, and Tunisia are
among countries that have expanded police or intelligence powers in terrorism-
related cases, in many instances with insufficient oversight.
Canada’s counterterrorism law of 2015 allows the Canadian Security Intelligence
Service (CSIS) to disrupt activities if it deems them unlawful, and even to violate
the country’s Charter of Rights and Freedoms so long as it obtains a warrant in a
secret hearing.
Poland’s counterterrorism law of 2016 allows surveillance of foreigners for up to
three months without a court order. It also empowers a local security force com-
mander to order snipers to shoot to kill to prevent a rapid attack on human life or
health or when rescuing a hostage when the country is at its highest threat level.
While UN principles allow police to use lethal force as a last resort to save the
lives of others, Poland’s measure raises the concern that a commander may
issue a kill order without having determined that there is an imminent threat to
human life. 
Since 2013, France has passed several laws that codify sweeping authority for
digital surveillance on both a targeted and mass basis. Internet service providers
may be forced to install “black boxes” on their networks to search all traffic for
unspecified “suspicious” patterns. These laws do not impose adequate safe-
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guards against abuse and often do not require prior judicial approval. Russia
and China also have enacted sweeping surveillance laws. 
The United States and United Kingdom continue to collect data on hundreds of
millions of internet users worldwide every day, three years after US whistle-
blower Edward Snowden first revealed these mass violations of privacy. Reforms
in the US in 2015 were insufficient, as were the reforms of intelligence powers
proposed in the UK at time of writing.
Preventive Detention and Control Orders
In tandem with measures banning suspected “FTFs” from travel abroad, coun-
tries including Australia, Canada, France, Libya, and the UK have enacted or con-
tinued to use preventive detention or “control” measures for terrorism suspects
that severely restrict their movements at home. 
Despite US President Barack Obama’s pledge upon taking office in 2009 to close
the US military prison at Guantanamo Bay, the United States at time of writing
continued to indefinitely detain dozens of individuals there without charge.
Preventive detention and control measures limit people’s liberty on the suspi-
cion that they may intend to commit a criminal act in the future, rather than be-
cause they are suspected or found guilty of committing a crime in the past.
These measures are imposed based on a lower threshold of evidence than would
be required for a criminal conviction, and in some cases on intelligence material
that may be difficult for the accused to challenge. While control orders may be
permissible in exceptional, narrowly defined circumstances, such as clear evi-
dence of a potential threat, their routine use violates international human rights
law.
Control orders typically include curfews, extensive home confinement, forced do-
mestic relocation, and restrictions on where targeted people can pray, whom
they can visit, what websites they can access, and even what over-the-counter
substances they can consume. 
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Lengthy Pre-Charge and Pretrial Detention
Terrorism suspects are increasingly subjected to pre-charge or pretrial detention
periods that exceed international guidelines. In some cases, the detainee is ini-
tially held incommunicado. International standards require “prompt” judicial re-
view of detention—generally within 48 hours—as longer periods increase the risk
of torture and other ill-treatment.
Chad, Egypt, France, Malaysia, Poland, Saudi Arabia, Spain, and Tunisia are
among countries with excessive pre-charge or pretrial detention periods. Chad
allows pre-charge detention for 30 days, renewable twice. Malaysia’s 2015 Pre-
vention of Terrorism Act allows pretrial detention of up to two years, with indefi-
nitely renewable two-year extensions. 
Special Courts and Death Penalties
Another growing trend is the use of special courts or proceedings for terrorism
suspects that flout international due process standards by holding closed ses-
sions with little or no justification, and restricting suspects’ rights to consult a
lawyer, examine evidence against them, and question those who testify against
them.
Egypt’s courts have tried hundreds of suspected Islamists in mass trials in which
lawyers said they were denied the right to make their case or question wit-
nesses.
Chad, Egypt, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and the US com-
bine proceedings for terrorism offenses with the death penalty. Pakistan and
Saudi Arabia since late 2015 have each executed dozens of people on terrorism
convictions, including after trials that fell far short of international due process
standards. Chad in 2015 executed 10 men in one day after convicting them in se-
cret proceedings. The United States continues to try detainees at Guantanamo in
military commissions that do not meet international fair trial standards. Six of
seven men currently charged face the death penalty.
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“Countering Violent Extremism” 
UN Security Council Resolution 2178 also requires that states “enhance efforts”
aimed at “countering violent extremism” (“CVE”)—sometimes referred to as
“Preventing Violent Extremism (“PVE”)—through educational, social, and other
activities. 
Implemented with sensitivity and respect for human rights, efforts to dissuade
individuals from joining or supporting terrorist groups could be a welcome addi-
tion to counterterrorism efforts. However, Resolution 2178 lists “preventing radi-
calization” as an “essential element” of “CVE” without any requirement that the
“radical” behavior involve violence or intended violence. This raises the specter
of clampdowns on peaceful expression and association, including academic
freedom and religious devotion.
In France following the Bastille Day attack in Nice, mayors along the Riviera used
“CVE” as a justification to ban the “burkini”—burqa-inspired swimwear—arguing
that it signified potential “affiliation with religious fundamentalism.” A court
overturned the ban, rejecting any link between the garment and national security
threats, but the debate still rages.
The UK’s long-standing “CVE” program, Prevent, has been criticized for its over-
broad approach, which has included police surveillance of a predominantly Mus-
lim neighborhood in a British city. In 2015, the UK imposed a duty on primary
schools, universities, and healthcare providers to “prevent” violent extremism.
Reports have emerged that schools and universities are casting suspicion on
lawful activities, creating the risk of a chilling effect on academic freedom.
In the United States some “CVE” programs instruct social workers, teachers,
mental health professionals, religious figures, and others to report on young
people they believe are heading towards radicalization based on criteria such as
“perceived sense of being treated unjustly,” “expressions of hopelessness, futil-
ity,” and “connection to group identity (race, nationality, religion, ethnicity).”
States of Emergency
Since late 2015, Egypt, Ethiopia, France, Mali, Tunisia, and Turkey have cited ter-
rorism as a reason to enact or extend states of emergency. Some of these emer-
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gency measures vastly increase government powers to search, detain, and moni-
tor individuals, to shut establishments such as meeting houses and places of
worship, and to ban public gatherings or free speech. 
International law allows restrictions on fundamental rights and freedoms during
severe crises such as those that threaten the life of a nation. However, the re-
strictions must be temporary, non-discriminatory, and strictly limited in scope.
Certain rights are non-derogable, including the rights to life; freedom from tor-
ture, inhuman, or degrading treatment; legality and equality before the law; and
freedom of thought, conscience, and religion. Many measures under such states
of emergency have violated these principles.
Ethiopia in October 2016 declared a sweeping, six-month state of emergency fol-
lowing government crackdowns in the restive Oromia region that killed at least
500 people in largely non-violent protests during the past year. The government
called the protesters “terrorists” or said they were working with “terrorist groups
abroad.” At time of writing the government said 1,600 people had been arrested
during the state of emergency—in addition to tens of thousands of others de-
tained in regions where residents have protested government policies in the
past year. Human Rights Watch received unconfirmed reports of unlawful
killings, mass arrests, and looting of houses and businesses by security forces. 
Mobile phone access to the internet was blocked and Addis Standard, one of
Ethiopia’s few remaining independent publications, stopped publishing its print
edition due to state of emergency restrictions. Ethiopia also continued to detain
scores of opposition leaders, journalists, and dissenters under its overbroad
counterterrorism law of 2009. 
In response to a coup attempt in July 2016, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Er-
doğan at time of writing had imposed a state of emergency until January 2017 to
quash what he described as the “Fethullahist Terrorist Organization (FETO),” in
reference to supporters of the US-based cleric Fethullah Gülen, whom he has ac-
cused of masterminding the failed putsch. Erdoğan has used his emergency
powers to detain more than 40,000 people, including soldiers, policemen,
judges, prosecutors, journalists, and teachers, on suspicion of involvement in
the coup or membership in FETO. Erdoğan’s government also has used the emer-
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gency powers to crack down on Kurdish activists, opposition elected officials,
and media outlets under the guise of countering terrorism. 
The emergency powers also extend pre-charge police detention for terrorism
suspects from 4 to 30 days and deny detainees access to counsel for 5 days, re-
moving crucial safeguards against torture. Not surprisingly, allegations of torture
and other ill-treatment of detainees surfaced following declaration of the emer-
gency. 
France’s emergency law, activated after the Paris attacks in November 2015, was
renewed until January 2017; a further extension seemed likely at time of writing.
The law empowers police to raid homes and other premises, search luggage and
vehicles, and seize data from computers and mobile phones, without prior ap-
proval from a judge. It allows the interior minister to place people under house
arrest on vague accusations, such as being a “radical,” also without prior judi-
cial approval. Human Rights Watch has documented abusive or discriminatory
searches and house arrests of Muslims under the state of emergency.
Tunisia has used its state of emergency, enacted in 2015 after a series of armed
extremist attacks, to disperse apparently peaceful protests against a proposed
law to grant impunity to former government officials for corruption. It also has
confined at least 139 people to their homes, indefinitely and without charge,
since November 2015, a Human Rights Watch investigation found. Police deliver
the arrest orders orally rather than in writing, making it harder for the affected
person to mount a court challenge.
Egypt has cited terrorism as reason to maintain a state of emergency in North
Sinai that since 2014 has made it easier for the military and police to carry out
arbitrary detentions, and thousands of mass evictions and home demolitions
that violate international human rights law.
***
Targeted laws and prevention programs can be important tools to address the
pressing and often transnational challenges that extremist armed groups pose.
But the recent spate of sweeping counterterrorism measures worldwide suggests
many governments have learned little from the corrosive “Global War on Terror”
that the US launched after the September 11, 2001 attacks. While many countries
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now reference human rights in their counterterrorism initiatives, their laws and
policies continue to invite overreach, and too many dispense with judicial review
and other critical checks against abuse. 
A key step toward reversing that trend is for UN member states to press the Secu-
rity Council to limit what acts can be considered “terrorism” in mandates such as
Resolution 2178, to ensure they are fully consistent with international human
rights law, refugee law, and international humanitarian law (the laws of war).
These definitions should, for example, exclude acts that lack the elements of
criminal intent to cause death, serious bodily injury, or the taking of hostages in
order to create a state of panic and provoke a government or third-party re-
sponse. Regional bodies such as the European Union and the African Union
should follow suit. 
Governments, for their part, should promptly repeal or revise overly broad or
vague “FTF” and CVE measures, and, when facing extraordinary threats that war-
rant declaration of an emergency, should limit the scope and duration of emer-
gency powers to what is truly necessary to address the crisis. They should
publicly call on other countries to do the same.
Governments need effective responses to attacks, but effective responses
should not and do not have to come at the expense of basic human rights. Abu-
sive responses are not only unlawful; they also backfire by alienating local popu-
lations at a time when governments should seek to unite societies against
extremist armed threats. 
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The Internet is Not the Enemy
As Rights Move Online, 
Human Rights Standards Move with Them
By Dinah PoKempner, General Counsel
We are at a difficult juncture in the protection of online speech and privacy,
when states resist applying principles they have endorsed internationally to
their own domestic legislation and practice. It is as if all road signs to freedom of
speech and privacy pointed one way, yet governments insist on taking the wrong
fork, telling the alarmed passengers it is for their own safety.
Divergence between what states endorse at the United Nations and what they do
at home is hardly news, though governments do not seem self-conscious when it
comes to restricting rights on the internet. They seem to sense that the internet
is somehow different, perhaps more powerful than older media, and reflexively
reach for greater limitation. 
They are right that the internet gives individuals unprecedented ability to project
their communications across borders and to access the world's information. But
that does not necessarily justify sacrificing privacy and speech to create un-
precedented police powers.
New technology has been empowering individuals—both for good and ill—and
making the world smaller for many decades, even while international human
rights law grew and flourished. Typewriters may be heading towards extinction,
but rights seem more important than ever. And how governments protect them in
the digital age will determine whether the internet will be a force that liberates or
enchains us.
What States Say and What They Do
The bifurcation between existing norms and what states really do is most evident
in the unfolding debate over surveillance. 
Edward Snowden, a former US government contractor, put that debate into high
gear in 2013 by leaking documents to media that showed the United States and
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its allies were engaging in massive, indiscriminate data collection on people in
the US and abroad who had no connection to wrongdoing. With the disclosures
came popular and government condemnations. The UN went into high gear, with
General Assembly debates and resolutions, Human Rights Council resolutions,
more expert reports, and even the creation of a new expert position on privacy.
Around the world, people challenged surveillance in courts and legislatures de-
bated them. 
Yet in the ensuing years, few countries curtailed surveillance powers and many
instead moved to cement into their laws powers similar to what the US was
shown to wield. 
In the US, some reforms gained traction, though they seem unlikely to signifi-
cantly curtail the breathtaking scope of data collection and real-time monitoring.
Congress revised the law used to justify collecting millions of call records with
another only somewhat more constraining. President Barack Obama apologized
for spying on allied heads of state, but the legal authorities that undergird over-
seas communications surveillance still permit collection for "foreign intelli-
gence,” a vague purpose that can easily justify sweeping communications
interception, including from US persons caught incidentally in the dragnet. 
The United Kingdom is adopting the troubling Investigative Powers Bill, which le-
galizes "bulk" surveillance practices of directly tapping into undersea cables
that carry internet traffic, government hacking, and thematic warrants that allow
intelligence services to designate broad targets without prior judicial approval.
France also moved to place surveillance practices on a legal footing in 2015, but
with deeply flawed laws, rushed through in the wake of attacks. The UN Human
Rights Committee, reviewing France's compliance with the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), concluded that the intelligence
law of June 2015 “grants excessively large powers of very intrusive surveillance
on the basis of broad and ill-defined aims, without prior judicial authorization
and without an adequate and independent oversight mechanism.” Most re-
cently, the Conseil d’Etat ruled unconstitutional the law’s regime of warrantless
surveillance of wireless communications. 
Russia also took a retrograde path, with legislative amendments in 2016 that re-
quire companies to retain the contents of all communications for six months,
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data about those communications for three years, and to store all their data
within Russian territory. Companies must also provide "information necessary
for decoding" digital communications, a provision that may mean backdoor ac-
cess to encrypted material. 
China, long a leader in censoring online speech and controlling access through a
national firewall, adopted a cybersecurity law in 2016 that would require compa-
nies to censor and restrict online anonymity, store user data in China, and moni-
tor and report undefined "network security incidents," deepening fears of
increased surveillance.
Even Brazil and Mexico, both critics of the mass surveillance programs of the US
National Security Agency (NSA) and strong proponents of privacy at the UN, en-
tertained cybercrime bills in 2016 that would have widened data retention re-
quirements and constricted access to information and free speech. Germany, a
leading proponent of data protection laws, approved a law in October 2016 that
authorized mass untargeted surveillance of non-citizens, earning the criticism of
three different UN rights experts and a legal challenge to its constitutionality. 
Little wonder the UN expert on freedom of expression lamented, “One of the
most disappointing aspects of the current situation … is that many States with
strong histories of support for freedom of expression—in law and in their soci-
eties—have considered measures liable to abuse.” 
Three Ways in which the Internet is Distinctive 
(and How that Scares Us) 
This schizophrenic state of affairs, where states pledge allegiance to interna-
tional human rights online and then legislate to curtail them, reflects a deeper
split in perceptions of the internet, its promise and its peril. 
There was a time when discussion of the internet and human rights rang full of
utopian aspiration—the internet would set speech free, remove censoring inter-
mediaries, enable social organizing on a scale never known. To some extent, this
promise came true; activists who were stifled under authoritarian governments
that suppressed organizing, protest, or an independent press could move their
causes forward online. Knowledge once cabined in libraries, universities, or
other networks of the elite became available to remote users in villages, fields,
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or slums. Minds could meet in that new location, "cyberspace," making global-
ized creation and impact within the reach of ordinary people.
The backlash from authorities who found this threatening was not long in com-
ing. Dissidents and critics of illiberal governments who tried to avoid suppres-
sion by going online soon found themselves monitored, publicly shamed or
arrested, a trend in full force today in Turkey, Egypt, Vietnam, Saudi Arabia,
China, or Russia’s Chechen Republic. Some governments, like Egypt, have even
sought harsher penalties for online speech crimes than their offline counter-
parts. 
When activists (as well as criminals) have tried to shield themselves through
anonymity or encryption, governments have issued orders or proposed laws to
force tech companies to hand over their users' data and decode communica-
tions. National firewalls, wholesale blocking of social media, and even internet
shutdowns are used by repressive governments in efforts to control online activ-
ity.
But even in non-authoritarian settings, there is ambivalence about the internet’s
power of social mobilization. People may admire how democracy activists can
organize online, yet worry when the Islamic State (ISIS) recruits remotely. They
may applaud those who crowd source evidence of war crimes, but condemn
“trolls” who expose, threaten, or harrow their victims. 
To probe this growing ambivalence over the power of online speech, it is useful
to consider what differentiates it from offline communication. At least three char-
acteristics are distinctive: online speech can be more disinhibited—that is, less
inhibiting—than speech in the real world; it persists and can be accessed on the
internet for a long time unless deliberately removed; and it is inherently trans-
border, both in the way it travels and is accessed. Each of these attributes can
make online speech powerful. And each complicates the task of regulation.
Disinhibition in online speech is a much studied but not well-understood phe-
nomenon. It accounts for greater responsiveness and "sharing" when we interact
with social media, and also for greater informality, incivility and invective. While
it is common to attribute disinhibition to anonymity, disinhibition is characteris-
tic of attributed online speech as well, and various studies cite many factors that
contribute to this quality, including the rapidity and impersonality of a medium
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lacking nonverbal cues and interaction. In fact, being identified (so peers can
see you as the nastiest troll on the site) may worsen behavior. This complexity
suggests that real-name policies are not necessarily a sure-fire way to better be-
havior. They are, however, a favorite requirement of authoritarian regimes that
would like to identify dissenters so they can be silenced. 
The persistence of online information advances all types of research and news
gathering, long after first reports. Real-time fact-checking in political contests,
for example, can add immeasurably to informed decision-making in elections.
But malicious or false speech also persists, and even when the subject succeeds
in having it retracted in one jurisdiction, it may be mirrored or available from an-
other. 
The European Court of Justice considered this problem in the 2014 Costeja judg-
ment, and pronounced that search engines like Google had an obligation to
delink to data that is “inaccurate, inadequate, irrelevant or excessive”—a stan-
dard that potentially allows for much more sweeping restrictions on public ac-
cess to information than allowed under international human right standards or
some national constitutions. A European view of what is "irrelevant" or "exces-
sive" information, for example, might strike a US court as a violation of the First
Amendment guarantees of freedom of speech; the information might well still be
accessible in the US even if delinked from search results in Europe.
The persistence of information on the web and its global accessibility has
prompted courts in Canada and France to issue orders to Google that would re-
quire the web index to delist content the world over, and not just within the
court’s home jurisdiction. But if Canada and France prevail, global injunctions
against content or links to content can be expected to become de rigeur, includ-
ing from countries that routinely punish dissent. Would more rights-respecting
countries enforce such orders? 
We may not even get to that question. Such injunctions would place the burden
of challenge on the speaker, not on the party that wishes to suppress the
speech. People who place controversial material on the internet may lack the
means to challenge such orders in every country. The force of global injunctions
is their chilling effect. They might reduce the amount of content some countries
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consider unlawful, but they might also purge the internet of much art, hetero-
doxy, criticism, and debate. 
Finally, the trans-border accessibility and routing of online communications em-
powers those far from the social and commercial hubs where information con-
centrates, be they villagers, or rebels in the hinterlands. Governments have
sought to control data by requiring it be kept within their borders to facilitate
surveillance, or by using firewalls to keep undesirable content out. This may
seem appealing in the context of limiting the influence of terrorists, intellectual
property thieves, or those who shame and expose their victims. It is less attrac-
tive when considered from the point of view of dissenting authors and activists
who throw their thoughts over the firewall, hoping they will live and be accessi-
ble elsewhere on the net. 
The combination of these attributes—prolific, often unguarded sharing, accessi-
ble through time and across borders—makes possible not only scientific, artistic
or even criminal collaborations as never before, but also frightening potential for
comprehensive social profiling and persecution. Data mining, aggregation, and
retention are increasingly in the human rights spotlight as new and potent dan-
gers to freedom. This led prominent internet archivist Brewster Kahle to remark,
“Edward Snowden showed we’ve inadvertently built the world’s largest surveil-
lance network with the web.”   
The new problems raised by the distinctive features of online speech seem to re-
quire doubling down on privacy and freedom of speech, rather than giving up on
them. The internet is not some unusual and threatening medium, but increas-
ingly the ordinary means of transmitting every type of speech and information in
our world. It is not a state of exception, and the baseline rule in human rights
law is that full observance of rights such as free expression and privacy is the
norm; it is limitations that must be exceptional. 
When Technology Changes, Human Rights Standards Still Fit
Back in 1948, the drafters of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights had the
foresight to insulate one of the most fundamental rights from obsolescence. Arti-
cle 19 of this foundational UN instrument provides: 
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Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes
freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart
information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers (emphasis
added). 
Since then, the principle that all rights that apply offline apply online as well has
been reiterated by the Human Rights Council and the General Assembly. While
new media pose new challenges, there is little support for the view that some-
how the advent of the internet has made human rights less important, or subject
to entirely different standards. 
The basic principles for evaluating whether restrictions on free expression, ac-
cess to information, association, and privacy are consistent with international
human rights law are well-established and reflected in many regional and do-
mestic legal systems. The Human Rights Committee, the UN expert body that in-
terprets the ICCPR, in 2004 summarized the basic framework this way: 
States must demonstrate their necessity and only take such measures as are
proportionate to the pursuance of legitimate aims in order to ensure continuous
and effective protection of Covenant rights. In no case may the restrictions be
applied or invoked in a manner that would impair the essence of a Covenant
right.
Consider the test of "necessary" to a "legitimate aim," that is, an aim specified in
the ICCPR, such as national security, public order, or the rights of others. The
state bears the burden of showing "a direct and immediate connection" between
the right to be restricted and the threat. It would not be enough, for example, for
personal information to be collected simply because it might be, at some unde-
fined point in the future, useful in advancing a variety of national interests. 
In the context of the most common justification for electronic surveillance, the
special rapporteur stated that "States often treat national security and public
order as a label to legitimate any restriction." Such interests are understood in
human rights law to represent the public's interest, rather than the interest of a
particular government or elite. So "national security" should be seen as public
interests in maintaining national independence or territorial integrity, not some
individual’s or group's concern about staying in power or maintaining an edge
over competitors. Invidious discrimination is never in the public's interest, and
45
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH
cannot be the basis of a valid limitation on rights, so surveillance measures that
are directed at religious, ethnic, or national groups cannot be justified as "nec-
essary" for "public security."
Dragnet collection and prolonged retention of masses of irrelevant personal data
would normally be difficult to justify as "necessary" in the sense of directly con-
nected to a specific threat to national security or public order. But, as noted
above, international human rights law requires that laws restricting speech be
“proportionate” as well as necessary, and it is even harder to show that sweep-
ing surveillance measures meet that test. 
To be proportionate, a limitation on rights must be the least restrictive means to
protect the public interest that motivates the restriction. It is hard to imagine
how regularly invading everyone's privacy, and monitoring everyone's communi-
cations could be proportionate to a specific threat, even the threat that a partic-
ular terrorist movement poses. Indeed, such practices would seem to "impair the
essence of the right." 
The special attributes of the internet can make old problems—whether terrorism,
threatening speech, discrimination against minorities, or crime prevention—
seem more daunting and in need of new solutions. But our obligation—if we
think rights have meaning—is to still subject every solution that limits rights to
rigorous consideration of necessity and proportionality. 
Applying the Standards to Today’s Challenges
Law enforcement figures have argued that to identify terrorists and prevent at-
tacks, a large "haystack" of data must be assembled to search. This presumes
that more data will yield more relevant data to be mined, producing more "nee-
dles" constituting true threats. This may work for problems where instances are
abundant, and the risk factors are relatively easy to identify. 
But terrorists and terror plots are relatively rare and quite varied in profile, moti-
vation, and details. The danger is that false leads can overwhelm the system and
divert resources from more productive actions, such as developing reliable net-
works of informants or mining a suspect’s past criminal history for clues. 
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As security expert Bruce Schneier said in his recent book, Data and Goliath,
“there is no scientific rationale for believing that adding irrelevant data about in-
nocent people makes it easier to find a terrorist attack, and lots of evidence that
it does not.” Even the NSA has urged its personnel to “store less of the wrong
data.” The more irrelevant data is added to the “haystack,” the harder it is to jus-
tify the collection program as proportionate. But when mass collection also
leads to mass data retention, further questions arise. One is whether data col-
lected for one purpose (say, foreign intelligence) can be later used for another
(say, enforcement of drug laws). 
Unless each use depends on an independent evaluation of necessity and pro-
portionality, repurposing data cannot be sure to comply with human rights law.
And simply retaining data for some hypothetical future use is difficult to justify
as "necessary." As Norway’s Supreme Court recently held in a case considering
seizure of documentary maker’s footage, the possibility that the material may
contain “valuable clues” to the prevention of terrorism recruitment was not
enough to make its disclosure “necessary.” 
Another problem is the use of biased data for predictive purposes. Corporations
have long been aggregating and analyzing data on consumers to predict what
advertisements, news, or job listings most suit their profile. Data protection law
can offer some protection against this profiling by making what corporations do
with your data more transparent, and enabling you to correct data or refuse to
provide it. 
But when governments use data analysis to predict where police should be di-
rected, or whether a defendant with a particular profile is likely to recidivate,
there is often little transparency as to what data was used to train the algo-
rithm—and biased data produces biased results. Law enforcement practices all
too often reflect bias, as Human Rights Watch has shown with relation to police
profiling of immigrants and Muslims and racial disparities in arrest and incarcer-
ation in the US, abusive identity checks of Muslims in France, or police discrimi-
nation against transgender people in Sri Lanka. Algorithms that are trained on
biased data can reinforce and even exaggerate biased profiles and policies, in a
horrible self-confirming loop. 
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Surveillance, even when justified, involves limiting rights, but bias can turn this
into discrimination or even persecution. When a person's faith, ethnicity, sexual
orientation, or race are taken as indicators of potential criminality—by police or
by the algorithm—their rights are violated. Programs for “countering violent ex-
tremism” can fall into this trap when they focus as much on the expression of
"extremist" beliefs or opinions as on any indicator of actual violence. 
The UK’s "Prevent" strategy, for example, defines its objective as countering
“ideology”—that is to say, ideas—and defines "extremism" as “vocal or active
opposition to fundamental British values." Schools, and thus teachers, are
obliged to monitor children's online activity for signs of radicalization, and inter-
vene with those who are "vulnerable." The program has drawn widespread criti-
cism from teachers for stifling free expression in the classroom, and from many
as stigmatizing and alienating precisely the segments of the community that law
enforcement most needs help from in identifying threats.
Applying the principle of proportionality, we see the more a program limits rights
for the many, the less likely it is to be the least intrusive means of protecting se-
curity. Indeed, pervasive rights intrusions themselves can worsen national secu-
rity or public order by eroding trust in government and protection of minorities. A
case in point are laws that undermine anonymity, like Russia's, or that require
companies to somehow decode encryption, like China's. No doubt some crimi-
nals use these strategies to evade detection, but ordinary people use them as
well, to evade persecution, secure transactions, or simply ensure privacy in nor-
mal communications and pursuits.
Neither anonymity nor encryption are absolute rights; a court may order that a
criminal suspect be identified, or require a person to decrypt their communica-
tions as part of an investigation. But disproportion is likely when governments
claim it is necessary to compromise the rights and security of millions of users to
catch specific bad guys by forcing companies to provide “back doors” into se-
cure technology. 
When the US Department of Justice, eager to get into the San Bernadino
shooter's iPhone, tried to force Apple to re-engineer its security features, much
more than that specific phone’s security was at stake. This "fix” could be leaked
or hacked by criminals who would seek to open the same models. Nor was there
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any guarantee the US government, or other governments, might not demand or
use it repeatedly jeopardizing the security of all users of that model. 
Governments can’t evade their human rights obligations by pushing the burden
onto companies to suppress uncivil speech, de-index information or retain un-
necessary data. The effect on rights can be as disproportionate as if government
had limited rights itself. Private companies, however, have considerable discre-
tion to set the rules for their services, and these terms can be much harder for
users to challenge than government-made laws. 
Before urging internet service providers to monitor or bank all incoming traffic or
provide back doors in security features, governments should consider the
human rights impact. Even when civic groups urge corporations to enforce val-
ues like civility, we should consider whether these corporate rules will be trans-
parent or opaque, capable of challenge, or driven by the sort of rights-blind
algorithm that cannot tell the difference between pornography and photojournal-
ism.
Realigning State Practice with International Standards
Limiting rights only where necessary and proportionate does not make regula-
tion impossible. Some limits are essential, because protecting people from ter-
rorism, incitement to violence, or revenge pornography is also a human rights
obligation. We know that these principles are being taken seriously when there
is transparency in law and state practice, independent oversight of executive
powers, and avenues of appeal and redress.
Restrictions should apply to the fewest people and the fewest rights possible for
the shortest period. And we have to consider whether some issues need state
action, or are better addressed by communities, or new technology, or by en-
abling and promoting counter-speech. Finding the least intrusive means takes
some imagination, and some collaboration between those who govern and
those whose rights are at stake. 
The present split between what states say and what they do cannot be sustained
indefinitely. Either rights will take a beating in the digital age, or state practice
must reconnect to rights protection. 
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Human rights and security are two faces of a single coin. When rights are consis-
tently violated, societies become insecure, as anyone watching the destruction
of Syria can tell. Societies that deprive their inhabitants of online privacy and
means of digital security are deeply vulnerable—to crime, to demagogues, to
corruption, to intimidation, and to stagnation. Hurtling into a digital future, it
seems prudent to carry our rights along, rather than abandon them by the road-
side with our typewriters.
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The Lost Years
Secondary Education for Children in Emergencies
By Bassam Khawaja, Researcher, Middle East Division; 
Elin Martinez, Researcher, Children’s Rights Division; 
Bill Van Esveld, Senior Researcher, Children’s Rights Division
Amin, 18, became a refugee when his family fled Syria for Lebanon five years
ago. He has not set foot in school since. With his father unable to get legal status
or work, responsibility for supporting the family of seven fell to Amin. A seventh
grader when he left his school in Homs, the then 13-year-old became a construc-
tion worker, hauling cement blocks for new apartment buildings. “I’ve been here
five years and lost five years of my life,” he said.
Every day in 2015, around 17,000 children fled their homes due to persecution
and conflict. Forcibly displaced children, including refugees, have the right to
available and accessible quality secondary education, without discrimination.
Such access is crucial: it can protect them physically; create a normal routine
vital to healing and recovery; provide a safe space at a developmentally critical
age; develop problem-solving skills; pave the way for better economic possibili-
ties; and nurture hope. 
But for many older children, going to school is an impossible dream.
According to the United Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR), half of the world’s 3.5
million refugee children of primary-school age attend classes, but less than a
quarter of the 1.95 million secondary-school aged children do. In Turkey—host to
the largest number of refugees in the world—including nearly 3 million Syrians—
just 13 percent of secondary school-age refugee children attend school. In
Cameroon, 6 percent do; in Pakistan and Lebanon, just 5 percent. 
And it is worse for girls: globally, just 7 girls for every 10 refugee boys go to sec-
ondary school. Although data on forcibly displaced children with disabilities is
limited, they clearly face huge obstacles, and are often excluded from secondary
education altogether.
While the record number of refugees and internally displaced people around the
world has focused attention on the need to ensure that displaced children can
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enroll in school, humanitarian responses to crises have tended to focus on pri-
mary, not secondary, education. 
This essay examines problems that bedevil secondary education in emergen-
cies—especially conflicts that forcibly displace children. And it offers solutions
that host countries, donors, and humanitarian actors could adopt to promote
and guarantee secondary education in aid-recipient countries affected by crises
or large refugee flows. 
At the root of these problems, and solutions, are funding and refugee policies.
Globally, less than 2 percent of donor support goes to education in emergencies;
of that, far more goes to primary than secondary education. Inadequate re-
sources coincide with restrictive refugee host-country policies that often hit chil-
dren hardest just as they become adolescents.
Quality secondary education benefits societies in which forcibly displaced chil-
dren have sought safety. Children with secondary education typically earn more
as adults and are healthier, increasing productivity and reducing health care
costs. They are more likely to find work, and escape poverty. When more girls
can complete access secondary education, it can narrow the gender pay gap. 
Yet despite its importance, in refugee situations and other humanitarian crises,
barriers to education mount as children advance in school. Some host countries
simply deny adolescent refugees the right to enroll in secondary schools outside
refugee camps. Other serious barriers include hazardous labor, child marriage
and sexual violence, harassment by state security forces, and targeting and re-
cruitment by armed groups. 
Failure by donors and host countries to ensure secondary education for dis-
placed children and adolescents risks undermining economic development. For
example, UNICEF estimates the lost earning potential of displaced children who
miss out on secondary education due to the conflict in Syria to be in the tens of
millions of dollars. 
It also robs secondary school-aged children of the tools and skills they need to
contribute to host and home communities if they return home—a scenario that
could have severe repercussions for the security and stability of both. 
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Secondary Education and Conflict
Education promotes stability: it provides children with care, support, and tools
for resolving disputes peacefully, and increases productivity. Quality secondary
education has been shown to promote tolerance, foster a stronger belief in
democracy and civic participation, and help resist recruitment to violent extrem-
ism. 
High secondary school enrollment levels have even been suggested to lower the
probability of civil war, while failure to provide education for displaced adoles-
cents in crises can hamper reconstruction efforts and fuel unrest. One study indi-
cated that if countries in which 30 percent of youth had a secondary education
doubled that percentage, they could halve the risk of conflict, according to a
2014 UNESCO report.
Yet education is often a casualty when children are forced to flee for safety. In
Somalia—where all parties to the conflict have kidnapped, recruited, or used
children for military service—a 2012 Human Rights Watch report found that the
threat of forced recruitment and abduction has led children to leave school, and
often flee the country with their families. Dropout rates reportedly reached 50
percent following an offensive in 2010. 
When conflict erupts, the impact may be greater on secondary than primary edu-
cation, because secondary schools need specialized resources, including teach-
ers, which are hard to get in crises, and because forcibly displaced adolescents
who drop out of school are unlikely to later return. 
Some governmental responses have only made matters worse for refugee and in-
ternally displaced children. After an attack by the Pakistani militant group
Tehreek-i-Taliban in December 2014 killed 132 secondary school-aged school-
children in Peshawar, hostility towards Afghans living in Pakistan intensified,
and authorities restricted Afghan refugees’ access to social services, including
education, according to a 2015 Human Rights Watch report on police abuses
against Afghans in Pakistan. 
In Nigeria, the government’s response to attacks by the extremist group Boko
Haram (“Western education is forbidden”)—including its targeting of secondary
school-age boys and its notorious April 24, 2014 abduction of more than 200
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girls from a secondary school in Chibok, Borno state—has not adequately pro-
tected schools, and enrollment has plummeted among internally displaced chil-
dren. One teacher told Human Rights Watch in 2015 that his own secondary
school had become “a Boko Haram slaughtering ground … anyone they caught,
they will bring to the school and kill them.” 
Enrollment and attendance levels have dropped dramatically due to fear of at-
tacks. In conflict-affected states in northeast Nigeria, fewer than 90,000 of
nearly 590,000 displaced school-age children can access education. Even when
schools remain open, parents have been too afraid to send their children; an-
other teacher in northern Borno state said that “some parents had sent their
children to Niger to be refugees there.” 
Compounding the problem, the government has allowed security forces to con-
tinue to use both primary and secondary schools, violating the commitment it
demonstrated by signing the Safe Schools Declaration to end military use of
schools in 2015. 
Overlooked and Underfunded 
In survey after survey, refugees identify education as a critical emergency need;
many spend large portions of their incomes sending their children to school.
Others take enormous risks: one woman returned to Syria after being unable to
enroll her children in Lebanese schools despite the danger. “Education is the
only goal,” she told Human Rights Watch. 
Yet education’s share of donor aid is paltry and falling. In 2002, lower and mid-
dle-income countries received 13 percent of overseas development assistance,
but 10 percent in 2015. Less than a quarter of that was disbursed to low-income
countries, which host 86 percent of the world’s refugees and are some of the
most under-resourced school systems. 
Many grants lasting only 12 months, often disregarding the importance of invest-
ing in early recovery interventions. Education in emergencies is also funded un-
equally: some countries experiencing long-term crises are permanently
underfunded, affected by a humanitarian funding system that skews towards re-
cent or ongoing emergencies, as well as those with greater media visibility.
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Of the limited funds available for education, primary education receives the
lion’s share, with secondary an afterthought, even though it often costs more
due to the need for more highly-qualified teachers, more textbooks and class-
rooms, and specialized equipment and infrastructure. In 2015, for example,
UNHCR allocated just 13 percent of its education budget to secondary education,
one-third of what it spent on primary. 
In part, this uneven distribution is because there are limited funds for education. 
But agencies themselves do not necessarily have as much programming for sec-
ondary education as they do for younger children, though many focus on acceler-
ated learning programs and non-formal education. Humanitarian actors are still
playing catch-up when it comes to providing secondary education, in both for-
mal non-formal education.
In Lebanon, the Ministry of Education and the United Nations High Commis-
sioner for Refugees (UNHCR) set a target last year of enrolling nearly 200,000
Syrian refugee children in public primary schools, but just 2,080 in public sec-
ondary schools. And while a back-to-school public outreach campaign adver-
tised free and easy enrollment for refugee and Lebanese children in grades 1-9,
it did not include higher grades. 
A separate UNESCO program covered secondary-school fees for Syrian children,
but it was not publicly advertised, and reached just 2,280 of the 82,744 children
of secondary school-age registered with UNHCR in the 2015-2016 school year. 
Bureaucratic Barriers 
Bureaucracy can hamper access to secondary education. 
For example, in some countries, secondary school-age children who have been
forcibly displaced can be barred from education if they lack official documenta-
tion, as Human Rights Watch research in Turkey and Lebanon—home to 1.4 mil-
lion school age Syrian refugee children—shows. In Lebanon, children turning 15
must pay $200—often a prohibitive sum— to renew their residency, and many
lack the required passport or individual identification card. In Turkey, Syrian
refugee children must obtain an identification document (a kimlik) to enroll in
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schools and access subsidized healthcare, but a “pre-screening” procedure put
in place in March 2016 has created backlogs of up to six months. 
Syrian adolescents in Jordan described giving up trying to re-enroll in secondary
school after spending years trying to meet inflexible requirements for school cer-
tification. Amal, 20, said she had completed all her high school exams “except
the very last one” before her family fled Syria, but when she tried to finish her
exams in Jordan, Ministry of Education officials refused. “They said they needed
proof I had passed 11th grade, but they wouldn’t accept my faxed form, and told
me I needed to send in the original.” She would have to return to Syria to obtain
it, “but the border is closed, and anyway it is dangerous for me to go back.” 
In Lebanon, refugee children must provide 9th grade transcripts to enroll in sec-
ondary school, which many left behind while fleeing the war in Syria. In other
cases, refugee children face school officials unwilling to accommodate them.
Sixteen-year-old Loreen has been out of school since heavy shelling cut her off
from seventh grade in Syria. When she tried to enroll in a secondary school in
Turkey, the director said she would “have to join her age group, no exceptions,”
even though she spoke no Turkish. When her mother asked the school about
language help, she was told “there wasn’t any.” Loreen did not enroll and now
works full-time in a dried-fruit factory.
Barriers to Girls’ Education
Girls face hurdles to secondary school that can be exacerbated in crisis situa-
tions, including restrictive social norms, sexual and gender-based violence, and
early pregnancy and marriage. 
In Afghanistan, Taliban forces targeted girls’ education after being forced from
power in 2001; in 2004, only 5 percent of Afghan girls attended secondary
schools, and attacks on education increased in 2005 and 2006. Taliban forces
continued to distribute threatening “night letters” to school, ordering girls to
stop attending school past puberty (around fourth grade), fatally shot students
and teachers, threw battery acid in the faces of adolescent schoolgirls, and at-
tacked girls’ schools with rockets, arson, and improvised explosives.
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The destruction or denial of access to school sanitation facilities during conflict
can also force girls to miss out on education, because private, clean facilities are
essential during menstruation. 
In situations of forced displacement, parents may marry off girls as a way to cope
with poverty or safety concerns, and most married girls stop going to school.
Out-of-school girls are more susceptible to child marriage, which has leapt four-
fold among Syrian refugee girls in Lebanon, Turkey, and Jordan. 
Conversely, the benefits of secondary education for girls can be life-changing,
with potential gains for host countries and overall development by facilitating
their access to information about rights and services, and enabling participation
in decision-making and accountability. It also saves lives. Ensuring girls stay in
secondary education can reduce child marriage and childhood deaths because
children with higher education levels are more likely to have a healthy diet and
seek medical care, and girls with secondary education are less likely to marry
early.  
Poverty and Child Labor
For too many displaced children, poverty—exacerbated by policies that prevent
parents from finding legal work—pushes school out of reach and makes child
labor more likely. Pressure to earn intensifies as children grow older, and even
those who do not work often cannot afford secondary-school related costs, in-
cluding fees in countries where secondary education is not yet free, uniforms
and notebooks. Transport costs are also often higher for secondary schools,
which are fewer in number than primary schools. 
Leaving school to work can lead to serious harm: exploitation, hazardous work
environments, or violence. In Lebanon, humanitarian agencies documented a
sharp increase in the worst forms of child labor among refugee children in 2015,
and Human Rights Watch interviewed children who had been injured, attacked,
or arrested while working. 
When there are few opportunities for skilled work or higher education—like in
Kenya’s Dadaab camp, where just 13 percent of adolescents are accommodated
in secondary schools—there is far less incentive to get a secondary education. A
UN survey in Zaatari, Jordan’s largest refugee camp, found that barriers to educa-
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tion included “a sense of the pointlessness of education as [Syrian children] had
limited hope for their future prospects.” In a smaller refugee camp in Jordan, en-
rollment in a high school class plummeted by half in the fall of 2015, shortly after
three students were accepted to university but could not afford the fees. 
Allowing refugees to work could help to ameliorate many of poverty’s knock-on
effects on secondary education. But host countries are often politically loath to
take this step due to fears that refugees will take citizens’ jobs. In fact, refugees
often take jobs that nationals do not want to do, and labor protections could
help stem the downward pressure on wages that results from informal work. 
Even in countries that have opened access to work permits for refugees, like
Turkey and Jordan, restrictions often remain, such as quotas, limits on access to
more skilled jobs, geographical restrictions, and tying permits to local sponsor-
ship. Denied the opportunity to work legally, Syrian refugees in Jordan and
Lebanon largely depend on insufficient humanitarian aid and have sunk deeper
into debt and poverty, making it harder to afford to send children to school. 
Alternatives are possible. In Uganda, where some 500,000 refugees are allowed
to work, choose where to live, and access public schools, only 1 percent rely
completely on aid. 
Global Response
It has taken decades for the global community to recognize the importance of
education in humanitarian response, but recent promises could help staunch
the loss of education for displaced children—if they are kept. 
In May 2016, humanitarian donors and UN agencies launched Education Cannot
Wait, a global fund that aims to support education for 75 million children and
young people affected by emergencies each year by raising $3.85 billion by
2020. 
In September 2016, at a US-sponsored summit on refugees at the UN, participat-
ing countries pledged commitments that, according to the White House, im-
proved access to lawful work for 1 million refugees, and access to education for 1
million refugee children. In parallel, the UN Global Commission on Education
has set out specific goals and timelines for governments to achieve free, equi-
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table, and quality secondary education for all by 2030, a target that all UN mem-
ber states pledged to meet as one of 17 Sustainable Development Goals agreed
to in September 2015.
But the good news must be taken with a grain of salt. Donor attention to educa-
tion has proved fickle before; in 2010, domestic investment and donor funding
dedicated to education decreased dramatically when donors reduced global aid
budgets or diverted existing funds to other sectors.
Greater transparency is also needed to hold donors to their promises. In Febru-
ary 2016, donors pledged more than $11 billion in multi-year support in response
to the Syria conflict, to meet goals that include universal school enrollment in
refugee-hosting countries by 2017. Hundreds of millions have been disbursed,
but as of August 2016, a report found that most donors had “failed to meet even
the most basic criteria for transparency.” 
Ways Forward
It is essential that governments affected by crises urgently protect secondary ed-
ucation from attack, create safe and accessible alternatives during violence, and
ensure their own forces refrain from the military use of schools. 
Governments and humanitarian actors need to address barriers that cause older
displaced children to drop out of school, address the needs of girls and children
with disabilities, and support those who need to study an unfamiliar curriculum
or in a foreign language.  
Humanitarian actors and donors responding to humanitarian crises should take
heed of increasing long-term displacement and make secondary education an
integral part of response plans. Transparent, sustained, multi-year funding is ur-
gently needed for education programs to ensure children, and particularly girls,
can access and complete secondary school. 
The link between poverty and education must also be addressed. To reduce
poverty and enable families to pay school-related costs, host countries should
allow refugees access to lawful work. Donor countries should ensure that liveli-
hood efforts are funded alongside education planning, so that families do not
have to rely on child labor and can send secondary-age children to school. 
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Host countries should also revise legal status requirements and restrictions on
movement that proscribe children’s access to secondary education, and with it
their futures. Governments hosting foreign children, regardless of their immigra-
tion status, should provide legal access to secondary education or vocational
and skills training on an equal basis with nationals, and de-link immigration-re-
lated requirements such as residence permits from enrollment criteria.
Host countries should also ensure national education plans include provisions
for refugee education, and accommodate children who may not have official
documents with flexible enrollment requirements. Administering placement
exams, in lieu of requiring transcripts, is one simple way to ensure children are
not excluded from secondary education due to factors beyond their control.  
Host countries must recognize that older children deserve the same protection
and support offered to primary school age children, and above all need to be in
school. Continuing to ignore their needs would be a grave mistake.
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Afghanistan
As fighting continued between Taliban and government forces in Afghanistan in
2016, thousands of civilians were killed and injured in insurgent suicide and IED
attacks. The Taliban claimed responsibility for many of these, but groups affiliat-
ing themselves with the Islamic State (also known as ISIS) claimed several par-
ticularly deadly attacks in Kabul. 
The Afghan government continued to expand its use of illegal militias, some of
which were responsible for killings and assaults on civilians. Afghan National
Security Forces (ANSF) were also responsible for civilian casualties from indis-
criminate aerial and mortar attacks. Both the Taliban and ANSF increasingly used
schools for military purposes; such abuses, along with insecurity throughout the
country, deprived many children, particularly girls, of access to education. Hun-
dreds of thousands of Afghans became newly internally displaced, including
many returned refugees and migrants. 
Throughout the year, political infighting stalled progress on the National Unity
Government’s reform agenda, threatening a political crisis over the govern-
ment’s failure to hold district council and parliamentary elections on time, and
meet the deadline for convening a constitutional Loya Jirga (grand assembly).
The government made some progress in releasing women jailed for so-called
morality crimes, but failed to end prosecutions of women for “running away.”
The year saw no progress in the government’s vows to implement a national ac-
tion plan to curb torture, or to hold accountable government officials responsible
for attacks on journalists.  
Armed Conflict
The United Nations documented 8,397 civilian casualties as of September 30,
approximately the same as the record number set in the first nine months of
2015. The Taliban and other insurgents were responsible for 61 percent, most
from IEDs and suicide attacks. Government forces, including unofficial militias,
caused 23 percent of civilian casualties. 
Kabul saw an increase in particularly deadly attacks, including an April 16 sui-
cide truck bomb that detonated in a parking lot adjacent to the VIP Protection
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Force Directorate. The Taliban clamed responsibility for the blast, which killed 56
civilians and injured more than 300. On July 23, multiple suicide bombings at a
large protest march made up primarily of ethnic Hazaras killed at least 80 and in-
jured more than 250; groups affiliated with ISIS claimed responsibility for the at-
tack. On August 24, insurgents attacked the American Univeristy of Afghanistan
in Kabul, killing 14 students and lecturers. 
Throughout 2016 both ANSF and insurgent forces raided and attacked medical
clinics and hospitals. Early on February 18, Afghan police special forces raided a
clinic run by the humanitarian organization Swedish Committee for Afghanistan,
assaulted medical staff, and shot dead two patients, including a 16-year-old,
and a 15-year-old caregiver. Witnesses reported that international military forces
accompanied the Afghan forces, although they did not enter the clinic. Wardak
provincial authorities justified the raid on the grounds the clinic was treating Tal-
iban. On September 12, Taliban fighters dressed as doctors attacked the Mirwais
Hospital in Kandahar city, apparently targeting the deputy governor who was vis-
iting the facility. In the ensuing gun battle, one patient was killed.
Civilian casualties from ANSF operations during ground offensives also in-
creased compared to 2015; most were due to indiscriminate mortar and rocket
fire in civilian-populated areas. Aerial strikes—most from attack helicopters—re-
sulted in a 72 percent increase in civilian casualties—the highest since 2011.
Most victims were women and children. 
The number of people internally displaced due to the conflict surged as fighting
intensified in mid-year. More than 300,000 new internally displaced persons
(IDPs) in 2016 brought the nationwide total to at least 1.3 million people. Hu-
manitarian organizations reported that many IDPs were living in informal settle-
ments where they lacked access to safe water, sanitation, health care, and
education. Many returning refugees and migrants, most from Pakistan, joined
the ranks of the IDPs.
In late 2015 through at least early 2016, the Taliban stepped up their recruitment
of child soldiers, particularly in northeastern Afghanistan. While the government
criminalized the recruitment of Afghans under 18 years of age, the practice con-
tinued, most notably among the Afghan Local Police (ALP), a militia force. Gov-
ernment forces, including the Afghan National Army (ANA), Afghan National
Police (ANP), and ALP increasingly occupied or used schools for military pur-
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poses in contested areas. The practice was particularly acute in Baghlan and
Helmand provinces. The United Nations also reported a significant increase in
attacks against schools by both Taliban and groups affiliating themselves with
ISIS.
As fighting intensified in northern provinces, Afghan officials reactivated pro-
government militias to bolster security. In Faryab, Kunduz, and other provinces,
these militia forces were accused of killing and assaulting civilians.  
These recent attacks on civilians added to decades of armed conflict and insecu-
rity, which have taken their toll on the population’s mental health. Health ex-
perts have voiced concern about the high prevalence of mental health
conditions among Afghans, and the lack of community-based mental health ser-
vices for those with psychosocial disabilities.
Women’s Rights
Members of parliament opposed to the landmark 2009 Elimination of Violence
Against Women (EVAW) law, notably the parliamentary Judicial Commission
headed by Nazir Ahmad Hanafi, continued their efforts to amend the law to re-
move provisions regulating the minimum age of marriage, prescribing punish-
ments for domestic assault; and providing for women’s shelters. As of November
2016, the draft amendments were being considered by the parliamentary Com-
mission on Women, Civil Society and Human Rights. 
Although in December 2015 the Supreme Court issued a judicial ruling banning
the imprisonment of women for running away from their families, the ban was
limited to cases in which the women went to a medical provider, the police, or
the house of a close male relative (mahram). As this was the practice before the
ruling, the court’s action represented no real change. In many cases, women run-
ning away from home are fleeing domestic violence and forced marriages. The
Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission reported that in the first
eight months of 2016, it documented 2,621 cases of domestic violence, about
the same as 2015, although the number is likely much higher due to underre-
porting. 
On March 8, the Supreme Court granted significant sentence reductions to 13
men convicted of the murder of Farkhunda, a woman who was beaten to death
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by a mob of men in Kabul in March 2015 in a case that sparked widespread crit-
icim of the police and judiciary. The court also reduced the sentences of nine
other defendants who had been convicted of assault. Many of the men involved
in the attack were never arrested.
In December 2015, the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission is-
sued a report documenting the widespread use of so-called virginity examina-
tions on female detainees. Afghan police and prosecutors routinely order such
tests on women in their custody, and use the results to charge women with
“morality crimes.” President Ashraf Ghani reportedly ordered a review of the
practice, but as of November 2016, no results had been announced. 
The Afghan government reportedly finalized its implementation plan for the Na-
tional Action Plan for Women, Peace, and Security, under UN Security Council
Resolution 1325. However, as of November 2016, the government had not final-
ized a budget for the implementation plan.
In December 2015, Sima Joyenda, one of Afghanistan’s only two female gover-
nors, was removed from her post in the western Ghor province after she received
a number of death threats. Joyenda was reappointed as deputy governor of
Kabul province, but the case illustrates the continuing threats that female public
officials face in Afghanistan. 
Arbitrary Detention, Torture, and Discriminatory Practices
Although President Ghani launched a national action plan to eliminate torture in
early 2015, these was no progress on implementation through 2016, and the
government did not make public information on investigations into cases of tor-
ture. In March, a smartphone video showing police in Kandahar beating a sus-
pect and dragging him behind a truck was widely circulated on social media,
prompting government officials to state that the incident had been investigated
and those responsible punished. However, no details were forthcoming. 
Afghan law criminalizes consensual same-sex sexual conduct, and there were re-
ports of harassment, violence, and detentions by police. Advocates for the les-
bian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) community function largely
underground out of fear of persecution.
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Freedom of Expression
The year was the bloodiest on record since 2001 for Afghan journalists, with 12
killed in the first nine months of the year. Government or pro-government ele-
ments were responsible for most of the violence against journalists, followed by
the Taliban. A January 20, 2016 suicide attack on a minibus in Kabul killed seven
journalists affiliated with Tolo, one of the largest national media outlets. The Tal-
iban claimed responsibility for the attack, which it described in a statement as
“revenge” for “false allegations” made against the insurgent group.
On January 30, President Ghani issued a decree for the protection of journalists,
ordering the Attorney General’s Office to “urgently” investigate all deaths of jour-
nalists since 2002 and publicize the results. As of November 2016, no results of
any investigations had been made public.
Following an incident on August 29, in which Ghani’s security detail beat nine
journalists during a visit to Bamiyan city, the National Security Council approved
the Procedure for Immunity and Security of Journalists and the Press, aimed at
protecting journalists from violence.
The implementation of the Access to Information Law, which came into effect in
2014, remained limited. In his January 2016 media decree, President Ghani
urged officials to provide information to journalists in a timely manner. But in
September 2016, the Oversight Commission on Access to Information reported
that the government was failing to share information with journalists.
The Media Violations Investigations Commission, which the government had dis-
solved in 2015 in response to demands by media watchdogs, was reinstated.
The minister of information and culture oversees the commission. Powerful indi-
viduals, mostly government officials, have used the commission as a tool to in-
timidate and silence journalists.
Key International Actors
The US military in May 2016 released a report on the October 2015 airstrike on a
Médecins Sans Frontières (Doctors Without Borders) hospital in Kunduz that
killed 42 and wounded dozens more. The report concluded that US personnel
had committed violations of international humanitarian law during the opera-
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tion, yet because there was no showing that the personnel acted deliberately,
did not recommend that any criminal charges be brought. 
At the NATO Summit in Warsaw on July 8-9, member states pledged to sustain
the Resolute Support mission in Afghanistan beyond 2016 and continue the mis-
sion’s training and financial assistance to Afghan security forces through 2020.
At the summit, NATO members endorsed a new policy for protecting civilians that
included measures to monitor its own actions in conflict areas and respond to
those of partner states. 
The US government did not clarify the overarching military objectives of US or
NATO military forces supporting Afghan security forces. As of June 15, the US au-
thorized its forces to “more proactively support” ANSF through providing “close
air support” and “accompanying and advising Afghan conventional forces.” 
The US continued to carry out counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan,
often partnering with Afghan Special Forces units in ground operations. The US
carried out airstrikes on a level not seen since 2011 in battles in Helmand, Kun-
duz, and Uruzgan when Taliban forces threated to take over provincial capitals,
and against Taliban and groups affiliating themselves with ISIS, particularly in
Nangarhar. More than 100 civilians were reportedly killed by US airstrikes in the
first half of 2016.
Noting Taliban gains and continuing insecurity in Afghanistan, on July 6, US Pres-
ident Barack Obama announced a revised withdrawal timetable to leave 8,400
troops in Afghanistan by the end of December 2016. Germany, Turkey, and Italy
agreed to keep their deployments in Afghanistan at current levels of 850, 760,
and 500 troops, respectively, after 2016. The UK increased its troop commitment,
adding 100 additional forces in July 2016.
India committed to defense and counterterror cooperation and promised assis-
tance in education, health, agriculture, empowerment of women, infrastructure
and strengthening of democratic institutions, but did not call for human right
protections. 
The International Criminal Court continued its preliminary examination of allega-
tions of serious international crimes in Afghanistan, which it began in 2007.
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At the Brussels Conference on Afghanistan in October 2016, donors committed
US$15.2 billion to the Afghan government, but specified no concrete human
rights benchmarks for that assistance.
Triggered by a surge in the return of refugees and migrants from Pakistan, in Sep-
tember the UN high commissioner for refugees launched an emergency appeal
for Afghanistan to provide humanitarian assistance to an unprecedented number
of returnees, along with hundreds of thousands of those newly displaced by the
expanding conflict. 
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Algeria
Algerian authorities increasingly resorted to criminal prosecutions in 2016
against bloggers, journalists, and media figures for peaceful speech, using arti-
cles in the penal code criminalizing “offending the president,” “insulting state
officials” or “denigrating Islam.” They have also prosecuted labor activists who
organized or called for peaceful demonstrations on charges such as “unautho-
rized gathering.”
Parliament adopted amendments to the constitution in February 2016 that in-
clude recognition of academic freedom and press freedom without prior censor-
ship and without prison as a punishment for press offenses. However, the
constitution conditions the exercise of these and other rights to national laws
that restrict them significantly.   
Freedom of Assembly 
Algeria’s 2016 constitution states that “the right to peaceful assembly is guaran-
teed within the framework of the law, which sets forth how it is to be exercised”
(article 49).
In practice, relying on a range of laws, Algerian authorities routinely violate the
right to freedom of assembly. The penal code punishes organizing or participat-
ing in an unauthorized demonstration in a public place with up to one year in
prison (article 98). Authorities in Algiers, the capital, banned public demonstra-
tions indefinitely in 2001, when the country was under a state of emergency. Au-
thorities did not rescind the ban when they lifted the state of emergency in 2011.
The ban on demonstrations in Algiers is strictly enforced by authorities, who mo-
bilize large numbers of police to thwart demonstrations and detain participants,
usually holding them for a few hours before releasing them. Police arrested 20
members of the National Coordination of Contractual Teachers who called for a
demonstration in Algiers on March 21 and 22, and held them in detention in po-
lice stations for several hours, then released them without charge. 
Police arrested relatives of the forcibly disappeared during the violence of the
90s and several human rights activists as they demonstrated on August 30, the
International Day of the Disappeared, in front of the National Consultative Com-
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mission for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights in Algiers. They held
them for several hours before releasing them without charge.
Authorities have also restricted the right to assemble even in private spaces in-
doors. On February 6, 2016, the National Union of Public Administration Staff
(SNAPAP), an independent labor union, organized a symposium on the socio-
economic situation in Algeria at the House of the Unions, a private space rented
by the SNAPAP. Police encircled the place, prevented people from accessing it,
and arrested six union leaders for several hours, then released them without
charge. 
Freedom of Association and Unions
In 2012, the government enacted Law 12-06, which requires all associations—in-
cluding those that had already successfully registered—to re-file registration ap-
plications and obtain a registration receipt from the Interior Ministry before they
can operate legally, in a cumbersome procedure akin to a new registration.
To date, major human rights organization such as the Algerian League for Human
Rights (Ligue Algérienne des Droits de l’Homme, LADDH) and Youth Action Rally
(Rassemblement Action Jeunesse, RAJ,) and the Algerian division of Amnesty In-
ternational, which submitted compliance applications in January 2014 as pro-
vided for by Law 12-06, have still not obtained a receipt certifying their legal
existence. The absence of a receipt weakens them by making it impossible to
open a bank account or rent an office in their own name, or hire a public hall for
a meeting. Moreover, members of an association that is “non-accredited, sus-
pended, or dissolved” risk prison sentences of up to six months for conducting
activities in its name. 
Until the 1990s, Algeria had only one lawful workers’ union, the General Union of
Algerian Workers (Union Générale des travailleurs algériens, UGTA). On June 2,
1990, Algeria adopted Law 90-14, allowing for the establishment of independent
unions. Several autonomous unions were created in the public sector.
In practice, authorities have curtailed the work of independent unions in various
ways. They withheld legal status from independent unions that applied for it,
hindering their ability to collect the membership fees they would need to rent an
office and organize events. Without legal status, they cannot open a bank ac-
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count or file cases in court. Several union activists faced retaliation for organiz-
ing or participating in strikes. They were suspended from their positions without
compensation and never rehired. In 2016, the International Labor Organization
recommended that Algerian authorities end the practice of preventing the regis-
tration of autonomous unions and reinstate all workers suspended or dismissed
because of their trade union activities.
Freedom of Speech
Since the 1990s, Algeria has seen a proliferation of privately owned newspapers
that enjoy a certain margin of freedom to criticize public figures and state poli-
cies. The 2014 Law on audio-visual activities ended the formal state monopoly
on audiovisual media. However, repressive press laws, dependence on revenues
from public-sector advertising, and other factors limit press freedom. The “infor-
mation code” adopted in 2012, contains several articles that constrain freedom
of expression. Article 2 states that news journalism is to be “a freely practiced
activity,” as long as it respects “national identity, the cultural values of society,
national sovereignty and national unity, as well as the requirements of national
security, national defense, public order, and the country’s economic interests,
among others.”
In 2016, authorities prosecuted a number of Algerians for critical speech. On
September 6, an appeals court gave Slimane Bouhafs, a converted Christian, a
three-year prison sentence for Facebook posts “offending the prophet” and
“denigrating” Islam, under article 144 bis of the penal code. 
On August 9, an Algiers appeals court upheld a two-year prison sentence for Mo-
hamed Tamalt, a freelance journalist with dual Algerian and British nationality,
for a video he posted on Facebook featuring a poem deemed offensive to Alge-
ria’s president. 
On May 25, the Laghouat first instance court sentenced Belkacem Khencha, a
labor rights defender, to six months in prison for posting a video on Facebook
criticizing the judiciary for sentences imposed on other rights activists. He re-
mained free pending an appeal scheduled for September 29. 
On June 24, authorities placed in pretrial detention two executives from the pri-
vately owned television channel KBC that aired the satirical political talk show
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“Ki Hna Ki Ness” (Just Like Everybody Else), five days after security forces shut
down operations at the studio producing the show and confiscated production
materials. “Ki Hna Ki Ness” had begun broadcasting on June 6.
The two executives were accused of making false statements under article 223
of the penal code and complicity in the abuse of office under articles 33 and 42
of a 2001 anti-corruption law. They spent three weeks in prison before being
sentenced, on July 18, to a suspended prison term of six months, and a fine of
50,000 dinars (US$457). At time of writing the show had not resumed and pro-
duction materials remain confiscated.
Women’s Rights
Algeria’s Constitution enshrines the principle of non-discrimination based on
sex and requires the state to take positive action to ensure equality of rights and
duties of all citizens, men and women. In February 2016, parliament introduced
an article proclaiming that the “state works to attain parity between women and
men in the job market,” and “encourages the promotion of women to positions
of responsibility in public institutions and in businesses.”
On December 10, 2015, parliament adopted amendments to the penal code
specifically criminalizing some forms of domestic violence. Assault against one’s
spouse or former spouse can be punished by up to 20 years in prison, depend-
ing on the victim’s injuries, and the perpetrator can face a life sentence for at-
tacks resulting in death. The amendments also criminalize sexual harassment in
public places.
Despite adoption of the law, Algeria has yet to adopt the more comprehensive
legal measures, such as protection orders to protect women from violence and
concrete duties on law enforcement to respond to domestic violence, needed to
prevent domestic violence, assist survivors, and prosecute offenders. The law,
moreover, makes women vulnerable to threats from the offender or relatives, by
including a provision that a pardon by the victim puts an end to prosecution.
Algeria’s Family Code continues to discriminate against women despite some
amendments in 2005 that improved women’s access to divorce and child cus-
tody. An adult woman still requires a male guardian to conclude her marriage
contract, a requirement not imposed on men. A man can divorce unilaterally,
while a woman must apply to the courts. If a woman wishes to divorce without
her husband’s consent and without justification, she needs to pay back her
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dowry, or an equivalent amount of money, to her husband in return for the di-
vorce. This is particularly problematic as the code does not recognize marital
property, provisions that values women’s non-monetary contributions to the
marriage at the time of termination.
Accountability for Past Crimes
Perpetrators of human rights crimes and abuses during the internal armed con-
flict of the 1990s continued to enjoy impunity under the Charter on Peace and
National Reconciliation. The charter criminalizes comments deemed to denigrate
the security forces or state institutions for their conduct during the armed con-
flict, when both state forces and extremist Islamist groups committed torture,
enforced disappearances, unlawful killings, and other serious abuses. 
Associations representing the families of the disappeared continued to face de-
nial for legal registration. Families of the disappeared alleged being subject to
pressures because they refused to accept compensation from the state in ex-
change for accepting a death certificate for their still-missing relatives.
Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity
Algeria’s penal code criminalizes same sex relations with a prison sentence of
two months to two years. In 2015, several people were arrested for same-sex re-
lations but none were prosecuted. 
Sahrawi Refugee Camps 
Algeria allows the Polisario Front, the liberation movement for the Western Sa-
hara, to administer refugee camps housing some 100,000 Sahrawi refugees in
the southern desert near the border with Western Sahara. During his first visit to
the refugee camps as UN Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon in March called it an
“unacceptable situation” and angered Moroccan authorities by referring to the
Western Sahara as “occupied” by Morocco.
In at least three cases during 2016, Sahrawi families prevented their adult
daughters from exercising their right to freedom of movement by departing for
Spain, where they had lived and established legal residency. The Polisario was
unwilling or incapable of ending these situations of illegal confinement of
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women, a form of domestic violence. Algeria, despite its ultimate responsibility
for protecting the human rights of all persons present on its territory, did not in-
tervene to end their confinement.
Key International Actors
Algeria continued to deny international human rights organizations entry to con-
duct research missions. It also did not reply to requests, pending since 1997 and
2011, respectively, for visits by the UN special rapporteurs on torture and on free-
dom of peaceful assembly and of association.
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Angola
Human rights in Angola suffered during 2016 due to continued government re-
pression and the country’s worst economic crisis since the civil war ended in
2002. 
Sparked by the global drop in oil prices, the economic crisis slowed a decade of
growth and exposed unresolved problems caused by years of corruption, mis-
managed public funds, and political control of institutions. Calls to diversify the
economy to create new revenue sources led to massive land acquisition by the
government and private businesses, often with forced evictions and other viola-
tions, including in the capital, Luanda. 
President José Eduardo dos Santos, in power since 1979, has announced that he
will step down in 2018, and that he will not run for office in 2017 elections. Secu-
rity forces continued to crack down on pro-democracy activists and those
protesting on behalf of human rights. 
Freedom of Media
Coverage in state-run media remained highly biased in favor of the government
and the ruling party, the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA).
The government continued to restrict freedom of expression with censorship in
state-run media and some private media controlled by ruling party officials,
which remained the only outlets with countrywide coverage. 
In 2016, state television channel TPA at times invited opposition and civil society
groups to debates but those discussions mostly maintained a pro-government
slant. Social media, blogs, and privately owned news websites continued to op-
erate without interference as the main channels for independent news and de-
bates. 
In November, without public consultation, the parliament passed a new media
law that gives regulatory control of all media to a new body that is controlled by
the state and ruling party. The Angolan union of journalists called the law “a po-
litical tool to intimidate the press,” and vowed to take the matter to the constitu-
tional court. 
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Freedom of Assembly
Article 47 of Angola’s Constitution permits citizens to protest without pre-autho-
rization, provided they inform authorities in advance. However, the government
consistently blocked peaceful anti-government protests with intimidation and
detention, and when peaceful protests did take place, they frequently encoun-
tered excessive force and arbitrary arrests. 
In March 2016, after a lengthy trial, a Luanda court sentenced 17 members of a
book club to between two and eight years in prison for discussing peaceful
protest and democracy at a meeting in June 2015, inspired by Gene Sharp’s
book, From Dictatorship to Democracy. 
In June, in an unprecedented move, the governor of Benguela province gave per-
mission for a group of anti-government activists called the Revolutionary Move-
ment to protest against the arrests. Later that month, after international
condemnation, the Supreme Court provisionally released the 17 people pending
a final decision on their appeal. In September, they were pardoned following the
approval of an amnesty law.
In May, the Supreme Court overturned the conviction of human rights defender
Marcos Mavungo, who had been sentenced to six years in prison in September
2015 in relation to a planned peaceful demonstration on corruption, human
rights abuses, and poor governance in oil-rich Cabinda province.
Treatment of Detainees
Prison conditions remained poor, with local activists and media highlighting cor-
ruption, overcrowding, and violence. In April, the Angolan government an-
nounced that it would open four new jails by the end of the year to help
accommodate the estimated 24,000 inmates distributed among 40 prisons
across the country. In July, parliament approved a new amnesty law that granted
freedom to thousands of inmates with prison sentences of up to 12 years for
nonviolent crimes.
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Abuses by Security Forces
Security forces continued to use excessive force with impunity as the govern-
ment failed to investigate and prosecute officers who committed serious human
rights violations. 
Authorities refused requests from local human rights groups, opposition mem-
bers of parliament and the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
to establish an independent commission to investigate the events of April 2015,
when a police operation against a religious sect left at least 22 people dead in
Huambo. 
In April 2016, Julino Kalupeteka, the leader of the sect, and nine of his followers
were sentenced to up to 28 years in prison for the killing of nine police officers
during the raid on their makeshift camp. However, to date, no security force
members have been arrested or prosecuted for the killing of the sect members.
In April, police gunfire wounded at least three people during a student demon-
stration against an increase in school fees in Caluquembe, Huila province. Police
initially denied firing live ammunition but later admitted that one officer had
opened fire and said he would be punished. It is not known what steps were
taken to punish him, or others. 
On August 6, soldiers fired live ammunition during a peaceful protest against
forced evictions in Luanda, killing a teenage boy (see below). The government
announced an investigation into the case but had not published any findings at
time of writing.
Right to Health 
Angola’s healthcare system, already under stress due to falling oil prices, strug-
gled to respond to parallel outbreaks of malaria and yellow fever. 
Angola has one of the highest child mortality rates in the world. According to the
Children’s Rights and Emergency Relief Organization (UNICEF), one in five chil-
dren in Angola does not survive to age 5. Almost 3,000 people died from
malaria, predominantly children, in the first quarter of the year—a much higher
number than in previous years—because among other reasons, the healthcare
system ran out of basic malaria medicines. 
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The healthcare system also ran out of yellow fever vaccines, essential for pro-
tecting children against this potentially deadly disease. Both basic malaria med-
icines and yellow fever vaccines are on the World Health Organization (WHO)
Model List of Essential Medicines. Governments are therefore required to ensure
their adequate availability even in times of economic crisis. Shortages of other
essential medicines and medical supplies were also reported, including syringes
and gloves, due to health budget cuts.
Housing Rights and Forced Evictions
Forced evictions persisted during the year with a host of associated human
rights violations. In Luanda, a special force tasked with protecting government
infrastructure and land forcibly evicted over 1,000 people in Zango area on the
outskirts of the city, destroying their homes and property. 
In July, armed soldiers with bulldozers and trucks arrived without warning or a
court order and demolished homes. In August, security forces responded to a
residents’ protest by shooting in the air and at their feet, killing a 14-year-old
boy. After growing complaints of abuses by soldiers against Zango residents, au-
thorities ordered the operation to be stopped in late September. However, at
time of writing, the forcibly evicted residents had not been relocated or compen-
sated. 
In June, 18 nongovernmental organizations signed a petition that denounced
land grabbing and forced evictions in Curoca, Cunene province. The groups ac-
cused security forces of abusing their powers, using excessive force, and arbi-
trarily detaining activists from the local communities.
Key International Actors
Angola continued to play an important role in the region, most notably in con-
flicts in Africa’s Great Lakes region. As president of the International Conference
on the Region of the Great Lakes (ICGLR), Angola organized in October an inter-
national conference to discuss the situation in the Democratic Republic of
Congo. 
Following an invitation by the government, the United Nations special rapporteur
on the human rights of migrants visited Angola in May. The UN official urged An-
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gola to ratify the Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture (OPCAT)
and to establish a National Preventive Mechanism to undertake regular unan-
nounced visits to all places of detention, including migrant detention centers. He
also renewed calls for Angola to establish an independent national human rights
institution. 
In October, a delegation of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’
Rights, led by the chairperson and special rapporteur on freedom of expression
and access to information, visited Angola at the invitation of the government.
Angola’s mandate as non-permanent member of the UN Security Council ended
in 2016. Despite the economic crisis, Angola has thus far remained donor inde-
pendent thanks to years of strong trade links with China. The health crisis has,
however, forced the government to request help from the United States, with
which it already had strong bilateral relations. Throughout 2016, the US provided
assistance to prevent major infectious diseases and strengthen Angola’s health
system. The European Union also provided funding and support to develop
higher education, agriculture, and sanitation.
In June, Angola endorsed the Safe Schools Declaration, thereby committing to
implement and use the Guidelines for Protecting Schools and Universities from
Military Use during Armed Conflict. 
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Argentina
Argentina faces long-standing human rights problems that include police abuse,
poor prison conditions, endemic violence against women, difficulty accessing
reproductive services, and obstacles keeping indigenous people from enjoying
the rights afforded to them by Argentine and international law. 
Impunity for the 1994 AMIA bombing, vaguely defined criminal provisions that
undermine free speech, and delays in appointing permanent judges are serious
concerns.
In 2016, Argentina adopted federal regulations to ensure access to official infor-
mation and to prevent favoritism in government purchase of media advertise-
ments, an important source of media revenue. Argentina continues to make
significant progress protecting lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT)
rights and prosecuting officials for abuses committed during the country’s “Dirty
War” (1976-1983), although trials have been delayed. 
Confronting Past Abuses
As of September 2016, 2,541 people had been charged, 723 convicted, and 76
acquitted of crimes allegedly committed by Argentina’s military junta during the
country’s “Dirty War,” according to the Attorney General’s Office. Prosecutions
were made possible by a series of actions taken in the early 2000s by Congress,
the Supreme Court, and federal judges annulling amnesty laws and striking
down pardons of former officials implicated in the crimes. As of November 2016,
121 children illegally taken from their parents during the war had been located.
In May, a federal court convicted 14 former military and intelligence chiefs from
Argentina and one from Uruguay of crimes against humanity committed as part
of the Condor Plan, a joint initiative targeting political opponents by the dictator-
ships in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay. In August, a
federal court sentenced 28 people to life without parole for crimes that included
torture, homicide, and the illegal abduction of babies in 1974—the first convic-
tion for abuses committed before the 1976 coup. 
Given the large number of victims, suspects, and cases, prosecutors and judges
face challenges bringing those responsible to justice while respecting their due
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process rights. In September, the Attorney General’s Office reported that 489
pretrial detainees and convicted prisoners were under house arrest, a right pro-
vided for by Argentine law to people over 70 years old. In August, the govern-
ment said it would not appeal judicial rulings granting house arrest to these
detainees and convicted prisoners.
The fate of Jorge Julio López, a torture victim who disappeared in 2006—a day
before he was due to attend the trial of one of his torturers—remains unknown.
Freedom of Expression
In January 2016, police detained Milagro Sala, a prominent social leader in Jujuy
province, for participating in peaceful street protests. Sala and other demonstra-
tors had gathered in the provincial capital to protest a decree issued by the gov-
ernor that purported to regulate organizations like Sala’s, which implement
government-funded housing and other welfare programs. 
Sala was charged with instigating protesters to commit crimes and also with
sedition, an offense that Argentine law broadly defines as “publicly mobilizing
to prevent implementation of national or provincial laws or resolutions of na-
tional or public officials.” As of November, Sala was in prison awaiting trial on
several charges, including sedition. 
Upon taking office, President Mauricio Macri adopted a temporary set of decrees
to regulate media, and created a new agency that reports to the Communications
Ministry to implement the new rules. In July, the government said it was drafting
a communications law that it claimed would respect free speech. As of Novem-
ber, the law was still being drafted but the new, supposedly temporary agency
that lacks structural independence from the executive had already issued rulings
regulating media.
In August, the Macri administration issued a resolution setting forth transparent
criteria for government purchase of media advertisements, and in September,
Congress passed a national law ensuring public access to information held by
government bodies. Some provinces and municipalities still lack such laws,
however, undermining free speech.
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Police Abuse and Prison Conditions 
Overcrowding, ill-treatment by guards, inadequate facilities, and inmate violence
continue to be serious issues in Argentina’s prisons. The National Penitentiary
Office, created by Congress in 2003 to supervise federal prisons and protect the
rights of detainees, reported eight violent deaths in federal prisons between Jan-
uary and September 2016. The office also documented 775 cases of torture or ill-
treatment in federal prisons in 2015, and 446 cases between January and
September 2016. 
A report published in September by the Provincial Commission for Memory—an
autonomous public body created by the legislature of Buenos Aires province—
found that in 2015, an average of three detainees died per week in Buenos Aires
province prisons, most of them due to preventable illnesses. The report high-
lights that more than half of detainees in prisons and police stations in the
province were being held in pretrial detention.
Police abuse remains a serious problem. Security forces occasionally employ ex-
cessive force against protesters, despite a 2011 commitment by authorities in at
least 19 of Argentina’s 23 provinces to ensure that force is used proportionately.  
In May, under a justice reform package called “Justice 2020,” the Macri adminis-
tration said it would create a national mechanism to prevent torture, in an effort
to fulfill its obligations under the Optional Protocol to the Convention against
Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.
Judicial Independence
The delayed appointment of permanent judges by the Council of the Judiciary
has led to temporary appointments of judges who lack security of tenure, which,
the Supreme Court ruled in 2015, undermines judicial independence. As of No-
vember 2016, 254 of 979 lower-court judgeships remained vacant. 
In December 2015, President Macri issued an executive decree to appoint two
Supreme Court justices, without following the process established in a 2003
presidential decree that includes civil-society participation in nominating judges
and Senate approval. After strong criticism by the opposition, lawyers, and non-
government organizations (NGOs), the government implemented the process. In
June 2016, after taking into consideration inputs from the public, NGOs, and aca-
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demic and bar associations, the Senate approved President Macri’s nominations
and the justices took office in August.
Impunity for the AMIA Bombing
Twenty-two years after the 1994 bombing of the Argentine Israelite Mutual Asso-
ciation (AMIA) in Buenos Aires that killed 85 people and injured more than 300,
no one has been convicted of the crime. 
The investigation stalled when Iran, suspected by the Argentine judiciary of or-
dering the attack, refused to allow Argentine investigators to interview Iranian
suspects in Argentina. In 2013, Argentina and Iran signed a memorandum of un-
derstanding (MOU) that allowed an international commission of jurists to review
evidence and question Iranian suspects—but only in Tehran, which would likely
have rendered the interviews inadmissible in an Argentine court. A federal court
declared the MOU unconstitutional, a ruling that the Macri administration said it
would not appeal. The government said further that it would ask Interpol to re-
issue red notices—a form of international arrest warrant—to detain several Irani-
ans implicated in the attack, and that it would present draft legislation to try the
Iranians in absentia. 
In January 2015—days after he filed a criminal complaint accusing then-Presi-
dent Cristina Fernández and her foreign affairs minister of conspiring with Iran to
undermine the investigation—Alberto Nisman, the prosecutor in charge of inves-
tigating the bombing, was found dead in his home with a single gunshot wound
to the head and a pistol beside him. In 2015, a federal court dismissed Nisman’s
complaint but an appeal by a federal prosecutor to reopen the investigation was
pending at time of writing. As of November 2016, the courts had not determined
if Nisman was a victim of suicide or murder. 
In 2015, a court began the trial of several officials—including former President
Carlos Menem, his head of intelligence, and a judge—for their alleged interfer-
ence with the initial investigation into the bombing. The trial continued at time
of writing.
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Indigenous Rights
Indigenous people in Argentina face obstacles in accessing justice, land, educa-
tion, health care, and basic services. Argentina has failed to effectively imple-
ment existing laws to protect indigenous peoples’ right to free, prior, and
informed consent when the government adopts decisions that may affect their
rights—a right provided for in international law. 
In May, President Macri created by decree the Advisory and Participatory Council
of Indigenous People of Argentina to protect and promote indigenous rights.
One of the council’s tasks is to ensure that a survey of indigenous lands, re-
quired by a 2006 law, is carried out. The survey is being conducted, but slowly.  
Women’s Rights
Abortion is illegal in Argentina, except in cases of rape or when the life of the
woman is at risk. But even in such cases, women and girls are sometimes sub-
ject to criminal prosecution for seeking abortions, and have trouble accessing
such reproductive services as contraception and voluntary sterilization. 
In April, a 27-year-old woman from Tucumán province was sentenced to eight
years in prison for aggravated homicide after suffering a miscarriage. In August,
the Supreme Court of Tucumán ordered her release, but at time of writing it had
yet to adopt a final decision regarding her conviction.
Despite a 2009 law setting forth comprehensive measures to prevent and punish
violence against women, the unpunished killing of women remains a serious
concern. The National Registry of Femicides, administered by the Supreme Court,
reported 235 femicides, but only seven convictions, in 2015. 
Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity
In 2010, Argentina became the first Latin American country to legalize same-sex
marriage. The Civil Marriage Law allows same-sex couples to enter into civil mar-
riages and affords them the legal protections of marriage enjoyed by opposite-
sex couples, including adoption rights and pension benefits. Since 2010, nearly
15,000 same-sex couples have married nationwide. 
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In 2012, the landmark Gender Identity Law established the right of individuals
over the age of 18 to choose their gender identity, undergo gender reassignment,
and revise official documents without any prior judicial or medical approval. 
Key International Actors and Foreign Policy
In July, the United Nations Human Rights Committee called on Argentina to de-
criminalize abortion and ensure that the new Communications Law does not
generate media concentration. It also urged Argentina to appoint an ombuds-
man to monitor human rights—a position that has been vacant since 2009. 
In October, the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention (UNWAD) ruled that Mi-
lagro Sala’s detention was arbitrary and urged the Argentine government to im-
mediately release her. In November, the Argentine government invited the
UNWAD and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights to visit the country
to assess Sala’s case.
In August, the US government declassified over 1,000 documents—including
some from the FBI and Pentagon—containing information about Argentina’s Dirty
War, an important contribution to the country’s efforts to bring those responsible
for abuses to justice.
At a December 2015 meeting of the regional trade bloc Mercosur, and several
times afterwards, President Macri openly criticized Venezuela’s poor human
rights record and called for the release of its political prisoners—a much clearer
stance than was taken by Foreign Minister Susanna Malcorra before the Organi-
zation of American States in May 2015.
In 2016, Argentina announced that it would host a conference on the global Safe
Schools Declaration in March 2017.
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Armenia
Armenia’s human rights record remained uneven in 2016. Authorities used ex-
cessive and disproportionate force against peaceful protesters, assaulted jour-
nalists, and pressed unjustified criminal charges against protest leaders and
participants. Ill-treatment in custody remained a persistent problem, and investi-
gations have been ineffective. 
Other concerns include domestic violence, often perpetrated with impunity, vio-
lence, and discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity, and
unnecessary restrictions on access to pain medications for people with life-limit-
ing illnesses. 
Excessive Use of Police Force 
In July, Armenian authorities used excessive force against peaceful protesters
demonstrating support for a radical group opposed to the government, and as-
saulted journalists reporting on the demonstrations. Authorities arbitrarily de-
tained dozens of protest leaders and participants, pressing unjustified criminal
charges against them and denying some of them basic rights of detainees.
Protests erupted after armed men from the radical opposition group, “Founding
Parliament,” seized a police station in the capital Yerevan on July 17, killing one
policeman and taking several hostages. Before the gunmen surrendered on July
31, public support for them and disaffection with the government grew into a
protest movement. The protests were largely peaceful, with isolated incidents of
violence from participants.
On July 29, police fired stun grenades into peaceful crowds in the neighborhood
of the seized police station, causing demonstrators to sustain first and second
degree burns and fragmentation wounds. Police did not attempt less violent
crowd control means, and did not make any meaningful effort to warn crowds to
disperse or about their plans to use force. 
Police and unidentified people in civilian clothes acting with them, then charged
towards the protesters, punching, kicking, and using wooden clubs and iron
bars to beat some protesters, before detaining many of them.
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Police warned several journalists to move away from the main crowd before
using force. While most journalists complied, police fired several stun grenades
in their direction, injuring at least eight. Police and unidentified men also beat
some journalists and damaged and seized their equipment.
Authorities opened an investigation into police actions on July 29, sacked the
Yerevan police chief, suspended four officers pending the investigation, and rep-
rimanded 13. At time of writing, the investigation was ongoing.
Arbitrary Detentions and Ill-Treatment
In July and August, authorities arbitrarily detained dozens of people linked to the
protests, beating many of them, and pressing unjustified criminal charges
against some. 
Police held some detainees for up to 12 hours without documenting the deten-
tion, and on at least two occasions arbitrarily held groups of people in a gymna-
sium on an interior troop base. Authorities primarily relied on police testimony
to press criminal charges against at least 40 people for allegedly “organizing
mass disorder,” which carries a penalty of up to 10 years’ imprisonment. Courts
relied on general and abstract reasons to send many of the detainees to pretrial
detention. On appeal, courts released some protest leaders from detention on
their own recognizance. 
Authorities denied many detainees their basic rights, including prompt access to
a lawyer of their choosing and the opportunity to inform a relative of their deten-
tion and whereabouts. Police also beat many detainees, in some case severely,
and did not allow some to get prompt medical care for their injuries. At time of
writing, an investigation was pending into illegal detentions and beatings by po-
lice. 
In a separate case, on January 1, police arrested opposition activist Gevorg Sa-
faryan for allegedly assaulting a police officer, amid a scuffle during a public
event organized by “Founding Parliament” members. Sarafyan denies he at-
tacked the officer. A court approved Safaryan’s pretrial detention despite no evi-
dence that he posed a flight risk or risk to the investigation. Local human rights
groups consider his prosecution politically motivated. Safaryan’s trial was con-
tinuing at time of writing. 
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In June, authorities arrested “Founding Parliament” leader Jirair Selifyan and six
other members on charges of planning an armed coup. Selifyan denied the accu-
sations as politically motivated. 
The gunmen involved in the July armed takeover of the Yerevan police compound
demanded Selifyan’s release and the president’s resignation, initially in ex-
change for release of hostages. After the men surrendered, authorities charged
them with seizure of state buildings, hostage taking, and illegal arms posses-
sion. Authorities also arrested several other “Founding Parliament” members,
including on suspicion of aiding and abetting the gunmen. Among them is a US
citizen of Armenian descent, Garo Yegnukyan, who participated in peaceful
protests following the seizure of the police station, and considers the charges
politically motivated. Yegnukyan remained in pretrial detention at time of writ-
ing.
Women’s Rights
Despite evidence that violence against women remains common and sustained
pressure from women’s rights groups and activists, Armenia has no law criminal-
izing domestic violence and has not ratified the Council of Europe’s Convention
on Prevention and Combatting Violence against Women and Domestic Violence.
The Coalition to Stop Violence Against Women published a report documenting
30 cases of women killed by intimate partners and family members between
2010 and 2015. The report notes that domestic violence is grossly underreported
and largely perpetrated with impunity. Coalition members receive more than
2,000 calls about domestic violence each year.
Palliative Care
Authorities continue to discuss reforming complicated and time-consuming pre-
scription and procurement procedures that create unnecessary obstacles in ac-
cessing essential opioid medications. Current regulations obstruct delivery of
adequate palliative care, condemning most patients with life-limiting illnesses
to unnecessary suffering. Lack of oral opioids, tight police controls on injectable
opioids, and restrictive policies on procurement, prescription, and disbursement
are inconsistent with many World Health Organization palliative care recommen-
dations.
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Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity
Activists reported that lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and intersex (LBGTI)
people face discrimination, harassment, and violence. The government has not
addressed hate speech or discrimination against LGBTI people. Gender identity
and sexual orientation are not included as protected grounds in anti-discrimina-
tion or hate speech laws, limiting legal recourse for many crimes against LGBTI
people. 
Following the October 2015 Rainbow forum, organized by Armenian LGBTI-
friendly groups to discuss protection and promotion of minority rights, anony-
mous people targeted some participants with intimidation and threats, mostly
on social media, including to burn and kill them. Authorities refused to launch a
criminal investigation into the threats, citing lack of evidence. 
In June, the LGBTI rights group, PINK Armenia, published a survey revealing that
90 percent of the population is hostile to LGBTI people and support limits on
their rights. In July, PINK Armenia released a report documenting 46 cases of vio-
lence and discrimination against LGBTI people in 2015. The government has not
taken meaningful steps to combat stereotypes and discrimination against LGBTI
people. 
Key International Actors
The observation mission of the Council of Europe’s Parliamentary Assembly
(PACE) called the December 2015 referendum to transform the government from
a presidential to a parliamentary system “driven by political interests instead of
the needs of the Armenian public.” PACE criticized inaccurate voter lists, allega-
tions of vote buying, abuse of administrative resources, an imbalanced media
field, and the effective exclusion of people with disabilities in the absence of
mobile voting. 
The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe’s representative on
freedom of the media, Dunja Mijatović, called for an investigation into verbal
and physical attacks on journalists at referendum polling stations. 
In response to the July demonstrations, the European Union delegation, together
with heads of mission of EU Members States in Armenia, called on the authori-
ties to avoid using unnecessary force and for effective investigations into police
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actions, and urged demonstrators to protest peacefully. The United Nations in
Armenia called for swift investigations and respect for peaceful assembly and
free expression rights and criticized the use of force against journalists. 
In a September Human Rights Council speech, United Nations High Commis-
sioner for Human Rights Zeid Ra’ad al-Hussein criticized the authorities’ denial
of full access for his staff, preventing full engagement with the government and
civil society.  
In a report to the Human Rights Council in March, Maud de Boer-Buquicchio, UN
special rapporteur on the sale of children, child prostitution, and child pornogra-
phy, acknowledged Armenia’s progress in combatting trafficking in persons, re-
ducing placement of children in residential care, and limiting intercountry
adoptions. However, she stated that the extent of child trafficking is unclear in
the absence of relevant legislation and child-friendly complaint mechanisms,
and insufficient awareness-raising among parents, professionals, and society.
She urged authorities to pass domestic violence and other relevant legislation
and ensure the child protection system consistently acts in the best interests of
the child. 
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Australia
Australia is a vibrant multicultural democracy with a strong record of protecting
civil and political rights, but serious human rights issues remain. In 2016, the
government continued its draconian policy of offshore transfers of asylum seek-
ers to Manus Island in Papua New Guinea (PNG) and Nauru. There were growing
calls to address abusive offshore detention conditions and resettle those found
to be refugees in Australia. 
Indigenous Australians remain disproportionately subject to the criminal justice
system. In 2016, the government of Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull announced
a royal commission into the mistreatment of children in detention facilities in the
Northern Territory.
Australia does not recognize the right of same-sex couples to marry. The Aus-
tralian government announced a plebiscite on the right of same-sex couples to
marry, but political opponents blocked it, arguing a plebiscite is expensive and
wasteful and that the issue should be determined by a parliamentary free vote.  
In November, controversy over the Racial Discrimination Act—including attacks
on the Australian Human Rights Commission for its handling of discrimination
complaints—led the government to set up a parliamentary inquiry to examine
whether the act imposes unreasonable limits on free speech. Other human
rights concerns include overly broad counterterrorism laws and limits to the
rights of people with disabilities. 
Asylum Seekers and Refugees 
Since June 2013, anyone intercepted arriving by boat and seeking refuge in Aus-
tralia has been sent to Manus Island or Nauru. At time of writing, more than 900
asylum seekers and refugees lived on Manus Island and about 1,200 on Nauru.
In February 2016, the Australian High Court rejected a constitutional challenge to
the offshore detention regime in Nauru. The court ruled that Australia’s role in
securing, funding, and participating in the detention of asylum seekers and
refugees on Nauru was authorized by law. However, in April, the PNG Supreme
Court ruled that the detention of asylum seekers on Manus Island was unconsti-
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tutional. In August, the Australian and PNG governments agreed to close the
center, although they set no timetable. 
On Nauru, refugees and asylum seekers regularly endure violence, threats, and
harassment from Nauruans, with little protection from local authorities. They
face unnecessary delays in, and at times denial of, medical care, even for life-
threatening conditions. Many have dire mental health problems and suffer from
depression. Self-harm and suicide attempts are frequent. In May 2016, two
refugees self-immolated in separate incidents; one died and the other was badly
burned. 
At time of writing, only 25 of the 675 refugees on Manus had been allowed to
move to mainland PNG, working in Lae or Port Moresby. Of this number, several
returned to Manus citing threats to personal safety and poor working and living
conditions. Of six refugees who resettled from Nauru to Cambodia under an
A$55 million (US$43 million) deal struck between the countries in 2015, two re-
main. The others returned to their country of origin. 
The Australian government’s offshore operations are highly secretive. Service
providers working for the Australian government face criminal charges and civil
penalties if they disclose information about conditions for asylum seekers and
refugees. In August and September 2016, the Guardian newspaper published
more than 2,000 leaked documents that exposed endemic and systematic
abuse, predominantly of children, at the Nauru detention center. 
In 2016, the Australian navy turned back boats carrying migrants, sending them
to Vietnamese and Sri Lankan waters. Both countries have poor records concern-
ing returned migrants. 
Asylum seekers or refugees perceived to be lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender,
or intersex (LGBTI) face harassment and abuse despite the recent decriminaliza-
tion of same-sex conduct in Nauru; in Papua New Guinea, such conduct remains
criminalized.
In November, the Turnbull Government introduced legislation that would prohibit
adult asylum seekers and refugees who have attempted to arrive in Australia by
boat since July 19, 2013, from ever obtaining an Australian visa of any kind. In
November, the government also announced a one-off arrangement to resettle
some refugees from Manus and Nauru in the United States, saying that women,
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children, and families would be prioritized. At time of writing, no one had been
removed for resettlement to the US.
Indigenous Rights
2016 marked the 25th anniversary of the Royal Commission into Aboriginal
Deaths in Custody. The commission recommended that imprisonment of indige-
nous convicted of crimes be a sanction of last resort. However, since 1991, the
rate of indigenous imprisonment has doubled. 
Indigenous Australians are significantly overrepresented in the criminal justice
system. Indigenous adults are 13 times more likely to be imprisoned than their
non-indigenous counterparts. Aboriginal women are the fastest growing prisoner
demographic in Australia. In the state of Western Australia, some 50 percent of
the female adult prison population is of Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander origin
even though such individuals make up only 3 percent of the state’s population.
Indigenous offenders are disproportionately detained or imprisoned for minor
and poverty-related offenses, particularly public order and unpaid fines of-
fenses.  
The juvenile detention rate for indigenous youth is about 24 times the rate of
non-indigenous youth. Indigenous children are often held in pre-trial detention,
despite the international legal requirement that detention of children be a last
resort and for the shortest appropriate period of time. 
In October, the Turnbull Government instructed the Australian Law Reform Com-
mission to report on the overrepresentation of indigenous Australians in pris-
ons; Federal Attorney-General George Brandis called it a “national tragedy.”
Children’s Rights
In July 2016, the Australian Broadcasting Corporation aired disturbing CCTV
footage showing the teargassing, hooding, shackling, and stripping of children
at a youth detention facility in August 2014. The incident had been a subject of a
2015 report by the Northern Territory’s children’s commissioner that revealed se-
rious shortcomings in juvenile detention practices in the territory. Despite the re-
port, territory officials failed to act. Within 12 hours of the footage airing, Prime
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Minister Turnbull announced a royal commission into child protection and youth
detention in the territory. 
In August, the Queensland attorney general announced an independent review
into the practices, operation, and oversight of Queensland’s youth detention fa-
cilities after the emergence of allegations of mistreatment akin to those in the
Northern Territory. 
Counterterrorism Laws
Since 2014, the Australian government has introduced a range of counterterror-
ism laws in response to the threat of “home-grown terrorism.” 
In September, the government introduced two further legislative measures to
deter terrorist attacks. The first bill proposes legislation that would allow a judge
to authorize detention for terrorist offenders who have served their sentences
but who pose an “unacceptable risk” of committing a serious offense if re-
leased. Such post-sentence detention for periods of up to three years could be
renewed, raising concerns about arbitrary and indefinite detention using a low
standard of proof and secret evidence. The second bill, passed in November, ex-
tends control orders to 14 year olds.
Disability Rights
In November 2015, a senate committee inquiry found that violence, abuse, and
neglect of people with disabilities is both “widespread and takes many forms.”
The committee’s report detailed long-term systematic abuse of persons with dis-
abilities in residential and institutional settings. 
Women and girls with disabilities in Australia are particularly at risk of sexual vi-
olence. Studies have shown that women with disabilities face much higher rates
of sexual abuse than the general population of women. Some face coerced steril-
ization and forced psychiatric interventions. 
People with disabilities are overrepresented in prisons and are more likely to be
investigated, charged, remanded to custody, or serve longer prison terms than
people without disabilities. In some cases, people with disabilities have been
languishing in prison for years without having been convicted of a crime, simply
because the government has not provided alternatives to incarceration. 
97
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH
In July 2016, the government rolled out the new National Disability Insurance
Scheme (NDIS). While the NDIS represents a major advancement on many fronts,
in some states it harms services for people with disabilities most at risk, such as
those in contact with the justice system. 
Foreign Policy
Australia raises human rights concerns in other countries, but does so very se-
lectively. It seldom raises human rights concerns publicly about countries it
works closely with in interdicting asylum seekers and refugees or with which it
has significant trade relations. 
However, Australia supported a US-led joint statement at the United Nations
Human Rights Council in March condemning China’s detention of activists and
enforced disappearances of citizens and foreigners. In August, Australia and
Vietnam held their 13th Annual Human Rights Dialogue in Hanoi. Australia reiter-
ated its “serious concerns about the harassment, arrest and detention of peace-
ful human rights activists.”
In February, the government announced that Philip Ruddock would be Australia’s
first special envoy for human rights and would drive Australia’s campaign for a
seat on the UN Human Rights Council in 2018. As Australia’s immigration minis-
ter from 1996 to 2003, Ruddock implemented the “Pacific Solution,” Australia’s
abusive policy of offshore detention and processing of refugees and asylum
seekers.
In May, a parliamentary committee report into Australia’s advocacy for the aboli-
tion of the death penalty called on the Foreign Affairs Department to coordinate
“a whole-of-government strategy for the abolition of the death penalty which has
as its focus, countries of the Indo-Pacific and the United States of America.”
Key International Actors
In February, the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child expressed “great con-
cern” over the Australian High Court’s finding that detaining asylum seekers off-
shore is legal. In May, the UN refugee agency stated that Australia’s “current
policy of offshore processing and prolonged detention is immensely harmful”
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and that the arrangements with Nauru and PNG had “proved completely unten-
able.” 
In August 2016, in response to the leaked files published in the Guardian, the
UN High Commissioner for Human Rights again urged Nauru and Australian au-
thorities to “put an end to the model of processing and keeping migrants off-
shore.”
In October, UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights Defenders Michael Forst vis-
ited Australia and expressed concern about restrictions facing civil society, free-
dom of expression, freedom of assembly, and access to justice. In November, UN
Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants Francois Crepeau visited
Australia and Nauru and found that some of Australia’s migration policies “have
increasingly eroded the rights of migrants, in contravention of its international
human rights and humanitarian obligations.” Crepeau expressed deep concern
about the impact of such policies on the mental health of many migrants.
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Azerbaijan
The government continued its thorough crackdown on dissenting voices in 2016,
leaving a wide gap in Azerbaijan’s once vibrant independent civil society. Au-
thorities released 17 human rights defenders, journalists, and political activists
imprisoned on politically motivated charges. But at least 25 government critics
remained wrongfully imprisoned, including political activists and bloggers ar-
rested in 2016. Restrictive laws continue to prevent nongovernmental organiza-
tions (NGOs) from operating independently. 
Reports of torture and other ill-treatment persisted throughout the year. 
The September 2016 constitutional referendum abolished minimum age require-
ments for presidential and parliamentary candidates, extended from five to
seven years the presidential term of office, and expanded the power of the presi-
dency. 
The Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (EITI) declined to restore Azerbai-
jan’s full membership in the organization and gave the government four months
to reform its laws limiting space for civil society or face suspension.
Prosecuting Government Critics
In March, President Ilham Aliyev pardoned 13 journalists, human rights defend-
ers, activists, and bloggers who had been prosecuted on politically motivated
charges in previous years. Their convictions have not been quashed, and some
former detainees continued to face travel and work restrictions and risk deten-
tion if they resume their work. Some led NGOs, and these groups remained
closed. 
Also in March, courts converted the prison sentences of journalist Rauf Mir-
gadirov and human rights lawyer Intigam Aliyev to suspended terms and re-
leased both. In May, the Supreme Court similarly converted investigative
journalist Khadija Ismayilova’s prison term and released her. All three retain a
criminal record and two faced foreign travel restrictions.
Ilgar Mammadov, leader of the pro-democracy opposition movement Republican
Alternative (REAL), remained in prison despite the 2014 European Court of
Human Rights decision on his case and repeated demands by the Council of Eu-
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rope to release him. Others who remain behind bars include youth activist Ilkin
Rustamzadeh, opposition Azerbaijani Popular Front Party Popular (APFP) activist
Murad Adilov, journalist Seymur Hazi, and blogger Abdul Adilov.  
New Arrests and Convictions
In August, in the lead-up to the constitutional referendum, the government ar-
rested eight activists on a range of false, politically motivated charges, including
drug possession, hooliganism, incitement, and illegal business activity. The au-
thorities also accused some activists of possessing banned or potentially ille-
gally imported materials related to Fethulla Gülen, the US-based imam who
Turkey accuses of organizing the failed July 2016 coup attempt there.
Among those arrested were Fuad Ahmadli, a well-known social media activist
and senior APFP member and Faig Amirov, financial director for the leading op-
position newspaper Azadlig. During searches following their arrests, police
claimed to have found prohibited religious books and compact discs related to
Gülen, but also pressed other criminal charges against them. Both were in cus-
tody at time of writing. 
Police also arrested three REAL members: Natig Jafarli, the party’s executive
secretary, who had publicly criticized the constitutional referendum, and two
other REAL activists campaigning against the referendum. A court jailed the
latter two for a week for refusing to abide by a police order not to distribute
campaign leaflets. In September, Jafarli was released pending trial. 
Authorities continued to target leading and rank-and-file APFP activists, at least
12 of whom were either on trial or serving prison terms in 2016. Among those
facing trial is Fuad Gahramanli, deputy APFP chairman, arrested in December
2015 on trumped-up charges of calling for the government’s overthrow. The
charges are part of the criminal conspiracy and terrorism case against religious
activists in Nardaran, a Baku suburb known for its Shi’ia conservatism. Gahra-
manli was in pretrial custody at time of writing. In March, a court convicted Mam-
mad Ibrahim, advisor to APFP chairman Ali Kerimli, on spurious hooliganism
charges and sentenced him to three years in prison. Elvin Abdullayev, a youth ac-
tivist and APFP member remained in prison since his January 2015 arrest on du-
bious drug possession charges. In June 2016, the Supreme Court reduced his
prison sentence from six to two-and-half years.
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Freedom of Media
Independent outlets faced harassment and closure, and critical journalists faced
threats and intimidation aimed at silencing them. 
In April, authorities launched a criminal investigation into alleged tax evasion
and related economic infractions supposedly involving 15 journalists who coop-
erate with Meydan TV, a Berlin-based online independent Azeri-language media
outlet that provides critical reporting on human rights, corruption, and similar is-
sues. They were at liberty pending the investigation; at least seven of them face
travel bans while under investigation. In December 2015 and April 2016, courts
convicted three family members of Meydan TV’s exiled journalists on trumped-up
drug charges and paroled them in April 2016 after they had served less than a
year. 
In September, the state-run printing house refused to publish Azadlig due to the
newspaper’s failure to make a debt payment to the company following the de-
tention of Faig Amirli. As a result, Azadlig had to indefinitely suspend its print
edition.
In July, authorities first suspended and then revoked the broadcasting license of
a privately owned, staunchly pro-government ANS television, following its an-
nouncement to broadcast an interview with Fethullah Gulen. The TV channels re-
mained closed at time of writing.
Freedom of Association
Highly restrictive and punitive regulations on NGOs adopted in 2014 and 2015
make it almost impossible for independent groups to fund and carry out their
work. In February 2016, new regulations went into force giving the Justice Min-
istry broad powers to conduct intrusive inspections of NGOs on a wide range of
grounds. 
In April, the Prosecutor’s Office suspended the sweeping criminal investigation
opened in 2014 against dozens of foreign donors and their grantees. Several or-
ganizations and their leaders that are members of Azerbaijan’s coalition for the
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) saw restrictions linked to the
investigation lifted. The authorities unfroze their bank accounts, lifted travel
bans against them, and stopped intrusive screenings at the Azerbaijani borders. 
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Despite the unfrozen bank accounts, several groups in the EITI coalition cannot
access funding because authorities refuse to register their grant agreements.
Azerbaijani regulations require NGOs to provide banks with proof of grant regis-
tration in order to access grant funds. 
The bank accounts of at least a dozen NGOs that worked on human rights and
government accountability remain blocked; the groups suspended their work or
operate in exile. 
Torture and Ill-Treatment
Torture and other ill-treatment continued with impunity. In August, police ar-
rested Elgiz Gahraman, member of an opposition youth movement, and held him
incommunicado for six days. Garhraman told his lawyer police beat and threat-
ened him with sexual humiliation to force him to confess to false drug posses-
sion charges. Authorities failed to effectively investigate. Gahraman remained in
custody at time of writing. 
In May, police arrested youth activists Giyas Ibrahimov and Bayram Mammadov
for spraying graffiti on a monument to former President Heydar Aliyev and de-
manded that they apologize on camera. When they refused, policemen beat and
threatened to rape them with truncheons to force them to confess to drug pos-
session. Authorities failed to conduct effective investigation into the ill-treat-
ment allegations. In October, Ibrahimov was sentenced to 10 years’
imprisonment; Mammadov’s trial was ongoing at time of writing.
In July, 18 of the 68 defendants in a high-profile trial counterterrorism case told a
court that police had beaten them repeatedly to elicit confessions and testi-
mony. The case concerns state allegations that Taleh Bagirzade, a religious ac-
tivist who had previously been jailed on politically motivated charges, conspired
with others to overthrow the government. 
A November 2015 police raid to arrest Bagirzade in Nardaran, a Baku suburb,
turned violent during unclear and disputed circumstances, with shootings leav-
ing two police and seven civilians dead. Bagirzade stated at trial that state
agents beat him to induce testimony against two political opposition leaders.
Authorities denied the allegations and did not thoroughly investigate. 
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Key International Actors
The United States, European Union, and Azerbaijan’s other bilateral and interna-
tional partners welcomed the release of government critics but failed to effec-
tively leverage the potential of their relationships with the government to press
for meaningful rights improvements. 
In October, EITI, a prominent international coalition that promotes good gover-
nance in oil, gas, and other extractive industries, declined to restore Azerbai-
jan’s full membership status in the organization, and gave the government four
months to reform its restrictive NGO laws or face suspension.
Following its May 2016 visit, the United Nations Working Group on Arbitrary De-
tention noted receiving “a large number of testimonies […] about torture and ill
treatment” in custody. It also observed “dire conditions of living and high level
of negligence in the institution for women,” and expressed dismay “about the
application of chemical restraints accompanied in the case of children with
‘light’ electroshocks” in one institution.
Following his September visit, the UN special rapporteur on human rights de-
fenders, Michel Forst, urged the government to stop criminalization of human
rights defenders for peaceful and legitimate activities, release all detained de-
fenders, and rescind criminal and administrative sanctions against them and
their families.
In its October concluding observations, the UN Human Rights Committee urged
Azerbaijani authorities to end “the crackdown on public associations … ensuring
that they can operate freely and without fear of retribution for their legitimate ac-
tivities.”
In late 2015, Council of Europe Secretary General Thorbjørn Jagland launched an
inquiry into Azerbaijan’s failure to carry out the European Court of Human Rights’
rulings. Jagland’s special representative could not visit Azerbaijan throughout
2016, apparently due to the lack of government cooperation to facilitate the ini-
tiative. 
In December 2015, bipartisan legislation was introduced in the US House of Rep-
resentatives, calling on the Azerbaijani government to free all “political prison-
ers.” The bill called for, among other things, visa bans on unnamed senior
Azerbaijani officials responsible for the crackdown.
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During her March visit to Baku, European Union High Representative for Foreign
Affairs and Security Policy Federica Mogherini announced the EU’s intention to
speed up negotiations on a new partnership agreement with Azerbaijan, making
little public mention of Baku’s atrocious human rights record. 
International financial institutions have continued or increased funding to the
Azerbaijan government, including in the extractives industries, despite the wors-
ening human rights situation.
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Bahrain
There was a marked deterioration in the human rights situation in Bahrain in
mid-2016, when authorities dissolved the main political opposition group, al-
Wifaq, jailed the country’s leading human rights activist, and harassed and pros-
ecuted Shia clerics who peacefully protested the arbitrary revocation of the
citizenship of al-Wifaq’s spiritual leader, Sheikh Isa Qasim. This orchestrated
crackdown on the rights to free expression, assembly and association under-
mined prospects for a political solution to Bahrain’s domestic unrest. 
Authorities made little progress in holding officials accountable for the mistreat-
ment and torture of detainees, continued to arbitrarily strip citizenship from
Bahrainis who have been critical of the government, and subjected civil society
actors to arbitrary travel bans. 
Freedoms of Expression, Assembly, and Association
Human rights activists Zainab al-Khawaja spent three months in jail after her de-
tention in March 2016 based on four convictions that violated her right to free ex-
pression, one of which resulted from an unfair trial. Al-Khawaja left Bahrain for
Denmark, where she also has citizenship, after authorities released her in June.
She said Bahraini authorities were preparing to press further charges against her
that could have resulted in a lengthy prison sentence. 
In May, Bahrain’s High Court of Appeal more than doubled the prison sentence
of al-Wifaq’s secretary-general, Sheikh Ali Salman, from four years to nine years.
The appeal court overturned a trial court’s decision to acquit him of advocating
the overthrow of the government by force. It increased the sentence despite
strong evidence his initial trial was unfair and the fact that two of the charges on
which he had been convicted clearly violated his right to freedom of expression.
In June, authorities detained prominent human rights activist Nabeel Rajab
solely on charges that violate his right to free expression. He is facing 15 years in
prison on charges that include criticism of Bahrain’s participation in Saudi Ara-
bia-led military operations in Yemen, and “offending national institutions.” The
latter charge is based on comments about alleged torture of inmates in Jaw
Prison in March 2015. On September 5, authorities charged Rajab with “under-
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mining the prestige of the state,” one day after the New York Times published an
open letter he wrote from prison.  
Also in June, the Ministry of Justice and Islamic Affairs requested that the judici-
ary dissolve al-Wifaq. The court issued an “expedited” ruling on June 14 ordering
the group to close its headquarters and suspend activities, and confiscated its
funds based on government allegations that the party was a cover for “acts asso-
ciated with extremism and terrorism.” Authorities produced no evidence to sup-
port their allegations. 
After authorities arbitrarily stripped al-Wifaq’s spiritual leader Sheikh Isa Qasim
of his citizenship in June for allegedly inciting sectarianism, hundreds of people,
including many Shia clerics, gathered in peaceful protest outside his home in
the town of Diraz. Authorities responded with a campaign of harassment against
Shia clerics, in violation of their right to free expression and peaceful assembly.  
In August, a Bahraini court convicted Sheikh Ali Humaidan of “illegal gathering”
and sentenced him to one year in prison for his involvement in the Diraz
protests. One of the most high-profile Shia clerics charged with illegal gathering,
Sheikh Maytham al-Salman, said that police insisted that he remove his clerical
turban and robes, refused his request to shower and change his clothes, and
kept him in interview rooms for 26 hours without sleep. He said he believed the
insistence that he remove his religious attire was intended to “insult and intimi-
date a Shia cleric.” Credible Bahraini sources told Human Rights Watch that au-
thorities questioned or brought charges against more than 50 Shia clerics in the
aftermath of the Diraz protests.
In July, a prosecutor charged Nazeeha Saeed, a Bahraini correspondent for the
French news agency Agence France Presse, with violating the country’s licensing
law for journalists. Bahrain’s Information Affairs Authority sent a letter to one of
Saeed’s employers citing “the unsatisfactory evaluation of her performance by
our specialists” as the reason for not renewing the license. 
Mistreatment of Detainees
The third annual report from the Office of the Ombudsman, released in June
2016, provided further evidence that authorities have made little progress in
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holding police and security forces accountable for the torture and mistreatment
of detainees. 
Since it was created in 2012, the Office of the Ombudsman has, according to its
annual reports, referred 138 cases to the Special Investigations Unit, the body
responsible for investigating and prosecuting security or other government offi-
cials allegedly involved in the torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment
of detainees. Of these, the Special Investigations Unit has successfully prose-
cuted only one torture case, which the ombudsman’s second annual report char-
acterized as “a vicious assault” on a detainee “in an attempt to force him to
confess to drug dealing.” 
The ombudsman’s 2016 report contained no information on the status of 15 com-
plaints relating to the alleged torture of inmates by prison officials after unrest in
Jaw Prison in March 2015. In May, M. Cherif Bassiouni, the lead author of the
Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry report into the anti-government
protests of 2011 and the disproportionate response of the security forces, urged
“the pursuit of investigations of those responsible for the killing of five persons
under torture and the ascertainment of their superiors’ responsibility.” 
Revocation of Nationality
As a result of a 2014 amendment to Bahrain’s citizenship law, the Interior Min-
istry can, with cabinet approval, revoke the citizenship of any person who, ac-
cording to authorities, “aids or is involved in the service of a hostile state” or
who “causes harm to the interests of the Kingdom or acts in a way that contra-
venes his duty of loyalty to it.” 
In 2016, information from media reports and credible local sources indicates
that the Bahraini authorities stripped 133 individuals of their citizenship, bring-
ing the total to 341 since the beginning of 2015. They can be classified into three
broad categories: human rights defenders, political activists, and journalists;
Bahrainis known to be fighting alongside the Islamic State (also known as ISIS);
and individuals convicted of domestic terrorism offenses.
In June 2016, the Interior Ministry said it was revoking the citizenship of Sheikh
Isa Qasim, considered the spiritual leader of the main opposition group, al-
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Wifaq. It accused him of “creating an extremist sectarian environment” and say-
ing he had “encouraged sectarianism and violence.”
Bahraini authorities deported seven stateless Bahrainis whom they had previ-
ously stripped of their citizenship, including Shia cleric Mohamed Khojasta in
February, academic Masaud Jahromi in March, and human rights lawyer Taimoor
Karimi in June.
Right to Leave the Country
Authorities have placed arbitrary travel bans on tens of individuals who have
been critical of the authorities’ human rights abuses. In September, an arbitrary
travel ban prevented human rights activist Nedal al-Salman from attending a
United Nations Human Rights Council meeting in Geneva, after earlier subjecting
two of al-Salman’s colleagues from the Bahrain Centre for Human Rights to simi-
lar bans. 
Other Bahrainis subjected to travel bans included Mohamed al-Tajer, a human
rights lawyer; Abdulnabi al-Ekry, a rights activist; Jalila al-Salman, the former
vice-president of the dissolved Bahrain Teacher’s Society; Rula al-Saffar, a nurse
and human rights activist; Mohamed Sharaf, the president of the Bahraini chap-
ter of Transparency International; and journalist Nazeeha Saeed.
Women’s Rights, Sexual Orientation, and Gender Identity
Law no. 19 of 2009 on the Promulgation of the Law of Family Rulings regulates
matters of personal status in Bahrain’s Sunni courts. The law does not apply in
the country’s Shia courts, with the result that Shia women, who comprise the
majority in Bahrain, are not covered by a codified personal status law. Both
Sunni and Shia women are discriminated against. For instance, men have a uni-
lateral right divorce their wives; Sunni men can do so orally, and Shia men must
do so in writing. Women must apply to the courts for a divorce.
Adultery is criminalized, as are sexual relations outside marriage, which is pros-
ecuted under an article that criminalizes “an act of indecency with a female.”
However, there is no law that prohibits discrimination on the grounds of sex,
gender, sexual orientation, or gender identity.
WORLD REPORT 2017
110
Key International Actors
Bahrain remained a member of the Saudi Arabia-led coalition that launched air
strikes in Yemen throughout 2016, causing hundreds of civilian deaths, accord-
ing to the UN. 
The United States, which has a permanent naval base in Bahrain, criticized the
dissolution of al-Wifaq and called on the government to drop charges and free
Nabel Rajab. The United Kingdom, for whom the Bahrainis are building a perma-
nent naval base, failed to call for the release of any imprisoned activists, or to
criticize the dissolution of al-Wifaq.
In September, US government officials announced that the approval of the sale
of F-16 fighter jets to Bahrain would be dependent on unspecified improvements
in the human rights situation in the country. 
In August, five UN human rights experts issued a joint statement criticizing au-
thorities’ “systematic harassment of the Shia population.”
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Bangladesh
Bangladesh witnessed a spate of violent attacks against secular bloggers, aca-
demics, gay rights activists, foreigners, and members of religious minorities in
2016. 
On July 1, armed gunmen attacked the Holey Artisan Bakery, a café in Dhaka,
killing 21 people, including foreigners, while holding Bangladeshi staff and
guests hostage until security forces stormed the café the next morning. On July
8, three people were killed at a checkpoint when gunmen carrying bombs tried
to attack a gathering to mark the Muslim Eid holiday. 
Although Islamist extremist groups, including the Islamic State or ISIS, claimed
responsibility for most of these killings, the government blamed domestic
groups, and said some had links to the main opposition political parties. Thou-
sands of people were arrested, and dozens of alleged members or supporters of
extremist groups are said to have been killed in armed encounters. 
Fire and safety factory inspections continued in the garment industry following
agreements between big brands and the Bangladeshi government arising out of
the 2013 Rana Plaza disaster. However, a September fire in a packaging factory
killed at least 24 people, highlighting the need for further efforts to ensure
worker rights and safety. 
Security Force Abuse and Impunity
Bangladesh security forces have a long history of arbitrary arrest, enforced dis-
appearance, and extrajudicial killing, raising concerns about recent arrests and
deaths. The Detective Branch of the police, the Bangladesh Border Guards
(BGB), the Directorate General Forces Inspectorate (DGFI), and the Rapid Action
Battalion (RAB) have all been accused of serious violations. 
In June 2016, security forces arrested nearly 15,000 people, mostly young men,
in connection with a series of attacks targeting writers, minority religious lead-
ers, and activists. 
Following the July attack on the Holey Artisan Café, security forces reportedly ar-
bitrarily detained and in many cases killed suspected militants. Two of the
hostages in the attack were secretly arrested and detained for over a month until
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international and national pressure forced the government to admit to holding
them in detention. A kitchen assistant, initially suspected to be one of the at-
tackers, was allegedly tortured to death. The government announced several
raids in various parts of the country but, due to lack of transparency about secu-
rity force abuses and the ongoing government clampdown on media, details of
those killed or arrested remain unclear. 
Attacks on Civil Society
Human rights groups in Bangladesh face constant obstacles, including escalat-
ing harassment and surveillance by police. A new law placed strong restrictions
on receiving foreign funds without approval by the NGO Affairs Bureau within the
Prime Minister’s Office. 
Journalists are also a common target. The editor of the English-language Daily
Star, Mahfuz Anam, faces a total of 54 criminal defamation cases and 15 sedition
cases. Fifty-five cases have been filed against editor Matiur Rahman and some
journalists associated with the country’s highest circulation daily, Prothom Alo,
for criminal defamation and “hurting religious sentiment.” 
Freedom of Expression
Several laws were proposed in 2016 to increase restrictions on freedom of ex-
pression. The Distortion of the History of Bangladesh Liberation War Crimes Act
provides for imprisonment and fines if details of the 1971 war of independence
are debated or disputed. The Foreign Donation (Voluntary Activities) Regulation
Act, passed in October, to control nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) will
hinder freedoms of expression and association. Proposed Press Council Act
amendments include provisions for closing newspapers.  
The government continues to use the overly broad and vague Information and
Communication Technology Act against people critical of decisions and activities
of senior government officials or their families.
Bloggers expressing secular views and editors and writers supporting sexual mi-
nority rights were attacked in 2016, many of them hacked to death in public
spaces. While authorities condemned the attacks, some recommended that indi-
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viduals holding unpopular views censor themselves, implying that the responsi-
bility for avoiding such attacks lay with the victims. 
Minorities
Several religious leaders were killed or injured in targeted attacks, allegedly by
the same extremist Muslim groups that targeted secular writers. In April, the ad-
vocacy group Hindu-Buddha-Christian Oikya Parishad said there had been three
times more incidents of violence against minority communities in the first three
months of 2016 than in all of 2015. Hindu shrines, temples and homes were at-
tacked over the October 2016 Diwali festival. The government responded by ar-
resting several hundred suspects, but some sporadic attacks against the Hindu
community continued. Thousands of indigenous people in the Chittagong Hill
Tracts and other areas are at risk of forced displacement. 
Environment
Workers in the tanneries of Hazaribagh, a residential area in Dhaka, continue to
suffer from highly toxic and dangerous working conditions, while residents of
nearby slums complain of illnesses caused by the tanneries’ extreme pollution
of air, water, and soil. The government continues its de facto policy of not enforc-
ing labor and environmental laws with respect to the tanneries and has failed to
insist on the relocation of the tanneries to a dedicated industrial zone in Savar,
ignoring a High Court decision from 2001.  
Some 20 years after the problem of arsenic in Bangladesh’s drinking water first
came to the world’s attention, 20 million people in Bangladesh are still drinking
water contaminated with arsenic above the national standard. Deeper wells
drilled down approximately 150 meters into the ground can often supply higher-
quality water without arsenic, but some politicians are diverting funds for such
wells to political supporters and allies, a practice facilitated by a government
policy permitting national parliamentarians to influence the siting of 50 percent
of all new government water points.
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Labor Rights
Bangladeshi authorities again failed to implement their commitments under the
Sustainability Compact in 2016. These include amending the Labour Act and
laws governing Export Processing Zones to bring them in line with international
standards. Largely, factory officials were not held accountable for attacks,
threats, and retaliation against workers involved with unions. 
In August, a Bangladeshi court charged 18 people with murder for the 2013 col-
lapse of the Rana Plaza textile factory, which killed 1,135 people and injured hun-
dreds. 
In September, another factory fire and building collapse in a packaging factory
killed 31 workers and injured another 50. 
Women’s and Girls’ Rights
Bangladesh government data indicates that the percentage of girls marrying be-
fore age 18 declined from 65 percent in 2014 to 52 percent in 2016, and that 18
percent of girls still marry before the age of 15, the highest rate in Asia and
among the highest in the world. In 2014, the government pledged to end mar-
riage of children younger than 15 by 2021, and marriage younger than 18 by
2041. 
In 2016, the government undermined progress toward these goals by continuing
to push for weakening of the law governing the minimum age of marriage. At
present, the minimum age of marriage for women is 18 with no exceptions, but
the government proposed to allow 16- and 17-year-old girls to marry with
parental consent, a change that would constitute a de facto lowering of the age
of marriage, as most marriages are arranged by parents. A national plan on end-
ing child marriage, promised by end-2014, had still not been finalized at time of
writing.
Stalking, sexual harassment, and violent retaliation against and even murder of
women and girls who protest such harassment continued in 2016. Prompt inves-
tigation and prosecution in such cases continues to be rare.
117
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH
Indigenous women and girls face multiple forms of discrimination due to their
gender, indigenous identity, and socio-economic status; they are especially vul-
nerable to sexual and gender-based violence.
Overseas Workers
Millions of Bangladeshis work abroad, sending home remittances worth billions
of US dollars. In 2016 alone, almost 100,000 women migrated overseas, mostly
to Gulf countries, for domestic work. The government has sought to increase the
recruitment of such workers without putting in place adequate mechanisms to
protect them against workplace abuses. Bangladeshi workers in the Gulf con-
tinue to report being deprived of food and forced to endure psychological, physi-
cal, and sexual abuse. In some cases, such abuses amount to forced labor or
trafficking. Some Bangladeshi domestic workers pay high recruitment fees and
take out loans in order to migrate. 
Bangladesh has set a minimum salary for domestic workers in the Gulf equiva-
lent to roughly US$200, the lowest minimum salary of all sending countries—
and its embassies in the region do not provide adequate protection and
assistance to many Bangladeshi nationals there.
Refugees
Bangladesh began its first census of undocumented Rohingya refugees in June,
setting off fears that it might lead to a mass relocation or forcible repatriation to
Burma. About 32,000 Rohingya are sheltered in camps administered by the
United Nations, but hundreds of thousands who have never been allowed to reg-
ister as refugees or to lodge asylum claims live undocumented in squalid,
makeshift camps, or in private dwellings scattered around southeast
Bangladesh, vulnerable to human traffickers and exploited as cheap labor. 
War Crimes Trials
The International Crimes Tribunal (ICT), set up to address laws of war violations
committed during Bangladesh’s 1971 independence movement, continued its
operations in 2015 without addressing serious procedural and substantive de-
fects. In September, the government executed Mir Qasem Ali, a senior member
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of the executive committee of the opposition Jamaat-e-Islaami party, for crimes
he alleged committed in 1971, even as the country’s chief justice criticized the
attorney general, the prosecution, and investigators for producing insufficient
evidence in the case. The government secretly detained Ali’s son, a key member
of his defense team, denied him access to his father before execution, and for-
bade him from participating in the funeral. 
Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity
Prominent gay activists Xulhaz Mannan, the founder of Roopbaan, Bangladesh’s
first lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and intersex (LGBTI) magazine, and
Mahbub Rabby Tonoy, the general secretary of the group, were hacked to death
in April. Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) claimed responsibility for
the killings. Fearing for their lives, many LGBT activists sought temporary refuge
outside the country.
“Carnal intercourse against the order of nature” carries a maximum sentence of
10 years in prison. The government has twice rejected recommendations to re-
peal the colonial-era law during its Universal Periodic Review at the UN Human
Rights Council.
The Bangladesh cabinet in 2014 declared legal recognition of a third gender cat-
egory for hijras—a traditional cultural identity for transgender people who,
assigned male at birth, do not identify as men—but the absence of a definition
of the term or procedure for gaining recognition of third gender status led to
abuses in implementation of the legal change. In June and July 2015, a group of
hijras were subjected to harassment and invasive and abusive physical examina-
tions at a government hospital as a requirement to join a government employ-
ment program.
Key International Actors
India, the United Kingdom, and the United States, countries with significant in-
fluence over the Bangladesh government, remained largely silent on the coun-
try’s human rights record in their public statements in 2016. The UK said nothing
publicly at all.
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The US Department of Justice funded and trained an internal investigations pro-
gram within the RAB, but the program produced no human rights prosecutions or
convictions in 2016, and US authorities said little publicly to signal the impor-
tance of holding RAB officers accountable for human rights crimes. In July, Secre-
tary of State John Kerry offered US assistance to Bangladeshi authorities
investigating the militant attack on the Holey Artisan Bakery that killed 21 people
in Dhaka.
The United Nations High Commissioner on Human Rights raised concerns about
the lack of fairness in the war crimes trials and about arbitrary and illegal ar-
rests, but the Bangladeshi government ignored the statements. 
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Belarus
Belarus’ human rights friendly rhetoric was not supported by genuine human
rights improvements in 2016. The death penalty remains in use. Officials con-
tinue to prosecute human rights activists and critical journalists on spurious
charges. Legislative amendments further restricted freedom of expression by ex-
panding the definition of “extremism” and by banning dissemination of certain
types of information among children under the false pretense of protecting
them. International observers recognized some progress during the September
parliamentary elections, but called for additional reforms. 
The European Union lifted sanctions, citing releases of political prisoners and
improved elections. The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
ended restrictions on lending to state entities. Authorities continue to refuse to
cooperate with the United Nations special rapporteur on Belarus.
In October, the government finalized an action plan to implement recommenda-
tions made by UN human rights treaty bodies and the Human Rights Council in
the country’s Universal Periodic Review. The government did not consult inde-
pendent civil society, and the plan lacks specifics and does not adequately ad-
dress civil and political rights.
Death Penalty
Belarus remains the only European country with the death penalty. There were
no steps in 2016 to introduce a moratorium or abolish it. 
Ivan Kulesh and Siarhei Khmialeusk were executed in November 2016. Siarhei
Ivanou, sentenced in 2015 for murder, was executed in April, although his com-
plaint about violations of his rights was pending before the United Nations
Human Rights Committee.
Death sentences were issued to Henadz Yakavitski for murder, Siarhei Khmi-
aleuski for three murders, and Siarhei Vostrykau for rape and two murders. All
three sentences were upheld on appeal.
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Human Rights Defenders and Critics
Although in 2015 Belarussian President Aliaksandr Lukashenka pardoned six
men sentenced in politically motivated trials, their criminal records were not ex-
punged, preventing them from occupying governmental jobs or standing in elec-
tions; authorizing police to question them frequently; and preventing their
international travel. 
Elena Tonkacheva, a human rights lawyer and chair of the Legal Transformation
Center who had been forced from Belarus in February 2015 with a three-year
entry ban, appealed for it to be shortened, but the appeal was rejected in Janu-
ary 2016. A second appeal was also denied in October 2016.
Also in January, a Minsk court found youth activists Maksim Pekarski, Vadzim
Zharomski, and Viachaslau Kasinerau guilty of criminal hooliganism and fined
them US$300-500 for public graffiti in August 2015. Local activists consider the
decision to press criminal rather than administrative charges to be politically
motivated. In March, an appeals court upheld the sentence.
Mikhail Zhamchuzhny, a founder of the prisoner’s rights group Platform Innova-
tion, was sentenced in 2015 to six-and-a-half years’ imprisonment for allegedly
disclosing official secrets after publishing information about police abuse he ob-
tained from a police officer. In July, he complained that prison officials denied
him access to necessary medical care and interfered with his filing an appeal
against his sentence. 
In April, a Minsk court found Aliaksandr Lapitski, 80, guilty of insulting President
Lukashenka and other authorities after numerous letters appealing against his
son’s 2011 conviction and accusing the president of organizing the 2011 Minsk
metro bombing. The court deemed Lapitski “legally incompetent” and sentenced
him to forced treatment in a closed psychiatric institution for up to one year. He
began serving his sentence in November, after losing all appeals.
In September, the Prosecutor’s Office denied a request by the Turkmenistan gov-
ernment to extradite Chary Annamuradov, a former dissident and journalist, who
traveled to Belarus for a vacation. Annamuradov fled persecution in Turk-
menistan in 1999 and received asylum in Sweden in 2003. 
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Freedom of Assembly
From January to April, police did not disperse unsanctioned assemblies or detain
participants, but continued to levy administrative charges and heavy fines
against them.
In late April, Minsk traffic police and riot police dispersed a monthly event of the
apolitical Critical Mass cycling movement, and detained six people, including
one nongovernmental monitor. Police forced detainees onto the floor of a police
bus, punched them, threw their bicycles on top of them, and brought administra-
tive charges of disorderly conduct and violating traffic violations against them.
Authorities brought additional criminal charges against Stanislau Kanavalau and
Dzmitry Paliyenka for allegedly resisting police and grabbing their uniforms.
Kanavalau was released, while Paliyenka stayed in pretrial detention until Octo-
ber, when a court convicted him and handed him a suspended two-year prison
sentence.
Freedom of Expression and Attacks on Journalists
In early 2016, authorities resumed targeting freelance journalists cooperating
with unregistered foreign media, a practice suspended since August 2015 after
President Lukashenka publicly promised to examine the cases. Law enforcement
officials in southern Belarus’ Homel region brought 10 administrative cases
against Kanstantsin Zhukouski and Larysa Shchyrakova for cooperating with
Poland-based Belsat television channel, and fined them US$250-350.
Police detained Zhukouski and Aliaksei Atroshchanka in June as the journalists
prepared a video about a business where workers complained about low wages
in Loyeu, Homel region. Zhukouski alleged police beat him, and filed a com-
plaint. In response, authorities charged and fined him for disorderly conduct, in-
sulting police, and petty hooliganism. 
In January, Minsk police beat and detained Pavel Dabravolsky as he filmed how
police detained two activists holding a “No to Political Prosecution!” banner out-
side a court. Dabravolsky sustained minor injuries. An internal police inquiry
found that the use of force was justified. Dabravolsky was fined for contempt of
court and disobeying police orders. Dabravolsky claimed he did not resist police.
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In an August closed hearing, a Minsk court found nine publications from
1863x.com, a news and analytical website often critical of the government, to be
“extremist” in nature, alleging some content contained pornography and incited
ethnic hatred, but relied exclusively on a state expert’s analysis. The site’s ad-
ministrator, Eduard Palchys, and his lawyer had to sign a non-disclosure agree-
ment prohibiting them from speaking publicly about the trial. After the criminal
investigation opened last year, Palchys fled, but Russian authorities detained
him in January 2016 and extradited him in May. Palchys remained in detention
until October, when he was convicted in a closed trial and sentenced to one year
and nine months of supervised parole, including restrictions on his movements. 
Through August, the Information Ministry blocked at least six websites for al-
legedly distributing information about illegal narcotics, and was able to block
websites without judicial review. None of the website owners received warnings
first. The ministry also issued at least twelve warnings to eight media outlets and
four news websites through June. After two warnings, the ministry may request a
court-ordered closure.
In April, parliament hastily adopted a bill expanding the definition of “extremist
activity” and introduced new offenses, including “creation of an extremist
group” and “financing the activities of an extremist group.” Activists warned that
the law’s vague definitions may be misused to suppress legitimate speech.
Parliament adopted a vaguely worded bill in May on “protecting children from in-
formation harmful for their health and development.” These provisions may be
used to restrict dissemination of neutral or positive information about lesbian,
gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) people as “discrediting the institution of
the family.”
Freedom of Association
Authorities continue to enforce criminal code article 193.1 criminalizing involve-
ment in an unregistered organization and at the same time arbitrarily deny regis-
tration to nongovernmental groups and political parties.
In March, the Supreme Court deemed lawful the Justice Ministry’s fourth refusal
to register the Human Rights Association “For Fair Elections.” The group’s
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founders believe this fourth denial since 2011 was arbitrary and politically moti-
vated.
The Supreme Court in April dismissed an appeal against the Justice Ministry’s
sixth refusal to register the Belarusian Christian Democratic Party. Also in April,
the Justice Ministry for the fifth time refused to register “Tell the Truth,” an oppo-
sition political movement. No political party has been registered since 2000.
Parliamentary Elections
International observers monitoring the September parliamentary elections noted
some improvements, but urged further reforms. The Organization for Security
and Co-operation in Europe Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights
(OSCE/ODIHR) found the elections “were efficiently organized but a number of
long-standing systemic shortcomings remain.” 
The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE)’s pre-electoral
statement called for reforms “to ensure a thoroughly competitive political envi-
ronment.” The EU echoed these concerns. The UN special rapporteur on Belarus
said the “elections proved a clear lack of political will to promote and protect
human rights in Belarus.”
Key International Actors
Belarus continued political “rapprochement” with European governments and
institutions. These actors strengthened their relations despite a lack of tangible
rights improvements.
The government continued to oppose and refused to cooperate with UN Special
Rapporteur on Belarus Miklos Haraszti, appointed in 2012. In June, the UN
Human Rights Council renewed the rapporteur’s mandate for another year.
In February, the EU lifted sanctions on 170 individuals and 3 companies, citing
release of “all the remaining political prisoners” and 2015 presidential elections
free from violence.
The EU’s special representative for human rights, Stavros Lambrinidis, visited in
March and had meetings with officials, political party representatives, and non-
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governmental groups, and called on Belarus to end the death penalty at an inter-
national conference but did not publicly condemn other human rights abuses. 
In June, the EU and Belarus held their third human rights dialogue, the first to
occur in Minsk. Topics included freedoms of expression, assembly and associa-
tion; elections; the death penalty, torture and ill-treatment; and disability rights.
The concrete outcomes were not known at time of writing.
The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development reviewed its Belarus
strategy in September and removed restrictions on support for state projects.
The bank noted that “the situation of human rights in the country has not under-
gone a systemic change and remains a subject of concern,” but claimed Belarus
had a “constructive role” in the region and authorities showed “more openness”
to discussing human rights.
The EU, the Council of Europe’s secretary general, PACE rapporteurs, and
ODIHR’s director repeatedly criticized the application of the death penalty in Be-
larus and called for a moratorium.
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Bolivia
Impunity for violent crime and human rights violations remains a serious prob-
lem in Bolivia. The administration of President Evo Morales has created a hostile
environment for human rights defenders that undermines their ability to work in-
dependently. 
Despite recent legal reforms, extensive and arbitrary use of pretrial detention—
combined with trial delays—undermine defendants’ rights and contribute to
prison overcrowding. Threats to judicial independence, violence against women,
and child labor are other major concerns.
In February, voters rejected a national referendum that would have reformed the
constitution to allow President Morales—who has served as president since
2005—to run for a fourth term in 2019.
Impunity for Abuses and Violent Crime
Bolivia has prosecuted only a few of the officials responsible for human rights vi-
olations committed under authoritarian governments from 1964 through 1982, in
part because the armed forces have at times refused to provide information to
judicial authorities on the fate of people killed or forcibly disappeared. Despite
repeated commitments to do so, the Bolivian government has yet to create a
truth commission to carry out independent investigations of abuses during that
period. 
Those responsible for the 2008 killing of at least 19 people during protest-re-
lated clashes between supporters and opponents of President Morales have
largely gone unpunished. As of September, a La Paz court had yet to rule in a
case against Leopoldo Fernández, former prefect of Pando Department, and
three other local officials, for their alleged roles in the deaths of 13 people.
Authorities have also failed fully to investigate alleged 2011 police abuses
against protesters opposing a proposed highway in the Isiboro Secure National
Park and Indigenous Territory (known as “TIPNIS”) and the 2009 police killing of
two Hungarians (one of Bolivian birth) and an Irishman whom the government al-
leged were mercenaries involved in a separatist plot. 
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Impunity has led to mob attacks, or lynchings, of alleged criminals. Five people
died in lynchings in 2015, according to the Ombudsman’s Office. In March 2016,
media reported that a mob in El Alto killed a man with mental disabilities whom
they suspected to be a criminal and burned parts of his body. Many lynchings go
unpunished.
Military Abuses and Jurisdiction
Human rights violations against soldiers remain a problem. In January, the Om-
budsman’s Office reported that a soldier had been killed in a military headquar-
ters that month and that another had died in December 2015 after being subject
to an “inhumane” military exercise. Most such deaths of soldiers go unpun-
ished, according to the Ombudsman’s Office. 
The Constitutional Court ruled in 2012 that a civilian court should have jurisdic-
tion of the case of a conscript who died in 2011 following a combat training exer-
cise during which instructors allegedly beat him on the head and chest. The high
court urged lawmakers to reform Bolivia’s military justice code to ensure that
cases of military human rights violations are heard in civilian courts. At time of
writing the code had not been reformed.
Judicial Independence
The Bolivian justice system has been plagued by corruption, delays, and politi-
cal interference for years. 
In June, members of the three branches of government, as well as civil society
groups and other stakeholders, discussed proposals to reform the Bolivian jus-
tice system during a “National Justice Summit.” The summit’s recommendations
included requiring that the Plurinational Assembly reform the selection process
for high-court judges, creating a new body to supervise judges, and assessing
the work of current judges and prosecutors. The scope of the proposed reforms
and thus their impact on judicial independence remained unclear at time of writ-
ing. 
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Due Process and Prison Conditions
As of June, 69 percent of inmates in Bolivian prisons had not been convicted of a
crime. Extended pretrial detention and trial delays have led to prison overcrowd-
ing and poor conditions. As of March, 13,940 inmates packed prisons built to
hold a maximum of around 5,000.
A 2014 law decreased the maximum periods of pretrial detention in most cases.
Presidential decrees adopted between 2012 and 2015 allowed the president to
reduce the sentences of those convicted of minor crimes and pardon those held
in pretrial detention for minor crimes. As of January 2016, more than 4,500 peo-
ple had benefited from these decrees, according to official figures.
In June, the National Justice Summit recommended that pretrial detention be
used “exceptionally” and that legal reforms should broaden alternatives to pre-
trial imprisonment. At time of writing, no legislation had been introduced to im-
plement those recommendations. 
In May, lawyer Eduardo León was detained and prosecuted for “human traffick-
ing” after he represented Gabriela Zapata Montaño, a former lover of President
Morales who claimed she had a son with him. Bolivian authorities said that Zap-
ata and León had paid a boy to say he was Morales’ son. According to the Om-
budsman’s Office, judges violated León’s due process rights, detaining him
without charge beyond the maximum period allowed by Bolivian law. Later that
month, government authorities summarily withdrew Leon’s license to practice
law, alleging he had falsified his military service certificate in 1999 (presenting
such a certificate was required to get a university degree at the time).
In October, the Attorney General’s Office used a 2010 law to charge business-
man and opposition leader Samuel Doria Medina with “anti-economic conduct”
for mismanagement he allegedly committed in 1992 when he was minister of
planning. International human rights law prohibits such retroactive application
of the criminal law, unless doing so is beneficial to the defendant.
Police Response to Protests
In May 2016, several protesters and policemen were wounded in La Paz during
clashes at a demonstration by people with disabilities demanding a raise in
their disability allowances. In August, the UN Committee on the Rights of Per-
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sons with Disabilities urged the Bolivian government to investigate allegations
by civil society groups that police used excessive force during the protest.
Human Rights Defenders
Human rights defenders continue to face harassment, including from govern-
ment officials, undermining their ability to work independently.
In 2013, President Morales signed a law and adopted a decree granting the gov-
ernment broad powers to dissolve civil society organizations. Under the decree,
any government office may request that the Ministry of Autonomy revoke the per-
mit of a nongovernmental organization (NGO) if it performs activities other than
those listed in its bylaws, or if the organization’s legal representative is crimi-
nally sanctioned for carrying out activities that “undermine security or public
order.” 
The decree also allows the Plurinational Assembly to request the revocation of
an NGO permit in cases of “necessity or public interest.” These measures give
the government inappropriately wide latitude to interfere with the operation of
independent civil society groups. In December 2015, the Bolivian Constitutional
Court ruled the law and decree constitutional.  
In March 2016, President Morales said that “some NGOs” were “conspiring”
against his government but did not specify which ones. In September, the minis-
ter of the Presidency said that “some NGOs” sought to carry out a coup and
“subdue the Bolivian People,” but he neither named the NGOs nor presented ev-
idence to support his claim.
Freedom of Expression
While public debate is robust, the Morales administration periodically lashes out
against journalists, accusing them, often without presenting evidence, of pub-
lishing what it calls lies and politically motivated distortions. The government
has repeatedly accused media outlets of participating in an international con-
spiracy against Bolivia and President Morales.
Bolivia lacks transparent criteria for using government funds to purchase media
advertisements—an important source of media revenue—and some media out-
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lets have accused the government of discriminating against those who criticize
government officials by withholding advertising from them.
When the OAS special rapporteur for freedom of expression told the Bolivian
media in August that under international law governments should not discrimi-
nate against media companies viewed as critical when purchasing media adver-
tisements, President Morales accused him of being part of a “cartel of liars.”
Indigenous Rights
The 2009 Bolivian Constitution includes comprehensive guarantees for indige-
nous groups’ rights to collective land titling, intercultural education, prior con-
sultation on development projects, and protection of indigenous justice
systems. 
Indigenous peoples’ right to free, prior, and informed consent (FPIC) regarding
legislative or administrative measures that may affect them is not fully embodied
in Bolivian legislation. A current mining law limits FPIC to the exploitation phase
of land concessions, but international standards call for FPIC through all stages
of projects that impact on indigenous peoples’ rights over land and natural re-
sources.
Gender-Based Violence and Reproductive Rights
Women and girls in Bolivia remain at high risk of gender-based violence, despite
a 2013 law that sets forth comprehensive measures to prevent and prosecute vi-
olence against women. The law created the crime of “femicide” (the killing of a
woman in certain contexts, including of domestic violence) and called for the es-
tablishment of shelters for women, as well as special prosecutors and courts for
gender-based crimes. 
In July, the Attorney General’s Office reported that that 147 “femicides” had oc-
curred in Bolivia from January 2015 through June 2016, and that prosecutors had
obtained convictions in four of these cases.
Women and girls face numerous obstacles to accessing reproductive health
products, contraceptives, and services.
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Under Bolivian law, abortion is not a crime when the pregnancy is the result of
rape or if the procedure is necessary to protect the life or health of a pregnant
women. In 2014, the Constitutional Court ruled that prior judicial authorization
and prosecution of the alleged rapist were not prerequisites for post-rape abor-
tion. In November 2015, the health ministry issued a resolution stipulating that
abortion should be permitted when the mental health of the mother—not just
her physical health—is at risk. 
Child Labor
In 2014, the Plurinational Assembly adopted legislation allowing children as
young as 10 to work, in contravention of international standards and making Bo-
livia the first country in the world to legalize employment at such a young age. In
February 2015, the Ombudsman’s Office said that 850,000 children were work-
ing in Bolivia, most of them younger than 14.
Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity
In May 2016, the Plurinational Assembly passed a bill that allows people to re-
vise the gender noted on their identification documents without prior judicial
approval.
Same-sex couples in Bolivia are not allowed to marry or engage in civil unions.
The 2009 constitution defines marriage as the union of a man and a woman.
Key International Actors
In September, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights urged Bolivia to
carry out an independent and impartial investigation into the killing of 5 people,
including the then-vice minister of interior, during a protest by miners in the mu-
nicipality of Panduro.
In August, the UN Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities urged Bo-
livia to abolish legislation that limits the legal capacity of people with disabili-
ties to form a family, vote, and enter into contracts, among other things. The
committee also recommended that Bolivia end the practice of sterilization with-
out consent and take measures to deinstitutionalize children with disabilities.
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Bosnia and Herzegovina
Bosnia and Herzegovina formally applied for European Union membership in
February 2016, but progress on human rights remains largely stalled. Authorities
failed to end political discrimination against Jews, Roma, and other minorities.
There was slow progress towards accountability for war crimes in domestic
courts. Journalists remain vulnerable to intimidation and threats. Lesbian, gay,
bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) people face hate speech and threats.  
Ethnic and Religious Discrimination
The government and assembly made no progress towards amending the consti-
tution to eliminate ethnic and religious discrimination in candidacy for the na-
tional tripartite presidency and the House of Peoples. Currently, the constitution
requires candidates for these institutions to come from one of the three main
ethnic groups—Bosniaks, Serbs, and Croats, thereby excluding Jews, Roma, and
other minorities from political office. 
The European Court of Human Rights ruled in 2016 that the arrangements violate
the European Convention on Human Rights—the third time it has done so. Imple-
mentation of prior rulings lost momentum after the EU dropped implementation
of the original 2009 European Court ruling as a condition for the entry into force
of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement. 
Local elections were held in Bosnia and Herzegovina on October 2, 2016, for all
municipalities except for the city of Mostar. Mostar has been excluded over fail-
ure by local authorities to give effect to a BiH Constitutional Court decision that
its election rules are discriminatory. Residents of the city have been unable to
vote in local elections since 2008.
The results of the 2013 census of BiH were finally published on June 30, 2016,
showing a changed demographic picture in which the country lost almost one-
fifth of its pre-war population. 
Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons
According to the Ministry for Human Rights and Refugees, the official number of
internally displaced persons at the end of 2015 was 98,324. The government
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published a revised strategy on the return of refugees and internally displaced
persons in December 2015. 
But a lack of reliable public information either from the Bosnia authorities or
UNHCR about returns of displaced persons and refugees to their pre-war homes
makes it difficult to assess what progress if any has been made under the previ-
ous 2010 strategy, and what impact the new strategy will have. 
Accountability for War Crimes
There was slow progress in prosecuting war crimes in domestic courts. The goal
to finish the most complex cases in the War Crimes Chamber of the State Court
by the end of 2015 has not been reached. At time of writing, the Special Depart-
ment for War Crimes of BiH Prosecutor’s Office was still working on 346 of the
most complex war crimes cases in relation to 3,383 individuals.
Bosnia and Herzegovina’s national war crimes strategy was critically assessed in
two separate studies published in 2016, one by the Supervisory Body for Over-
seeing the Implementation of the National War Crimes Strategy and the other
commissioned by the Organization for Security and Co-Operation (OSCE) in Eu-
rope and International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY). Both
found that that authorities had failed to meet the targets in the strategy and
identified a lack of strategic planning, understaffing, and poor training as con-
tributing factors.  
Between January and August 2016, the State Court War Crimes Chamber reached
13 verdicts (3 acquittals, 10 convictions) at the first instance in relation to 25 de-
fendants, and 19 verdicts (11 upheld, 7 modified, and 1 revoked) at the second
instance in relation to 26 defendants, increasing the total number of completed
cases at the first instance to 169 and at the second instance to 158 since the
court became fully operational in 2005.
Between January and October 2016, the cantonal courts reached 20 verdicts (5
acquittals, 15 convictions) in relation to 27 defendants. The district courts
reached 5 verdicts (3 acquittals, 2 conviction) in relation to 5 persons in the
same period. 
In August 2016, research conducted by Balkan Investigative Reporting Network
showed that cantonal courts and the Basic Court in Brcko have allowed five war
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crime convicts who were sentenced to up to one year in prison to pay fines to
avoid going to jail.
The trial in the State Court against Naser Oric, a former Bosnia army general, and
Sabahudin Muhic, a former Bosnian army soldier, started on January 26, 2016.
The trial started after the Mechanism for International Tribunals rejected a re-
quest by Oric’s lawyers to order the State Court to stop the case against him be-
cause he has already been acquitted of the same charges at the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY). The prosecution alleges that
Oric and Muhic killed three Serb prisoners in the villages of Zalazje, Lolici, and
Kunjerac in 1992. 
At the ICTY in March, Bosnian Serb wartime President Radovan Karadzic was
convicted of genocide, crimes against humanity, and violations of the laws or
customs of war and sentenced to 40 years’ imprisonment. Karadzic was con-
victed of genocide in the area of Srebrenica in 1995, of persecution, extermina-
tion, murder, deportation, inhumane acts (forcible transfer), terror, unlawful
attacks on civilians and hostage-taking. He was acquitted of the charge of geno-
cide in other municipalities in BiH in 1992.
At time of writing, the defense case in the trial of Ratko Mladic, the former com-
mander of the Republika Srpska Army, was in progress at the ICTY. Mladic’s case
experienced a substantial slowdown due to delays in evidence presentation by
the defense. Mladic is on trial for genocide in Srebrenica and seven other munic-
ipalities in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the persecution of Bosniaks and Croats
throughout the country, terrorizing the civilian population of Sarajevo and taking
UN peacekeepers hostage. The trial judgment was expected in November 2017.
National Security 
Imad Al-Husin (also known as Abu Hamza), a naturalized Bosnian from Syria de-
tained in 2008, was released in February 2016 from the immigration center in
Sarajevo where he was held for over seven years on national security grounds
without ever being indicted. The Ministry of Security announced in a press re-
lease in February 2016 that the decision to expel Imad Al-Husin still stands; until
then his movement remains limited to the Canton of Sarajevo.
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Zeyad Khalaf Al Gertani, an Iraqi citizen, detained without charge on national se-
curity grounds from 2009 until 2014, remains under a supervision order confin-
ing him to the Bosnian town of Banovici, apart from his family. 
Human Rights Defenders and Civil Society
By October 2016, Civil Rights Defenders had registered 12 incidents targeting
groups and individuals working to defend human rights, including six physical
attacks against journalists and three incidents against one human rights organi-
zation in Prijedor municipality. 
Freedom of Media
Journalists continue to face threats and intimidation. In the first nine months of
2016, the national journalists’ association registered 40 cases of violations of
media freedom and expression, including 5 physical attacks, 2 death threats, 6
cases of pressure, 3 cases of defamation, and 3 cases of verbal threats.
Borka Rudic, general secretary of the Association of Journalists of Bosnia and
Herzegovina, and the Journalists’ Association itself were accused in July by
Salmir Kaplan, a member of parliament and adviser to the security minister, of
supporting the Gulen movement in Turkey and Rudic was called a “Chetnik”
(right-wing nationalist Serb), after Rudic spoke out against curbs on media free-
dom in Turkey. 
In May, a Croatian television journalist Petar Panjkota was struck on the head
after reporting from a demonstration in Banja Luka. Two crew from Bosnian TV
station BN TV covering the same demonstration were verbally abused and a third
received threats on social media. 
Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity
Sarajevo Open Centre, the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender rights organi-
zation, documented 23 cases of hate speech and incitement of violence and
hate and two crimes and incidents motivated by prejudice on the basis of sexual
orientation and/or gender identity in the first three months of 2016. The reaction
of authorities to these incidents is generally inadequate. There was no progress
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in police investigations into the 2014 attack on a film festival that Sarajevo Open
Centre organized.
Key International Actors
In April, Dunja Mijatovic, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Eu-
rope’s representative on freedom of the media, urged authorities to address at-
tacks against journalists who are experiencing a growing number of online
threats. The problem is particularly severe when it comes to female journalists.
A July 2016 report prepared by the European Committee for the Prevention of Tor-
ture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT) noted allegations
of widespread physical ill-treatment of detainees by law enforcement officials
and inmates by prison staff, and was critical of the failure by prosecutors and
judges to investigate such allegations.
The United States State Department annual report on human rights in Bosnia
and Herzegovina, published in April 2016, underlined the issue of severe mis-
treatment of detainees in prisons, remand detention centers, and the harsh and
sometimes life- threatening conditions in the country’s prisons. Furthermore, the
report highlighted the widespread violence against women, including sexual as-
sault and domestic violence, exacerbated by ineffective, underfunded social
services and an inadequate police response. 
In its annual progress on Bosnia and Herzegovina published in November, the
European Commission highlighted the failure of authorities to amend the consti-
tution, in breach of the European Convention on Human Rights and to implement
rulings by the Constitutional Court. The report also identified inadequate legal
protection for LGBTI persons and the failure of authorities to protect adequately
the rights of minorities and to ensure media freedom. 
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Brazil
Brazil suffered both economic and political crises in 2016. In August, its Con-
gress impeached President Dilma Rousseff; Vice President Michel Temer re-
placed her. 
Chronic human rights problems plague Brazil’s criminal justice system, includ-
ing unlawful police killings, prison overcrowding, and torture and ill-treatment of
detainees. Some recent reform efforts aim to address these problems, but other
proposed moves would exacerbate them. In 2016, the judiciary broadened a pro-
gram to ensure that detainees are promptly brought before judges after their ar-
rest, as required by international law. Congress approved a counterterrorism bill
with overbroad and vague language that could be used to undermine freedom of
association.
Public Security and Police Conduct
Widespread violence, often perpetrated by criminal gangs, plagues many Brazil-
ian cities. Abuses by police, including extrajudicial executions, contribute to a
cycle of violence in high-crime neighborhoods, undermining public security and
endangering the lives of the police officers who patrol them. In 2015, 393 police
officers were killed in Brazil, according to the latest data available at time of writ-
ing. 
Police officers, including off-duty officers, killed 3,345 people in 2015, according
to official data compiled by the nongovernmental organization (NGO) Brazilian
Forum on Public Security. This represents a 6 percent increase over 2014, and a
52 percent increase over 2013. While some police killings result from legitimate
use of force, others are extrajudicial executions, as documented by Human
Rights Watch and other groups, and as acknowledged by Brazilian criminal jus-
tice officials.
After doubling in 2014, killings by on-duty police officers in São Paulo–the state
with the largest population in Brazil–decreased by 17 percent in 2015 and fell by
another 19 percent from January to September of 2016. But killings by on-duty
police officers in Rio de Janeiro–the state with the highest rate of police killings–
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increased 11 percent in 2015 and an additional 23 percent in the first 9 months
of 2016.
In September, an appeals court voided the convictions of 74 police officers for
their participation in the 1992 killing of 111 detainees in the Carandiru prison in
São Paulo. One of the members of the three-judge panel claimed “there was no
massacre” and that all killings were in self-defense, despite overwhelming evi-
dence that police executed the detainees.
Prison Conditions, Torture, and Ill-Treatment of Detainees
Many Brazilian prisons and jails are severely overcrowded and violent. The num-
ber of adults behind bars jumped 85 percent from 2004 to 2014 and exceeds
622,000 people, 67 percent more than the prisons were built to hold, according
to latest Ministry of Justice figures.
A key contributor to the dramatic increase in Brazil´s prison population has been
a 2006 drug law that increased sentences for traffickers. While the law also re-
placed prison sentences for drug users with penalties such as community serv-
ice, a measure that might have reduced the prison population, the law was
worded vaguely, leaving open the possibility of users being prosecuted as traf-
fickers. In 2005, 9 percent of those in prison had been detained on drug
charges—in 2014 it was 28 percent, and among women, 64 percent, according to
the latest data available. 
In 2014, judges started seeing detainees promptly after arrest, as required by in-
ternational law. Such “custody hearings”—currently carried out in state capitals
and some other jurisdictions—help judges determine who should be in preven-
tive detention and who should be set free pending trial. In the absence of cus-
tody hearings, detainees often wait many months to see a judge for the first
time. In Brazil, 40 percent of people in prison are pretrial detainees. At time of
writing, Brazil’s Congress was examining a bill to make such hearings mandatory
throughout the country.
Custody hearings have the potential to be a powerful weapon against police
abuse of detainees because they allow judges to detect and hear about mistreat-
ment soon after arrest. However, an analysis by the Institute for the Defense of
the Right of Defense (IDDD), an NGO, of more than 700 custody hearings carried
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out in São Paulo in 2015 showed that judges asked detainees about their treat-
ment in custody in only about 40 percent of cases, and took no action in a third
of the 141 cases of alleged abuse they heard. Judges sent the rest to the police
internal affairs divisions. The IDDD had no information about the results of any
inquiries into the cases by those divisions by the time it published its report in
May 2016.
A team from the government’s National Mechanism for the Prevention and Com-
batting of Torture visited six states between April 2015 and March 2016, docu-
menting cases of torture and cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment in “most, if
not all” of the 17 jails and prisons it inspected. In Sorocaba jail in São Paulo
state, they found 50 detainees in cells designed to hold 9 people.
Children’s Rights
Brazil’s Senate is examining a Constitutional amendment—a version of which
was approved by the Chamber of Deputies in 2015—that would allow 16 and 17-
year-olds accused of serious crimes to be tried and punished as adults. If en-
acted, the law would violate international norms enshrined in human rights
treaties that Brazil has ratified, which state that people under 18 should not be
prosecuted as adults. 
The Chamber of Deputies is considering a separate bill, which the Senate has al-
ready approved, to raise the maximum time of internment for children from 3 to
10 years. If enacted, the bill would aggravate overcrowding in the juvenile deten-
tion system, which was built to hold about 18,000 juveniles but held close to
22,000 in 2014, according to the latest data published by the National Council of
the Prosecutor’s Office.
The National Mechanism for the Prevention and Combatting of Torture found that
the physical infrastructure of the nine juvenile centers it visited in three states
between April 2015 and March 2016 did not comply with the Federal Govern-
ment’s regulations: instead of promoting rehabilitation and education, the cen-
ters served as places of isolation and punishment. In most units, children spent
more than 20 hours a day—and in one unit 24 hours a day—locked in their
rooms. Conditions were especially dire in the state of Ceará, where the number
of children held as of January 2016 was more than double capacity in some facil-
ities, according to CEDECA Ceara, an NGO. Some children reported that juvenile
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detention officers beat them and that they were kept in units infested with rats
and cockroaches, and which lacked adequate sanitation, ventilation, mat-
tresses, and basic hygiene products. 
Counterterrorism
In February, the Rousseff administration won Congressional approval for a coun-
terterrorism bill that contains vague language that endangers such basic human
rights as freedom of association. The law includes an overbroad definition of
“terrorism” and of “actions in preparation” of a terrorist act that could be used
against peaceful advocacy groups. 
Internet Freedom, Privacy, and Freedom of Expression
Brazil was at the vanguard of digital rights in 2014 with the enactment of a Digi-
tal Bill of Rights, intended to protect privacy and free expression rights online. It
also co-led an initiative at the United Nation Human Rights Council in 2015 to
create a new UN special rapporteur on the right to privacy. One of Dilma Rouss-
eff’s last acts as president was signing a decree in May 2016 that implemented
the law.
But other developments risk setting back the right to privacy in Brazil. From Feb-
ruary 2015 to July 2016, four judges ordered the temporary blocking of What-
sApp, the Facebook-owned messaging service, across the country, and in March
2016 federal police arrested a Facebook executive because the company refused
to turn over user information to authorities.
Between March and June 2016, judicial officials filed more than 40 lawsuits
against five employees of the newspaper Gazeta do Povo (People’s Gazette) in
the state of Paraná for a series of stories, based on information publicly avail-
able from government websites, revealing that judges and prosecutors were re-
ceiving more in wages and benefits than is allowed by the Constitution. In July,
Brazil’s Supreme Court suspended the lawsuits pending its review of the cases.
In August, a judge authorized police to wiretap a reporter’s phone after he re-
fused to reveal his sources for a story that published a list of Brazilians whom
authorities suspect have Swiss bank accounts.
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According to Artigo 19, a Brazilian NGO, five journalists were killed in Brazil in
2016 through October, including at least two who were attacked or threatened
prior to their deaths. Since 2011, at least 21 journalists have died violently in
Brazil in direct relation to their work, according to the Committee to Protect Jour-
nalists, an international press freedom group.
Women’s Rights
Abortion is legal in Brazil only in cases of rape, when necessary to save a
woman’s life, or when the fetus suffers from anencephaly, a fatal congenital
brain disorder. In 2016, conservative members of Congress promoted several
bills that would eliminate those exceptions and that would make it a crime even
to provide information to women about abortion. 
Women and girls who abort pregnancies illegally risk not only injury and death,
but face sentences of up to three years in prison, while people who perform
abortions face up to four years, if convicted.
Brazilian women and girls of child-bearing age faced new health challenges from
an outbreak of the Zika virus starting in 2015. The virus can cause a series of con-
genital conditions during fetal development, including microcephaly, or the un-
derdevelopment of the brain. In August, the National Association of Public
Defenders, with support from the NGO Anis, filed a petition before the Supreme
Court to allow women infected with Zika to have abortions.
Disability Rights
In January, a disability rights law came into effect, requiring public agencies to
give priority to people with disabilities when providing services related to
health, education, work, housing, culture, and sport. The law also instructs cities
to adapt sidewalks and public spaces for people with disabilities. In June,
Brazil’s Supreme Court upheld a provision in that law that requires private
schools to incorporate children with disabilities in regular classrooms at no extra
cost to their families.
However, a bill under discussion in Congress could set back Brazil’s efforts to
meet its obligation under the Convention on the Rights of People with Disabili-
ties to ensure that persons with disabilities “enjoy legal capacity on an equal
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basis with others in all aspects of life.” The bill would revert to a system under
which some people with disabilities can be placed in guardianship arrange-
ments that are not consistent with Brazil’s human rights obligations.
Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity
Brazil’s Supreme Court approved same-sex marriage in 2011 and it upheld the
right of same-sex couples to adopt children in 2015. But the Chamber of
Deputies was, at time of writing, debating a bill that would define a family as a
union between a man and a woman. 
The national Human Rights Ombudsman’s Office received 1,983 complaints of vi-
olence, discrimination, and other abuses experienced by lesbian, gay, bisexual,
and transgender (LGBT) persons in 2015. In the first half of 2016 the ombudsman
received 879 such complaints.
Labor Rights
Since 1995, the Ministry of Labor has documented almost 50,000 cases of work-
ers being subjected to abusive working conditions that under Brazilian law rise
to the level of “slave-like,” such as forced labor and degrading working condi-
tions. More than 1,000 such cases were documented in 2015. From April 2014 to
April 2016, the Ministry of Labor imposed penalties on 349 companies for em-
ploying 4,119 people in “slave-like” conditions. 
Rural Violence
Rural activists and indigenous leaders involved in conflicts over land continue to
face threats and violence in Brazil. According to the Pastoral Land Commission of
the Catholic Church, 39 people involved in land conflicts died violently from Jan-
uary to August 2016. 
In 2015, five indigenous people died as a result of land conflicts, according to
the Indigenous Missionary Council of the Catholic Church (Cimi). Of particular
concern, the council said, is the situation of the Guaraní-Kaiowá people, who
continue to suffer violent attacks by militias linked to landowners as they strug-
gle to regain their rights over ancestral lands.
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After a visit to Brazil in March 2016, the UN special rapporteur on the rights of in-
digenous peoples said that in the last eight years there was a “disturbing” lack
of progress in areas of key concern to indigenous peoples, such as the demarca-
tion of their territories. She urged Brazil’s government to address violence and
discrimination against indigenous people. 
Confronting Military-Era Abuses
The perpetrators of human rights abuses during military rule from 1964 to 1985
continue to be shielded from justice by a 1979 amnesty law that was upheld by
the Supreme Court in 2010, a decision that the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights quickly ruled was a violation of Brazil’s obligations under international
law. In 2014, the National Truth Commission identified 377 such perpetrators,
but owing to the amnesty law, their crimes remain unpunished.
Federal courts did allow the prosecution of at least two former military officers
for killings during military rule, but the Supreme Court temporarily halted those
prosecutions in 2014 and 2015, pending its re-examination of the validity of the
amnesty law.
Key International Actors
In a May report to the UN Human Rights Council, the UN working group on busi-
ness and human rights found that mining company Samarco had failed to alert
residents after the November 2015 rupture of a tailings dam, which caused one
of the worst environmental disasters in Brazilian history and the death of 19 peo-
ple. Prior warning might have prevented these deaths, the working group said. In
November, four UN rapporteurs said in a joint statement that the measures taken
so far by the government and the company are “insufficient” to deal with the
“massive” environmental and human impact of the disaster.
Foreign Policy
Brazil was elected to the Human Rights Council for the 2017-2019 term. In June,
the council adopted a resolution, presented by a core group of Latin American
countries, including Brazil, that established the position of UN independent ex-
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pert on protection against violence and discrimination based on sexual orienta-
tion and gender identity.
The total number of people with refugee status in Brazil more than doubled from
2011, when President Rousseff took office, to more than 8,800 in April 2016, ac-
cording to the Ministry of Justice. About a quarter of those with refugee status
are Syrian. The Temer administration has said that in 2017 it intends to receive at
least 3,000 Syrians from Jordan, Turkey, and Lebanon, as well as an undeter-
mined number of Central American refugees who are in Mexico.
The new government made a clear shift in its position toward Venezuela. In Au-
gust, Foreign Minister José Serra called the Venezuelan government “authoritar-
ian and repressive” and highlighted the plight of political prisoners there. The
Rousseff administration had avoided criticizing Venezuela’s persecution of polit-
ical opponents and crackdown on protesters. 
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Burma
Burma’s new government led by the National League for Democracy (NLD) took
office in March 2016 after sweeping the November 2015 elections. Headed by
State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi and President Htin Kyaw, the NLD controls a
majority of both upper and lower house parliamentary seats in the country’s first
democratically elected, civilian-led government since 1962. However, the new
government inherited deep-rooted challenges, including constitutional empow-
erment of the military, repressive legislation, weak rule of law, and a corrupt ju-
diciary.
The political transition began promisingly, with the April release of over 200 po-
litical prisoners and detainees. Nonetheless, the NLD-led government has thus
far not capitalized on its initial momentum in guiding the country toward sub-
stantive reform or the creation of democratic institutions. 
Fighting between the Burmese armed forces and ethnic armed groups intensified
or flared up in several regions during the year, resulting in abuses against civil-
ians and massive displacement. Violent attacks by unknown insurgents against
border guard posts on October 9 in Maungdaw, northern Rakhine State, resulted
in the deaths of nine officials and sparked the most serious humanitarian and
human rights crisis in Rakhine State since the October 2012 “ethnic cleansing”
campaign against the Rohingya. 
Under the deeply flawed 2008 constitution, the military retains autonomy from
civilian oversight and extensive power over the government and national secu-
rity, with control of the Defense, Home Affairs, and Border Affairs Ministries. It is
guaranteed 25 percent of parliamentary seats, which constitutes an effective
veto over any constitutional amendments, and is authorized to assume power in
a national state of emergency. 
Ethnic Conflict and Armed Forces Abuses
Fighting between the Tatmadaw (Burmese armed forces) and ethnic armed
groups worsened over the year in Kachin, Rakhine, Karen, and Northern Shan
States, displacing thousands of civilians. Government forces have been respon-
sible for serious abuses, including extrajudicial killings, torture, sexual violence,
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and destruction of property. Government shelling and airstrikes have been con-
ducted against ethnic areas, in violation of the laws of war. Both government
and non-state groups have been implicated in the use of anti-personnel land-
mines and forced recruitment, including of children.
The legacy of the Burmese military’s “divide and rule” approach persists, as the
conflict’s spillover and ensuing abuses compound tensions among ethnic
groups.
The Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) orchestrated under the previous
Thein Sein government was signed in October 2015 by eight non-state armed
groups, fewer than half of the country’s total. Since its adoption, military opera-
tions and clashes between signatory and non-signatory armed groups have con-
tinued. 
From August 31 to September 3, Aung San Suu Kyi presided over the 21st Century
Panglong Conference, billed as a forum for re-engaging armed groups and other
national stakeholders in the country’s peace process. Intensified fighting on the
ground has continued unabated since the conference.
In Northern Shan State, fighting between the Ta’ang National Liberation Army
and the Restoration Council of Shan State/Shan State Army-South, at times with
the support of the Tatmadaw, flared throughout the year. 
Fighting between the military and the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) in Kachin
State increased steadily since mid-August. In September, fighting between eth-
nic armed groups and government forces in Karen State displaced about 5,900
civilians.
Violence over the past five years has left 220,000 people displaced nationwide—
120,000 in Rakhine State and 100,000 in Shan and Kachin States.
Security threats, weak infrastructure, and restrictions imposed by government
and non-state authorities regularly impeded access by humanitarian agencies to
civilians displaced in conflict-affected areas. Restrictions on access to Internally
Displaced Persons (IDPs) in Kachin and Shan States increased in late 2016. 
149
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH
Abuses against Rohingya
Muslim minorities in Burma, in particular the 1.2 million ethnic Rohingya, con-
tinue to face rampant and systemic human rights violations. 
Outbreaks of violence in Maungdaw district in northern Rakhine State escalated
following an October 9 attack on three border outposts that left nine police offi-
cers dead. Asserting that both the initial and subsequent attacks were carried
out by armed Rohingya militants, the government initiated “clearance opera-
tions” to locate the alleged attackers while locking down the area, denying ac-
cess to humanitarian aid groups, independent media, and rights monitors. 
The security operations led to numerous reports of serious abuses by govern-
ment security forces against Rohingya villagers, including summary killings, rape
and other sexual violence, torture and ill-treatment, arbitrary arrests, and arson.
The military employed helicopter gunships during a series of clashes beginning
on November 11. At time of writing, the government said it had arrested over 300
alleged suspects. Local groups reported the use of torture and a number of
deaths in custody. 
Satellite imagery in November revealed widespread fire-related destruction in
Rohingya villages, with a total of 430 destroyed buildings in three villages of
Maungdaw district. 
Government travel restrictions placed on humanitarian agencies have led to criti-
cal food insecurity and malnutrition, and an estimated 30,000 Muslim villagers
remain displaced. 
The government has continually failed to adequately or effectively investigate
abuses against the Rohingya, and did not act on recommendations to seek UN
assistance for an investigation into the violence.  
The ongoing crisis in Maungdaw represents the most serious and widespread vi-
olence against the Rohingya since the ethnic cleansing campaign carried out in
June and October 2012. Four years after the 2012 violence, about 120,000 Ro-
hingya remain displaced in camps in Rakhine State. Humanitarian conditions for
both remaining IDPs and newly resettled persons remain dire due to restrictions
on movement and lack of access to livelihoods and basic services. 
WORLD REPORT 2017
150
The effective denial of citizenship for the Rohingya—who are not recognized on
the official list of 135 ethnic groups eligible for full citizenship under the 1982
Citizenship Law—has facilitated enduring rights abuses, including restrictions
on movement; limitations on access to health care, livelihood, shelter, and edu-
cation; arbitrary arrests and detention; and forced labor. Travel is severely con-
strained by authorization requirements, security checkpoints, curfews, and strict
control of IDP camp access. Such barriers compound the health crisis caused by
poor living conditions, severe overcrowding, and limited health facilities. 
The government refuses to use the term Rohingya, which the group self-identi-
fies as but is rejected by nationalist Buddhists in favor of the term “Bengali,”
which implies illegal migrant status in Burma. Aung San Suu Kyi refers to the
group as the “Muslim Community in Rakhine State,” and has requested that in-
ternational stakeholders, including the United States, European Union, and
United Nations, follow suit. 
The new Burmese government established two bodies to address sectarian ten-
sions in Rakhine State—a government committee and a nine-member
national/international advisory commission led by former UN Secretary-General
Kofi Annan, which initiated its year-long research mandate in September. 
Freedom of Expression and Assembly
Restrictions on the rights to freedom of expression and assembly persist, amid
the government’s failure to contend with the range of rights-abusing laws that
have been long used to criminalize free speech and prosecute dissidents. 
In its final months of rule, Thein Sein’s government continued arresting activists
using politically motivated charges, failing to fulfill the former president’s 2013
pledge to release all political prisoners by the end of his term. In April, the new
NLD-led government released 235 political prisoners and detainees in a series of
amnesties. 
However, the nod toward a new era of openness was contradicted by the govern-
ment’s continued use of problematic legislation to restrict free speech. In April,
two Muslim interfaith activists were convicted on charges under section 17(1) of
the Unlawful Association Act and sentenced to an additional two years in prison
with hard labor. Numerous activists were arrested under section 66(d) of the
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Telecommunications Act for “defaming” Aung San Suu Kyi, President Htin Kyaw,
or the military in social media posts. These include Maung Saungkha, who was
sentenced to six months in prison in May for a poem he posted on Facebook,
and Aung Win Hlaing, sentenced to nine months in prison in September for call-
ing the president an “idiot” and “crazy” on Facebook. 
Parliament put forward a new Peaceful Assembly and Peaceful Procession Law in
May, yet despite slight improvements the proposed revisions maintain regula-
tions that allow for at-will crackdowns on peaceful protests, blanket prohibitions
on certain protest speech, and criminal penalties for any violation of its restric-
tions. 
Arrests and prosecutions for participation in peaceful assemblies have contin-
ued under the new administration. Police arrested 90 political activists in May,
including student leaders of an interfaith peace walk in Rangoon; demonstrators
against the Letpadaung mine in Sagaing Division; and 76 labor rights activists
marching to the capital, Naypyidaw, to protest treatment by local factory owners.
Fifty-one of the labor activists were charged with unlawful assembly, rioting, and
disturbing public tranquility under the Burmese penal code; 15 were convicted in
October and sentenced to between four and six months in prison. 
Throughout the year, as many as 60 Arakanese men were arrested under section
17(1) of the Unlawful Association Act for alleged ties to the Arakan Army. From
March to July, 28 were found guilty and sentenced to two to five years in prison
with hard labor. 
The criminalization of expression perceived as a threat to the armed forces also
continued. In late June, the Ta’ang Women’s Organization was forced to cancel a
press conference in Rangoon to launch a report documenting military abuses
against ethnic Palaung in Northern Shan State. In August, Khine Myo Htun, an
environmental activist and member of the Arakan Liberation Party, was charged
with violating sections 505(b) and 505(c) of the penal code for accusing the
armed forces of committing crimes against humanity. In October, veteran activist
Htin Kyaw was arrested and charged with violating section 505(a) for accusing
the military of committing human rights abuses.
While the relaxation of press censorship has been a key hallmark of the demo-
cratic transition, various forms of government control remain inscribed in the
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legal framework and employed to restrict media freedom. In June, the Ministry of
Information banned the film “Twilight Over Burma” from a human rights film fes-
tival for its depiction of a relationship it claimed would threaten ethnic and mili-
tary relations. 
As part of the military’s “clearance operations” in northern Rakhine State, the
authorities denied independent journalists access to the region since early Octo-
ber. The Myanmar Times fired a journalist who had reported on allegations of
rape by security forces in Maungdaw, reportedly under pressure from the Min-
istry of Information.
Burma’s national penal code criminalizes consensual same-sex behavior be-
tween adult men. In recent years police have arrested gay men and transgender
women assembling in public places, and politicians have called for the “educa-
tion” of gay people.
Women’s and Girls’ Rights
Justice for women and girls in Burma remains elusive, particularly with regard to
violence related to armed conflict. Sexual violence by the military, and to some
extent ethnic armed groups, has been frequent, and the renewed violent clashes
in Kachin and Northern Shan States has exacerbated the problem. Such crimes
are facilitated by a near total lack of accountability, and no institutionalized com-
plaint mechanism. Few prosecutions have been publicly reported, despite alle-
gations of more than 115 cases of sexual violence perpetrated by the Burmese
army since fighting renewed. 
In October and November, media and local groups reported numerous incidents
of rape and other sexual assault of Rohingya women and girls committed by se-
curity forces during the “clearing operations” in Maungdaw district. The govern-
ment denied all reports of sexual violence, and the military lockdown has
prevented independent investigations into the abuses. This suppression is em-
blematic of the military’s long-standing refusal to seriously investigate cases of
sexual violence. 
In May, the Tatmadaw announced that an investigation into the January 2015
rape and murder of two Kachin schoolteachers by suspected army soldiers had
taken place, but no public information about charges or a trial was released.
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Women in conflict zones and displaced or stateless women are especially vulner-
able to abductions, enforced disappearances, sexual violence, and exploitation. 
Despite their central role in human rights and democracy activism in Burma,
women have been marginalized in the government’s various peace process ini-
tiatives, and their concerns have been noticeably absent from the negotiations.
Women made up less than 10 percent of participants in the peace process, and
women’s rights groups were sidelined at the 21st Century Panglong Conference. 
Women hold only 13 percent of seats in the new parliament; only one woman sits
on the 18-person cabinet, and only 0.25 percent of village-level administrators
are women. 
Key International Actors
Burma’s political transition has triggered an enthusiastic response from interna-
tional stakeholders. Since the new administration took office, there have been
only limited attempts by foreign governments to press for genuine legal and pol-
icy reforms. 
In May, the United States government relaxed a range of sanctions to ease US
business investments and financial transactions in Burma. Following a visit by
Aung San Suu Kyi in September, the US announced plans to lift most remaining
sanctions, which was carried out by executive order on October 7.
The US also resumed the General System of Preferences (GSP) trade status with
Burma, despite serious concerns that Burma’s labor practices do not meet GSP
conditions on labor rights. In a contradictory move, the US State Department
downgraded Burma in its annual Trafficking in Persons report to Tier 3, the low-
est tier, in recognition of ongoing abuses related to human trafficking, child sol-
dier recruitment, and forced labor. 
The UN Human Rights Council in March once again adopted its resolution on
Burma and extended the special rapporteur’s mandate, requesting that she
identify benchmarks for reform. However, the EU decided not to introduce a res-
olution at the UN General Assembly in November, underscoring the international
community’s softening approach. 
As Burma’s immediate neighbor with significant business and military ties
within the country, China continued efforts to strengthen its geopolitical engage-
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ment with the Burmese government and advance the large-scale development
projects that offer access to the country’s natural resources and strategic re-
gional borders, often to the detriment of local populations. 
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Burundi
The political and human rights crisis that gripped Burundi the previous year
deepened in 2016, as government forces targeted perceived opponents with in-
creased brutality. Security forces and intelligence services—often in collabora-
tion with members of the ruling party’s youth league, known as
Imbonerakure—were responsible for numerous killings, disappearances, abduc-
tions, torture, rape, and arbitrary arrests. Armed opposition groups also carried
out attacks and killed ruling party members. 
Dozens of dead bodies, some mutilated, were found across the country. The
identity of the perpetrators was often unknown. 
In December 2015, in the deadliest attack since the crisis began, police and mili-
tary shot dead a large number of residents in the capital, Bujumbura, following
attacks on four military installations, attributed to the opposition. 
The justice system is manipulated by ruling party and intelligence officials and
judicial procedures are routinely flouted. The prosecutor general created several
commissions of inquiry into allegations of serious human rights abuses. Their re-
ports were biased and misleading, largely exonerating security forces and failing
to hold those responsible to account. 
More than 325,000 Burundians have fled the country since 2015, most to Tanza-
nia, Rwanda, Uganda, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. 
Killings by Security Forces and Ruling Party Youth
On December 11, opposition members, with support from some members of the
military, attacked three military positions and a military training center in Bujum-
bura.
Police, military, and armed Imbonerakure pursued the attackers into Nyakabiga
and Musaga, two neighborhoods where residents had demonstrated in large
numbers against President Pierre Nkurunziza’s third term in 2015. In Nyakabiga,
armed opponents engaged the security forces in a sustained gun battle. It is un-
clear how many were killed on each side.
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Police, military and Imbonerakure then forced their way into houses and ordered
residents to show them where young men or combatants were hiding, some
shouting ethnic slurs at Tutsi residents. They killed scores of people in Nyak-
abiga and Musaga and carried out large-scale arbitrary arrests. 
The following day, some victims were found lying side by side, face down; they
appeared to have been shot in the back or the head. 
On December 12, 2015, police and Imbonerakure, accompanied by local govern-
ment officials and public health workers, picked up some of the dead bodies
from Musaga and took them away in local government vehicles to bury them in
mass graves in and around Bujumbura.
Several witnesses said that Imbonerakure, wearing surgical masks and gloves,
dug three or four graves in a cemetery in the Kanyosha neighborhood and buried
bodies there. 
Then-Prosecutor General Valentin Bagorikunda set up a commission of inquiry
into the December 11 events. Summarizing its main conclusions on March 10, he
did not mention killings of Bujumbura residents by the security forces. He
claimed that those killed on December 11 were armed “combatants” wearing po-
lice or military uniforms.
Torture and Disappearances 
There was a sharp increase in torture by the intelligence services and the police,
particularly of alleged opposition sympathizers. Intelligence agents beat de-
tainees with hammers and steel construction bars, drove sharpened steel rods
into their legs, dripped melting plastic on them, tied cords around men’s geni-
tals, and used electric shocks. Many tortured or injured detainees were denied
medical attention.
Disappearances and covert abductions increased in late 2015 and early 2016. In
December 2015, Marie-Claudette Kwizera, of the human rights group Ligue Iteka,
was driven away in a vehicle thought to belong to the intelligence services. She
has not been seen again. 
In late July, Jean Bigirimana, a journalist with the independent newspaper Iwacu,
disappeared after leaving his home in Bujumbura for Bugarama, in Muramvya
province. Unconfirmed reports indicate he was arrested by the intelligence
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services. In early August, two decomposed bodies were found in the Mubarazi
River in Muramvya, one of which was decapitated and the other weighed down
by stones. There was speculation that one of them could have been Bigiri-
mana’s but local authorities buried the bodies before determining their identi-
ties. 
Rape and Other Abuses by Ruling Party Youth
Members of the Imbonerakure and police, sometimes armed with guns, sticks or
knives, raped women whose male family members were perceived government
opponents. In some cases, Imbonerakure threatened or attacked the male rela-
tive before raping the woman. Women often continued to receive threats after
being raped.  
Imbonerakure and police raped women who attempted to cross into Tanzania,
apparently to deter them from leaving Burundi.
Imbonerakure set up roadblocks and check points in some provinces. They ex-
torted money, harassed passersby, and, despite having no powers of arrest, ar-
rested people they suspected of having links to the opposition. They also went
door to door, extorting money from residents. 
Mass Arrests 
Scores of opposition party members have been arrested, ill-treated, and illegally
detained, and other detainees taken to unknown destinations. Police almost
never produced warrants at the time of arrest. 
Ruling party officials, police, and Imbonerakure arrested at least 16 members of
the opposition party National Liberation Forces (FNL) at a bar in Kirundo province
in March. The police claimed they were conducting a political meeting without
authorization. Many more FNL members were arrested in later months.
Large-scale arrests, many of them arbitrary, continued throughout the year. In
May, police arrested more than 200 young men and students in Bujumbura’s
Musaga neighborhood. Local residents said the police ordered them to produce
identity cards and “household notebooks,” an obligatory register of all people
living in each house. Police beat some detainees with belts and truncheons. 
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After a grenade attack in Bujumbura’s Bwiza neighborhood in May, the police
detained several hundred people. Police spokesperson Pierre Nkurikiye told a
local media outlet it was “normal” to arrest people near the site of a grenade ex-
plosion and “among those arrested, there may be perpetrators of the attack.”
Police officials said all those arrested were later released.
Abuses by Armed Opposition Groups
Local journalists and human rights activists reported several grenade attacks
and killings believed to have been committed by armed opposition groups.
Other armed opposition attacks appeared to be more targeted and covert.
Unidentified people attacked several bars in Bujumbura and elsewhere with
grenades. Burundian media reported that in May, an attack on a drinks depot
and bar in Mwaro province killed a judicial policeman and injured several cus-
tomers. During the same attack, a guard at the ruling party offices in Ndava, in
Mwaro, was also killed as the attackers attempted to burn down the building.
Three men were arrested in connection with the attacks.
In Bururi province, unidentified gunmen shot dead several ruling party members
in April and May, including Jean Claude Bikorimana, on April 9. Three ruling party
members were among four people shot dead at a bar on April 15; another attack
on the same night killed a ruling party member, Japhet Karibwami, at his home. 
Civil Society and Media
Most leading civil society activists and many independent journalists remain in
exile, after repeated government threats in 2015 and arrest warrants against sev-
eral of them. In October, the Interior Minister banned or suspended 10 civil soci-
ety organizations that had spoken out against government abuses. 
In February, the Burundian National Communications Council signed an agree-
ment with Radio Isanganiro and Radio Rema FM allowing them to resume their
broadcasts. Following an attempted coup d’état in May 2015, the government
had closed these stations, along with Radio Publique Africaine, Radio Bonesha,
and Radio-Television Renaissance, which remain off the air at the time of writing. 
In August, men armed with a machete attacked a Burundian human rights ac-
tivist in Nakivale refugee camp in Uganda. The activist survived.  
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Key International Actors
There was little progress in regional and international efforts to broker a dia-
logue between Burundian political actors, co-facilitated by former Tanzanian
President Benjamin Mkapa. 
The Burundian government reacted with hostility to statements and initiatives by
the United Nations, the African Union (AU), the European Union (EU) and other
governments and international institutions. Ruling party officials accused
donors, foreign journalists and human rights organizations of siding with the op-
position. Government officials repeatedly rebuffed diplomats’ concerns about
human rights.   
Most major donors have suspended direct budgetary support to the Burundian
government, but some maintained humanitarian assistance. The US and EU
have imposed targeted sanctions on several senior Burundian officials and op-
position leaders. 
The Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC) announced
in April that it was opening a preliminary examination into the situation in Bu-
rundi. In early October, Burundi’s parliament voted overwhelmingly to with-
draw from the ICC and the government officially notified the UN
Secretary-General of its decision to withdraw on October 27.
At a special session in December 2015, the UN Human Rights Council (HRC)
tasked a team of three independent experts to investigate human rights viola-
tions in Burundi. The team’s report, presented in September, found that gross
and systematic human rights violations had taken place, some possibly amount-
ing to crimes against humanity. It suggested the HRC review Burundi’s member-
ship status. The HRC adopted a resolution presented by the EU calling for a
commission of inquiry into human rights violations in Burundi since April 2015,
including on whether they may constitute international crimes. The inquiry
would also identify alleged perpetrators with a view to ensuring accountability. 
In October, the Burundian government, angered by the UN report, stated it had
suspended all cooperation with the Office of the UN High Commissioner for
Human Rights in Burundi and declared the three UN independent experts per-
sona non grata.
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The UN chose in June not to replace Burundian police in its peacekeeping mis-
sion to the Central African Republic because of concerns about human rights
abuses in Burundi.
In July, the UN Committee Against Torture held a special session on Burundi and
raised serious concerns about torture and other violations. The Burundian dele-
gation failed to show up on the second day to answer the committee’s ques-
tions, instead sending a statement requesting more time to respond. The
committee rejected this request and released its concluding observations in Au-
gust.
In August, the UN Security Council passed a resolution calling for the deploy-
ment of 228 unarmed police officers to Burundi to support UN human rights
monitors. Burundian authorities rejected the deployment and pro-government
demonstrators protested it.  
The AU authorized the deployment of 100 human rights observers and 100 mili-
tary observers, but only a small number have been deployed because of dis-
agreements between the Burundian government and the AU. The AU authorized
in December 2015 the deployment of a 5,000-person African Prevention and Pro-
tection Mission in Burundi, which the Burundian government rejected, saying it
would consider it an invading and occupying force. The AU did not pursue the
proposal.  
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Cambodia
During 2016, Prime Minister Hun Sen and his ruling Cambodian People’s Party
(CPP) significantly escalated persecution on political grounds, targeting Cambo-
dia’s political opposition, human rights workers, social activists, and public in-
tellectuals on the basis of their real or perceived political opposition to the
government and its leader. These abuses appeared aimed to prevent victory or
create conditions for overturning victory by the opposition Cambodia National
Rescue Party (CNRP) in local and national elections scheduled for 2017 and 2018
respectively. The government also filed baseless charges against Rong Chhun, a
member of the National Election Committee (NEC) appointed as a neutral mem-
ber of the NEC as part of a political deal with the opposition.
On July 10, popular political commentator Kem Ley, who had voiced many criti-
cisms of the government, was shot to death in Phnom Penh in broad daylight.
Members of the public chased the gunman, who police took into custody. Au-
thorities soon announced he had confessed to the crime. Media reports identi-
fied him as a former soldier from outside the capital. No genuine effort was
made to identify those who ordered the killing. 
Authorities systematically denied Cambodians their right to peaceful assembly
by suppressing protests and issuing a series of ad hoc bans on non-violent gath-
erings and processions. Senior military officials backed this up with a flurry of
pronouncements, including threats to deploy armed forces to prevent or sup-
press demonstrations by taking “absolute” action against them. These followed
a memorial march on July 24, 2016, in memory of Kem Ley. Tens of thousands of
people attended, despite government efforts to restrict participation.
Corruption remains a huge problem. Rather than targeting high-level official cor-
ruption, Cambodia’s official anti-corruption unit has launched politically moti-
vated investigations against the CNRP and the Cambodian Human Rights and
Development Association (ADHOC), one of the country’s oldest and most re-
spected nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).
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Attacks on the Political Opposition
CNRP president Sam Rainsy remained outside Cambodia in 2016, having de-
cided not to return to the country in 2015 after the government announced it was
going to enforce a two-year prison sentence against him on trumped-up charges.
During 2016 four new prosecutions were brought against Rainsy, including one
for being an accomplice to CNRP Senator Hong Sok Hour, convicted on politically
motivated charges in August 2015 despite having parliamentary immunity and in
violation of his right to freedom of opinion and expression. Two assistants to
Rainsy fled abroad to avoid arrest on charges that carried up to 17 years in
prison. The three other cases against Rainsy were for alleged criminal defama-
tion of Hun Sen, CPP honorary chairperson Heng Sarmin, and a minister of state
attached to Hun Sen. 
On September 9, a Phnom Penh court convicted CNRP acting leader Kem Sokha
of disregarding a court summons to appear as a witness against two fellow CNRP
National Assembly members in another trumped-up case. In pursuing the case
against Sokha, the courts violated his parliamentary immunity and sentenced
him to five months in prison. Following a failed government attempt to arrest him
in May, he moved to CNRP headquarters where he remained at time of writing,
protected by party supporters but enduring a form of de facto house arrest.
On June 13, a Phnom Penh Court convicted without basis three CNRP activists for
“insurrection.” Arrested in August 2015, they joined 11 other CNRP activists
found guilty on the same trumped-up charge in July 2015, in serving long prison
terms for their involvement in a 2014 demonstration in Phnom Penh during
which security forces attacked protesters.
CNRP parliamentarian Um Sam-an was arrested on April 11 for criticizing the gov-
ernment’s handling of border disputes with Vietnam. He was falsely charged
with incitement and discrimination and faces up to five years’ imprisonment.
Attacks on Land Activists
Government promises to end decades-old land-grabbing practices had no over-
all positive effect. According to statistics compiled by NGOs working on the sub-
ject statistics, land disputes in 2016 continued at the same level as in
2014-2015, affecting approximately 10,000 families per year.
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The government targeted veteran land activists for prosecution. On August 15,
Phnom Penh authorities ordered the arrest of two for holding a peaceful protest
vigil. In a summary trial seven days later, they were sentenced to six days’ im-
prisonment for “insulting” government officials. On August 19, two long-dormant
politically motivated prosecutions against one of the two, Tep Vanny, were sud-
denly revived. She was kept in detention after the other activist was released. At
least three other land activists were charged in these two revived cases, both re-
lated to land rights protests. On September 19, Tep Vanny and three others were
convicted and sentenced to six months in prison in one of the cases, despite no
evidence connecting them to any recognizable criminal offense.
Attacks on Labor Activists 
While labor unions succeeded in gaining government agreement for an increase
in the minimum wage for garment workers, labor activists were under siege. In
addition to NEC member and labor activist Rong Chhun, whose case is men-
tioned above, at least 12 other prominent trade union figures faced prosecution
on baseless or frivolous charges. Although none of the 13 were in detention, all
faced the prospect of jail. Trade union activists believed the prosecutions were
in significant part intended to intimidate the movement’s leadership during ne-
gotiations with the government that began in September 2016 over the minimum
wage for garment workers.
Election-monitoring experts were concerned that prosecution of Rong Chhun
aimed at pressuring him to refrain from pressing for free and fair elections. They
also pointed out that convicting him would remove him from the NEC and allow
the CPP to shift the balance of power there decisively in its favor.
Attacks on Human Rights Organizations
On April 28, 2016, the government’s Anti-Corruption Unit (ACU) took into custody
four senior staff of the Cambodian Human Rights and Development Association
(ADHOC) and one former staffer, Ny Chariya, a deputy secretary-general of the
NEC. They were accused of “bribing a witness” in connection with legal advice
and other assistance ADHOC had been providing to a witness in the case against
Kem Sokha. All five remained in detention on charges punishable by up to 10
years in prison. Authorities warned that further arrests of ADHOC staff could fol-
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low. On September 22, Ny Chariya was sentenced to six months in prison upon
conviction in another case for having raised crtical questions about the conduct
of a provincial court dealing with a land dispute.
Attacks on Public Intellectuals
The CPP sued political commentator Ou Virak in April in a defamation lawsuit for
raising questions about the CPP’s legal actions in the Kem Sokha case. Although
defamation itself does not carry a custodial sentence, the damages requested
were exorbitant and failure to pay could result in imprisonment.
On July 22, 2016, the Appeals Court upheld the conviction earlier in the year of
student Kong Raya for advocating a “color revolution” in Cambodia, maintaining
his one-and-a-half-year prison sentence.
Impunity
The May 2016 trial of three officers of Hun Sen’s personal Bodyguard Headquar-
ters for a brutal October 2015 assault against two opposition National Assembly
members resulted in partly suspended prison sentences. Two of the attackers
will each serve just one year. The cases appeared to be brought to pin the blame
on lower-ranking individuals and avoid following up on evidence that higher-ups
were involved in the crime, which had all the hallmarks of being government-or-
chestrated.
Similarly, according to sources with direct knowledge of the investigation into
the killing of Kem Ley, the charging and detention of the alleged shooter was ac-
companied by an attempt by officials to falsely implicate the CNRP national lead-
ership as having orchestrated the assassination while avoiding following up on
leads that might produce evidence of CPP involvement.
The UN-supported Khmer Rouge Tribunal has been crippled since its inception in
2006 by Hun Sen-led government non-cooperation with its investigations into in-
ternational crimes committed in the 1970s by Pol Pot’s Khmer Rouge. In 2016,
the court did not complete a second trial of two prominent ex-Khmer Rouge lead-
ers, Nuon Chea and Khieu Samphan, and did not conclude investigations into
four other, mid-level, Khmer Rouge leaders.
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Arbitrary Arrest and Detention
Despite promises by Hun Sen to reform or close the Prey Speu detention center
for Phnom Penh’s “undesirable people,” it remained operational. Security forces
arbitrarily arrested hundreds of alleged homeless people, people who use drugs,
sex workers, street children, and persons assumed to have a mental disability,
and sent them to Prey Speu or one of the seven other so-called drug treatment
centers around the country, where they are held for indefinite periods without a
judicial process. At least two detainees died in Prey Speu under suspicious cir-
cumstances. The centers, many of them operated by security forces, often sub-
ject detainees to torture and other forms of ill-treatment. 
Transgender women report high rates of police harassment, arbitrary arrest, and
detention. 
Key International Actors
China, Vietnam, and South Korea were key investors in 2016. China, Japan, and
the European Union were the leading providers of development-related assis-
tance.
In a joint statement first made before the UN Human Rights Council on Septem-
ber 14, 39 countries declared they were deeply concerned about escalating
threats to “legitimate activities by opposition parties and human rights NGOs”
in Cambodia and called on the government to ensure future free and fair elec-
tions and thus “the legitimacy of the next government.” The European Parlia-
ment issued a strong resolution condemning abuses and repression.
Nevertheless, foreign governments took no concrete steps to address Cambo-
dia’s deteriorating human rights situation.
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Canada
In October 2015, Canada’s Liberal Party, led by Justin Trudeau, won power in na-
tional elections and signaled a change in Canadian politics. However, the new
government faces important human rights challenges, including violence against
indigenous women and girls, the rights of indigenous peoples, the impact of
Canada’s extractive and garment industries abroad, and children in detention. 
Violence against Indigenous Women and Girls
In August 2016, the Canadian government launched a national public inquiry
into the murders and disappearances of indigenous women and girls across
Canada. With five commissioners and a budget of $53.86 million (US $41.13 mil-
lion) over two years, the inquiry is tasked with examining the root causes and in-
stitutional responses to the high levels of violence. Although they represent just
4.3 percent of Canada’s female population, 16 percent of female homicide vic-
tims are indigenous. 
The inquiry comes after a change in government and stern criticism from interna-
tional human rights authorities. In 2015, the United Nations Committee on the
Elimination of Discrimination against Women concluded that Canada had com-
mitted a “grave violation” of the rights of indigenous women by failing to
promptly and thoroughly investigate the high levels of violence they suffer.  
The extent to which the inquiry will scrutinize policing practices remains to be
seen. Government ministers have assured the public that the broadly worded
terms of reference will provide for a critical review of policing, even though it is
not referenced explicitly. Advocates have long fought for an investigation into al-
legations that police forces have neglected the murders and disappearances,
and that some officers have committed abuses against indigenous women and
girls.
Rights of Indigenous Peoples
The government has yet to pay adequate attention to severe poverty, housing,
water, sanitation, healthcare, and education problems in indigenous communi-
ties, particularly those in remote and rural areas. Inadequate access to clean,
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safe drinking water continues to pose a major public health concern in a number
of indigenous communities. 
As of July, there were 132 drinking water advisories—indicating unsafe water—in
effect in 92 First Nations communities across Canada, excluding British Colom-
bia. Contaminants found in the water have been linked to negative health conse-
quences, from serious gastrointestinal disorders to increased risk of cancer. 
The UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights voiced concern in
March about the inadequate access to safe drinking water and to sanitation
faced by First Nations, as well as the lack of water regulations for First Nations
people living on reserves. 
A June Human Rights Watch report, Make It Safe, found that this restricted ac-
cess impacts the health and hygiene of families on reserve. Caregivers shoulder
extra burdens to ensure that children, elders, and others avoid exposure to un-
safe water.
Children in Immigration Detention
A 2016 report by the University of Toronto’s International Human Rights Program
found that children in Canadian immigration detention are held in facilities that
resemble medium-security prisons, where they receive inadequate access to ed-
ucation and have insufficient recreational opportunities. Primary medical care is
available, but children receive no mental health support. Outside Ontario and
Québec, children are held in even less suitable facilities, in some instances in
correctional facilities for young offenders.
Canadian law and policy do not prohibit immigration detention of children and
do not set a limit on how long children can be held in immigration detention. An
average of 242 children were held in Canadian immigration detention each year
between 2010 and 2014, according to government statistics released to Univer-
sity of Toronto researchers.
That figure does not include all children, including Canadian citizens, who are
not themselves subject to formal detention orders but stay in detention with
their parents in order to avoid separating from them. The exact number of these
de facto detained children is not publicly known: Canada’s immigration agency
considers them “guests” of the detention facilities. 
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They are not legally obligated to be in detention, but if their parents are held, the
only alternative may be placement with a child protection agency. In 2014-15,
such children spent, on average, three times as long in detention than children
who are held under formal detention orders, the Canada Border Services Agency
told University of Toronto researchers.
Canada’s federal government and the Canada Border Services Agency have
shown willingness to reform the immigration detention system but had not an-
nounced concrete steps to do so at time of writing. 
Human Rights Watch and other groups called on Canadian authorities to ensure
that children and families with children are not detained solely because of their
immigration status; develop strong policies and guidelines about how the vari-
ous alternatives to detention should be used; and review their practices to en-
sure that they are reflecting the best interests of the child in all decisions that
affect them.
Mining Industry Abuses
Because Canada is the mining industry’s most important global hub, the collec-
tive human rights impact of Canadian mining firms is enormous. In past years,
our research has uncovered widespread patterns of gang rape by employees of
Barrick Gold in Papua New Guinea, and the apparent use of forced labor at Nev-
sun Resources’ Bisha mine in Eritrea. Many human rights problems linked to
Canadian mining firms go underreported and unremedied because the govern-
ment makes no proactive effort to monitor, let alone regulate, the human rights
conduct of Canadian companies operating abroad. 
Consistent with its predecessor, the Trudeau government has expressed the view
to Human Rights Watch that no new oversight or regulation in this space is war-
ranted, pointing in part to the existence of the government’s Corporate Social
Responsibility Counselor. This institution, however, cannot and indeed does not
even purport to do what is most urgently needed—carry out any extraterritorial
oversight or independent monitoring of Canadian firms. 
In November 2016, the Canadian Network on Corporate Accountability proposed
draft legislation that would create an ombudsman’s office to hear and investi-
gate human rights complaints against Canadian extractives firms operating in
countries around the world. 
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Palliative Care
In June 2016, Canada enacted legislation to allow people with “grievous and irre-
mediable medical conditions” that cause enduring and intolerable suffering to
seek assistance from a physician or nurse practitioner to end their lives, acting
on a February 2015 Supreme Court ruling. 
While the government has discussed a number of possible measures to address
the significant gaps in the availability of hospice palliative care in the country it
has yet to make a clear commitment to do so, or to take the urgent steps neces-
sary to ensure that Canadians who will die of natural causes—likely the vast ma-
jority—can live the final stretches of their lives with dignity.
Foreign Policy
The administration of former Conservative Prime Minister Stephen Harper began
brokering an arms manufacturing and supply deal between Canada and Saudi
Arabia in 2012. The finalized arrangement with General Dynamics Land Systems
Canada resulted in a $15 billion, 15-year contract to manufacture an unspecified
number of Light Armored Vehicles (LAVs), representing the largest manufactur-
ing-export contract in Canadian history. On April 8, 2016, Foreign Affairs Minister
Stéphane Dion approved six export permits covering more than 70 percent of the
transaction.
Canadian law puts limits on the export of military technology to countries with a
record of human rights violations against their citizens. Canadian arms export
law demands indication that “there is no reasonable risk” that the arms will be
used against civilians. However, the Saudis have used such vehicles to violently
suppress peaceful protests in eastern Saudi Arabia in 2011 and 2012.
In addition, since a Saudi Arabia-led coalition began its military campaign
against Houthi forces in Yemen on March 26, 2015, at least 3,799 civilians have
been killed and 6,711 wounded, according to the Office of the High Commis-
sioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). In addition, Saudi Arabia is arming Yemeni
forces led by a controversial military commander accused of using child soldiers,
in the fight to retake the north from the Houthis and forces loyal to former Presi-
dent Ali Abdullah Saleh, including with vehicles.
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Central African Republic
On March 30, 2016 former Central African Republic Prime Minister Faustin-
Archange Touadéra was sworn in as president after more than two years of an in-
terim government. Despite the rare peaceful transition of power and relatively
peaceful elections, the country remained insecure, unstable and beset by seri-
ous human rights violations. 
Sectarian violence and attacks on civilians continued in central and western re-
gions of the country, most notably in the Ouaka, Nana-Grébizi, and Ouham-
Pendé provinces where predominantly Muslim Seleka rebel groups, largely
Christian and animist anti-balaka militias and other armed groups remained ac-
tive. Civilians continued to bear the brunt of the fighting and armed groups
raped and sexually assaulted women and girls. An estimated 467,800 people,
the majority of them Muslim, remained refugees in neighboring countries and a
further 384,300 remained internally displaced.  
The United Nations peacekeeping mission, MINUSCA, deployed about 10,050
peacekeepers and 2,000 police across many parts of the country during the year,
but struggled to establish security in key areas and to sufficiently protect civil-
ians. MINUSCA’s efforts were marred by allegations of sexual exploitation and
abuse by peacekeepers of civilians, including children. Credible accusations
that African Union (AU) peacekeepers murdered 12 civilians in Boali in 2014
gained further strength when a mass grave was exhumed in the town in Febru-
ary.
Impunity for past abuses and war crimes remained pervasive. Progress toward
the functioning of a Special Criminal Court in the national justice system has
been slow. The International Criminal Court (ICC) prosecutor continued investiga-
tions, started in September 2014, into alleged war crimes and crimes against hu-
manity committed in the country since August 2012.
About 2.3 million people, out of a population of 4.6 million, needed humanitar-
ian assistance. Of those 2.3 million, some humanitarian aid reached only 1.9
million. 
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Attacks on Civilians
The Seleka, a predominantly Muslim rebellion made up of loosely affiliated fac-
tions, continued to attack civilians, killing scores, often under the pretext of pro-
tecting themselves from the anti-balaka. In September, fighters from the Union
for Peace in the Central African Republic (l’Union pour la Paix en Centrafrique), a
Seleka faction, attacked villages on the road between Kouango and Bianga, in
Ouaka province.
In October, Seleka forces attacked and burned a displacement camp in Kaga-
Bandoro, killing at least 37 civilians, despite the presence of UN peacekeepers.
At least four people with disabilities were among the victims. Rising insecurity in
the Nana-Grébizi province led to dozens of attacks on international humanitar-
ian organizations by armed groups and bandits between August and October,
impairing life-saving assistance. 
An armed group 3R, meaning “Return, Reclamation, Rehabilitation,” comprised
of Muslim Peuhl, emerged in western Ouham-Pendé province under the com-
mand of General Sidiki Abass. As fighting between 3R and anti-balaka increased
in 2016, scores of civilians, both Muslim Peuhl herders and non-Muslim farmers,
were killed. Credible reports indicated that both sides committed rapes, reflect-
ing the widespread problem of sexual violence in the conflict since 2013. 
The Ugandan rebel group the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) remained active in
the southeast with allegations of increased killings and abductions of civilians.
While the capital Bangui stabilized in late 2015 after the violence of the previous
months, armed militias raped or sexually assaulted at least 25 women and girls
in and around the M’poko displacement camp between September and Decem-
ber 2015. In some cases, the perpetrators raping the women and girls said it was
to punish them for allegedly interacting with people on the other side of the sec-
tarian divide. Survivors of sexual violence continued to face stigma, rejection,
and other barriers to accessing essential services and justice. 
Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons 
Conditions for internally displaced persons and refugees remained harsh. Many
displaced people, such as those in Ouaka and Ouham provinces, had little or no
humanitarian assistance. Persons with disabilities at displacement sites faced
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barriers to access sanitation, food, and medical assistance. The M’poko dis-
placement camp in Bangui held approximately 20,000 people by the year’s end.
In southwestern parts of the country, small pockets of Muslims lived in enclaves
protected by UN peacekeepers. In central and northwestern parts of the country,
displacement increased as a result of the violence. Attacks by Seleka in the
southern Ouaka province displaced 3,500 people and fighting in Ouham-Pendé
displaced between 5,000 and 10,000. Approximately 20,000 people were dis-
placed after the Seleka attacked the displacement camp in Kaga-Bandoro in Oc-
tober. 
Elections 
In a December 2015 referendum, voters overwhelmingly approved a new consti-
tution. Legislative and presidential elections took place two weeks later and
Touadéra won a presidential runoff on February 14, 2016.
At least eight anti-balaka leaders participated in parliamentary elections, three
of whom won seats, including Alfred Yékatom, also known as “Rombhot.”
Amnesty International accused Yékatom of having participated in and ordering
killings of civilians in 2014 and the UN imposed sanctions on him in 2015. The
UN Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic identified Yékatom as having
intimidated voters and harassed political competitors in Mbaïki, his con-
stituency, during the 2016 electoral campaign. Another victorious candidate,
militia leader Eric Pogola, threatened staff of a political rival and allegedly sent
armed fighters to polling stations on election day in the Sangha-Mbaéré
province.  
Peacekeeper Abuses 
In early February, Human Rights Watch issued a report documenting sexual
abuse and exploitation by MINUSCA peacekeepers of at least eight women and
girls between October and December 2015 around Bambari in the Ouaka
province, including the rape of a 14-year-old girl and the gang-rape of an 18-year-
old woman. In response to the allegations, MINUSCA promptly sent home 120
peacekeepers from the Republic of Congo. 
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The contingent of peacekeepers from the Democratic Republic of Congo, who
also faced numerous other allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse, were
repatriated at the end of February for failing to meet UN standards for equipment
and preparedness. Criminal proceedings by DRC authorities into sexual abuse
and exploitation by peacekeepers from that country began in Kinshasa, but were
adjourned in June to explore ways of interviewing victims. 
In March, international media reported additional allegations of sexual exploita-
tion and abuse by MINUSCA peacekeepers. MINUSCA announced it was investi-
gating the cases and would take action against perpetrators. 
A military trial in Paris against five French peacekeepers for beating a Central
African man began in September. Military trials against French peacekeepers ac-
cused in 2015 of sexual abuse continued. 
In June, the government of the Republic of Congo announced that a judicial pro-
cedure was ongoing against an unspecified number of Congolese MINUSCA
peacekeepers based in Mambéré who had allegedly beaten two men to death in
2015. 
In February, a mass grave exhumed at Boali appeared to contain the remains of
12 people allegedly killed by AU peacekeepers from the Republic of Congo in
2014. In December 2013, AU peacekeepers also from the Republic of Congo al-
legedly beat to death two anti-balaka fighters they had detained in Bossangoa
and, in February 2014, allegedly executed two anti-balaka fighters in Mambéré.
In June 2016, the government of the Republic of Congo announced that a judicial
procedure was ongoing for the Boali and Bossangoa cases. At time of writing, no
action has been taken on the 2014 Mambéré killings.
National and International Justice 
Impunity remained one of the main challenges in addressing past and ongoing
atrocities. In August and September, the criminal court in Bangui tried 55 cases,
some of them dealing with serious crimes such as rape and murder. However,
the court did not address any abuses or alleged war crimes related to the con-
flict. 
Resource constraints and administrative hurdles impeded operationalizing the
Special Criminal Court, a hybrid court with national and international judges and
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prosecutors that will focus on grave international crimes committed since 2003.
In a positive step, the minister of justice announced in July that the court’s spe-
cial prosecutor would be appointed before the end of 2016. In August, the UN
and the government signed a document that outlined their tasks and responsi-
bilities related to the court.
The Office of the Prosecutor at the ICC continued its investigations throughout
the year into serious crimes committed by the Seleka and anti-balaka. The ICC is-
sued no arrest warrants in 2016.
A previous ICC investigation led to the conviction of Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, a
former vice president of the Democratic Republic of Congo. Forces from Bemba’s
Movement for the Liberation of the Congo (Mouvement pour la Libération du
Congo) were active in the Central African Republic in 2002 and 2003, acting at
the behest of then-President Ange-Félix Patassé to repress a coup attempt by
then-Gen. François Bozizé. 
On March 21, 2016, ICC judges found Bemba guilty of rape, murder, and pillage
under the legal principle of “command responsibility.” On June 21, the court sen-
tenced him to 18 years in prison. In September, Bemba’s legal team filed an ap-
peal. The prosecutor, who had sought a 25-year sentence, has indicated that her
office would appeal the sentence to “reflect the totality of Bemba’s culpability.”
On October 19, ICC judges found Bemba and four associates guilty of witness
tampering because they attempted to bribe witnesses.
Key International Actors 
France began withdrawing its peacekeeping forces in October. They are expected
to retain approximately 300 troops in the country. 
At the Brussels International Conference for the Central African Republic on No-
vember 17, the European Union, the country’s largest donor, pledged €409 mil-
lion (US$450 million) over five years for peace building, development and
humanitarian assistance. Overall pledges from the conference totaled €2.06 bil-
lion ($2.28 billion). 
In 2016, the United States provided $95 million in humanitarian aid. The total
humanitarian response met only 32.2 percent of the country’s funding needs.
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The Netherlands, US, and the UN were the principal donors to the Special Crimi-
nal Court, but the court’s five-year budget remained only partially covered. 
In April, the EU approved the establishment of a military training mission, EUTM
RCA, operational for an initial period of two years to train two battalions of the
national army. 
In August, the Ugandan military began withdrawing troops from an AU-led offen-
sive against the LRA in the southeast. At time of writing, the US had decided to
continue counter-LRA operations in the country.
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Chile
Courts continue to prosecute people for abuses committed during military rule In
Chile, but the Supreme Court has used its discretionary powers in many cases to
reduce sentences against human rights violators, resulting in punishments in-
commensurate with the gravity of the crimes. Poor prison conditions and reports
of excessive use of force by police also continue to be significant human rights
concerns in Chile.
The National Service for Minors became the center of a scandal in 2016 when in-
formation was released indicating that more than 850 children and 448 adults
had died in state custody since 2005. Reported causes of death varied, but in-
cluded infants and young children drowning in their own gastric or respiratory
fluids, suicides, and delayed medical attention to injuries. 
Chile’s parliament has debated reform of a counterterrorism law and decriminal-
ization of abortion in limited circumstances, as promised by President Michelle
Bachelet, but neither had passed at time of writing. In November, a bill was in-
troduced to end the jurisdiction of military courts over alleged human rights
abuses by Carabineros, Chilean police officers responsible for public order and
crime prevention. 
Confronting Past Abuses
According to data released by the Ministry of the Interior’s human rights program
in December 2015, justice authorities are investigating a total of 1,048 cases in-
volving human rights violations committed during military rule (1973-1990). As of
December 2015, 344 individuals had been sentenced for human rights crimes,
including killings and enforced disappearances; 117 of them were serving prison
sentences. While courts continue to prosecute abuses committed during military
rule, the Supreme Court has used its discretionary powers in many cases to re-
duce the sentences imposed on perpetrators, sometimes even to a non-custo-
dial sentence. 
In July 2016, Juan Emilio Cheyre, former army commander-in-chief, was placed
under judicial investigation for his alleged role as accomplice in the 1973 mur-
ders of 15 opponents of the Pinochet dictatorship. At the time, he was a lieu-
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tenant in the La Serena regiment, and the homicides were part of what became
known as the “Caravan of Death,” a military death squad that tortured, extrajudi-
cially killed, and disappeared suspected dissidents throughout Northern Chile.
Gen. Sergio Víctor Arellano Stark, who led the Caravan of Death, died in March
2016 without serving prison time, though the Supreme Court convicted and sen-
tenced him to six years. 
In October, the Supreme Court overturned the 1974-1975 convictions for sedition
and treason of 12 ex-members of the Chilean air force who refused to join the
1973 military coup.
Counterterrorism Law
A bill presented by the government in November 2014 to replace Chile’s coun-
terterrorism law remained under discussion in the legislature at time of writing.
The current law lacks sufficient due process protections, and its definition of ter-
rorism is overly broad. The bill would update and narrow the definition of terror-
ism, excluding crimes against private property, which have formed the basis for
terrorism prosecutions of Mapuche indigenous activists. It would also
strengthen due process guarantees, giving defense attorneys the right to learn
the identity of protected witnesses, question them about their evidence, and
probe their credibility. 
Military Jurisdiction
Military courts continue to exercise jurisdiction over abuses committed by
Chile’s uniformed police, the Carabineros. Criminal proceedings in military
courts lack the independence and due process guarantees of ordinary criminal
cases. Investigations are secret, the proceedings are conducted mainly in writ-
ing, and lawyers have limited opportunities to cross-examine witnesses. Many
legitimate complaints of human rights abuses filed in military courts are dis-
missed. Sentences are often inappropriately reduced by the military appeals
court. Both the Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court have opposed mili-
tary jurisdiction in such cases. 
In May 2014, the minister of defense promised to present draft legislation before
the end of June 2015 that would end military jurisdiction over crimes committed
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against civilians by the armed forces (including Carabineros). In November 2016,
the government introduced such a bill.
Freedom of Expression
In May 2016, President Bachelet filed criminal defamation charges against four
journalists from the magazine Qué Pasa, after it printed the transcript of a tele-
phone wiretap of a suspect in the Chilean Public Ministry’s investigation into a
business with links to one of Bachelet’s relatives. In September, the ethical
council of the Federation of Media of Chile (FMCS), a professional association,
adopted a resolution sanctioning the magazine for breach of journalistic ethics.
Bachelet subsequently withdrew her case, saying she was “satisfied” with the
FMCS sanction and had never intended to “affect journalists or win money.” 
Police Abuses
Carabineros continue to use excessive force, according to media reports, partic-
ularly against protesters, students, and indigenous communities. Some officers
have allegedly sexually harassed women and girls at protests.
A controversial law that allows what many are calling “preventive identity con-
trol” entered into force in July 2016. Article 12 of Law 20931 permits law enforce-
ment to ask for identification from anyone who is older than 18 years of age
without any suspicion of connection to a crime, which was the standard previ-
ously required to check identification. This is particularly concerning in the case
of protests, as identification checks at protests in Chile have been reported as
disproportionately affecting marginalized groups. 
Torture
In November, President Bachelet signed into law a bill that will modify Chile’s
criminal code to comply with international and regional standards on torture and
cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment including by increasing penalties for
torture and prohibiting amnesty. 
According to the Public Ministry, complaints of torture, genocide, ill-treatment,
and crimes against humanity increased 193 percent in the first nine months of
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2016, compared with the same period in 2015. Most cases allegedly involve pub-
lic functionaries, such as Carabineros.
Prison Conditions
Despite measures adopted in 2010-2013 to reduce the prison population, many
of Chile’s prisons remain grossly overcrowded. Prisons in Chile house nearly
49,000 detainees and prisoners, though their maximum capacity is less than
42,000. Conditions remain poor, and violent abuses by prison guards are com-
mon. 
Children’s Rights
The National Service for Minors (Sename), the government agency tasked with
caring for children and adolescents whose families are unable to do so, became
the center of a scandal in July when an information request through Chile’s
Transparency Law revealed that 185 children died in the care of state institutions
from 2005 to May 2016; in October, Sename confirmed that the figure was even
higher: 865 children and 448 adults (such as persons with disabilities or those
in residences or outpatient programs)—a total of 1,313 deaths of people in its
custody. As noted above, reported causes of death included infants and young
children drowning in their own gastric or respiratory fluids, suicides, and de-
layed medical attention to injuries. The Chamber of Deputies questioned Minis-
ter of Justice Javiera Blanco in August, and a judicial investigation was ongoing
at time of writing.
Reproductive Rights
In March, Chile’s Chamber of Deputies approved a bill to decriminalize abortion
in cases of rape, fetal inviability, and when a woman or girl’s life is at risk. The
Senate Health Commission held public hearings in August. The bill, in particular
the provision that decriminalizes abortion in rape cases, has been met with
near-unanimous opposition from center-right and right-wing parties in Congress,
as well as from the Catholic and Evangelical Churches. At time of writing, the bill
was still pending in the Constitutional Commission of the Senate.
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Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity
A “civil union” bill presented by former President Sebastián Piñera in 2011 that
provides legal recognition and protection for same-sex couples became law in
April 2015 and went into effect in October 2015. 
In September 2016, the Senate Human Rights Commission approved a bill to rec-
ognize the gender identity of transgender people, with a Senate vote expected in
December. 
In June 2016 Chile, on behalf of four Latin American states and 42 co-sponsors,
presented a resolution at the United Nations Human Rights Council creating the
first UN expert post addressing violence and discrimination based on sexual ori-
entation and gender identity. 
Human Rights Defenders
On May 13, uniformed personnel of the National Human Rights Institute (INDH)—
a government agency that promotes, monitors, and reports on human rights in
Chile—reported being arbitrarily detained, beaten, and verbally assaulted by
Carabineros when they tried to visit detained protestors at a police station in
Antofagasta. Their professional association cited the incident as part of broader
police attempts to undermine their function. In 2015, the Chamber of Deputies
defeated, in a two-to-one vote, a motion to dismiss Lorena Fries, then director of
INDH, for alleged negligence, after the INDH distributed educational materials
critical of the Carabineros. The dismissal request and chamber vote showed the
agency’s vulnerability to political reprisals.
Key International Actors
The special rapporteur for freedom of expression of the Inter-American Commis-
sion on Human Rights, in preliminary observations from a 2016 visit to Chile, ex-
pressed concern that President Bachelet’s criminal charges against Qué Pasa,
along with various bills under consideration in Congress, risked restricting the
media, particularly from reporting on issues of public interest that involve politi-
cal figures.
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In June, the UN special rapporteur on freedom of assembly and association
called Chile’s military jurisdiction system and the impunity it engenders “the
most visible parts of the legacy of dictatorship,” criticized excessive use of force
by police at protests, particularly against Mapuche demonstrators, and ex-
pressed opposition to the use of preventive identity controls at protests.
In April 2016, the UN Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities urged
the government to prohibit practices amounting to cruel, inhuman, or degrading
treatment of people with disabilities in state and private institutions—such as
psychosurgery, electroconvulsive therapy without consent, physical restraints,
and isolation in cells—and to investigate reports of security forces mistreating
people with disabilities.
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China
More than three decades after pledging to “reform and open up,” there are few
signs the Chinese Communist Party intends to change its authoritarian posture.
Under the leadership of President Xi Jinping, who will remain in power until 2022
and possibly beyond, the outlook for fundamental human rights, including free-
doms of expression, assembly, association and religion, remains dire.
China made modest improvements in a few areas in 2016. These include trial
regulations promulgated in February that may reduce the rate of pretrial deten-
tion, the Supreme People’s Court’s continued efforts to retry cases of wrongful
convictions and executions, and the acceptance by courts of discrimination
cases brought by lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) individuals. But
such developments pale in comparison to the government’s systematic efforts
to silence independent civil society voices, its passage of abusive new laws, and
a highly politicized anti-corruption campaign that is further undermining an al-
ready weak judicial system.
Over 16 human rights lawyers and activists—detained after a nationwide sweep
of rights advocates in July 2015—were the clearest victims of the authorities’
hostility towards independent civil society. Most were held in secret and not al-
lowed to communicate with their families or lawyers of their choosing. Families,
lawyers, and supporters who inquired about the cases or sought the detainees’
release also became targets of the authorities’ wrath. 
The secrecy surrounding these detentions stood in stark contrast to the aggres-
sive state media campaign to smear the detainees, many of them well-known for
their years of activism. The publicity, which departed from the quieter treatments
of past political trials such as that of Liu Xiaobo’s in 2009, appears designed to
punish the activists and advance President Xi’s campaign to depict independent
civil society as a national security threat. 
Chinese authorities’ enforced disappearance of critics from Hong Kong and other
countries in 2016 garnered headlines globally. Beijing’s decision to interfere in a
politically charged court case in Hong Kong in November undermined judicial in-
dependence and the territory’s autonomy. In the ethnic minority regions of Xin-
jiang and Tibet, Beijing continued its highly repressive rule, curtailing political
activity and many peaceful expressions of ethnic and religious identity.
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Authorities also moved to further limit freedom of expression. In November, the
government passed a Cybersecurity Law, which will strangle online freedom and
anonymity, and further clamped down on media outlets for reporting that de-
parts from the party line. Authorities also issued multiple directives to tighten
control over the internet, which has long been a beacon of hope as a relatively
free public space, despite online censorship and surveillance. 
The Chinese government continues to lead the world in the number of people ex-
ecuted, with 46 crimes eligible for the death penalty. Scholars in China claimed
in September that executions had “fallen about 60 percent” to “a few thou-
sands” in 2005, but official statistics remain state secrets.  
Human Rights Defenders 
As noted above, more than 16 human rights lawyers and activists were detained
in a nationwide sweep of rights advocates starting in July 2015. State media
aired their forced confessions, ran frontpage “exposes” about their personal
lives, and disparagingly described their work as that of a “major criminal gang”
aiming to “attack social stability” with the backing of “foreign forces.” Authori-
ties handpicked four Hong Kong-based and one Taiwan-based pro-Beijing media
outlets to cover the trial proceedings while barring others from entering the
courtroom.
In August 2016, after days of closed trials, a Tianjin court handed down heavy
sentences to Beijing Fengrui Law Firm director Zhou Shifeng and veteran activist
Hu Shigen, and gave suspended sentences to two other activists. Although au-
thorities released some detainees on bail, including lawyer Wang Yu and her
husband, legal advocate Bao Longjun, their lawyers and close friends have not
been able to contact them. Most of the 16 remained in detention awaiting trial at
time of writing.
Authorities’ hostility toward those who advocate for human rights reached new
heights in 2016. Some activists who had previously been able to carry out advo-
cacy now find themselves behind bars. In June, citizen journalists Lu Yuyu and Li
Tingyu, who had been documenting China’s protests since 2012, were formally
detained for “creating disturbances.” Labor rights advocates Meng Han and
Zeng Feiyang were convicted without credible evidence on vague charges includ-
ing “gathering crowds to disturb public order” and “gathering crowds to disturb
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social order.” Meng was sentenced to 21 months in jail while Zeng was given a
four-year suspended sentence. According to state media, they had “used fund-
ing from abroad” to “incite workers to go on strike.”  
Authorities increasingly use vague public order charges against activists, includ-
ing “creating disturbances” and “disturbing social order,” in addition to serious
political charges such as “subversion.” In a disturbing trend, charges of “subver-
sion”—which previously had been reserved for those who voiced opposition to
the Chinese Communist Party—are now being extended to lawyers and activists
who do not directly challenge the party, as in the case against the Beijing Fen-
grui Law Firm. 
In January, rights activist Zhang Haitao was sentenced to 19 years in prison for
“inciting subversion of state power” and “probing and illegally supplying intelli-
gence abroad.” In June, democracy activists Lu Gengsong and Chen Shuqing
were slapped with over 10 years in prison for “subversion.”
In January, a Guangzhou court handed down a five-year prison term to lawyer
Tang Jingling; he had promoted non-violent civil disobedience. In September, a
Beijing court convicted rights lawyer Xia Lin on dubious extortion charges and
sentenced him to 12 years in prison. Official lawyers associations in January can-
celled the license of Shandong lawyer Liu Shuqing and in May refused to renew
the license of lawyer Liu Xiaoyuan. Both had supported lawyers held in the July
2015 crackdown. 
Authorities continued to tighten their grip over independent groups. In January, a
Swedish national who heads a nongovernmental organization (NGO) that pro-
vides funding to human rights lawyers, Peter Dahlin, was detained for 23 days,
forced to confess on television, and then deported. In April, the National Peo-
ple’s Congress approved the Foreign NGO Management Law, which gives police
unprecedented power to restrict the work of foreign groups in the country, and
limits domestic groups’ ability to obtain foreign funding and work with foreign
organizations. In August, authorities issued new rules on domestic civil society
groups, requiring a “strengthening” of the party’s “leadership role” over them.
In September, a new charity law went into effect; it may further limit fundraising
by and strengthen state control over civil society. 
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Freedom of Expression 
Freedom of expression, already severely restricted through censorship and pun-
ishments, was hit particularly hard in 2016. Shortly after activist Lei Yang’s May
death in police custody, the Ministry of Public Security issued new rules requir-
ing officers to film some of their operations. Few other media stories broke
through official censorship to generate nationwide discussion or policy change.
In February, President Xi visited three major state media outlets and called on
them to pledge absolute loyalty to the party. That month, authorities also shut
down the microblogs of prominent blogger Ren Zhiqiang, who has 35 million fol-
lowers, after Ren criticized Xi’s media visits.  
In March an anonymous letter calling for Xi’s resignation was posted on the
Wujie news website, prompting police to interrogate 20 people. Also in March,
Guangxi police detained He Linxia, director of Guangxi Normal University Press,
which is known for publishing books focused on politics. He was formally ar-
rested for “corruption” in May. In May, the State Administration of Press, Publi-
cation, Radio, Film and Television (SAPPRFT) reportedly met with video
companies to ask them to sell company equity stakes to the government as a
means to increase control over content. 
In June, the Cyberspace Administration issued new rules requiring app providers
to keep user logs for 60 days to reduce the spread of “illegal information.” It also
ordered news websites to “clean up” comment sections to purge views prohib-
ited by the government. SAPPRFT also issued new rules requiring game develop-
ers to submit their work for government pre-approval. 
In July, authorities sacked two of Tencent’s editors after the website ran a head-
line with an error seen as insulting to President Xi. That month the Beijing Cyber-
space Administration shut down seven web-based news channels of Sohu, Sina,
Netease, and Ifeng. In July, the CCP United Front Work Department established
Bureau Number 8 to enlist the support of influential individuals in new media for
the Party. In the same month, Beijing authorities sacked or demoted the editors
of Yanhuang Chunqiu, a moderate history magazine with the backing of rela-
tively liberal Party elders, leading to its closure. 
In August, the Cyberspace Administration imposed new requirements on web-
sites, including requiring staff to monitor content round the clock, and the SAP-
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PRFT issued a notice ordering all media “not to promote western lifestyles” or to
“poke fun at Chinese values” when reporting entertainment news.
In October, authorities closed the influential intellectual website Consensus,
21ccom.cn, for “transmitting incorrect ideas.” In November, the Cyberspace Ad-
ministration issued new rules on live streaming platforms, requiring companies
to monitor user content that threatens national security. 
Hong Kong 
Under its Basic Law, Hong Kong is guaranteed autonomy in all matters other than
foreign affairs and defense, and enjoys an independent judiciary and other civil
liberties. In practice Beijing is increasingly encroaching on rights to political par-
ticipation, expression, and assembly in the territory.
Between October and December 2015, five staff members of the Causeway Bay
Bookstore, which publishes and sells books in Hong Kong about mainland poli-
tics, went missing. One, Swedish national Gui Minhai, was disappeared from
Thailand. Another British national, Lee Po, was disappeared from Hong Kong,
though his travel documents had remained at home. In March, four of five disap-
peared booksellers reappeared in China, confessed on television to smuggling
banned books, and were released. Swedish national Gui Minhai remains de-
tained incommunicado in an unknown location. In June, Lam Wing-kee, one of
the four who was released, broke with his captors’ orders and told media about
his detention in the mainland. The central Chinese government has yet to ex-
plain whether, and under what circumstances, mainland security forces are oper-
ating in the territory, and Hong Kong authorities have failed to press for such
information. 
In July, a Shenzhen court convicted Wang Jianmin and Guo Zhongxiao, who pub-
lished and sold Chinese political magazines in Hong Kong but reside in the
mainland, to prison sentences of five and two years for “running an illegal busi-
ness.” Their lawyer had contended that the duo did not break Chinese law as the
magazines were sold in Hong Kong. 
Also in July, a Hong Kong court convicted student leaders Joshua Wong and Alex
Chow of “unlawful assembly” and Nathan Law of “incitement,” offenses under
Hong Kong’s Public Order Ordinance. The charges stem from their leadership of a
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peaceful sit-in that triggered the 79-day pro-democracy Umbrella Movement in
2014. While all three received light sentences, such as community service, their
prosecution indicated a worrying trend, as peaceful protest leaders previously
had rarely been prosecuted in the territory. 
In July, Hong Kong’s Electoral Affairs Commission announced a new requirement
that candidates running for the semi-democratic Legislative Council (“LegCo”)
must formally declare their recognition of Hong Kong as an “inalienable part” of
China. Election officers then disqualified six candidates who have peacefully ad-
vocated for the territory’s independence. In August, a spokesperson for the Edu-
cation Bureau warned teachers that they could lose their professional
qualifications for advocating independence. In September, voters turned out in
record numbers for the LegCo elections, sending to office six individuals who
support Hong Kong self-determination. 
In November, China’s top legislature issued an interpretation of a provision of
the Basic Law (Hong Kong’s functional constitution) on oath-taking that seemed
designed to compel the Hong Kong High Court to disqualify two recently elected
pro-independence legislators from taking office. It marked the first time Chinese
authorities had issued a ruling on the Basic Law while legal proceedings were
ongoing in Hong Kong.
Xinjiang 
Authorities made no moves in 2016 to lift restrictions on fundamental human
rights and end pervasive ethnic and religious discrimination in Xinjiang, home to
10 million predominantly Muslim Uyghurs and an increasing number of Han Chi-
nese migrants. Opposition to central and local government policies has been ex-
pressed in peaceful protests but also through bombings and other violent
attacks. The Chinese government claims that it faces terrorism in the region and
conducts counterterror operations there. However, details about protests, vio-
lence, and terrorism, and counterterrorism operations are scant, with few inde-
pendent sources of information there.
In June, Ili police announced that applicants for passports must supply a DNA
sample, fingerprints, a voice recording, and a “three-dimensional image,” ac-
cording to media reports. The requirement adds to already stringent restrictions
on foreign travel for Xinjiang residents. Local government authorities again
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banned civil servants, students, and teachers from fasting and instructed restau-
rants to stay open during the Muslim holiday of Ramadan.
In August, Xinjiang authorities issued a new directive to implement China’s abu-
sive Counterterror Law, which came into effect in January 2016. In June, a group
of 10 Uighur students in Guangzhou No. 75 Middle School were reportedly ar-
rested for terrorism, but little other information was available about the case at
time of writing.
Uighur economist Ilham Tohti is serving a life sentence on baseless charges of
separatism for having peacefully criticized the government’s Xinjiang policies. In
October, he was awarded the prestigious Martin Ennals human rights award.
Tibet 
Tibetans continue to face routine denial of basic freedoms of speech, assembly,
and movement. In 2016 authorities prioritized rights-abusing “anti-splittism”
and “stability maintenance” campaigns despite the absence of tangible threats,
and forbade almost all residents of the Tibet Autonomous Republic (TAR) from
foreign travel. 
In August, Wu Yingjie, an ethnic Chinese Communist Party cadre, was appointed
to succeed Chen Quanguo as TAR party secretary and is expected to continue
Chen’s policies of heavy-handed governance and social control. The 13th Five
Year Plan began in 2016, and the TAR set ambitious goals for massive infrastruc-
ture construction and urban development; Tibetan areas of Qinghai and Sichuan
provinces are also slated for greater resource extraction. Many reported public
protests were against rural land grabs, including one in Gansu which security
forces suppressed in May.
Continuing restrictions on religious freedom include a program of demolitions
and evictions at Larung Gar monastic complex in Serta county, Sichuan, which
will see the world’s largest Tibetan Buddhist community shrink from its 2016
population of at least 10,000 to no more than 5,000 by September 2017. The Ti-
betan writers Shokjang and Lomik were given three and seven-and-a-half year
sentences, respectively, and Lu Konchok Gyatso and Tashi Wangchuk remained
in custody at time of writing, one for planning to publish a book and the other for
speaking to the New York Times about the loss of Tibetan language teaching. 
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At time of writing, two more Tibetans had self-immolated in 2016, both in
Sichuan. At least four Tibetans were believed to have died in custody, including
Kandze nun Yeshe Lhakdron, who has not been seen since her arrest in 2008.
Freedom of Religion 
The government restricts religious practice to five officially recognized religions
and only in officially approved religious premises. The government retains con-
trol over religious personnel appointments, publications, finances, and semi-
nary applications. The government classifies many religious groups outside of its
control as “evil cults.” Falun Gong, a meditation-focused spiritual group banned
since July 1999, continues to suffer state persecution.
Zhejiang authorities released some of the individuals it took into custody in
2015 for resisting its campaign to remove crosses from churches in the province,
known as China’s “heartland of Christianity.” In February, Zhejiang state televi-
sion aired a coerced confession of human rights lawyer Zhang Kai, who had been
detained incommunicado for providing legal advice to Christians affected by the
cross removals. Zhang was released in March. But in Jinhua City, pastors Bao
Guohua and Xing Wenxiang were sentenced to 14 and 12 years, respectively, in a
case widely seen as retaliation for their opposition to the anti-cross campaign.  
In April, President Xi gave a major speech on religion, during which he warned
against “overseas infiltrations through religious means,” and called on religions
to “Sinicize” or “adopt Chinese characteristics.” 
In August, a Tianjin court sentenced Hu Shigen, a veteran activist and a Chris-
tian, to seven-and-a-half years in prison. Hu’s crimes, according to the prosecu-
tion, included “using illegal religious activities as a platform” to “spread
subversive thoughts.”
In September, the Chinese government released draft revisions to its abusive
2005 Religious Regulations; these require that religion “protect national secu-
rity” and prohibit individuals and groups not approved as religious bodies from
attending meetings abroad on religion.  
Guizhou authorities have held Pastor Li Guozhi of the Living Stones Church since
December 2015, when the authorities closed down the 500-member house
church and declared it “illegal.” 
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Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity 
China has no law protecting people from discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation or gender identity, and there is no legal recognition of same-sex part-
nership. Possibly because their activism is not considered threatening to the
state, LGBT individuals enjoyed some success advancing legal cases in 2016.
In January, a Hunan court heard a case filed by Sun Wenlin against the local Bu-
reau of Civil Affairs, which had refused to marry Sun and his male partner.
Though the court ruled against Sun in April, his case—the first gay marriage law-
suit accepted by Chinese courts—attracted wide media attention. In June, a
Henan court accepted a case filed by Yu Hu against a mental health hospital that
had subjected him to 19 days of involuntary “therapy” to “cure” his homosexual-
ity. Also in June, a Guangdong university student, Qiu Bai, sued the provincial
education department over textbooks that depict homosexuality as an illness.
Qiu filed a similar suit in 2015, though she withdrew it later because the depart-
ment had promised to look into the matter. She decided to sue again after the
authorities’ pledge failed to materialize. 
In June, China voted against a UN resolution creating an expert post dedicated to
addressing violence and discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender
identity.
Women’s Rights 
Women in China face systemic discrimination in higher education and employ-
ment, as well as domestic violence and sexual harassment. The government’s re-
sponse to these abuses continues to be inadequate despite its rhetorical
commitment to gender equality.  
Authorities’ heightened hostility toward civil society extended to women’s rights
activists in 2016. In January, Guo Jianmei, founder of the well-known Beijing
Zhongze Women’s Legal Counseling and Service Center, closed the organization,
citing official pressure.
In April, in a landmark case, a Guangzhou court ruled in favor of a woman who
sued two companies for discriminating against her in their hiring process.
Women’s rights advocates criticized the paltry compensation—2,000RMB
(US$300)—awarded by the court.  
197
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH
Disability Rights
Although China ratified the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities
in 2008, persons with disabilities continue to face barriers and discrimination in
areas including education and employment. The government also continues to
detain activists in psychiatric facilities.
Regulations drafted in 2013 on access to education for people with disabilities
have still not been adopted. Official guidelines continue to allow universities to
deny enrollment in certain subjects if the applicants have certain disabilities. In
July, a Henan student, Song Yichen, made headlines when he was rejected by
Tianjin University of Traditional Chinese Medicine for his visual impairment. 
Official guidelines on hiring civil servants continue to discriminate against those
with certain disabilities. In August, Tan Jinsong, a man with visual impairment
was rejected for a job with the local legislative office in Henan province despite
obtaining the highest scores in the civil service exam. 
Key International Actors
In February, the UN high commissioner for human rights expressed concern re-
garding China’s continued arbitrary detention and interrogation of lawyers, ha-
rassment and intimidation of government critics and NGO workers, and the
negative impact on basic rights of the new Foreign NGO Management law.
In February 2016, the European Parliament adopted a strong resolution con-
demning human rights abuses in China and in March, a dozen governments led
by the United States signed on to an unprecedented statement condemning
China’s “deteriorating human rights record” at the UN Human Rights Council.
Several governments, including those of Canada, the European Union, Germany,
and the United States, issued statements in 2016 about the crackdown on civil
society, disappearances of the Hong Kong booksellers, and the foreign NGO
management law. No government, however, imposed any other concrete costs
on Beijing for its deteriorating human rights record.  
On his penultimate visit to China as UN secretary-general in July, Ban Ki-moon fi-
nally expressed concern about the crackdown on civil society, and urged Chinese
authorities to give “citizens a full say and role in the political life of their coun-
try.” US President Barack Obama failed to make any specific public statements
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about human rights on his last visit as president to China in September. G20
member states not only failed to condemn China’s human rights record when
they met in Hangzhou in September, they also failed to condemn the abuses in
Hangzhou stemming from the event, such as the detention of local activists or
the far-reaching restrictions China imposed to limit participation by independent
civil society organizations in G20 discussions.  
Foreign Policy
In July, the Permanent Court of Arbitration, an international tribunal, issued a
sweeping rebuke of China’s claims of sovereignty over large portions of the
South China Sea, stating that Beijing’s claims lacked legal validity. China re-
sponded by dismissing the legality of the court, saying it would not respect the
ruling.
In 2016, China did not exercise its veto power at the UN Security Council. How-
ever in December 2015, China tried to block discussion of the human rights situ-
ation in North Korea by forcing a procedural vote. China also abstained on
resolutions that authorized additional regional peacekeepers for South Sudan
and UN police for Burundi. At the UN Committee on Non-Governmental Organiza-
tions and the UN Economic and Social Council, the Chinese delegation opposed
granting UN accreditation to the internationally respected Committee to Protect
Journalists. 
In August, China allowed a visit by the UN special rapporteur on extreme poverty,
Philip Alston. But consistent with past practice, authorities restricted Alston’s
movements and meetings, and in his departing press conference the special
rapporteur noted some of the economic progress China has made but con-
demned the “dramatically shrinking space for civil society.” 
The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), launched by China in 2015, held
its first annual general meeting in Beijing in June. None of the governments pres-
ent pushed the AIIB to adopt safeguard policies requiring the bank to identify
and address human rights risks in its projects. The AIIB has not publicly ad-
dressed whether it will consult with nongovernmental groups, particularly in
countries hostile to independent monitors.
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In an alarming trend, Beijing pressured several governments, including Armenia,
Cambodia, and Kenya, to deport Taiwanese citizens to mainland China. The peo-
ple, suspected in the mainland of fraud, were given no discernible opportunity to
contest their deportations before a competent court in those countries. 
Chinese authorities claimed that some 500 allegedly corrupt “economic fugi-
tives” had been returned to the mainland by September, bringing the two-year
total of the “Sky Net” campaign to nearly 2,000. It was unclear at time of writing
whether any of these people had access to family members or lawyers of their
own choosing while awaiting trial in China, or what guarantees the returning
countries sought from China prior to their return.
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Colombia
The government and the country’s largest guerilla group, the Revolutionary
Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), reached an agreement in 2016 to end their 52-
year armed conflict. The agreement provides a historic opportunity to curb
human rights abuses. Much will depend on how its justice provisions are passed
into legislation, reviewed by the Constitutional Court, and then interpreted by a
new “Special Jurisdiction for Peace.” On October 2, an initial version of the
peace deal with flawed justice provisions was rejected by a slim margin in a na-
tional plebiscite, but the parties reached a new agreement on November 12.
Violence associated with the conflict has forcibly displaced more than 6.8 mil-
lion Colombians, generating the world’s second largest population of internally
displaced persons (IDPs), after Syria. Civilians continue to suffer serious abuses
by the country’s second largest guerilla group, the National Liberation Army
(ELN), and by paramilitary successor groups that emerged after a demobilization
process a decade ago. Human rights defenders, trade unionists, journalists, in-
digenous and Afro-Colombian leaders, and other community activists face death
threats and violence, including from guerrillas and successor groups. Perpetra-
tors of violence against civilians are rarely held accountable. 
Since the FARC announced a unilateral ceasefire in July 2015, abuses attributed
to them have declined steeply. The Colombian government and the ELN an-
nounced in March 2016 that, after almost two years of exploratory negotiations,
they would start formal peace talks. These had not started at time of writing,
largely owing to the ELN’s unwillingness to free captives and end kidnappings. 
In September, the Council of the State—one of Colombia’s high courts—annulled
the 2012 re-election of Alejandro Ordoñez as the country’s inspector general and
dismissed him from office. Under Colombian law, the inspector general is
charged with protecting human rights, but during his seven years in office, Or-
doñez repeatedly sought to undermine the rights of women and lesbian, gay, bi-
sexual, and transgender (LGBT) people. 
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Guerrillas
Since its formation in the mid-1960s, the FARC has committed systematic atroci-
ties against civilians, including child recruitment, abductions, and widespread
crimes of sexual violence.In August, President Juan Manuel Santos and the FARC
leadership declared a “definitive ceasefire” which was followed by the peace
agreement approved later in the year. 
The ELN continues to commit serious abuses against civilians. In the province of
Chocó, for example, it has been responsible for kidnappings, killings, forced dis-
placement, and child recruitment. In May 2016, ELN guerillas kidnapped three
journalists in the northeastern province of Norte de Santander. 
The ELN continued in 2016 to use antipersonnel landmines. The government re-
ported that landmines and unexploded ordnances killed 3 civilians and injured
19 between January and October 2016.
Paramilitaries and their Successors
Between 2003 and 2006, right-wing paramilitary organizations with close ties to
security forces and politicians underwent a deeply flawed government demobi-
lization process in which many members remained active and reorganized into
new groups. These successor groups continue to commit such widespread
abuses as killings, disappearances, and sexual violence. They have at times
benefited from the tolerance and even collusion of state agents.
Buenaventura, a largely Afro-Colombian port on the Pacific coast where succes-
sor groups continue to commit such abuses, has one of the highest rate of
forced displacement in Colombia, with 12,956 residents fleeing their homes in
2015, and 1,955 fleeing from January through October 2016.
The conflict between the AGC and the ELN in the province of Chocó has severely
limited the ability of many indigenous and Afro-Colombian people to leave their
towns.   
Implementation of the Justice and Peace Law of 2005, which offers dramatically
reduced sentences to demobilized paramilitary members who confess their
crimes, has been slow, despite significant progress since 2014. As of July 2016,
182 of the more than 30,000 paramilitary troops who officially demobilized had
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been sentenced under the law. The convictions cover a small portion of the more
than 4,000 defendants seeking the law’s benefits.
In October, the Attorney General’s Office indicted Santiago Uribe, the brother
of former President Alvaro Uribe, on charges of murder and association to com-
mit crimes for his alleged role in the paramilitary group “The 12 Apostols” in
the 1990s. 
“Parapolitics” investigations of current and former members of Congress ac-
cused of conspiring with paramilitaries continued in 2016. From 2006 through
August 2015, 63 legislators were convicted of crimes related to “parapolitics.”
Abuses by Public Security Forces
From 2002 through 2008, army brigades across Colombia routinely executed
civilians. Under pressure from superiors to show “positive” results and boost
body counts in their war against guerrillas, soldiers and officers abducted vic-
tims or lured them to remote locations under false pretenses—such as promises
of work—and killed them, placed weapons on their bodies, and reported them as
enemy combatants killed in action. There has been a dramatic reduction in cases
of alleged unlawful killings attributed to security forces since 2009, though cred-
ible reports of some new cases continue to emerge.
As of June 2016, the Attorney General’s Office was investigating more than 3,600
alleged unlawful killings from 2002 through 2008, and had convicted more than
800 state agents in 210 rulings. 
The vast majority of those convicted are low-level soldiers. Authorities have
failed to prosecute senior army officers involved in the killings and instead have
promoted many of them through the military ranks. 
At time of writing, the Attorney General’s Office had summoned a total of 11 ac-
tive or retired generals for questioning on their alleged role in false-positive
cases. In August, retired Gen. Henry William Torres Escalante, was indicted;
but no meaningful progress has been achieved in other cases against generals
allegedly responsible for “false positive” killings. In March 2016, prosecutors
summoned the former head of the army, retired Gen. Mario Montoya Uribe, for a
hearing in which he was to be charged. The hearing had yet to take place as of
November. 
203
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH
Gen. Rodríguez Barragan continued, at time of writing, to command the armed
forces, despite strong evidence implicating him in false-positive killings.
Peace Negotiations and Accountability
The peace agreement creates a Special Jurisdiction for Peace to try those respon-
sible for gross human rights violations committed during the conflict. Individuals
responsible for crimes against humanity and serious war crimes who fully coop-
erate with the new jurisdiction and confess their crimes will be subjected to up
to eight years of “effective restraints of rights and liberties.” 
The November 12 agreement, while not fully addressing the flaws of the original,
contains language that could make it much easier to fix at least two of the most
important ones: an overly narrow conception of when superior officers can be
held responsible for the crimes of their subordinates, and modest and vaguely
defined definitions of the “restrictions on liberty” to be imposed on individuals
who fully and promptly confess their war crimes.
Members of the armed forces would also benefit under the agreement, probably
including many soldiers responsible for false-positive killings. 
Internal Displacement and Land Restitution
More than 6.8 million Colombians have been internally displaced since 1985,
government figures reveal. Some 35,000 people were displaced in 2016, a signif-
icant drop from the more than 140,000 displaced in 2015. 
The government’s implementation of land restitution under the Victims’ Law con-
tinues to move slowly. The law was enacted in 2011 to restore millions of
hectares of abandoned land and land stolen by armed groups and civilians to in-
ternally displaced Colombians. As of September 2016, the courts had issued rul-
ings in just 4,100 of more than 93,000 claims received.
Gender-Based Violence
Gender-based violence (GBV) is widespread in Colombia. Lack of training and
poor implementation of treatment protocols impede timely access to medical
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services and create obstacles for women and girls seeking post-violence care.
Perpetrators of GBV crimes are rarely brought to justice.
In July 2015, “femicide”—defined, in part, as the murder of a woman because of
her gender—became a crime. The law established comprehensive measures to
prevent and prosecute GBV, including recognizing a victim’s right to specialized
legal assistance. 
Human Rights Defenders, Journalists, and Trade Unionists
Rights advocates and journalists continue to be targeted with threats and at-
tacks. Despite an Interior Ministry program that assigns protection to human
rights defenders, trade unionists, and journalists, the United Nations high com-
missioner for human rights in Colombia documented the killings of 28 leading
rights advocates and community activists from January through September 2016.
During 2015, the Attorney General’s Office successfully prosecuted seven indi-
viduals for killing community activists and rights advocates.  
The Foundation for a Free Press, a respected Colombian nongovernmental organ-
ization (NGO) that monitors press freedoms, reported threats against 91 journal-
ists from January through October 2016. 
The National Labor School, Colombia’s leading labor-rights NGO, reported 18
killings of trade unionists from January 2015 through February 2016—and the
government has reported more than 120 since 2011. As of February 2015, the At-
torney General’s Office had obtained convictions in only six of such killings com-
mitted since 2011. 
Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity
In recent years, authorities in Colombia have taken several steps to recognize
the rights of LGBT people. In June 2015, the Justice Ministry issued a decree al-
lowing people to revise the gender noted on their identification documents with-
out prior judicial approval. In November 2015, the Constitutional Court ruled that
sexual orientation could not be used to prohibit someone from adopting a child,
although a legislative proposal to hold a referendum on this issue remained
pending at time of writing. In April 2016, the Constitutional Court upheld the
right of same-sex couples to marry.
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In October 2016, FARC leaders met with conservative politicians and agreed to
promote a definition of the family as formed by a man and a women. The FARC
backtracked after meeting with LGBT representatives days later. Conservative
politicians and evangelist leaders had attacked the peace agreement claiming
that it would “destroy families.”
Between January and June 2016, the Ombudsman’s Office received 89 reports of
cases of violence against LGBTI people.
Indigenous Rights
Indigenous peoples in Colombia suffer disproportionate limitations on their en-
joyment of social and economic rights. From January through August 2016, at
least 51 children—the vast majority of them belonging to Wayuu indigenous com-
munities—died in the province of La Guajira of causes associated with malnutri-
tion. Many of these deaths are caused by limited access to water. The
Inter-American Commission of Human Rights had asked the government in De-
cember 2015 to take measures to curb these deaths. 
Key International Actors
The United States remains the most influential foreign actor in Colombia. In Feb-
ruary, US President Barack Obama announced “Peace Colombia”—a new frame-
work for bilateral collaboration to support peace efforts—and pledged US$450
million for the 2017 fiscal year.
A portion of US military aid is subject to human rights conditions, which the US
Department of State has not enforced; in September, it again certified that
Colombia was meeting the conditions. Through a special envoy to the FARC
peace talks, Bernard Aronson, the US has strongly supported the peace agree-
ments reached in September and November.  
Cuba has also provided key support to the peace process by hosting the talks
and acting as “guarantor” of the process. 
In September, before the peace agreement was rejected in the national
plebiscite, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon participated in the ceremonial
signing of the agreement, saying it “creates the conditions for lasting peace.”
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The Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC) continues to
monitor Colombian investigations of crimes that may fall within the ICC’s juris-
diction. In September, ICC Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda welcomed the announce-
ment of the peace deal with the FARC but highlighted the importance of
“genuine accountability” and “effective punishment” for those responsible for
atrocities. 
In January 2016, the UN Security Council, at the government’s request, estab-
lished a political mission under a tripartite mechanism—the UN, the govern-
ment, and FARC—to monitor and verify the peace agreement’s definitive bilateral
ceasefire and cessation of hostilities, and the laying down of arms. 
The Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights continues to play a
key role in defending and promoting human rights in Colombia. On October 31,
the day the office’s mandate would have expired, the Colombian government
agreed to extend it until 2019.
In October, President Santos was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for his efforts to
bring the Colombian armed conflict to an end. 
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Côte d’Ivoire
Côte d’Ivoire’s continued political stability and strong macroeconomic growth
provided a platform in 2016 for gradual improvement in the rule of law and the
fulfillment of economic and social rights. A new constitution removed a divisive
nationality clause—requiring a presidential candidate’s father and mother to be
Ivorian—that had contributed to over a decade of political turmoil. However, little
progress was made in addressing key human rights issues at the root of political
violence, such as combating impunity and delivering justice for the victims of
over a decade of political violence, including the 3,000 victims of the 2010-11
post-election crisis. 
The campaign in advance of an October 30 referendum on the new constitution
was characterized by some violations of the rights of freedom of assembly and
expression. The new constitution contains provisions that the opposition con-
tend significantly strengthen the power of the presidency. Côte d’Ivoire was
slated to hold legislative elections on December 18.
A terrorist attack on a beach resort in Grand-Bassam on March 13 killed 22 peo-
ple, including three assailants. The attack, claimed by al-Mourabitoun, an off-
shoot of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, underscored the risk that Côte d’Ivoire
faces from regional extremist groups.
Freedom of Assembly and Expression
Ahead of the constitutional referendum, the ability of opposition parties to ex-
plain their opposition to the draft constitution was undermined by a brief seven-
day campaign period, lack of access to state media, and the suspension of two
opposition-leaning newspapers. 
The opposition argued that the addition of a vice president and a senate, one
third of which is appointed by the president, as well as a clause stating that the
constitution can be amended by a two-thirds vote of the national assembly and
the senate, gave undue power to the executive.
In the weeks leading up to the vote, Ivorian security forces on at least two occa-
sions dispersed demonstrators opposed to the constitution and briefly detained
several opposition leaders. Several other opposition rallies occurred without in-
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cident. Many opposition parties boycotted the vote, which was marred by mod-
est turnout and the vandalism of dozens of polling stations in opposition strong-
holds. 
Accountability for Past Abuses
Progress in delivering impartial justice for victims of past political violence was
slow. In January 2016, the International Criminal Court (ICC) trial began of former
President Laurent Gbagbo and the former youth minister and militia leader,
Charles Blé Goudé, for crimes against humanity committed during the 2010-11
crisis.
An Ivorian court tried former First Lady Simone Gbagbo for crimes against hu-
manity and war crimes during the crisis. The ICC and national judges are investi-
gating high-level perpetrators from pro-Ouattara forces but had yet to bring them
to trial at time of writing. 
The Special Investigative and Examination Cell, established in 2011, continued
its investigations into human rights crimes committed during the 2010-2011
post-election crisis. The cell has charged high-level perpetrators from both sides,
including several pro-Ouattara commanders now in senior positions in the Ivo-
rian army. 
The only national civilian trial for human rights crimes so far, however, is that of
Simone Gbagbo, whose trial in Côte d’Ivoire’s highest criminal court (cour d’as-
sises) for crimes against humanity and war crimes began on May 31, 2016.
Human rights groups acting on behalf of victims decided not to participate in the
trial, citing violations of victims’ due process rights. In May, the Ivorian Supreme
Court denied Simone Gbagbo’s appeal of her March 2015 conviction and 20-year
sentence for offenses against the state during the post-election crisis. 
The ICC has also indicted Simone Gbagbo, but the Ivorian government has re-
fused to transfer her to The Hague. The ICC’s long-delayed investigations into
crimes committed by pro-Ouattara forces continued during 2016, although Presi-
dent Ouattara has said that all further cases related to the post-election crisis
will be tried in national courts.
A military court on February 18 convicted 13 military personnel, including Gen.
Dogbo Blé, the former leader of Gbagbo’s Republican Guard, and Commander
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Anselme Séka Yapo, former head of protection detail of Simone Gbagbo, for the
2002 assassination of former coup leader and Ivorian president, Gen. Robert
Gueï and his family. Neither the special cell nor the ICC are investigating crimes
committed during election-related violence in 2000 or the 2002-2003 armed
conflict.
Côte d’Ivoire’s reparations body had, when it submitted its report in April 2016,
compiled a list of more than 316,000 victims potentially eligible for reparations,
although the vast majority of victims have yet to receive assistance. The govern-
ment on October 25 published the report of the Dialogue, Truth and Reconcilia-
tion Commission, which completed its work December 2014, although the report
does little to identify those responsible for crimes committed during the 2002-
2003 conflict or 2010-11 crisis.
Judicial System
Sessions of the cour d’assises were held in Abidjan and several regional courts,
an essential step to clear the backlog of serious criminal cases. However, ap-
proximately 40 percent of the prison population remains in pretrial detention,
often for several years. Despite the conditional release since December 2015 of
some 100 pro-Gbagbo defendants arrested for their alleged role in the post-elec-
tion crisis or subsequent attacks against the state, more than 200 remained in
extended pretrial detention. 
Most prisons are overcrowded and detainees lack adequate nutrition, sanita-
tion, and medical care. On February 20, 2016, an uprising in Abidjan’s central
prison (Maison d’Arrêt et de Correction), led to the death of a prison guard and
10 inmates, including a gang leader responsible for systematic racketeering in-
side the facility.
Fear of violent crime committed by street gangs, including by children, fueled
several public lynchings of suspected criminals. Although the government has
taken steps to eliminate its use of the word “germ” (“microbe”) to describe chil-
dren in criminal gangs, it has yet to develop a comprehensive strategy to ad-
dress the social, psychological, and economic drivers of violent crime by
children.
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Conduct of Security Forces
The prevalence of arbitrary arrests, mistreatment of detainees, and unlawful
killings by the security forces lessened in 2016. Investigations and prosecutions
of those who do commit abuses increased slightly, but were still rare. The mili-
tary justice system remains severely under-resourced, and needs reform to
strengthen its independence from the executive.
The security forces continued to engage in extortion, parallel tax systems and
other criminal conduct to obtain revenue from the illicit exploitation of cocoa, di-
amonds, and other natural resources. Commanders allegedly responsible for se-
vere human rights violations remain in positions of authority within the armed
forces and several have allegedly illicitly accumulated private wealth and per-
sonal armories.
Extortion by security forces at illegal checkpoints remains an acute problem on
secondary roads in rural areas. The United Nations reported that in March, in As-
suéfry northeastern Côte d’Ivoire, the Ivorian army fired on protesters angry at
soldiers’ continued extortion, resulting in the death of three persons. 
Communal Violence and Land Rights
In March, violent intercommunal clashes between pastoralists and farmers in
Bouna, in the northeast, left at least 27 people dead and thousands more dis-
placed. Armed traditional hunters, known as Dozo, intervened in the conflict and
were responsible for at least 15 of the killings. The government subsequently
charged the Dozo chief from Bouna with murder, and some 70 Dozos were
among more than 115 people arrested for their role in the violence. More than 75
people at time of writing remained in detention awaiting trial.
Land conflicts between migrant and indigenous communities underscored
episodic violence in southwestern Côte d’Ivoire, including a December 2, 2015
attack by Ivorian and Liberian militiamen in Olodio that killed seven Ivorian sol-
diers. The December 2015 resumption of the repatriation of refugees from
Liberia, on hold during the Ebola crisis, increased competition for land in west-
ern Côte d’Ivoire. 
In an effort to restore Côte d’Ivoire’s dwindling forests, the government in July
evicted more than 15,000 cocoa farmers from Mont Péko National Park, leaving
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many families without access to sufficient food, shelter, or sanitation. Smaller-
scale evictions from protected forests were frequently conducted without ade-
quate notice, and farmers were beaten and extorted during eviction operations.
Violence against Women and Girls
Gender-based violence remains widespread, particularly against girls. A July UN
report found that of 1,129 rapes reported between 2012 and 2015, more than
two-thirds of victims were children. Because the cour d’assises mandated to try
rape cases rarely functions, Ivorian judges frequently reclassify rape cases to
lesser offenses, although cour d’assises did hear at least 15 rape cases in 2016,
resulting in more than a dozen convictions.
Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity
No law prohibits discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation, gender
identity, or intersex status. Côte d’Ivoire does not criminalize same-sex conduct,
but the criminal code establishes higher penalties for same-sex couples con-
victed of public acts of indecency. Two men were in November convicted of pub-
lic indecency and sentenced to three-month prison terms after being accused of
same-sex sexual acts. Two gay men were assaulted in June after a photo was
published of them signing a book of condolences to the victims of a shooting at
a gay nightclub in Florida, US.
Human Rights Defenders
Although in June 2014 the government passed a law that strengthened protec-
tions for human rights defenders, it has so far failed to adopt a decree to facili-
tate the law’s implementation. International and national human rights groups
generally operate without government restrictions.
Key International Actors
On April 28, 2016, the UN Security Council extended the mandate of the UN
peacekeeping mission, the UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI), for a final
time, to June 30, 2017. The UN Security Council also terminated the arms em-
bargo and individual sanctions first imposed in 2004. UNOCI progressively re-
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duced its military and civilian components throughout 2016, leaving France, the
European Union, and the United States as the government’s principal partners
on justice and security sector reform. 
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Cuba
The Cuban government continues to repress dissent and punish public criticism.
It now relies less than in past years on long-term prison sentences to punish its
critics, but short-term arbitrary arrests of human rights defenders, independent
journalists, and others have increased dramatically in recent years. Other repres-
sive tactics employed by the government include beatings, public shaming, and
termination of employment.
On November 25, Fidel Castro, who ruled Cuba from 1959 until handing off the
presidency to his brother, Raúl, in 2006, died in Havana.
In March, US President Barack Obama visited Cuba, where he met with President
Raúl Castro, as well as with representatives of Cuban civil society. President
Obama gave a nationally televised address and held a joint press conference
with President Castro in which he urged the Cuban government to lift restrictions
on political freedoms and reiterated his call for the US Congress to end the eco-
nomic embargo of the island.  
Arbitrary Detention and Short-Term Imprisonment
The government continues to rely on arbitrary detention to harass and intimidate
critics, independent activists, political opponents, and others. The Cuban Com-
mission for Human Rights and National Reconciliation, an independent human
rights group that lacks official authorization and is therefore considered illegal
by the government, received more than 7,900 reports of arbitrary detentions
from January through August 2016. This represents the highest monthly average
of detentions in the past six years.
Security officers rarely present arrest orders to justify the detention of critics. In
some cases, detainees are released after receiving official warnings, which pros-
ecutors can use in subsequent criminal trials to show a pattern of “delinquent”
behavior.
Detention is often used preemptively to prevent people from participating in
peaceful marches or meetings to discuss politics. Detainees are often beaten,
threatened, and held incommunicado for hours or days. The Ladies in White
(Damas de Blanco)—a group founded by the wives, mothers, and daughters of
215
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH
political prisoners also, like the Cuban Commission on Human Rights, lacks offi-
cial authorization and is therefore considered illegal by the government. Its
members are routinely harassed, roughed up, and detained by either police or
state security agents before or after they attend Sunday mass.
Prior to President Obama’s visit in March, police arrested more than 300 dissi-
dents as part of a crackdown on opposition leaders. 
Freedom of Expression
The government controls virtually all media outlets in Cuba and restricts access
to outside information.
A small number of journalists and bloggers who are independent of government
media manage to write articles for websites or blogs, or publish tweets. How-
ever, the government routinely blocks access within Cuba to these websites.
Moreover, only a fraction of Cubans can read independent websites and blogs
because of the high cost of, and limited access to, the internet. 
Independent journalists who publish information considered critical of the gov-
ernment are subject to smear campaigns and arbitrary arrests, as are artists and
academics who demand greater freedoms.
Lazaro Yuri Valle Roca, a blogger and videographer who often covers the Sunday
demonstrations of the Ladies in White, was jailed for five days after trying to
cover a protest on March 20, the day of President Obama’s arrival in Cuba. Police
officers apprehended Valle Roca, beat him, and took him to a nearby police sta-
tion, according to Aliuska Gómez García, a member of the Ladies in White who
witnessed the beating and arrest and spoke afterwards to the Committee to Pro-
tect Journalists. Valle Roca was later accused of attacking an official. While he
did not face charges on this occasion, officers warned him that he might if ar-
rested in the future.
In May, police detained journalist Daniel Domínguez López in his office at the
Cuban Institute for Freedom of Speech and Press (ICLEP) after he wrote an article
about a deprivation-of-property case involving a member of the National Revolu-
tionary Police Force. Police ultimately took him to a “criminal instruction unit,”
where he said that they threatened to imprison or kill him and his family. Officers
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reportedly warned him against further distribution of his bulletin and told him
that they were determined to destroy ICLEP.
Police in October detained Maykel González Vivero, a reporter of the news site
Diario de Cuba, while he was reporting on the damage caused by Hurricane
Matthew. Three days later, police arrested Elaine Díaz, director of the independ-
ent news site Periodismo del Barrio and four of her colleagues when they trav-
eled to Baracoa, eastern Cuba, to report on the storm’s effects. She and her
team were released a few hours later, as was González, but authorities report-
edly confiscated their laptop computers, cameras, and other equipment. 
The government harasses artists as well. Police detained Danilo Maldonado, a
graffiti artist known as “El Sexto,” during a march led by the Ladies in White
movement shortly before President Obama’s visit in March 2016, but released
him the following day. The day after Fidel Castro’s death in November, police ar-
rested Maldonado again after he posted an online video mocking Castro’s death
and spray painting “se fue” (he’s gone) on a wall in downtown Havana. Police
held him incommunicado for 72 hours, inflicting a beating that triggered an
asthma attack. After his mother brought an inhaler, his detention continued. He
was still detained at time of writing in early December. Two years earlier, Maldon-
ado had been charged with “contempt for authority” for attempting to stage a
satirical performance with two pigs daubed with “Raul” and “Fidel.” He served
10 months in prison.
Political Prisoners
Despite the release of the 53 political prisoners in conjunction with the agree-
ment to normalize relations with the US, dozens more remain in Cuban prisons,
according to local human rights groups. The government denies access to its
prisons by independent human rights groups, which believe that additional po-
litical prisoners, whose cases they cannot document, remain locked up.
Cubans who criticize the government continue to face the threat of criminal pros-
ecution. They do not benefit from due process guarantees, such as the right to
fair and public hearings by a competent and impartial tribunal. In practice,
courts are subordinated to the executive and legislative branches, denying
meaningful judicial independence.
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Travel Restrictions 
Reforms to travel regulations that went into effect in January 2013 eliminated the
need for an exit visa to leave the island. Exit visas had previously been used to
deny the right to travel to people critical of the government—and to their fami-
lies. Since then, many people who had previously been denied permission to
travel have been able to do so, including human rights defenders and independ-
ent bloggers.
Nonetheless, the reforms gave the government broad discretionary powers to re-
strict the right to travel on the grounds of “defense and national security” or
“other reasons of public interest.” Such measures have allowed authorities to
deny exit to people who express dissent. 
The government restricts the movement of citizens within Cuba through a 1997
law known as Decree 217, which is designed to limit migration to Havana. The de-
cree has been used to harass dissidents and prevent those from elsewhere in
Cuba from traveling to Havana to attend meetings.
Prison Conditions
Prisons are overcrowded. Prisoners are forced to work 12-hour days and pun-
ished if they do not meet production quotas, according to former political prison-
ers. Inmates have no effective complaint mechanism to seek redress for abuses.
Those who criticize the government or engage in hunger strikes and other forms
of protest are often subjected to extended solitary confinement, beatings, re-
strictions on family visits, and denied medical care.
While the government allowed select members of the foreign press to conduct
controlled visits to a handful of prisons in April 2013, it continues to deny inter-
national human rights groups and independent Cuban organizations access to
its prisons.
Labor Rights
Despite updating its Labor Code in 2014, Cuba continues to violate conventions
of the International Labour Organization that it has ratified, specifically regard-
ing freedom of association, collective bargaining, protection of wages, and pro-
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hibitions on forced labor. While the formation of independent unions is techni-
cally allowed by law, in practice Cuba only permits one confederation of state-
controlled unions, the Workers’ Central Union of Cuba.
Human Rights Defenders
The Cuban government still refuses to recognize human rights monitoring as a
legitimate activity and denies legal status to local human rights groups. Govern-
ment authorities harass, assault, and imprison human rights defenders who at-
tempt to document abuses.
In September, police raided Cubalex, a six-year-old organization that investi-
gates human rights violations and provides free legal services to free-expression
activists, migrants, and human-rights defenders. Officers confiscated files, strip-
searched four men and a woman, and arrested two attorneys, one of whom was
still in detention at time of writing. 
Key International Actors
In December 2014, President Obama announced that the United States would
ease decades-old restrictions on travel and commerce, and normalize diplomatic
relations with Cuba. In return, the Cuban government released 53 political pris-
oners and committed to allowing visits by international human rights monitors.
The two governments restored diplomatic relations in July 2015, but at time of
writing, no international human rights monitors had visited Cuba.
In January 2015, President Obama called on the US Congress to lift the economic
embargo on the island that had been imposed more than four decades earlier. In
October 2016, he used executive orders to end a few trade restrictions, including
the longstanding $100 import limit on two of Cuba’s signature products: cigars
and rum.
In September 2016, the European Union approved an agreement with Cuba that
would strengthen economic and political ties and bring an end to the EU’s 1996
“Common Position on Cuba,” which conditions full European Union economic
cooperation with Cuba on the country’s transition to a pluralist democracy and
respect for human rights. In October, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolu-
tion—for the 25th consecutive year—calling on the US to end the embargo. Only
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the US and Israel did not vote in favor, but for the first time, they abstained in-
stead of voting against.  
As a member of the UN Human Rights Council from 2006 to 2012 and from 2014
to the present, Cuba has regularly voted to prevent scrutiny of serious human
rights abuses around the world—opposing resolutions spotlighting abuses in
North Korea, Syria, Iran, and Ukraine. However, Cuba supported a resolution
adopted by the council in June 2016, establishing the post of an independent ex-
pert to combat violence and discrimination based on sexual orientation and gen-
der identity.
In October, Cuba was re-elected to the Human Rights Council for the 2017-2019
term.
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Democratic Republic of Congo
Political violence and government repression intensified in 2016 as President
Joseph Kabila clung to power beyond the end of his constitutionally mandated
two-term limit, which ended on December 19, 2015, despite widespread opposi-
tion and international condemnation. As authorities deliberately stalled plans to
organize elections, government officials and security forces systematically
sought to silence, repress, and intimidate the growing coalition of voices calling
for credible, timely elections.
In eastern Congo, the security situation remained volatile as numerous armed
groups, and in some cases government security forces, viciously attacked civil-
ians.
Freedom of Expression and Peaceful Assembly
Government officials and security forces repeatedly banned opposition demon-
strations, fired teargas and live bullets at peaceful protesters, shut media out-
lets, and prevented opposition leaders from moving freely. 
More than 100 activists and opposition leaders or supporters were arbitrarily ar-
rested between January and November 2016, and held for at least 48 hours.
Some were held incommunicado for weeks or months, while others were put on
trial on trumped-up charges. 
On November 28, 2015, in the eastern city of Goma, police fired teargas and live
bullets in the air when about 100 people were attending a peaceful protest
against the government’s failure to halt massacres in Beni territory. A 14-year-old
girl was wounded. Authorities arrested 12 people. Three teenagers among them
were released after four days while the others remained in detention for over
three months on trumped-up charges.
Nine youth activists and at least 30 political opposition supporters were arrested
in Kinshasa and Goma on or around February 16 in connection with a “ville
morte,” or general strike, to protest delays in organizing presidential elections. 
On May 4, Congo’s justice minister opened an investigation into one of the coun-
try’s leading opposition figures, Moïse Katumbi, for alleged recruitment of mer-
cenaries. After police fired teargas and threw rocks at demonstrators who had
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gathered to support Katumbi when he was called in for questioning at the prose-
cutor’s office in the southeastern city of Lubumbashi, the national prosecutor
authorized Katumbi to leave the country for health reasons. 
In an unrelated case, he was later convicted in absentia for forgery regarding a
real estate deal many years earlier and sentenced to three years in prison and
fined US$1 million. One of the judges later described how she had been threat-
ened by the director of the National Intelligence Agency (Agence Nationale de
Renseignements, ANR), Kalev Mutond, and forced to hand down the conviction—
a blatant example of the agency’s interference in judicial independence. 
On May 26, security forces fired teargas and live bullets as they sought to pre-
vent demonstrations from going forward in Goma, killing at least one person and
injuring at least 11 others, including four children. Opposition leaders had called
for nationwide demonstrations to protest the Constitutional Court’s ruling that
the president could remain in office “until the installation of the new elected
president.”
The government also shut down media outlets close to the opposition, at least
seven of which remain blocked at time of writing. In November, Communications
Minister Lambert Mende issued a decree, making it increasingly difficult for for-
eign radio and TV stations to operate in Congo. The move came a week after au-
thorities cut the signal of Radio France Internationale in Kinshasa altogether,
and temporarily jammed the United Nations-supported Radio Okapi station. 
In August 2016, the Congolese government blocked a Human Rights Watch sen-
ior researcher from continuing to work in Congo.
Nine human rights and pro-democracy youth activists were released from prison
in August and September. Their release ended their wrongful detention, but in it-
self did not signify a shift in government policy. At time of writing, at least 29 po-
litical prisoners held since 2015 remained in detention.
Congolese took to the streets again the week of September 19 to protest the
electoral commission’s failure to announce presidential elections, three months
before the end of Kabila’s term. Security forces responded with excessive force,
killing at least 56 people and setting three opposition party headquarters on
fire. Some protesters also turned violent, beating or burning to death several po-
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lice officers. At least seven journalists were detained in an apparent attempt to
block independent reporting of the situation.
In early November, a team of UN human rights experts called on authorities to lift
a ban on public political meetings in several cities in Congo.
Attacks on Civilians by Armed Groups
Dozens of armed groups remained active in eastern Congo. Many of their com-
manders have been implicated in war crimes including ethnic massacres, killing
of civilians, rape, forced recruitment of children, and pillage. 
In Beni territory, North Kivu, unidentified fighters continued to commit large-
scale attacks on civilians, killing more than 150 people in 2016 according to
Human Rights Watch research and credible reports from Congolese activists and
the UN. Nearly 700 people have been killed since the beginning of the series of
massacres in October 2014. There are credible reports that elements of the Con-
golese army were involved in the planning and execution of some of these
killings. 
Intercommunal violence increased as fighters from the armed groups Nduma De-
fense of Congo- Renové (NDC-R), the Union of Patriots for the Defense of the In-
nocent (UPDI), and the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR)
carried out ethnically based attacks on civilians, killing at least 170 people and
burning at least 2,200 homes. 
Kidnappings of Congolese civilians and humanitarian aid workers continued to
affect parts of Rutshuru, Lubero, and Masisi territories in eastern Congo. At least
175 people were kidnapped for ransom during 2015. In 2016, kidnappings con-
tinued, with more than 20 aid workers among the victims, further shrinking hu-
manitarian space. 
In 2015, the Congolese army unlawfully detained at least 29 children in dire con-
ditions in the Angenga military prison in northwestern Congo. The authorities al-
leged that the boys were members of a rebel armed group. Most of them were
released in April following pressure from Human Rights Watch and the UN. The
others remain detained in Angenga. 
No progress was made in bringing to justice those responsible for the summary
executions of at least 51 young men and boys and the enforced disappearance of
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33 others during a police campaign in Kinshasa, known as Operation Likofi, from
November 2013 to February 2014, or for the summary executions during the Janu-
ary 2015 demonstrations. 
Justice and Accountability
On December 19, 2015, two Congolese rebel leaders convicted by the Interna-
tional Criminal Court (ICC), Germain Katanga and Thomas Lubanga, returned to
Congo to serve the remainder of their sentences in Kinshasa. While Katanga fin-
ished his sentence from the ICC ruling in January, he remains in detention and
faces national war crimes charges in Congo that were filed against him before he
was transferred to the ICC.
On March 21, the ICC found the Congolese politician and former rebel leader
Jean-Pierre Bemba guilty of rape, murder, and pillage in neighboring Central
African Republic. On October 19, the ICC found Bemba and his defense team
guilty of bribing witnesses to lie in his favor at his trial. On March 23, the ICC con-
firmed 70 charges of war crimes and crimes against humanity for Lord’s Resist-
ance Army (LRA) leader Dominic Ongwen, a former child soldier who became a
senior LRA commander. The trial was due to begin in December 2016. 
In October, warlord Gédéon Kyungu Mutanga surrendered. Instead of arresting
him, local officials in Lubumbashi gave Gédéon, as he is commonly known, a cel-
ebratory welcome. At time of writing it remained unclear whether he would serve
the remainder of his 2009 sentence.
Regional and International Developments
On October 18, an African Union-facilitated “national dialogue” concluded, ac-
cepting that Kabila would stay in power at least until April 2018. It listed a num-
ber of challenges that could further delay the vote, and did not provide a specific
election day. Most of Congo’s main opposition parties either refused to partici-
pate or merely observed the dialogue. Twenty-six activists from the Filimbi and
LUCHA youth movements were arrested in Goma and Kinshasa in October as
they were protesting the agreement. 
In response to the increased political repression, the United States imposed tar-
geted sanctions against Kinshasa’s police commissioner, Gen. Célestin
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Kanyama, in June, and later against Gen. Gabriel Amisi Kumba and former police
inspector John Numbi in September.
In late September, following government repression of the protests in Kinshasa,
the ICC prosecutor issued a strong warning that the court was closely monitoring
the escalating situation.
In October, the European Union Foreign Affairs Council instructed its high repre-
sentative to initiate proceedings to impose individual sanctions against those
responsible for serious human rights violations.
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Ecuador
The administration of President Rafael Correa has expanded state control over
media and civil society and continues to harass, intimidate, and punish critics.
Other persistent concerns include limited judicial independence, poor prison
conditions, and far-reaching restrictions on women’s and girls’ access to repro-
ductive health care.
An earthquake on April 16 left approximately 670 people dead and thousands in-
jured and displaced. At time of writing, 2,348 victims continued to live in official
shelters. Vulnerable populations, including women and children, remained at
particular risk in shelters without adequate security. Some children living in the
shelters have not been able to access adequate education.
Disproportionate Criminal Charges against Protesters
Hundreds of Ecuadorians took to the streets in December 2015 to protest the Na-
tional Assembly’s approval of constitutional amendments granting the armed
forces powers to assist police in security operations, allowing the president and
other elected officials to run for office indefinitely after 2017, and declaring com-
munications a public service—thus granting the government broad powers to
regulate media. The day after the protests, a court sentenced 21 people to 15
days in prison for “issuing expressions of discredit and dishonor against police-
men.”
In May 2016, a court in Loja province convicted Luisa Lozano and Amable Anga-
marca, of the Saraguro indigenous community, of interrupting public services by
closing roads during protests that called for increased protection of indigenous
rights. They were sentenced to four years in prison. In October, after an appeal
by the Interior Ministry, three others were sentenced to four years in prison in
connection with the same incidents.
Freedom of Expression
A 2013 communications law gives the government broad powers to limit free
speech. The law requires all information disseminated by media to be “verified”
and “precise,” opening the door to retaliation against media critical of the gov-
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ernment as officials decide what meets these vague criteria. It also prohibits
“media lynching,” defined as “repeatedly disseminating information with the
purpose of discrediting or harming the reputation of a person or entity.” In addi-
tion, it prohibits what it terms “censorship,” which, under the law’s definition,
includes the failure of private media outlets to cover issues that the government
considers to be of “public interest.”
The Superintendency of Information and Communication (SUPERCOM), a govern-
ment regulatory body created by the 2013 communications law and separate
from the Communications Ministry (SECOM), has in dozens of cases ordered
media outlets and journalists to “correct” or retract reports, including opinion
pieces and cartoons, or to apologize publicly for their content. SUPERCOM has
also accused outlets of engaging in “censorship” by not publishing information
officials deem important. 
In August, SUPERCOM issued a written warning to journalist Janet Hinostroza
and the TV channel Teleamazonas, where her daily news show airs, and ordered
her to apologize publicly for repeatedly denouncing irregularities in government
purchase of medicines. The sanction came eight days after the president, during
his Saturday weekly broadcast, accused Hinostroza and Teleamazonas of “media
lynching.” 
The Correa administration repeatedly used the communications law to order
media outlets to publish information favorable to the government and to trans-
mit official broadcasts responding to unfavorable news coverage. In July, SECOM
ordered the TV channel Ecuavisa to transmit a 30-minute official broadcast at a
time when it was scheduled to air an investigative program criticizing govern-
ment funding of audiovisual propaganda. Ecuavisa aired part of the investigative
program in the time that was left but viewers had to view the rest online. 
In July, the brother of Vice President Jorge Glas asked a court to ban a book on
their father’s rape conviction. In August, the judge ordered the author to sus-
pend circulation of the book in any form, arguing it undermined the honor of the
Glas family.
Criminal defamation remains a concern, despite a 2014 legal reform narrowing
the crime’s definition. In June, President Correa brought a defamation complaint
against Eduardo del Pozo, the vice mayor of Quito, for saying in a radio interview
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that Correa had manipulated the justice system to send money abroad without
paying taxes. In September, del Pozo was sentenced to 15 days in prison. A
higher court ratified the conviction in October.
The president, his political party and its members, state media outlets, and state
agencies have repeatedly sought to exploit US copyright law in efforts to have
critical images and documents removed from the internet. Users sometimes
manage to restore content, after a legal process that can take weeks.
In September, after digital newspaper 4Pelagatos published an article criticizing
an opinion piece by President Correa’s daughter in the official newspaper El Telé-
grafo, 4Pelagatos journalist Martín Pallares received threats from various Twitter
accounts, including one from a high-level SECOM official threatening a beating.
The photographs, phone numbers, addresses, and geo-location of the homes of
Pallares and two other journalists at the newspaper, Roberto Aguilar and José
Hernandez, were posted on social networks. María Dolores Miño, a law professor
who published an opinion piece referring to Correa’s daughter’s article, also re-
ceived online threats. 
Freedom of Association
In 2015, President Correa issued a decree confirming broad government powers
to intervene in the operations of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), includ-
ing the power to dissolve groups on the grounds that they have “compromise[d]
public peace” or have engaged in activities different from those they identified
when registering with the government. 
In August, the education minister dissolved the largest and oldest teachers’
union for allegedly violating a legal obligation to register board members. The
dissolution came after the union’s president met with the International Labour
Organization (ILO) and the United Nations Human Rights Committee to report on
alleged violations of educators’ rights. In September, UN human rights experts
noted that the decision seemed “arbitrary, political and lacked any logical con-
nection to a legitimate State interest.” 
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Judicial Independence
Corruption, inefficiency, and political interference have plagued Ecuador’s judi-
ciary for years. President Correa received a popular mandate in a 2011 referen-
dum on whether to overhaul the justice system to fix the problems. As part of his
sweeping judicial reforms, however, the Council of the Judiciary, which in prac-
tice lacks independence from the executive, appointed and removed hundreds
of judges, including all magistrates of the National Court of Justice, through
highly questionable mechanisms that have undermined judicial independence.
Prison Conditions
Prison overcrowding and poor prison conditions are long-standing problems in
Ecuador. Since 2012, the government has spent millions of dollars to construct
new detention centers, but their remote locations and strict and limited visita-
tion rules impede prisoners’ contact with family members. 
In August, after the Public Defender’s Office filed a habeas corpus request on be-
half of detainees at the Turi detention center in Azuay Province, a series of
videos were leaked to the public showing prison guards beating inmates, some
of them naked, and subjecting them to electric shocks. In September, a judge
approved the habeas corpus request and ordered reparation measures for the
inmates.
Migrants and Refugees
In July, approximately 150 Cubans were detained during a raid in a park where
they were sleeping in tents to protest their inability to obtain a special humani-
tarian visa from Mexico that would allow them to travel to the US border, and
from there, seek asylum in the United States. Judges conducted deportation
hearings that did not comply with basic due process guarantees, and ordered
the deportation of most of the detainees, including some who had sought asy-
lum in Ecuador. The Cubans were deported before they had an opportunity to ap-
peal the orders and, in some cases, despite judicial orders in their favor.
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Accountability for Past Abuses
A truth commission set up by the Correa administration to investigate govern-
ment abuses from 1984 to 2008 (from the beginning of the repressive presi-
dency of León Febres Cordero until Correa took office) documented 136 cases
involving 456 victims, including 68 victims of extrajudicial execution and 17 of
enforced disappearance. Progress by a special prosecutorial unit created in 2010
to investigate the cases has been slow. According to government statistics from
December 2015, judicial procedures have been initiated in only eight cases.
Reproductive Rights
The right to seek an abortion is limited to instances in which a woman’s health
or life is at risk, or when a pregnancy results from the rape of a “woman with a
mental disability.” Fear of prosecution drives some women and girls to have ille-
gal and unsafe abortions and impedes health care and services for victims of
sexual violence. Fear of prosecution also hinders detection and prevention of
sexual and gender-based violence. Government statistics released in 2010, the
latest available, indicate that one in four women and girls over 15 years old in
Ecuador has been a victim of sexual violence.
Key International Actors
In March 2016, the government refused to participate in a hearing on freedom of
association before the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, and said it
would not comply with the commission’s recommendations.
In its periodic review of Ecuador in July, the UN Human Rights Committee raised
concerns including violence against women, violence in detention centers, the
criminalization of abortion, and threats to judicial independence and freedom of
expression and association. It also called on Ecuador to carry out timely investi-
gations of cases documented by Ecuador’s truth commission, and bring those
responsible to justice.
In 2015 the UN General Assembly elected Ecuador to the Human Rights Council
for the 2016-2018 term.
WORLD REPORT 2017
230
In October, during extraordinary sessions of the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights (IACHR) in Ecuador, the court’s president, Roberto Caldas, enthusiasti-
cally praised Ecuador’s judicial reform, which led to strong public criticism re-
garding the lack of judicial independence in the country.
In 2016, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights ruled against Ecuador in two
cases—one determining that it is discriminatory to punish officers who allegedly
have homosexual sex on military installations, and another sanctioning Ecuador
for the arbitrary detention and torture of four foreigners in 1994.
In November, OAS and UN special rapporteurs on freedom of expression sent a
joint letter to the Ecuadorian government stating that the Communications Law
undermined free speech. The government rejected the experts’ analyses.
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Egypt
Public criticism of the government remained effectively banned in Egypt in 2016.
Police arrested scores of people in connection with protests, many preemptively.
Authorities ordered travel bans and asset freezes against prominent human
rights organizations and their directors and brought criminal charges against the
head of the Press Syndicate and the country’s top anti-corruption official. Parlia-
ment proposed a new law regulating nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)
that would effectively end independent human rights work in the country.
Members of the security forces, particularly the Interior Ministry’s National Secu-
rity Agency, continued to routinely torture detainees and forcibly disappeared
hundreds of people with little or no accountability for violations of the law. The
disappearance, torture, and death of Italian doctoral researcher Giulio Regeni,
probably at the hands of security services, highlighted these abuses and caused
a diplomatic rift between Egypt and Italy. 
Investigations by National Security officers, often without any hard evidence,
formed the basis of many of the 7,400 or more military trials of civilians brought
since President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi issued a decree widening the scope of mili-
tary jurisdiction in 2014.
Conditions in detention remained harsh. The quasi-official National Council for
Human Rights continued to report that prisons and other detention facilities
were severely overcrowded. Conditions were particularly harsh in Cairo’s Scor-
pion Prison, where inmates, most of them political prisoners, suffered abuses at
the hands of Interior Ministry officers, including beatings, force feedings, depri-
vation of contact with relatives and lawyers, and interference in medical care
that may have contributed to at least six deaths in 2015.
Security Force Abuses
Officers of the National Security Agency routinely tortured and forcibly disap-
peared suspects with few consequences. Many of the detainees who suffered
these abuses were accused of sympathy with, or membership in, the Muslim
Brotherhood, which the government named a terrorist group in 2013 but has re-
mained the country’s largest opposition movement. 
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Between August 2015 and August 2016, the Egyptian Commission for Rights and
Freedoms, an independent group, documented 912 victims of enforced disap-
pearance, 52 of whom had not reappeared by the time the group issued its re-
port.
National Security officers routinely tortured suspects during these enforced dis-
appearances. Between January and October 2016, 433 detainees claimed that
police or prison officers mistreated or tortured them while they were in custody,
according to a count by the Nadeem Center for the Rehabilitation of Victims of Vi-
olence and Torture based on media reports, lawyers’ statements, criminal com-
plaints, and other sources. In one case documented by Human Rights Watch,
National Security officers in Alexandria forcibly disappeared and tortured 20
people, including eight children, in connection with a protest and an alleged
arson attack on a garage and a traffic police vehicle.
Incidents of abuse by police officers, including fatal incidents of torture and ille-
gal killings at protests, rarely resulted in accountability. Of the hundreds of such
cases recorded in media reports and by activist groups since July 2013, when the
military ousted Former President Mohamed Morsy, only 10 had gone through trial
as of October 2016, resulting in six guilty verdicts against police officers. 
Many convicted officers have appealed initial verdicts and won acquittals or
shorter sentences. In February, Egypt’s highest appeals court ordered a retrial for
an officer originally sentenced to 15 years for shooting and killing political ac-
tivist Shaimaa al-Sabbagh at a peaceful protest in January 2015, an incident that
was photographed and videotaped. In October, the same court ordered a retrial
for two officers who received five-year sentences for torturing lawyer Karim
Hamdy to death in a police station in 2015.
Freedom of Assembly
A 2013 decree that effectively banned all anti-government protests remained in
place, though it was subject to an ongoing legal challenge before the Supreme
Constitutional Court.
Police made large, pre-emptive raids and arrests on two occasions when they an-
ticipated protests. 
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Beginning in December 2015, police arrested dozens of people in a number of
governorates whom they accused of planning protests timed for the January an-
niversary of the 2011 uprising. In the days ahead of the anniversary, police
raided numerous downtown Cairo apartments, searched them without warrants,
and arrested some activists, including Taher Mokhtar, a doctor who had advo-
cated for better detention conditions. A court in August ordered Mokhtar re-
leased on bail pending investigation.
One official at the National Security Agency told Reuters on January 21: “We have
taken several measures to ensure activists don’t have breathing space and are
unable to gather, and several cafés and other meeting places have been closed,
while some have been arrested in order to scare the rest.”
After a rare mass demonstration on April 15 against President al-Sisi’s decision
to cede two Red Sea islands to Saudi Arabia, activists planned a follow-up
protest for April 25. Police arrested at least 382 people in the days leading up to
and during the dispersal of the second protest, many from their homes or down-
town Cairo cafés. Police stopped people riding public transportation or walking
in the street, inspected mobile phones without warrants, and arrested phone
owners if they found anti-government images.
Prominent human rights lawyer Malek Adly, arrested in May after filing a legal
challenge against al-Sisi’s decision to cede the islands, was released without
bail in late August but still faced charges of spreading false rumors, inciting
protests and attempting to overthrow the government.
Freedom of Association
Parliament and authorities took unprecedented steps to restrict independent
human rights work by nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), threatening their
very existence.
In September, a Cairo criminal court approved a request from a panel of inves-
tigative judges to freeze the assets of three organizations and the personal as-
sets of five people who founded or led prominent human rights groups. The
investigative judges had previously banned at least 12 NGO directors, founders,
and staff members from travelling outside Egypt. Activists said the travel bans
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were probably a prelude to the filing of criminal charges against them for ille-
gally receiving foreign funding. 
Under penal code article 78, amended by decree by President al-Sisi in 2014,
NGO workers can receive a 25-year sentence under such charges if a judge deter-
mines that they received foreign funding for “pursuing acts harmful to national
interests” or other broad reasons. 
In November, parliament swiftly approved a new law regulating NGOs after no
public debate or input from civil society. The law would effectively eliminate in-
dependent human rights work, placing all NGOs under the effective veto power
of a council dominated by representatives of the General Intelligence Service
and Interior and Defense Ministries and allowing the council to dissolve NGOs
based on broadly worded infractions. It would punish anyone violating the law
with a prison term of one to five years and a fine of 50,000 to 100,000 pounds
(US$3,160-$6,300). In late November, the law still awaited legal advice of the
State Council and approval from President al-Sisi.
In February, local government authorities and security officers ordered the clo-
sure of the Nadeem Center for the Rehabilitation of Victims of Violence and Tor-
ture for allegedly violating the terms of its license, but the center remained open
pending negotiations with the Health Ministry. In June, an investigative judge in-
terrogated human rights lawyer Negad al-Borai, who had been involved in draft-
ing an anti-torture law, on charges that he received illegal funding, established
an unlicensed entity, and spread false information. Al-Borai has been interro-
gated on these charges six times.
Freedom of Expression
On May 29, prosecutors summoned the head of the Press Syndicate and two
senior board members for questioning. The following day, they charged the men
with “harboring suspects against whom an arrest warrant has been issued” and
“publishing false news, which threatens public peace.” The charges were related
to an unprecedented police raid on the Press Syndicate headquarters on May 1,
during which police arrested two journalists whom they accused of belonging to
the April 6 Youth Movement.
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On July 28, a Cairo court for minor offenses convicted Hisham Geneina, the coun-
try’s former top corruption watchdog, for disseminating false information and
gave him a suspended one-year sentence. Geneina appealed the verdict but had
to pay a fine of 20,000 Egyptian pounds ($2,252) and 10,000 ($1,126) for bail.
President al-Sisi removed Geneina in March after Geneina claimed to have un-
covered tens of billions of dollars-worth of government corruption.
In May, police arrested four members of the Street Children satire troupe who
had posted videos on YouTube mocking al-Sisi and government policies. Though
a court ordered the four released in September, they still faced charges of using
social media sites to undermine the country’s stability by inciting citizens to
protest.
In February, writer and novelist Ahmed Nagi received a two-year sentence for
what the prosecution described as “sexually explicit” content in his novel, Using
Life, parts of which appeared in a newspaper.
Freedom of Religion
In August, parliament passed a long-awaited law on church building that main-
tained restrictions over the construction and renovation of churches and dis-
criminated against the country’s Christian minority. 
The new law allows governors to deny church-building permits with no stated
way to appeal, requires that churches be built “commensurate with” the number
of Christians in the area, despite the lack of official census statistics, and con-
tains provisions that allow authorities to deny construction permits if granting
them would undermine public safety, potentially subjecting decisions on church
construction to the whims of violent mobs that have attacked churches in the
past.
Between May and July, anti-Christian violence, prompted or preceded by suspi-
cion among some local Muslims about actual or alleged church construction, left
one person dead, several injured, and numerous Christian properties destroyed.
Authorities continued to fail to protect Christian minorities from sometimes fatal
attacks and imposed “reconciliation sessions” that allow Muslim perpetrators to
escape prosecution and foster impunity.
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In February, a juvenile minor offenses court sentenced four Christian children to
five years in prison for posting a video online mocking the Islamic State (also
known as ISIS). The boys fled Egypt in April. In March, an appeals court upheld a
three-year sentence for contempt of religion against the writer Fatma Naout for
criticizing the Muslim tradition of slaughtering livestock as a sacrifice on Eid al-
Adha. 
Egyptian human rights groups documented unlawful harassment of other reli-
gious minorities, including Shia Muslims and atheists, such as arbitrary travel
bans and summonses for interrogations. 
Violence and Discrimination against Women
In August, parliament passed an amendment to a law prohibiting female genital
mutilation (FGM), increasing the penalties. The new law provided for prison
terms of five to seven years for those who carry out FGM and up to 15 years if the
procedure results in permanent disability or death. Anyone who escorts girls to
undergo female genital mutilation will also face one to three years in prison.
FGM is still widely practiced, and prosecutors have only obtained one conviction
since the law was passed in 2008. 
In September, a group of eight women’s rights organizations released a state-
ment commending the government for initiating its “National Strategy to Combat
Violence Against Women” in 2015 but recommended creating a follow-up com-
mittee to ensure that government ministries were actually carrying out the strat-
egy.
Sexual harassment and violence against women remained endemic. The Interior
Ministry appointed Brig. Gen. Nahed Salah, a woman, to a new position in
charge of combating violence against women. Salah publicly urged women to
avoid talking or laughing loudly in public and to be cautious about how they
dress to avoid street harassment.
Women continued to face discrimination under Egypt’s personal status law on
equal access to divorce, child custody, and inheritance.
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Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity
Sexual relations outside marriage are criminalized. Since 2013, authorities have
pursued a campaign to intimidate, track, and arrest lesbian, gay, bisexual, and
transgender (LGBT) people, including entrapment using social media applica-
tions. Police regularly used forced anal examinations in prosecutions of those
suspected of homosexual sex. 
Solidarity With Egypt LGBTQ+, an advocacy group, said it had recorded 114 crimi-
nal investigations involving 274 LGBT individuals launched between the end of
2013 and November 2016, 66 of which involved the authorities’ use of social
media.
Refugees, Asylum Seekers, and Migrants
According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), there
were 212,500 registered refugees and 38,171 asylum seekers in Egypt in 2016.
Since January 2015, Egyptian authorities arrested more than 2,300 people for at-
tempting to enter or leave the country in an irregular manner, according to the
UNHCR. A report by the independent website Mada Masr stated that the UNHCR
recorded 3,742 migration-related detentions on the north coast of Egypt by Au-
gust.
In November, President al-Sisi signed a new law on irregular migration, stiffening
penalties for smugglers and shielding asylum seekers and smuggled migrants
from criminal responsibility but failing to enshrine key rights. The law provides
for harsher prison terms for those who smuggle women and children and life
sentences for those involved in organized crime or who smuggle a migrant who
dies. But it does not guarantee non-refoulement—the principle that countries
will not send migrants back to places where they risk persecution, torture, or a
threat to life. 
Key International Actors
In April 2016, during a visit to Cairo by President François Hollande, France
signed deals to build a military telecommunications satellite, extend the Cairo
metro, and finance a wind farm and solar power plant. In June, France delivered
the first of two Mistral class helicopter carriers to Egypt, part of a spree of Egypt-
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ian arms purchases from France that have also included a FREMM-class frigate,
four Gowind-class corvettes and 24 Rafale fighter jets. Hollande said in a press
conference that he raised issues of human rights, specifically the case of Eric
Lang, a French teacher murdered in a Cairo jail cell in 2013.
In March, United States Secretary of State John Kerry criticized the reopening of
the investigation into the funding of local Egyptian NGOs, saying he was “deeply
concerned by the deterioration in the human rights situation in Egypt in recent
weeks and months.” 
During two visits to Egypt in April and May, Kerry’s public remarks stressed coop-
eration against the Islamic State extremist group and made no comment on
human rights concerns. In April, a US Government Accountability Office report
documented the US government’s failure to fully implement required end-use
monitoring and human rights vetting for US military equipment purchased by
Egypt under the US’ annual $1.3-billion Foreign Military Financing program. The
White House issued a statement in September calling on Egypt to release US-
Egyptian citizen Aya Hegazy, who ran a center for homeless children before her
arrest in May 2014. 
During a meeting with President al-Sisi during the United Nations General As-
sembly in September, two months before being elected president, Donald Trump
expressed “strong support for Egypt’s war on terrorism” and pledged that his ad-
ministration “will be a loyal friend, not simply an ally.” 
The disappearance, torture and murder of Italian doctoral researcher Giulio Re-
geni, who was in Egypt to research labor unions, caused a diplomatic rift with
Italy after media reports quoted unnamed members of the security services who
said that they had arrested Regeni before his death. Italy recalled its ambassa-
dor and expressed anger at apparent Egyptian efforts to stall the investigation,
which remained ongoing as of October 2016. 
In April, the United Arab Emirates pledged $4 billion of aid to Egypt, adding to
the $20 billion already granted or loaned by other members of the Gulf Coopera-
tion Council since former President Morsy’s 2013 ouster. In October, Ali Mam-
louk, head of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s intelligence services, visited
Cairo for the second time in a year, reportedly to discuss security cooperation.
Mamlouk’s visit, together with Egypt’s support for Russia on Syria at the United
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Nations Security Council, raised diplomatic tensions with Saudi Arabia, which
supports armed groups fighting al-Assad’s forces. 
In September, the International Monetary Fund reached a staff-level agreement
with Egypt on a $12 billion loan program aimed at raising revenue and cutting
spending. The agreement would require Egypt to cut subsidies, impose a new
value-added tax, and float the Egyptian pound.
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Equatorial Guinea
Corruption, poverty, and repression continue to plague Equatorial Guinea under
President Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo, who has been in power since 1979,
making him the world’s longest serving non-royal head of state. Obiang won an-
other term in April 2016 elections, which most opposition groups boycotted, cit-
ing intimidation and procedural irregularities.
Vast oil revenues fund lavish lifestyles for the small elite surrounding the presi-
dent, while a large proportion of the population remains in poverty. Mismanage-
ment of public funds, credible allegations of high-level corruption and other
serious abuses, including torture, arbitrary detention, enforced disappearances,
repression of civil society groups and opposition politicians, and unfair trials
persist.
In March, the minister of interior suspended the Center for Development Studies
and Initiatives (CEID), the country’s leading civic group and a member of the na-
tional steering group of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI),
which effectively paralyzed progress toward the country’s reapplication for EITI
membership. 
In September, a French judged ordered Obiang’s eldest son, Teodorin, to stand
trial on money-laundering charges. In an apparent attempt to shield him from ac-
countability, Obiang appointed Teodorin vice president shortly after French pros-
ecutors concluded their investigation, and filed a complaint against France in
the International Court of Justice claiming breach of immunity. 
Economic and Social Rights
Equatorial Guinea is among the top five oil producers in sub-Saharan Africa and
has a population of approximately 1 million people. According to the United Na-
tions 2015 Human Development Report, the country had a per capita gross na-
tional income of $21,056 in 2014, the highest in Africa. Yet it ranks 138 out of 188
countries in the Human Development Index that measures social and economic
development, by far the world’s largest gap between per capita wealth and
human development score.
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Despite the country’s abundant natural resource wealth, available data, includ-
ing from the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, reveal that Equa-
torial Guinea has failed to provide crucial basic services. About half of the
population lacks access to clean water, according to a 2011 joint household sur-
vey by government and ICF International, a US firm specializing in health sur-
veys. 
Childhood malnutrition, as seen in the percentage of children whose growth is
stunted, stood at 26 percent in 2011. Equatorial Guinea has among the world’s
lowest vaccination rates; 25 percent of children received no vaccinations at all,
according to the 2011 survey. In 2016, 42 percent of children were not registered
in primary schools, the seventh highest proportion in the world, according to
UNICEF. Only half of children who begin primary school complete it. 
In August 2014, Equatorial Guinea reaffirmed its commitment to rejoin EITI, an
initiative from which it was expelled in 2010, for its failure to guarantee an “en-
abling environment” for civil society to fully participate in EITI’s implementation.
EITI promotes a standard by which information on the oil, gas, and mining in-
dustry is published, requiring countries and companies to disclose information
on the key steps in the governance of oil, gas, and mining. 
Freedom of Expression and Association
Only a few private media outlets exist in the country, and they are largely owned
by persons close to Obiang. Freedom of association and assembly are severely
curtailed, and the government imposes restrictive conditions on the registration
and operation of non governmental organizations. The few local activists who
seek to address human rights-related issues often face intimidation, harass-
ment, and reprisals.
The minister of interior, who also headed the National Electoral Commission,
suspended leading civil society group CEID on March 2, one week before the
government called for elections. He alleged that comments made during a youth
forum organized by CEID two months earlier constituted “messages aimed at in-
citing violence and civil disobedience among the Equatoguinean youth.” Author-
ities had earlier cancelled the forum on January 29, 2016, after its first day. CEID
accused the government of heavy handedness for suspending the organization
because of the comments of some forum participants. 
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A health ministry official similarly accused a theater group working in collabora-
tion with UNICEF of “inciting the youth” in July and ordered it to stop performing
its play on HIV awareness. This was after the official attended a performance
session where a member of the audience raised questions as to whether the
government was committing sufficient resources to preventing and treating the
disease. Last year, the government shut down a cultural center after a minister
objected to lyrics of a hip-hop performance as “going against the ideals of the
ruling party and unconstitutional,” according to EG Justice, an independent
rights group.
Elections and Political Opposition
The ruling Democratic Party (PDGE) maintains a monopoly over political life. The
two-chamber parliament with a total of 170 seats has only one opposition repre-
sentative in each chamber. 
Elections were held on April 24, 2016, after being announced only six weeks in
advance. Most opposition parties boycotted the elections citing harassment,
procedural irregularities, absence of an independent electoral body, and lack of
media access. Obiang’s term was set to end in December 2016, but the govern-
ment called elections in April, in apparent violation of a constitutional provision
that says elections should be held no earlier than 45 days before the end of the
president’s term. Obiang ran in the elections after declaring that a 2011 constitu-
tional amendment limiting presidents to two consecutive seven-year terms is not
retroactive. He declared victory with 93.7 percent of the vote. 
Nine days before the elections, police reportedly arrested the campaign man-
ager of an opposition party that had not boycotted the elections “for disturbing
the peace” while he was campaigning with a megaphone, and allegedly beat
him at a military base, according to EG Justice. An opposition party also reported
that its headquarters was surrounded by army personnel on April 21. The United
States embassy in the capital, Malabo, criticized the restrictive atmosphere prior
to elections and noted that its election day observers witnessed voter intimida-
tion, violation of voting secrecy, and other irregularities.
Political repression was not limited to election season. In January, police report-
edly arrested two members of an opposition party while advertising an author-
ized party meeting, and held them for nine days without charge, according to EG
WORLD REPORT 2017
244
Justice. A month later, police arrested the son and nephew of the leader of a po-
litical opposition party living in exile. He was detained at time of writing. Their
lawyer said they were accused of revealing state secrets on a social media post
by divulging a government list of “blacklisted political exiles” barred from enter-
ing the country. On May 13, police arrested the leader of yet another opposition
party and allegedly beat him for several hours while questioning him about his
political activities and a critical article he published.
International Corruption Investigations
On September 7, a French judge ordered that Obiang’s eldest son, Teodorin,
stand trial on charges of corruption, money-laundering, and embezzlement. Dur-
ing the investigation, French authorities seized valuables belonging to Teodorin,
including a mansion reportedly worth €180 million (approximately US$196 mil-
lion), 18 luxury cars, and a €22 million (approximately $24 million) art collec-
tion. At the time the purchases were made, Teodorin was minister of agriculture,
for which he earned less than $100,000 annually.
French prosecutors formally requested Teodorin be brought to trial in May.
Obiang responded by appointing his son vice president and suing France in the
International Court of Justice for violating his immunity. The impending French
trial comes on the heels of the US Department of Justice’s investigation into
Teodorin’s alleged money laundering in the US, where he purchased a $30 mil-
lion Malibu mansion and a $38.5 million private jet. That case was settled when
Teodorin agreed to forfeit $30 million to US authorities that would be repatriated
for the benefit of Equatoguineans. The US is expected to determine which chari-
ties will receive the funds by the end of 2016. 
A Spanish corruption case against several senior government officials, including
the president, remains pending. The complaint alleges that the officials pur-
chased homes in Spain through a private company that a US senate investiga-
tion revealed had received $26.5 million in government funds at around the
same time of the purchases. In September 2015, police arrested a Russian cou-
ple and their son who were accused of facilitating the transactions. 
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Eritrea
After 25 years of rule by unelected President Isaias Afwerki, Eritrea’s citizens re-
main subjects of one of the world’s most oppressive governments.
In May 2016, a United Nations Commission of Inquiry (CoI) established by the
Human Rights Council in its final report said it found reasonable grounds to be-
lieve the government has committed numerous crimes against humanity. The
government’s “totalitarian practices” and disrespect for the rule of law mani-
fested “wholesale disregard for the liberty” of Eritrea’s citizens, the CoI con-
cluded.
In turn, the council by resolution “condemn[ed] in the strongest terms” Eritrea’s
“systematic, widespread and gross human rights violations” and asked the Gen-
eral Assembly to submit the commission reports to all “relevant organs of the
UN.” The General Assembly took no public action on that recommendation at its
October 2016 session.
Indefinite Military Service and Forced Labor
By law, each Eritrean is compelled to serve 18 months in national service starting
at 18 but in practice conscripts serve indefinitely, many for over a decade. End-
less conscription remains a principal driver of migration. The CoI concluded that
conditions of national service rise to the crime of enslavement.
Conscripts are often assigned to arduous non-military construction and agricul-
ture projects though some serve in the civil service, education, and other service
jobs. Conscripts are used not only in government-related projects, they are used
in projects personally benefitting military commanders and other officials.
Treatment of conscripts is often harsh, depending on the whim of the com-
mander. Physical abuse, including torture, occurs frequently; so does forced do-
mestic servitude and sexual violence by commanders against female conscripts.
There is no redress mechanism for conscripts facing sexual and other abuses.  
Attempts to flee are sternly punished. On April 3, new conscripts trying to escape
from a convoy in Asmara were shot at by guards, killing several. 
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Conscript pay is insufficient to support the conscript, let alone a family. An Er-
itrean refugee told Human Rights Watch he fled in 2015 after 18 years of service
because there was no end in sight. Another said he fled after 10 years because
“my family couldn’t survive.” A third said he fled after serving for 12 years be-
cause “I couldn’t see any future for my children.”  
When Eritrea was discussing a large grant from the European Union in 2015, sen-
ior Eritrean officials told diplomats and foreign visitors that the 18-month limit
would be applied to new conscripts, though not to those already serving far
longer. In February, the government abandoned that proposal.
Instead, President Isaias announced that conscript pay would be raised. His fi-
nance minister said pay for conscripts working in the civil service would almost
triple; he made no mention of increases for others. At time of writing, there is no
evidence that pay had increased for most conscripts.
Repression of Speech, Expression, and Association
President Isaias rules without institutional restraint. No national elections have
been held since self-rule in 1991. Eritrea has had no legislature since 2002. The
judiciary is subject to executive control and interference. A constitution adopted
in 1997 remains unimplemented. Public space to question government policy
does not exist. No domestic nongovernmental organizations are permitted. 
The government owns all media. In September 2001, the government closed all
independent newspapers and arrested its leading journalists. None were
brought to trial. They remain in solitary detention, with no access to family mem-
bers. Former guards have reported about half have died in detention. Eleven for-
mer high-level officials who criticized Isaias’s rule were also arrested and
detained since 2001. Eritrean authorities have ignored calls, including by the
African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights and the UN special rappor-
teur for Eritrea, for their release or at least a judicial hearing.
Less prominent citizens are also subject to arbitrary imprisonment. Very few are
given a reason for their arrest. Few, if any, receive trials; some disappear. The
length of imprisonment is often indefinite and conditions are harsh.
Although the government issued a new criminal procedure code in 2015, requir-
ing warrants for arrest, access to defense counsel, and other procedural safe-
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guards, including the right to petition for habeas corpus, there is no evidence
that any of these protections has been implemented.
Interference with Religious Practices
The government persecutes citizens who practice religions other than the four it
recognizes– Sunni Islam and the Eritrean Orthodox, Roman Catholic, and Evan-
gelical (Lutheran) churches. The government interferes in the practices of the
four religions it recognizes. Authorities deposed the patriarch of the Eritrean Or-
thodox Church in 2006, appointing a successor one year later. The deposed pa-
triarch remains under house arrest over 10 years later.  
Security personnel raid private homes where adherents of unrecognized reli-
gions meet for prayers, arresting and detaining them. Those arrested are only re-
leased after repudiating their religious affiliations. 
Jehovah’s Witnesses are especially persecuted. Three arrested 22 years ago, in
1994, for refusing military service remain imprisoned. Fifty-four Witnesses, ar-
rested in 2014 for “unlawful assembly,” admitted guilt in March 2016 and were
released with a fine of 500 nakfa (US$35); a lone holdout was sentenced to six
months and fined 7,000 nakfa ($470).
Currency Confiscation
In late 2015, the government ordered all paper currency held by citizens be
turned in to government banks within six weeks. In February 2016, the govern-
ment decreed that payments exceeding 3,000 nakfa ($200) could only be made
by check
Although the new restrictions limit black market conversions they also create
new tools closely to monitor citizens’ individual expenditures and income. 
Refugees
The United Nations refugee agency, UNHCR, reported 475,0624 Eritreans globally
to be refugees and asylum seekers at the end of 2015, about 12 percent of Er-
itrea’s official 3.6 million population estimate.  
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European countries continue to attempt to stem the flow of asylum seekers and
migrants from Eritrea. A Swiss immigration fact-finding mission to Asmara, Er-
itrea’s capital, in March, however, concluded “proof of improved human rights
conditions is still missing” and that involuntary returnees could count on impris-
onment and perhaps torture. In October, an appellate tribunal in the United
Kingdom held that Eritreans of draft age who left the country illegally and are in-
voluntary returned to Eritrea “face a real risk of persecution, serious harm or ill-
treatment”; these abuses, the decision said, violate the European Convention on
Human Rights. The UK Home Office amended its immigration policy to conform
to the tribunal’s holding.
In May, Sudan expelled over 400 Eritrean refugees and asylum seekers to Eritrea.
Most were promptly incarcerated according to CoI witnesses. 
Israel for years has refused to allow Eritreans to apply for asylum. In September,
an appeals court held that Eritreans must be given individualized hearings, over-
ruling an Interior Ministry policy that from national service evasion or desertion
can never be justification for asylum.
Key International Actors
Eritrea’s relations with neighboring Ethiopia and Djibouti remain severely
strained. After a bloody border war in 1998-2000, Ethiopia occupies slivers of
territory identified by an international boundary commission as Eritrean, includ-
ing the town of Badme where the war began. President Isaias uses the pretext of
“no-war, no-peace” for his repressive domestic policies. 
Eritrea and Ethiopia both host each other’s armed opposition groups. On June
12-13, border clashes, including artillery fire, erupted near Tsorona, a village just
inside Eritrea. President Isaias blamed Ethiopia for the attack but there are con-
flicting reports of the cause, including that fighting began when armed Eritrean
troops chased fleeing conscripts into Ethiopian territory and that Ethiopia re-
sponded to an attack by an Eritrea-based rebel group. 
Also in March, Eritrea released four Djibouti prisoners-of-war captured in a bor-
der conflict in 2008. Eritrea had never before acknowledged holding POWs even
after two escaped in 2013. Djibouti claims Eritrea still holds a dozen more.  
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Eritrea strengthened its relations with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates
(UAE) in 2016, agreeing in December 2015 to support Saudi Arabia’s military role
in Yemen, as part of what Eritrea called “broad strategic cooperation to combat
terrorism.” Eritrea has reportedly allowed the UAE to deploy military jets and
train Yemeni forces at Assab on the Red Sea coast, where the UAE is building a
new port to support its military activities in Yemen.  
The UN Security Council continued an arms embargo on Eritrea for another year
after its Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea reported Eritrea has not coop-
erated with the group. The group said Eritrea may have violated the embargo by
arming and training anti-Ethiopia and anti-Djibouti militias, using mining income
and UAE payments for military purposes, and attempting to buy military equip-
ment in Europe.  
Eritrea receives substantial foreign exchange income from foreign-owned gold,
copper, zinc, and nickel mining projects in which the government holds 40 per-
cent ownership. China’s SFECO Group’s Zara Mining Share Company began gold
production in January. Chinese state-owned Sichuan Road & Bridge Mining In-
vestment planned to start operations in late 2016. Canadian Nevsun’s Bisha
mine is in its sixth year. 
Based on Nevsun’s experience, it is likely that the Chinese companies use Er-
itrean government-owned construction firms for infrastructure development, and
by so doing indirectly use national service conscript labor.
After the European Union gave Eritrea a five-year €200 million (approximately
$220 million) aid package in 2015, to try to stem migration, the European Parlia-
ment in March expressed its opposition and “great concern [over] the continuing
deplorable human rights situation and the complete absence of rule of law and
media freedom….”
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Ethiopia
Large-scale and unprecedented protests swept through Ethiopia’s largest region
of Oromia beginning in November 2015, and in the Amhara region from July
2016. Ethiopian security forces cracked-down on these largely peaceful demon-
strations, killing more than 500 people. 
Scores of people fleeing security force gunfire and teargas during the annual Ir-
reecha festival died in a stampede on October 2 in Bishoftu, Oromia region. On
October 9, following the destruction of some government buildings and private
property by youths, the government announced a draconian and far-reaching six-
month countrywide state of emergency, which prescribes sweeping and vaguely
worded restrictions on a broad range of actions and undermines free expression,
association, and peaceful assembly. The directive also effectively codified many
of the security forces’ abusive tactics, such as arbitrary detention. 
The protests occurred against a background of nearly non-existent political
space: in parliament, the ruling coalition has 100 percent of seats, there are re-
strictions on civil society and independent media, and those who do not actively
support the government often face harassment and arbitrary detention.   
Ethiopia deploys troops inside Somalia as part of the African Union mission
(AMISOM). In 2016, there were reports that abusive “Liyu police,” a paramilitary
force, were also deployed alongside the Ethiopian Defense Forces in Somalia. In
July, Ethiopian forces operating outside the AMISOM mandate indiscriminately
killed 14 civilians during an operation against Al-Shabab in Somalia’s Bay re-
gion. (See Somalia chapter.) 
Freedom of Assembly 
Concerns about the government’s proposed expansion of the municipal bound-
ary of the capital, Addis Ababa, triggered widespread protests across Oromia
and a heavy-handed response by security forces in 2016. Protesters feared that
the Addis Ababa Integrated Development Master Plan would displace Oromo
farmers, as has increasingly occurred over the past decade. There were broad
doubts about the sincerity of the government’s announced cancellation of the
Master Plan in January 2016, due largely to past broken promises. Protesters ex-
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pressed concerns over decades of historical grievances and the wrongful use of
lethal force by the security forces. There were some reports of violence by pro-
testers, but protests were largely peaceful. Similar protests and a resultant
crack-down occurred in Oromia in April and May 2014. 
During the protests, security forces arrested tens of thousands of students,
teachers, opposition politicians, health workers, and those who sheltered or as-
sisted fleeing protesters. While many detainees have been released, an un-
known number remain in detention without charge or access to legal counsel or
family. Most of the leadership of the legally registered opposition party, Oromo
Federalist Congress, have been charged under the anti-terrorism law, including
Deputy-Chairman Bekele Gerba, a staunch advocate of non-violence.
In July, protests spread to the Amhara region, triggered by the arrest of Welkait
Identity Committee members, a group seeking to resolve long-standing concerns
over administrative boundaries. Protesters in Amhara region are primarily con-
cerned with the unequal distribution of power and economic benefits in favor of
those aligned to the government. On August 6 and 7, security forces killed over
100 people in Amhara and Oromia, including over 30 people killed in Bahir Dar
alone. The town witnessed one of the largest protests. There were reports of
large-scale arrests throughout Amhara.
In September, dozens of ethnic Konso were killed by security forces in the South-
ern Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples’ Region (SNNPR) following protests over
administrative boundaries in the Konso area.
The government has not shown a willingness to address the expressed griev-
ances of the protesters in Amhara, Oromia, or Konso, blaming much of the un-
rest on lack of good governance and youth unemployment, exacerbated by
“outside forces.” 
The Ethiopian government failed to meaningfully investigate the killings of pro-
testers in Oromia, Amhara, or Konso. In a report to parliament in June, the
Ethiopia Human Rights Commission, a government body, concluded that the
level of force used by security forces in Oromia was proportionate to the risk they
faced from protesters, contrary to available evidence.
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The October state of emergency directive banned all protests without govern-
ment permission and permits arrest without court order in “a place assigned by
the command post until the end of the state of emergency.” 
The Liyu police, a Somali Regional State (SRS) paramilitary police force, contin-
ued to commit serious human rights abuses in their ongoing conflict with the
Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF). There have been reports of extrajudi-
cial killings, arbitrary detention, and violence against civilians accused of sup-
porting or being sympathetic to the ONLF. Following a June 12 protest in
Melbourne, Australia, against the visit of SRS President Abdi Iley, dozens of fam-
ily members of protesters were arrested in Ethiopia.
Freedom of Expression and Association
Media continues to be under government stranglehold, exacerbated by the state
of emergency at the end of 2016, with many journalists forced to choose be-
tween self-censorship, harassment and arrest, or exile. At least 75 journalists
have fled into exile since 2010. In addition to threats against journalists, tactics
used to restrict independent media include targeting publishers, printing
presses, and distributors. 
Scores of journalists—including Eskinder Nega and Woubshet Taye—protesters,
and political opponents remain jailed under the anti- terrorism law. Journalist
Getachew Shiferaw was convicted in November of criminal defamation and sen-
tenced to one year in prison. On May 10, blogger Zelalem Workagegneu was sen-
tenced to five years and two months under the anti-terrorism law after being
detained for over 700 days. Journalist Yusuf Getachew, who was convicted in Au-
gust 2015 also under the anti-terrorism law, was pardoned and released on Sep-
tember 10, after over four years in detention.
The government regularly restricts access to social media apps and some web-
sites with content that challenges the government’s narrative on key issues. Dur-
ing particularly sensitive times, including after the Irreecha festival stampede,
the government blocked access to the internet. 
The government also jammed the signals of international radio stations like
Deutsche Welle and Voice of America in August and September. Social media
and diaspora television stations played key roles in the dissemination of infor-
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mation and mobilization during protests. Under the state of emergency, people
are banned from watching diaspora television, sharing information on social
media, and closing businesses as a gesture of protest, as well as curtailing op-
position parties’ ability to communicate with media. 
The 2009 Charities and Societies Proclamation (CSO law) continues to severely
curtail the ability of independent nongovernmental organizations. The law bars
work on human rights, governance, conflict resolution, and advocacy on the
rights of women, children and people with disabilities if organizations receive
more than 10 percent of their funds from foreign sources. 
Questioning the government’s development policies is deemed particularly sen-
sitive and activists face charges for doing so. For example, the trial of Pastor
Omot Agwa, who had worked as the facilitator and interpreter for the World
Bank’s Inspection Panel as it investigated abuses linked to a bank investment,
continued in 2016. Two other individuals charged with Omot were acquitted in
November. They were arrested in March 2015 at Addis Ababa airport on their way
to a food security workshop in Nairobi, Kenya, and charged on September 7,
2015.  
Torture and Arbitrary Detention
Ethiopian security personnel, including plainclothes security and intelligence of-
ficials, federal police, special police, and military, frequently tortured and other-
wise ill-treated political detainees held in official and secret detention centers,
to give confessions or provide information. Many of those arrested during recent
protests said they were tortured in detention, including in military camps. Sev-
eral women alleged that they were raped or sexually assaulted. There is little in-
dication that security personnel are being investigated or punished for these
abuses. 
Allegations of forced displacement have arisen from commercial and industrial
projects associated with Addis Ababa’s expansion and the continued develop-
ment of state-owned sugar plantations in the Lower Omo Valley, home to about
200,000 indigenous people. Communities in Omo have seen grazing land
cleared and access to the Omo River restricted. The reservoir behind the Omo
River’s Gibe III dam began filling in January 2015, and there was no artificial
flood in 2015 and a limited flood in 2016 contrary to government assurances. The
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flood is important in replenishing water levels in Kenya’s Lake Turkana and the
agricultural lands along the banks of the Omo River. 
Key International Actors
Ethiopia continues to enjoy strong support from foreign donors and most of its
regional neighbors, due to its role as host of the African Union (AU) and as a
strategic regional player, contribution to UN peacekeeping, regional counterter-
rorism, aid, and migration partnerships with Western countries, and its stated
progress on development indicators. Ethiopia is also a country of origin, transit,
and host for large numbers of migrants and refugees. 
The brutal crackdown against protesters and the state of emergency announce-
ment resulted in stronger than usual public statements from many of Ethiopia’s
traditional allies. The AU and the African Commission on Human and Peoples’
Rights both issued statements expressing concern, while the European parlia-
ment released a strong resolution, and resolutions were introduced in the US
Senate and House of Representatives. The UN High Commissioner for Human
Rights publicly stressed the need for an international investigation into the
killings in July. Other donors, including the World Bank, have continued business
as usual without publicly raising concerns.
In June, Ethiopia was elected to the UN Security Council. It is also vice president
of the UN Human Rights Council despite a history of non-cooperation with UN
special mechanisms. Despite these roles, Ethiopia has refused entry to all UN
special rapporteurs, other than the UN special rapporteur on Eritrea, since 2006. 
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European Union
Faced with significant strategic challenges, including the refugee crisis, the
United Kingdom vote to leave the European Union, attacks by violent extremists,
and rising support for populist anti-immigration parties, EU governments and in-
stitutions responded in 2016 in ways that often undercut or set aside core values
and rights protections rather than working consistently together to defend them.  
Migration and Asylum
The EU as a whole failed to show leadership and solidarity in the face of the
largest global displacement crisis since World War II. Much of the debate about
policy responses focused on concerns about the impact on security and cultural
identity and growing support for populist parties with xenophobic platforms. EU
policies focused primarily on preventing arrivals and outsourcing responsibility
for asylum seekers and refugees to other regions.
Border closures along the Balkans route and a March agreement with Turkey con-
tributed to a significant decline in arrivals by sea to Greek islands in the Aegean
Sea, while boat migration from North Africa to Italy kept pace with previous
years. In the first 10 months of the year, almost 328,000 had crossed the sea to
reach European shores, compared to 736,646 during the same period in 2015,
according to the United Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR). 
Fifty-eight percent of those arriving by sea came from the world’s top 10 refugee-
producing countries, including Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Eritrea, according to
UNHCR. Nigerians, Pakistanis, Gambians, Ivorians and Guineans together made
up 21 percent of the new arrivals. Nearly one-third were children, and the propor-
tion of unaccompanied children rose over previous years. 
Despite increased capacity for search and rescue operations in the Mediter-
ranean, and numerous nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) conducting res-
cue missions, by mid-November 4,271 had died or gone missing at sea, making
2016 the deadliest year on record. The EU began training Libyan coast guard offi-
cers amid persistent concerns about violence and degrading conditions in
Libyan detention centers and the absence of a functioning asylum system.
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Border closures on the Balkans route and heightened border controls by Austria,
France, and Switzerland left asylum seekers and migrants stuck in Greece and
Italy. There were violent pushbacks at the Bulgaria-Turkey and the Macedonia-
Greece borders. Austria, Denmark, Hungary, Sweden, and Germany were among
EU states adopting more restrictive asylum laws. 
There was little appetite among EU governments to share responsibility for asy-
lum seekers more equitably across the union. By mid-November, only 7,224 asy-
lum seekers had been relocated from Greece and Italy to other EU countries
under an EU emergency plan, according to the European Commission. The com-
mission proposed a permanent relocation mechanism to help countries experi-
encing disproportionate numbers, but it would allow countries to pay to avoid
accepting relocations, and retain the Dublin regulation that places primary re-
sponsibility for processing asylum seekers on the first EU country of entry. 
A new European Border and Coast Guard began operating in October. Replacing
the external border agency Frontex, the entity has more autonomy from member
states and a reinforced role in returns, as well as a complaints mechanism. It
does not have an explicit search and rescue mandate.
In March, the EU signed a problematic deal with Turkey to send back asylum
seekers reaching Greece by sea in exchange for billions of euros in aid and a
pledge to resettle one Syrian for every Syrian returned. In June, the commission
announced a new “partnership framework on migration” conditioning aid on mi-
gration cooperation, drawing criticism from development NGOs, and began im-
plementing migration control projects with countries including Sudan and
Eritrea. 
EU governments made slow progress on resettlement. By July 2016, only 8,268
refugees had been brought to EU states under a July 2015 EU plan to resettle
over 22,000 within two years, although some EU states resettled additional
numbers through bilateral arrangements. Ten EU states failed to resettle a single
person. Poor progress lowered expectations for implementation of the perma-
nent EU Resettlement Framework proposed by the commission. The proposal
would make immigration co-operation an element in the decision whether to re-
settle refugees out of a host country.
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The European Commission issued a raft of proposals in July to reform the EU’s
dysfunctional asylum system. They include stronger safeguards for children and
better access to a lawyer, but would punish asylum seekers for moving from one
EU country to another and make it easier to summarily reject claims and revoke
refugee status. The council and parliament had yet to approve them at time of
writing.
Discrimination and Intolerance
The ongoing refugee crisis and attacks by armed extremists in Belgium, France,
and Germany reinforced xenophobic, Islamophobic and anti-immigrant senti-
ment, manifest in attacks on Muslims, migrants, and those perceived as foreign-
ers and support for populist anti-immigration parties in many EU states. 
Anti-Semitism, including hate crimes, remained a serious concern in some EU
states including the UK and France. In an April resolution on combating anti-
Semitism in Europe, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe noted
that members of the Jewish community regularly experience insults and physical
violence across Europe.
In September, United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights Zeid Ra’ad
al-Hussein warned leaders of populist parties in Europe about the corrosive ef-
fect on societies of their instrumentalization of bigotry and xenophobia for politi-
cal ends. 
In its May annual report, the Council of Europe’s Commission against Racism
and Intolerance noted an anti-immigrant and Islamophobia trend, and empha-
sized the need to combat racist violence. The Council of Europe’s Commissioner
for Human Rights Nils Muižnieks urged European countries to prioritize migrant
integration, including by ensuring effective protection from discrimination.
In June, the European Commission launched the High Level Group on combating
racism, xenophobia and other forms of intolerance in order to improve efforts by
EU member states to prevent hate crimes. In an April report, the EU’s Agency for
Fundamental Rights said that hate crimes often go unreported and unprosecuted
and urged member states to improve access to justice for victims.
In May, the European Network Against Racism reported that Muslim women were
the main targets of Islamophobia in eight EU countries surveyed. 
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In February, Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights Muižnieks called
for an end to forced evictions of Roma in several European countries, and noted
that this practice increases the vulnerability of Roma families, prevents their so-
cial inclusion, and impedes the prospects of regular schooling for their children.
In May, Council of Europe Secretary General Thorbjørn Jagland urged govern-
ments to ensure that children can study in a safe environment, free from vio-
lence, bullying and discrimination on all grounds, including their sexual
orientation or gender identity.
In March, the European Commission proposed that the EU ratify the Istanbul
Convention on Domestic Violence. EU Commissioner for Justice Vera Jourova said
that one in three women in the EU has experienced physical or sexual violence or
both, and called on the 12 remaining member states to ratify the convention.
Malta was among eight EU states that began work on a pilot for an EU disability
card to secure mutual recognition of the rights and benefits of 80 million people
with disabilities across the EU. In a report published in August, the EU’s Agency
for Fundamental Rights noted that gaps in screening prevent migrants with dis-
abilities from receiving adequate support throughout arrival, registration and
asylum procedures.
Terrorism and Counterterrorism 
Attacks in Belgium, France, and Germany, many claimed by the Islamic State
(also known as ISIS), together killed scores of people and injured hundreds
more. The attacks prompted or reinforced measures and proposals in EU states
to expand police and surveillance powers, strengthen intelligence cooperation,
and revoke dual citizenship of those found to have committed terrorist acts. 
In Belgium, which suffered coordinated attacks on Brussels airport and a metro
station on March 22, the government proposed a raft of new counterterrorism
laws to expand powers of surveillance and detention. None had become law at
time of writing. 
In March 2016, EU Justice and Home Affairs ministers agreed a draft directive to
strengthen the EU’s legal framework for preventing terrorist attacks, in particular
by criminalizing preparatory acts, such as training and travel abroad for terrorist
purposes. Human rights groups expressed concerns about insufficient safe-
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guards and precision in the draft directive. The draft directive remained under
consideration at time of writing. 
In April, the EU Council adopted a directive to regulate the transfer of personal
information on air travelers to member states’ law enforcement authorities in re-
lation to possible terrorist offences and other serious crimes.
In June, the European Parliament renewed calls for investigations into the com-
plicity of EU states into CIA torture and secret detention on European soil, re-
flecting the limited progress made so far in national investigations. Poland and
Lithuania’s criminal investigations remained stalled and the UK’s concluded
with no charges brought. 
Croatia 
Fewer than 500 people claimed asylum in Croatia in the first nine months of
2016. Thirty-four were granted some form of protection during the same period.
Restrictions on the Western Balkan migration route reduced the number of ar-
rivals. Croatia continues to push back asylum seekers and migrants who attempt
to enter via Serbia. 
While the government made some progress in providing housing to the small
number of people from outside the Western Balkans who were granted protec-
tion, asylum seekers and refugees from outside the region continue to face diffi-
culties in accessing education and employment. Unaccompanied migrant and
asylum seeking children continue to be placed in residential institutions, includ-
ing homes for children with behavior problems, without adequate guardianship
or access to education.
People with disabilities continue to face exclusion and discrimination, including
barriers that prevent them from participating in society on an equal basis with
others. The guardianship system denies around 18,000 people with disabilities
the right to make a range of decisions about their lives. 
In February, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) ruled that Croatia dis-
criminated on grounds of sexual orientation against a woman from Bosnia and
Herzegovina, by denying her the right to a residence permit in Croatia to join her
female partner. 
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In April, Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights Muižnieks raised
concerns at the reported rise in discrimination, ethnic intolerance, and hate
speech targeting members of minorities, in particular Jews, Roma, and Serbs.
The commissioner also warned against the inadequate state response to physi-
cal attacks, death threats, and intimidation against journalists.  
As of August 2016, more than 2,800 persons, most of them Roma, remain state-
less or at risk of statelessness. They face particular difficulties accessing basic
state services, such as health care, social assistance, and adequate housing.
Roma children remain subject to de facto segregation in the education sector.
Estonia
According to the Interior Ministry, as of January 2016, about 6.1 percent of the
country’s population of 1.3 million is stateless, a slight decrease from 2015. 
Statelessness disproportionately affects ethnic Russians, who lost their citizen-
ship after Estonia declared independence from the Soviet Union in 1991 and en-
acted policies stripping most non-Estonians of citizenship. Stateless persons
continue to face significant obstacles in accessing full employment rights and
are barred from holding certain jobs, including as judges, police officers, and
prosecutors.
New amendments to the Citizenship Act entered into force on January 1, 2016.
They provide for automatic Estonian citizenship for children born to stateless
parents, whereas before parents had to apply for it. Parents may reject the grant
of Estonian citizenship to their children within a year. The amendments also ex-
empt people 65 and older from the written portion of the mandatory Estonian
language exam for naturalization. 
Language requirements remain the most significant naturalization challenge for
the country’s Russian-speaking population. The costs of naturalization, includ-
ing application and language exam preparation, and income requirements, im-
pede naturalization of poorer long-term residents and contribute to
statelessness among Russian speakers. The state reimburses language class
fees only after the applicant passes the test.
The government failed to adopt amendments that would allow the Co-Habitation
Act to fully enter into force in 2016. The act is progressive legislation that ex-
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tends the rights of marriage to unmarried—including same-sex—couples, en-
compassing, among other things, child adoption and property rights.
Estonia maintains a minimalist refugee policy. By November, the government
had relocated 66 asylum seekers from Greece under the EU relocation scheme,
according to the European Commission. 
France
France suffered three deadly attacks claimed by ISIS in June and July, including
an attack with a truck in Nice that killed 86 people and injured hundreds. The
state of emergency declared by President Francois Hollande following the No-
vember 2015 attacks in Paris and Saint-Denis was renewed by Parliament in Feb-
ruary and May 2016.
On July 21, a few days after the Nice attacks, Parliament adopted a new law ex-
tending the state of emergency by another six months and expanding already
wide police powers of search, seizure, and detention. 
The new law toughens several terrorism-related provisions in France’s laws and
criminal code. It re-instates warrantless seizures of computer and cellphone data
that France’s highest legal authority earlier in the year had struck down as un-
constitutional, adding safeguards that still fall short of proper judicial oversight. 
The law came only weeks after an already broad counterterrorism law adopted by
Parliament in June 2016, which the French National Consultative Commission of
Human Rights (CNCDH) had criticized for curbing freedoms.
Between November 2015 and July 2016, under the emergency law, police carried
out nearly 4,000 warrantless raids and placed 400 people under house arrest,
yet those actions led to only six terrorism-related criminal investigations. Those
measures targeted mostly Muslims and led to abuses of the rights to liberty, pri-
vacy, freedom of movement, and non-discrimination. 
A French commission of inquiry into the Paris attacks concluded on July 5 that
the state of emergency had “limited impact” on improving security. The panel
described important failures in analyzing intelligence that could have helped
prevent the attacks. In a May review of France, the UN Committee against Torture
expressed concern about excessive use of force by police when carrying out
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house searches in the context of the state of emergency, as well as during
demonstrations. 
In August 2016, mayors in about 30 towns adopted decrees prohibiting women
from wearing full body covering swimsuits (known as “burkinis”) or any other
skin concealing outfits on the beach, arguing that they may pose a risk to public
order. 
The French Human Rights League and the Collective against Islamophobia in
France contested those bans before administrative courts. In August, the Council
of State, France’s highest administrative court, ruled that the ban in one town il-
legally breached fundamental freedoms and ordered it to be suspended. Some
bans were subsequently withdrawn by some towns or struck down by lower
courts, while other courts upheld bans despite the Council of State ruling.
The number of migrants in a camp in Calais known as “the Jungle” in August
2016 reached 6,900, according to authorities more than double the estimate a
year earlier. NGOs insisted the actual numbers were higher. On July 7, the CNCDH
expressed concern regarding the increase in the number of migrants living there
in conditions “contrary to human dignity.” 
A 2016 UNICEF survey of unaccompanied children in Calais and Dunkirk camps
found they were subject to sexual exploitation, violence, and forced labour. In
the last week of October, French authorities dismantled the camp. Between Oc-
tober 24 and 26, nearly 5,600 people were relocated to reception centers across
France, with some unaccompanied children brought to the UK (see below). Arbi-
trary age assessment meant that some unaccompanied minors were left out of
the specific process put in place for children. 
France had accepted 2,091 asylum seekers relocated from Greece and 231 from
Italy at time writing, the largest number of any EU state under the relocation
scheme. 
In July, the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights criticized as
“substandard” reception and accommodation facilities for asylum seekers in
France. 
In July, the National Assembly deemed as too costly a measure that would have
required police officers conducting an identity check to record it in a written doc-
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ument. The proposal had been seen by human rights advocates as an important
means of addressing discriminatory checks. 
In November, the Court of Cassation ruled against the state in three cases of po-
lice identity checks involving ethnic profiling, finding that the checks were “dis-
criminatory” and that the state committed a “gross fault.” According to a CNCDH
report published the same month, there is growing evidence from separate stud-
ies that young men from visible minorities are overrepresented in police checks.
An April report by the CNCDH expressed concern about the rise in racist, anti-Se-
mitic, and Islamophobic incidents reported to police in 2015.
French prisons continued to be severely overcrowded and the suicide rate
among inmates remained high, particularly among women, drawing criticism in
July from the UN Committee for the Elimination of Discrimination against Women
(CEDAW). Prisoners with psychosocial disabilities often have inadequate access
to mental healthcare.
Germany
In 2016, Germany continued to grapple with the implications of the arrival of
890,000 asylum seekers and migrants in 2015. A number of attacks in July, some
inspired by or claimed by ISIS, put the spotlight on the country’s counterterror-
ism policy. 
Authorities sought to respond to a wave of arson attacks on asylum-seeker hous-
ing, with federal police reporting more than 850 such attacks between January
and mid-November 2016.
Authorities took some steps to address the shortcomings in Germany’s response
to hate crimes, including training law enforcement and judicial authorities to im-
prove the investigation and prosecution of racially motivated crimes. In March, a
chief judge at a district court sentenced three people to prison for hurling a
gasoline bomb into an asylum-seekers’ apartment and pointed to the attackers’
xenophobic and racist motives. 
Several changes were made to asylum law and policy. In February, the Federal
parliament passed restrictions on family reunification rights for people who do
not qualify for full refugee status, and in July, passed a law aimed at integrating
refugees, beneficiaries of subsidiary protection, and certain asylum seekers,
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conditioning access to benefits and permanent residence status on cooperation
with language and other integration requirements.
After a series of attacks in July, Germany amended several existing counterterror-
ism-related laws in an effort to increase coordination among intelligence agen-
cies. Germany’s highest court in April struck down parts of a 2009
counterterrorism law expanding the federal police authority to investigate and
gather intelligence on terrorist threats, on grounds of inadequate safeguards to
protect privacy. 
In October and November respectively, the lower and upper houses of parlia-
ment approved a law permitting surveillance of journalists outside the EU, de-
spite extensive criticism of the measure by human rights groups, the OSCE
representative on media freedom, and three UN special rapporteurs. Several
groups subsequently announced their intention to challenge the law in the con-
stitutional court. 
Mass sexual assaults against women in Cologne, Hamburg, and other German
cities on New Year’s Eve prompted debate about the police failure to respond ef-
fectively to violence against women. In July, Germany made it easier to prosecute
suspects of sexual violence by removing a requirement that the victim physically
resist assailants in order to bring charges. 
Greece
Despite reforms to address chronic deficiencies, Greece’s broken asylum and re-
ception system deteriorated. While the numbers of arrivals by sea fell after the
EU-Turkey deal, border closures along the Balkans route preventing asylum seek-
ers from leaving, limited solidarity from other EU governments and ongoing ar-
rivals by sea left more than 60,000 asylum seekers and migrants stranded in the
country. 
Thousands who arrived after the EU-Turkey deal were restricted to islands in the
Aegean, often in closed facilities, while tens of thousands face abysmal condi-
tions across the country. By mid-November, only 5,654 asylum seekers had been
relocated from Greece to other EU countries, out of the 66,400 initially planned,
even as the European Commission pressed Greece to start accepting returns of
asylum seekers who transited the country under the Dublin regulation. 
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A Greek law adopted in April to facilitate implementation of the EU-Turkey deal
allows for expedited examination of the admissibility of asylum claims in order
to determine whether asylum seekers can be safely returned to Turkey to be pro-
vided temporary protection or to have the merits of their claims assessed there.
At time of writing, only 12 asylum seekers have had their cases ruled inadmissi-
ble following an appeal, but none of them had been deported to Turkey. At least
one Syrian is challenging the decision at Greece’s highest court, the Council of
State. 
More than 700 people were removed to Turkey under the deal after their claims
were considered in Greece under a fast-track border procedure and rejected on
the merits or because they did not file an asylum claim or agreed to return volun-
tarily.  
Most asylum seekers entering Greece came through the Aegean islands, and
were processed in EU-mandated asylum centers known as hotspots. More than
16,000 asylum seekers and migrants staying in the islands’ hotspots face ap-
palling detention and reception conditions, including severe overcrowding, sig-
nificant shortages of basic shelter and unsanitary, unhygienic conditions.
Women, children and people with disabilities are particularly affected. 
Long lines for poor quality food, mismanagement, and lack of information con-
tributed to a chaotic and volatile atmosphere. Fights occurred on a frequent
basis, particularly in the food lines, at times with no police intervention, while
women and girls were exposed to sexual harassment and violence.
Greek authorities drew criticism over their failure to put systems in place that
would allow the full disbursement of EU assistance to improve reception condi-
tions. 
An estimated 4,370 unaccompanied migrant children entered Greece during the
year, according to the National Center for Social Solidarity (EKKA). Unaccompa-
nied migrant and asylum seeking children were often detained in police cells or
closed facilities in the islands, due to the lack of adequate shelter accommoda-
tions. At time of writing, an estimated 1,610 were waiting to be placed in a dedi-
cated facility. 
A large-scale asylum pre-registration process between June and July aimed to im-
prove access to asylum and speed-up relocation, benefitting 27,592 asylum
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seekers. Despite these efforts, access to asylum remained difficult and subject
to delay. 
Civil society groups reported an increase in attacks and intimidation of asylum
seekers and migrants on the islands and in the mainland in the second half of
the year, and an inadequate police response. In a March landmark ruling, the
ECtHR criticized Greece for failing adequately to investigate a racist attack
against an Afghan national in 2009.
In September, Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights Muižnieks
urged Greece to protect the human rights of persons with intellectual and psy-
chosocial disabilities and move them out of institutions into the community.
Children with disabilities were removed from an institution in Lechaina notorious
for abusive practices, but in some cases transferred to other institutions rather
than into community-based care. 
Hungary
Hungary saw a significant decrease in asylum applications in 2016. By early Sep-
tember, Hungary had registered 26,192 asylum seekers, compared to over
150,000 during the same period in 2015, according to UNHCR. The majority of
asylum seekers in 2016 came from Afghanistan and Syria.
February 2016 border closures on the Western Balkan route, combined with in-
creased restrictive measures along Hungary’s border with Serbia, criminal prose-
cutions of irregular border crossers and pushbacks, often accompanied by
violence, at Hungary’s border with Serbia contributed to the decrease. 
An April law restricted the rights of asylum seekers and cut integration support
for recognized refugees. The same month, the government announced the clo-
sure of the largest open reception facility by the end of the year.
An accelerated fast-track border procedure effectively bars asylum seekers from
meaningful access to the asylum procedure. A July law legalized push-backs to
the Serbian border, enabling police officers to escort to the border anyone
caught irregularly eight kilometers inside Hungary. The law, together with low
daily caps on entry, leaves asylum seekers—including children, families and
people with disabilities—stranded at the border for weeks in poor conditions. 
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During 2016, the government continued its anti-immigrant rhetoric. In February,
the government announced a national referendum on the EU relocation plan re-
quiring Hungary to accept 1,294 asylum seekers and in July launched a govern-
ment sponsored and tax payer funded anti-immigrant campaign. A low turnout
for the October referendum meant that the result was invalid, although most
who did vote supported the government’s position.
Journalists continued to work in a hostile environment. In September, the editor-
in-chief of Budapest Business Journal, Tom Popper, resigned after being told by
its publishers to stop mentioning refugee issues in the editorial column. The
largest opposition daily newspaper, Nepszabadsag, and its website closed down
without warning in October with its owner citing financial losses and plummet-
ing circulation. 
Roma continued to face discrimination in housing, education, and public health
care. In September, the Council of Europe Advisory Committee on the Framework
Convention for the Protection of National Minorities urged Hungary to end dis-
criminatory segregation of Roma schoolchildren. 
In August, a lower court sentenced a right-wing extremist to 10 years’ imprison-
ment for violent attacks between 2007 and 2009, including throwing Molotov
cocktails at the homes of socialist MPs and an attack on a gay bar in Budapest. 
In January, the ECtHR ruled that secret surveillance by the Hungarian Anti-Terror-
ism Task Force had violated privacy rights. The grounds for the decision included
Hungary’s failure to provide judicial oversight over Task Force actions and other
sufficiently precise and effective safeguards.
In July, the ECtHR ruled that Hungary had arbitrarily detained an Iranian gay man
and failed to take into account his vulnerability in detention arising from his sex-
ual orientation. 
By late October, 26 homeless people had been charged with misdemeanours
under local decrees banning the homeless from residing habitually in public
spaces, compared to 71 in the first 10 months of 2015. 
Italy
By mid-November, 164,695 migrants and asylum seekers reached Italy by sea,
according to UNHCR. Nigerians, Eritreans, and Sudanese made up the largest na-
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tional groups. Numbers of unaccompanied children increased significantly, with
an estimated 23,000 traveling alone to Italy by mid-September compared to
12,360 in all of 2015. The International Organization for Migration estimated that
80 percent of all Nigerian women arriving in Italy had been trafficked or were at
risk of being trafficked into sex work.
New asylum applications and rejection rates increased compared to 2015, as in-
creased border controls by neighboring countries prevented onward movement.
Most asylum seekers lived in temporary emergency facilities of varying stan-
dards. Concerns persisted about use of force for fingerprinting as well as over-
crowding and lack of protection for unaccompanied children at hotspots. At time
of writing, only 1,570 asylum seekers had been relocated to other EU countries
out of the 39,600 initial target under the EU plan.
Italy intensified negotiations with countries such as Sudan, Gambia, and Libya
on migration control, including to facilitate deportations. In August, after a mem-
orandum of understanding with Sudan, Italy deported 48 Sudanese it claimed
had not sought to apply for asylum amid concerns about the procedure.
A bill to make torture a criminal offence in domestic law, approved by the lower
house of parliament in 2015, languished in the Senate at time of writing. 
In February, the ECtHR ordered Italy to compensate an Egyptian cleric known as
Abu Omar for complicity with his 2003 rendition and for failing to ensure effec-
tive punishment for those responsible. At time of writing, one of the 22 CIA
agents convicted in absentia by Italian courts in the case was fighting extradi-
tion from Portugal. At issue is Italy’s refusal to grant her a retrial.
Italy continued to expel terrorism suspects under a procedure that explicitly de-
nied the right to an in-country appeal. Italy expelled 47 individuals, many of
them to Tunisia and Morocco, in the first eight months of 2016. 
In April, the Council of Europe’s Social Rights Committee said the fact that 7 out
of 10 doctors in Italy are “conscientious objectors,” meaning that they refuse to
provide abortion services in some or all circumstances, created serious difficul-
ties for women accessing safe and legal abortions. 
As of May, same-sex couples may have their relationships legally recognized as
civil unions, though they do not have the right to adopt. 
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Latvia
Statelessness remains a key concern. UNHCR estimated that as of late 2015,
around 252,000 of the country’s population is effectively stateless (referred to
by authorities as “noncitizens” or “persons with undetermined nationality”). De-
spite 2013 reforms, several thousand children remain stateless. 
Discrimination persists against Russian speakers, particularly in employment,
language use, and education. Latvian non-citizens are barred from occupying
certain posts in the civil service and other professions. They also face restric-
tions on owning land.
Authorities continued to sanction individuals over alleged failure to use Latvian
in professional communications. According to the Latvia’s State Language Cen-
ter, a government agency, 180 people were fined for violating the state language
law in the first six months of 2016. In March, a cleaner in a Russian-language
school was fired following a State Language Center inspection, for not having a
sufficient level of Latvian. In June, a speech therapist was forced to resign her
post in a kindergarten due to a similar inspection. In July, the State Language
Center fined the mayor of Riga over Russian language use in social media posts
by the Riga city administration. The mayor appealed. 
In September, the Latvian parliament adopted in first reading draft amendments
to the Law on Public Associations and Foundations, creating broad grounds for
government oversight over NGOs deemed to undermine national security, public
safety, and order.
According to Latvian LGBT activists, the authorities used a 2015 law on “constitu-
tional morality education” to censor discussion about LGBT people in at least
two schools in 2016. 
At time of writing, Latvia had accepted a total 148 asylum seekers relocated from
Greece and Italy under the EU relocation scheme. 
Netherlands
In February, the government expanded the list of safe third countries for asylum
seekers. Nationals from countries deemed safe are presumed not to need inter-
national protection and are subject to accelerated procedures, raising concerns
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about the quality of individual examination of asylum claims. In September
2016, the country’s highest administrative court affirmed the legality of Alba-
nia’s designation as a safe country of origin.
The Dutch government continued to offer support that is limited in duration and
scope to rejected asylum seekers, with assistance contingent on their coopera-
tion with removal from the country. In February, several UN special rapporteurs
urged the Dutch government to provide emergency assistance to rejected asylum
seekers.    
Refugee rights groups criticized Dutch authorities over longer waits for asylum
determinations and family reunification procedures. 
At the start of 2016, NGOs reported threats and discrimination against LGBT asy-
lum seekers at asylum facilities, and a Dutch independent monitoring body, the
Dutch Board for Protection of Human Rights, found in February that LGBT asylum
seekers at a large facility face discrimination. 
In May, the Netherlands enacted a law allowing authorities to strip Dutch citizen-
ship from dual nationals as young as 16 if they determine that they have joined
or fought abroad with a terrorist group and pose an “immediate threat” to na-
tional security. No court conviction is required. Those whose Dutch citizenship is
revoked have only four weeks to appeal.
In January, the Netherlands ratified the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons
with Disabilities. 
Poland
Poland faced international criticism over attempts by the newly elected parlia-
ment led by the ruling Law and Justice Party to undermine the independence of
the Constitutional Tribunal, the country’s highest court. 
In November 2015, the parliament cancelled the appointments of all five Consti-
tutional Tribunal judges elected under the previous government, and passed a
law in December that undermined the tribunal’s functioning. When the tribunal
ruled in March 2016 that the changes were unconstitutional, the government re-
fused to publish the ruling or to change the law. 
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In July, the parliament adopted a revised Act on the Constitutional Tribunal. Pol-
ish NGOs expressed concern the new act would paralyze the court and affect its
independence. The Constitutional Tribunal ruled that part of the new law was un-
constitutional. At time of writing, the Law and Justice Party was reportedly
preparing yet another draft revision of the act on the Constitutional Tribunal.
In March, the Venice Commission, the Council of Europe’s advisory body on con-
stitutional issues, concluded that the December 2015 amendments endanger
the rule of law and called on the government to implement the Constitutional
Court’s judgment. In October, the Venice Commission criticized the July revised
act as limiting the tribunal’s effectiveness and independence.
The crisis led the European Commission in January to activate for the first time
its rule of law mechanism—created in 2014 to address rights-threatening meas-
ures by EU member states. In July, the European Commission gave the govern-
ment three months to publish the Constitutional Court’s rulings and implement
the Venice Commission’s recommendations. At time of writing it had yet to an-
nounce any follow-up action.
In January, Parliament adopted amendments to the Act on the Police that raised
concerns on the protection of privacy online. In June, President Andrzej Duda
signed into law a new Anti-Terrorist Act that introduces a vaguely defined “event
of a terrorist nature,” extends investigative powers specifically on foreigners,
regulates access to online content and extends arrest and search powers.
In October, Parliament withdrew a contentious proposition supported by Polish
Prime Minister Beata Szydło to impose an almost total ban to abortion, following
mass protests. Amid continued protests, the Law and Justice Party pressed
ahead with efforts to further limit what is already one of the most restrictive
abortion laws in Europe. 
There continues to be little accountability for hate crimes based on sexual orien-
tation. Anti-migrant hate speech and violence was a growing concern. Polish
NGOs accused authorities of preventing asylum seekers at the border with Be-
larus from entering Polish territory to seek protection.
There was no sign of progress in the Krakow appellate prosecutor’s longstanding
criminal investigation into a secret CIA detention and interrogation program on
Polish territory. 
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Spain
A policy of summary returns and reinforced controls at Spain’s land border with
Morocco in its North Africa enclaves appeared to result in migrants increasingly
trying to reach Ceuta and Melilla by boat or swimming. The number of deaths
along that route tripled to 45 in the first six months of 2016 compared to 2015. 
There were several group attempts to scale the fences surrounding the enclaves,
followed by summary returns, though fewer than in previous years. In July, Coun-
cil of Europe Human Rights Commissioner Muižnieks urged Spain to adopt bor-
der procedures to prevent refoulement and collective expulsions. An ECtHR
challenge to summary returns from Melilla in 2014 was pending at time of writ-
ing.
As of mid-November, Spain had relocated only 398 asylum seekers of the 9,323
it had committed to taking from Greece and Italy. While it pledged to resettle
1,449 refugees from other regions, at time of writing it had resettled only 279.
In April, the European Commission took the first step towards legal action
against Spain for failure to protect consumers against unfair mortgage terms. In
July, the EU Court of Justice advocate general recommended the court uphold a
2013 Spanish Supreme Court judgment preventing consumers from suing banks
for interest paid on mortgages under rules subsequently declared unlawful; the
EU court had yet to rule at time of writing. 
In June, Spain’s Constitutional Court suspended a Catalan law with protections
for those facing eviction from their homes, including for failure to mortgages,
pending examination of an appeal by the central government.
In May, the ECtHR ruled Spain had failed adequately to investigate allegations of
torture of a man suspected of affiliation with the armed Basque separatist group
ETA, while he was held and interrogated in incommunicado detention. 
At least one journalist was fined, in April, for publishing photographs of a police
operation under a controversial 2015 public security law. There were several
high-profile cases of charges against musicians, puppeteers, and activists for
glorification of terrorism, including on social media, under strengthened provi-
sions in the criminal code.
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United Kingdom
The referendum vote in June to leave the European Union sent political shock-
waves through the country, creating uncertainty about future constitutional
arrangements and the residence status of the more than 3 million citizens from
other EU states in the UK. 
The Brexit vote was preceded by the murder of MP Jo Cox, who had campaigned
vigorously on behalf of asylum seekers and for the UK to remain in the UK. Fol-
lowing the vote there was a marked increase in xenophobic and racist hate
crimes, including assault and arson attacks, with EU citizens from eastern Eu-
rope a particular target, according to data issued by the police. Poland sent po-
lice officers in September to an English town after a Polish man was beaten to
death in a possible hate crime. 
In an August review of the UK, the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination expressed concern at the “divisive, anti-immigrant and xenopho-
bic rhetoric” employed during the Brexit campaign and the hate crimes that fol-
lowed it, and called on public officials to formally reject such speech.  
The government of Prime Minister Theresa May, elected leader by the Conserva-
tive Party in July, renewed its pledge to replace the UK’s domestic human rights
legislation with a bill of rights, but took no discernable action towards that end.
After the Brexit vote, May backed away from the suggestion the UK would leave
the Council of Europe and ECtHR. 
May used her first party conference speech as prime minister to say that “activist
left-wing human rights lawyers” would “never again” be allowed to pursue
claims on behalf of victims of human rights abuse by UK military forces. She was
apparently referring to cases brought against the Ministry of Defence in relation
to abuses in Iraq and Afghanistan. The government wants to exempt UK forces
operating overseas from human rights law. 
The UK made some progress on pledges to resettle Syrian and other refugees,
but opted out of the EU asylum seeker relocation scheme. In late October, as
French authorities moved to close the Calais camp, the UK finally stepped up ef-
forts to bring unaccompanied children with family ties to the UK. By mid-Novem-
ber, the UK had brought around 300 children from the camp. Despite a
legislative requirement that the government facilitate the relocation from Calais
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and elsewhere in the EU of unaccompanied asylum seeking children even with-
out family ties in the UK, very few of the children brought from Calais lacked fam-
ily ties, and the government imposed age and nationality restrictions on those it
would accept. 
In a June review, the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child called on the UK to
stop detaining asylum-seeking and migrant children and expedite family reunifi-
cation for unaccompanied children outside the UK. 
In January, a government-commissioned independent review of the tied visa for
migrant domestic workers recommended restoring their right to change em-
ployer—a key safeguard against employer abuse. The government restored the
right but failed to permit visa extensions beyond the existing six-month limit,
blunting the measure’s effectiveness. 
In June, prosecutors announced no UK officials would face charges for involve-
ment in the kidnap, transfer, and torture of two Libyan dissidents and their fami-
lies in 2004, effectively closing the last criminal investigation for the UK
authorities’ complicity in global counterterrorism abuses. A review by a parlia-
mentary body into UK complicity in torture and rendition continued at time of
writing. 
The Iraq Historic Allegations Team, a body set up to investigate possible war
crimes by UK forces, continued work in 2016, despite unwarranted political criti-
cism of its existence and the principle of legal scrutiny of military operations. 
In November, Parliament approved problematic legislation—the Investigatory
Powers Act—entrenching and broadening state surveillance powers without ade-
quate safeguards. 
Foreign Policy
The EU’s foreign policy agenda was dominated by the conflicts in Syria and east-
ern Ukraine, and the deteriorating relationship with the Russian government as a
result of Moscow’s involvement in these conflicts. Another focus of EU foreign
policy appeared dictated by EU member states’ desire to prevent a growing num-
ber of refugees, asylum seekers, and migrants from arriving in Europe.
The EU successfully pressed Ukraine to refer jurisdiction over grave crimes to the
International Criminal Court (ICC), through a so-called article 12(3) self-referral.
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But at time of writing the EU has not been able to ensure that Ukraine fulfills its
obligation to ratify the Rome Statute, as required in the legally binding EU-
Ukraine Association Agreement.
The EU maintained a comprehensive set of sanctions against Russian individu-
als and entities in response to Russia’s involvement in the eastern Ukraine con-
flict and its occupation of Crimea. Sanctions included asset freezes and visa
bans against 149 persons and 37 entities.
Apart from critical statements decrying Russia’s comprehensive crackdown on
freedom of expression, association, and assembly at home, the EU and its mem-
ber states did not appear to have any united strategy in response to the rapidly
deteriorating human rights situation in Russia.
But, in a new and innovative way to counter Russian propaganda, the EU started
a “EU Mythbusters” twitter effort @EUvsDisinfo where lies and myths were chal-
lenged with facts and figures.
The EU as a whole remained the largest humanitarian donor for the Syrian crisis.
But EU assistance went beyond emergency assistance and rapidly centered more
on sustained help, particularly aimed at securing Syrian refugees’ access to edu-
cation and work in their host countries: Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey. 
A new deal was finalized between the EU and Jordan granting trade concessions
in exchange for work opportunities for Syrian refugees. Spanning 10 years, the
deal will apply to some 52 product groups that are manufactured in special eco-
nomic zones in Jordan, on condition that producers employ more Syrian
refugees. The requirement for workforces is at least 15 percent Syrian participa-
tion, rising to one quarter after three years. The deal is supposed to serve as a
win-win model for a refugee-hosting community.
The EU also started to negotiate and conclude several questionable readmission
and other migration cooperation agreements with third countries, paving the
way for the return of asylum seekers and migrants to countries that are neither
safe nor stable. The hallmark of most of these agreements—that also serve to
prevent asylum seekers and migrants from coming to the EU—does not appear to
focus on the advancement of protection of the most vulnerable, but on protect-
ing the EU from having to deal with them on its own territory.
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The EU continued to sponsor and co-sponsor some important country resolu-
tions in the United Nations Human Rights Council, including on Burma, North
Korea, and Burundi, ensuring continued UN human rights monitoring and report-
ing on these countries. The EU response was fragmented, however, on join state-
ments on China and Azerbaijan, and the resolution on Yemen.
With regards to the continuing deterioration of human rights in Turkmenistan,
where the government refuses to even confirm whether several prisoners are
dead or alive, the European Parliament took the important step of suspending
the ratification process of an EU-Turkmenistan Partnership and Cooperation
Agreement. 
The European Parliament also adopted strong resolutions calling for the immedi-
ate adoption of targeted sanctions against officials responsible for grave rights
abuses in the Democratic Republic of Congo, and in October EU foreign ministers
adopted conclusions paving the way for such sanctions to be imposed.
The EU imposed restrictive measures against Burundi officials deemed responsi-
ble for rights abuses and undermining democracy in Burundi. 
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Gambia
The December 2016 presidential election, won by opposition coalition leader
Adama Barrow, brought hope for improved respect for human rights and the rule
of law. Barrow defeated incumbent Yayah Jammeh who had held power since a
1994 coup and whose government had a long track record of using enforced dis-
appearances, torture, intimidation, and arbitrary arrests to silence opposition
voices.  
While the two-week election campaign was peaceful, with security forces largely
respecting opposition parties’ rights to freedom of expression and assembly, the
lead up to the campaign was characterized by the intimidation of political oppo-
nents and the government’s use of state media and resources to promote Jam-
meh’s candidacy. 
In April, prominent opposition leader Solo Sandeng was beaten to death in state
custody, ushering in an often-violent government crackdown on Gambia’s largest
opposition party, the United Democratic Party (UDP). More than 90 opposition
activists were detained for participating in peaceful protests and 30 incarcerated
for three-year terms, including the leadership of the UDP. 
Gambian security forces, particularly the National Intelligence Agency (NIA) and
Police Intervention Unit (PIU), also arrested and detained civil society activists
who criticized the government, including religious leaders, trade unionists, and
journalists. 
During Jammeh’s three decades in power, no members of state security or para-
military groups are known to have been convicted or otherwise held to account
for torture, enforced disappearances, or other serious violations.
Gambia’s key international interlocutors, including the Economic Community of
West African States (ECOWAS), the United Nations, the European Union, and the
United States, were at times robust critics of the government’s abuses against
political opponents. But in 2016 they failed to take meaningful steps to sanction
the government for its persistent abuses. 
Gambia notified the UN secretary-general of its withdrawal from the International
Criminal Court on November 10, to take effect on November 10, 2017. However, in
December, President-elect Barrow promised to reverse it.
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Crackdown on Political Opposition
The April death in custody of the UDP national organizing secretary, Solo
Sandeng, presaged a wider crackdown against political opposition and the UDP
in particular. Sandeng and some 25 others were arrested by Gambian police on
April 14 during a rare public demonstration in favor of electoral reform. Sandeng
was taken to the headquarters of Gambia’s National Intelligence Agency and
brutally beaten to death.
On April 16, Ousainou Darboe, the UDP leader, was among more than 20 people
beaten and arrested by police during a protest against Sandeng’s treatment.
Forty-five protesters were subsequently arrested by the police during a May 9
rally.
In the aftermath of these protests, Jammeh repeatedly threatened opposition
groups, which he called “evil vermin,” warning them: “If you want to destabilize
this country, I will bury you nine-feet deep.”
Darboe and 18 others, including several other high-ranking UDP members, were
sentenced on July 20 to three years’ imprisonment for their role in the April 16
protest. On July 21, 11 protesters arrested with Sandeng were also sentenced to
three years in prison. At time of writing, 14 other protesters arrested during a
May 9 protest were on trial in the Banjul High Court.
Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, and Enforced Disappearances
As well as targeting political opponents, the security services, especially the
NIA, continued to arbitrarily arrest, detain, and intimidate religious leaders,
trade unionists, journalists and former civil servants, seemingly targeting those
critical of the government and particularly President Jammeh. Barrow promised
during his election campaign to release political prisoners. 
The government has forcibly disappeared three imams arrested in October and
November 2015. Alhagi Ousman Sawaneh, the imam of Kanifeng South, was ar-
rested on October 18, 2015, reportedly because he petitioned the Gambian gov-
ernment to free a farming cooperative leader detained by the NIA. Sawaneh was
initially taken to the NIA headquarters, and then reportedly transferred to Janjan-
bureh prison, where, at time of writing, he remained in incommunicado deten-
tion. 
285
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH
The High Court on March 21 ordered that the government produce Sawaneh in
court, but it had failed to do so at time of writing. Two other imams, Sheikh Omar
Colley and Imam Gassama, reportedly arrested in relation to the same incident,
are also believed to being held incommunicado at Janjanbureh prison.
Ousman Jammeh, a former deputy minister of agriculture, has been held without
charge in incommunicado detention since being removed from his post on Octo-
ber 15, 2015. Gambia’s former ambassador to the African Union, Sarjo Jallow,
was arrested and held without charge by the NIA on September 2, 2016. Al-
though a Gambian court on October 17 granted him bail, he remained in state
custody at time of writing.
Torture, Ill-Treatment, and Neglect in Detention
Gambian security forces continued to subject detainees to serious mistreatment,
including torture. Several protesters arrested in April and May were subjected to
serious physical abuse while in detention. UDP activist Solo Krummah, who had
been arrested on May 9, died in state custody in a Banjul hospital on August 20.
His family have been given no information regarding the cause of death or the
medical treatment he received.
Sheriff Dibba, the leader of Gambian National Transport Control Association,
died in police custody on February 21 after being arrested following a trade
union demand that the government lower fuel prices. After Dibba fell ill in police
custody, the government failed to provide him with prompt and adequate med-
ical attention. 
Prisons continued to operate far below international standards. Prisoners lack
appropriate housing, sanitation, food, and inadequate medical care. Detainees
in the security wing of Mile 2 Central Prison, including the UDP leadership, were
frequently subjected to prolonged solitary confinement.
Freedom of Expression
Since 1994, dozens of journalists have fled Gambia after being arbitrarily de-
tained and often tortured. At least two journalists have been murdered or forcibly
disappeared since 2004.
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While there were fewer reports of abuses against journalists in 2016 than in pre-
vious years, the culture of impunity that has permitted abuses against journal-
ists to go unpunished under Jammeh’s government remained intact and caused
many journalists to self-censor reporting. 
The managing director of independent radio station Teranga FM, Alhagie Ceesay,
who was arrested in July 2015, held without charge at the NIA headquarters, and
tortured, remained in government custody until April 2016, when he escaped
while receiving treatment at a Banjul hospital. He was convicted of sedition in
absentia on November 9 and sentenced to four years’ imprisonment.
In December 2015, the Federation of African Journalists and three exiled Gam-
bian reporters filed a legal claim before the ECOWAS Community Court of Justice
challenging a series of Gambian laws that curtail freedom of expression, includ-
ing criminal laws on sedition, defamation and the publication of “false news.”
Gambia is yet to implement judgments in the favor of the plaintiffs in three other
ECOWAS Court of Justice cases related to journalists: the enforced disappear-
ance of Ebrima Manneh in 2006; the torture of Musa Saidykhan in 2006; and the
unlawful killing of the president of the Gambia Press Union, Deyda Hydara, in
2004.
During the two-week campaign period for the December 1 election, the Inde-
pendent Election Commission granted all political parties the right to equal air
time daily on state media for election broadcasts. However, the near complete
domination of state media by Jammeh and the ruling party prior to the campaign
period denied opposition parties a level-playing field to contest the election.  
Online diaspora media organizations remain a vital source of news for Gambians
with internet connectivity. The government accuses diaspora media of fabricat-
ing stories to discredit President Jammeh and, in past years, several people have
been arrested for providing information to diaspora journalists.
Women’s and Girls’ Rights  
Gambia has very high rates of female genital mutilation (FGM). President Jam-
meh announced in November 2015 that Gambia would ban FGM, and the Gam-
bian parliament enacted legislation on December 28, 2015, criminalizing the
practice. Jammeh announced on July 6 that child marriage was also to be crimi-
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nalized and the Gambian parliament on July 21 imposed severe penalties on par-
ents responsible for children marrying before age 18. Women’s rights advocates
underscored that, as a complement to punitive measures, intensive community
education campaigns would be necessary to address the centuries-old customs
that underpin these practices.
Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity
The government continued to resist calls to repeal laws that criminalize homo-
sexuality, including an October 2014 law that introduced a series of new “aggra-
vated homosexuality” offenses that impose sentences of up to life in prison. The
criminalization of same-sex conduct leaves lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgen-
der (LGBT) Gambians at risk of arbitrary arrest and detention, although fewer ar-
rests and physical abuse of LGBT Gambians were reported in 2016.
Key International Actors
The government’s crackdown on the opposition in advance of the election led to
condemnation by the African Commission on Human and People’s Rights, the
United Nations secretary-general, the United States, the European Union, and
the United Kingdom.
The UN high commissioner for human rights expressed alarm at Gambia’s
human rights situation several times during 2016, including at the UN Human
Rights Council in September. Gambia has drafted legislation, with UN assis-
tance, for the creation of a national human rights commission, although the
draft bill at time of writing had yet to be presented to the National Assembly.
President Jammeh was largely dismissive of critical statements regarding his
human rights record, saying in May that human rights groups and UN Secretary-
General Ban Ki-moon could “go to hell.”  
In February 2016, the EU deployed a resident ambassador to Gambia for the first
time in its history. The US also upgraded their head of mission from a chargé
d’affaires to an ambassador. The EU, which had frozen development assistance
in December 2014 due to concerns over human rights abuses, now channels all
aid through nongovernmental organizations.
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Georgia
Georgia’s ruling party swept to an overwhelming victory in October 2016 parlia-
mentary elections. The state security service’s unfettered access to telecom op-
erators’ networks compromised the right to privacy. Lack of accountability
persisted for abuses committed by law enforcement. Other areas of concern in-
cluded media freedoms and the rights of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender
(LGBT) people.  
The International Criminal Court (ICC) ordered an investigation into war crimes
and crimes against humanity committed during the August 2008 war in Georgia. 
Parliamentary Elections
The ruling Georgian Dream (GD) party won an overwhelming victory in October 8
parliamentary elections, giving it full control over the formation of a new govern-
ment. International observers, led by the Organization for Security and Co-opera-
tion in Europe (OSCE), concluded that the elections were “competitive,
well-administered and fundamental freedoms were generally respected.” 
However, they also noted procedural violations during the vote count in almost
one-third of all polling stations and violent altercations in four. Local monitoring
groups highlighted some cases of vote-buying, alleged political intimidation,
and campaigning by unauthorized persons, but found these had no effect on the
overall outcome.
Three violent incidents during the week before the vote marred an otherwise
peaceful pre-election process. On October 4, an explosion hit the car of a promi-
nent member of parliament from the opposition United National Movement
(UNM) party, injuring five. An October 2 shooting during an outdoor campaign
meeting for an independent candidate wounded two people. On October 1, three
GD activists were assaulted while campaigning. Investigations into all three inci-
dents were pending at time of writing.
Right to Privacy
In April, the Constitutional Court ruled unconstitutional legislation that allows
state security services to have direct, unrestricted access to telecom operators’
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networks to monitor communications and ordered the authorities to reform sur-
veillance regulations by March 2017. Legislation adopted in 2014 had imposed
restrictions on surveillance operations by law enforcement but left in place the
security agencies’ operation of “black box” surveillance devices in telecommuni-
cations service providers’ networks. The court found this system allows mass
collection of personal information in real time without effective oversight. 
The online publication of several illegally recorded personal phone conversa-
tions of opposition party members and their supporters in the run-up to the elec-
tion seemed aimed at influencing the vote. Among the recordings were private
conversations between former President Mikheil Saakashvili and fellow UNM
party members, and a call between a pro-opposition television director and an
opposition party leader. The State Security Service denied involvement, and the
Interior Ministry opened an investigation.
In March, unknown persons threatened to release sex tapes implicating two cab-
inet members, an opposition figure, and a television journalist if they did not
quit their jobs by March 31. The threats were made through YouTube videos of
secretly recorded videos purportedly showing their private lives, with blurred out
faces, which were quickly removed. Authorities launched an investigation.
Torture, Ill-Treatment, and Police Abuse
Georgia does not have an independent effective mechanism for investigating
crimes committed by law enforcements officials. 
In July, the Georgian Young Lawyers’ Association (GYLA), a leading human rights
group, published a report analyzing 22 cases they litigated in the past two years
concerning alleged torture and ill-treatment by law enforcement officials. GYLA
concluded that in most cases the investigations were ineffective. In several
cases, officials retaliated against the victims who had filed complaints by press-
ing administrative and criminal proceedings against them.  
GYLA received at least 62 allegations of torture and ill-treatment in 12 months
since November 2015; 45 of them concerned abuse by police, and 17 by prison
staff. According to GYLA, authorities failed to effectively investigate those allega-
tions.
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In August, Demur Sturua, 22, committed suicide, leaving behind a note stating
that a local policeman was coercing him to inform on local cannabis growers.
The autopsy showed that Sturua had bodily injuries, which the prosecutor said
were inflicted by the policeman prior to Sturua’s death. The Prosecutor’s Office
filed criminal charges against the policeman, and the investigation was pending
at time of writing. Georgia’ s public defender said the case exemplified the con-
sequences of Georgia’s “repressive drug policies.” 
Concerns about Politicized Justice
Several criminal cases against former officials raised questions about selective
justice and politically motivated prosecution. In May, a court found five former
Defense Ministry and general staff officials guilty of misspending GEL 4.1 million
(roughly US$1.8 million) arising from a closed 2013 tender for the laying of fiber-
optic cable, and sentenced them to seven years in prison. 
For several months following the defendants arrest in 2014, authorities denied
defense lawyers full access to evidence, claiming it consisted of classified docu-
ments. The court did not establish any mercenary motives behind the mis-
spending charges. The public defender filed an amicus brief in support of the
defendants’ Constitutional Court claim that the definition of misspending in the
criminal code is vague and allows for arbitrary interpretation. The men were ar-
rested in 2014, which led to sacking of then-Defense Minister Irakli Alasania.
In June, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) issued a ruling in the case
of ex-minister of interior and the UNM leader Vano Merabishvili, saying that
while his initial pretrial detention in May 2013 was lawful, the remand renewal
four months later lacked reasonable grounds. The court said Merabishvili’s con-
tinued detention “was … treated by prosecuting authorities as an additional op-
portunity to obtain leverage” over investigations into unrelated cases, including
one against ex-president Saakashvili. In October, the ECHR Grand Chamber
agreed to hear the Georgian government’s appeal of the ruling.
Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity
In August, President Giorgi Margvelashvili blocked a referendum bid on defining
marriage as a union of a man and a woman, saying that the issue is already cov-
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ered in the civil code. Prime Minister Giorgi Kvirikashvili vowed to pursue a con-
stitutional definition of marriage after the October elections, arguing that this
would help counter alleged Western efforts to spread same-sex marriage “propa-
ganda” in Georgia. Local rights groups feared this effort would further marginal-
ize the LGBT community and intensify anti-LGBT prejudice. 
Authorities declined a request by LGBT activists to hold an event to mark Interna-
tional Day Against Homophobia and Transphobia (IDAHO) on Tbilisi’s main thor-
oughfare, stating it was already booked for a procession by Orthodox groups to
mark Family Day, an annual event established by the Orthodox Church in 2014.
Activists refused to celebrate IDAHO in the alternative venue offered. 
The Women’s Initiatives Supporting Group (WISG), a local LGBTI rights group,
said it documented almost 20 cases of attacks against transgender people in
2016. In October, a transgender woman was beaten and stabbed in what rights
groups suspected was a hate crime. Police arrested a suspect on attempted mur-
der charges, and the public defender urged authorities to examine a possible
hate motive. 
Freedom of Media
The ownership dispute over Georgia’s most-watched television broadcaster, Rus-
tavi 2, continued in 2016 and raised concerns about ongoing government inter-
ference with media. In June, the Tbilisi Court of Appeals upheld a lower court
ruling in favor of Kibar Khalvashi, who owned Rustavi 2 from 2004 to 2006 and
sought to reclaim his shares. Khalvashi alleged that in 2006, then-UNM govern-
ment leaders forced him to sell the shares. Rustavi 2’s current owners appealed
the appeals court decision, alleging Khalvshi’s lawsuit is a government-orches-
trated move to take over the opposition-minded station. In September, the
Supreme Court found the appeal admissible. A decision was pending at time of
writing. 
Key International Actors
The Association Agreement between the European Union and Georgia went into
force on July 1, strengthening political and economic ties between the two. The
agreement requires Georgia to fulfill extensive commitments in the areas of
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democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. The EU pledged €100 million ($
107.8 million) per year to support Georgia’s reform agenda, including in areas re-
lating to human rights and the rule of law. 
Following her February visit, the United Nations special rapporteur on violence
against women issued a report highlighting widespread violence against women
both in private and public spheres, caused by “entrenched patriarchal attitudes
and gender stereotypes.” 
She noted ongoing and disquieting levels of domestic violence, including femi-
cide/killings of women, and police failure to provide adequate protection in re-
ported cases as well as the persistent belief that such violence is a private
matter. She also raised concerns about the high number of child and forced mar-
riages resulting from lax enforcement of laws prohibiting such marriages and so-
cial attitudes and practices that foster the practice. Georgia has signed but not
yet ratified the Council of Europe Convention on Violence against Women and
Domestic Violence (Istanbul Convention).
The US-Georgia bilateral working group on democracy and governance under the
strategic partnership charter met in June in Tbilisi. The US delegation underlined
the importance of a peaceful pre-election environment and reiterated concerns
over the Rustavi 2 ownership dispute. The April US Department of State’s annual
human rights report noted among other things “significant shortcomings in the
administration of justice, including pressure on judiciary in selected cases.”
In January, the ICC authorized its prosecutor to open an investigation into war
crimes and crimes against humanity allegedly committed in the lead up to, dur-
ing, and after the August 2008 war between Russia and Georgia over South Os-
setia.
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Guatemala
Guatemala continued to make progress in prosecuting human rights and corrup-
tion cases, due in significant part to the collaboration of the Attorney General’s
Office with the United Nations-backed International Commission against Im-
punity in Guatemala (CICIG), which was established in 2007 to investigate organ-
ized crime and reinforce local efforts to strengthen the rule of law.  
In September 2015, after being implicated by CICIG in a million-dollar tax-fraud
scandal, Guatemalan President Otto Pérez Molina resigned and was arrested on
charges of customs fraud, racketeering, and bribery. 
President Jimmy Morales took office in January, and in April, asked the UN to ex-
tend CICIG’s mandate—which had been set to expire in 2017—until September
2019. 
Accountability for Past Human Rights Violations
In February, a court convicted two former military officers on charges of crimes
against humanity in the form of sexual violence and domestic and sexual slav-
ery. It was the first time that a Guatemalan court had prosecuted a case of sexual
violence related to the country’s 36-year internal armed conflict. The victims
were 15 Maya Q’eqchi’ women. 
In addition to the sexual violence convictions, the court found Lt. Col. Esteelmer
Reyes Girón, former commander of Sepur Zarco military base, guilty in the homi-
cides of three females, and Heriberto Valdez Asig, former military commissioner,
guilty in the enforced disappearance of the husbands of seven of the female vic-
tims. They were sentenced to 120 years and 240 years in prison respectively.
Former Guatemalan head of state Efraín Ríos Montt was found guilty in May 2013
of genocide and crimes against humanity. He was sentenced to 80 years in
prison, but several days later the Constitutional Court overturned the verdict on
procedural grounds. The retired general had led a military government from 1982
to 1983, when the military carried out hundreds of massacres of unarmed civil-
ians. 
In August 2015, a trial court declared Ríos Montt mentally unfit for retrial, ruling
instead that he should be represented by his lawyers in a special closed-door
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proceeding. In October 2015, an appellate court rejected a two-year-old petition
by Rios Montt’s attorneys to apply a 1986 amnesty decree that would put an end
to his prosecution. The court ruled that the decree, applicable to “all political
and related common crimes” committed between March 1982 and January 1986,
does not apply to genocide and crimes against humanity. A retrial of Rios Montt
began in March 2016, behind closed doors. 
In May, the First Court of Appeals issued a provisional ruling that the former dic-
tator should be separated from his co-defendant, José Mauricio Rodríguez
Sánchez, the former intelligence director. A new trial for each defendant had yet
to be scheduled at time of writing.
In recent years, the Attorney General’s Office has obtained convictions in several
other cases involving human rights crimes committed during the war. In 2011,
four army Special Forces soldiers received lengthy sentences for their role in the
1982 Dos Erres massacre of more than 250 people. In 2013, former National Po-
lice Chief Héctor Bol de la Cruz received a 40-year sentence for ordering the dis-
appearance of a student activist in 1984. In January 2015, former Police Chief
Pedro Garcia Arredondo was sentenced to 90 years in prison for a raid on the
Spanish embassy in 1980, in which 37 people burned to death.
In July 2014, Fermín Felipe Solano Barillas became the first ex-guerrilla to be con-
victed in connection with atrocities. Found guilty of ordering the massacre of 22
residents of the town of El Aguacate in 1988, he was sentenced to 90 years in
prison.
Public Security, Corruption, and Criminal Justice 
Violence and extortion by powerful criminal organizations remain serious prob-
lems in Guatemala. Corruption within the justice system, combined with intimi-
dation against judges and prosecutors, contributes to high levels of impunity.
Gang-related violence is an important factor prompting people, including unac-
companied youth, to leave the country. 
Despite these problems, prosecutors in recent years have made progress in
cases of violent crime, as well as some cases of extrajudicial killings and corrup-
tion.
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In April 2015, a CICIG investigation uncovered a US$130 million tax fraud scandal
involving more than 50 high-ranking members of the government. This led to
charges against then-President Otto Pérez Molina, Vice President Roxana
Baldetti, and 35 others. 
In April 2016, prosecutors brought additional charges against Pérez Molina in
connection with a $30 million commission on a Spanish company’s contract to
operate a new, Pacific-coast container terminal in Puerto Quetzal.
In June, the CICIG announced arrests in connection with a clandestine structure
that operated behind the façade of the Partido Patriota (PP), ex-President Pérez
Molina’s political party. The PP allegedly designed a financial scheme whose
main objective was the illicit enrichment of its members through state contracts
worth more than $35 million. At time of writing, more than 57 members of the
Guatemalan business elite, from bankers to Congressmen, had been arrested.
Key International Actors
The UN-backed CICIG, established in 2007, plays a key role in assisting
Guatemala’s justice system in prosecuting violent crime. The CICIG works with
the Attorney General’s Office, the police, and other government agencies to in-
vestigate, prosecute, and dismantle criminal organizations operating in the
country. It is empowered to participate in criminal proceedings as a complemen-
tary prosecutor, to provide technical assistance, and to promote legislative re-
forms. 
The US Congress approved $750 million in assistance for 2016 for the Plan of the
Alliance for Prosperity in the Northern Triangle, a five-year initiative announced
in 2014 that intends to reduce incentives to migrate from Guatemala, El Sal-
vador, and Honduras. The Obama administration requested the same amount for
the plan for 2017. At time of writing, Congress had not yet approved the final
budget.
The aid aims to reduce violence, strengthen governance, and increase economic
opportunity. Fifty percent of it is conditioned on the US Department of State an-
nually certifying progress by the beneficiary countries in strengthening institu-
tions, fighting corruption and impunity, and protecting human rights. In 2016,
Guatemala received certification for continued full funding under the plan. The
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assistance for 2016 included $7 million for CICIG in Guatemala, and funding for
similar commissions, if established, in El Salvador and Honduras. The US De-
partment of State announced in June that, since 2008, the US had invested $36
million in the CICIG’s work.
The Guatemalan government is implementing a reparations plan, required for
certification to receive US aid, to address human rights violations suffered by
communities displaced by construction of the Chixoy Hydroelectric Dam in 1975.
Distribution of $2.8 million in reparations started in March 2015. Reparations are
expected to total $156 million by 2029, the dam’s planned completion.
The Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights has maintained an of-
fice in Guatemala since 2005. The office monitors the human rights situation in
the country and provides policy support to the government and civil society.
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Guinea
During 2016, the government of President Alpha Conde, who won a second term
as president in flawed elections in late 2015, made some gains in consolidating
the rule of law and addressing security force violations. A national dialogue be-
tween the ruling and opposition parties reduced ethnic and communal tensions
and led to a roadmap for long-delayed local elections to be held in early 2017.    
However, continued deficiencies within the police and judiciary, along with sev-
eral risk factors—notably high unemployment, organized crime, and regional in-
security— highlighted the fragility of these gains. 
Reports of human rights violations by security forces declined, and authorities
demonstrated increased willingness to investigate and sanction those impli-
cated in violations, notably those which had been widely reported in the local
media. 
Though the government allowed several opposition demonstrations to take
place, thereby improving its respect for the right to freedom of assembly, little
progress was made on improving access to key economic rights, including
health care and primary education. Violence against girls and women remained
high.
The judiciary made progress in the investigation into the 2009 stadium mas-
sacre of unarmed demonstrators by security forces, but largely failed to investi-
gate other past episodes of state-sponsored violence. The justice ministry
embarked on a major reorganization of the judiciary to improve the dispensation
of justice, but concerns over prison overcrowding, unprofessional conduct by ju-
dicial personnel, and lack of judicial independence remain. 
International actors—notably the European Union, United Nations, France, and
the United States—focused on ensuring political dialogue between the ruling
party and the opposition, though they infrequently pushed for progress on ac-
countability. Donors supported programs to strengthen the rule of law, address
unemployment, and improve discipline within the security sector. 
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Security Force Abuses
Discipline within and civilian control over the security forces appeared to im-
prove as those mandated to respond to civil unrest—the police and gen-
darmerie—did so with increasing proportionality. However, in several cases,
members of the security forces mistreated and at times tortured detainees as
they responded to protests and criminality. There were also numerous allega-
tions of unprofessional conduct, including theft and extortion.  
In March, a widely circulated cell phone video of a criminal suspect being tor-
tured by members of an elite anti-crime unit in Conkary was condemned by the
public and government. In May, several officers from the police and the gen-
darmerie were questioned by investigating judges for physical violence against
demonstrators in April. In June, an army colonel was removed from his post after
he and several subordinates severely beat and shot residents who they accused
of stalling their convoy. In August, a police captain was detained and, at time of
writing, was under investigation for excessive use of lethal force that killed a by-
stander and injured several protestors during a demonstration.  
In sharp contrast to the lack of government response following similar incidents
in previous years, these cases in 2016 elicited administrative sanctions, investi-
gations, and commitments to deliver justice. However, at time of writing, none of
the alleged perpetrators in these cases had yet been held to account. 
Justice for the 2009 Stadium Massacre
More than seven years on, Guinea has yet to deliver justice for the grave crimes
committed in September 2009, when security forces massacred some 150 oppo-
sition supporters and raped over 100 women. The crimes were committed during
the military rule of then-Cpt. Moussa Dadis Camara.
The panel of judges appointed in 2010 to investigate the massacre has made im-
portant strides despite political, financial, and logistical obstacles. They have in-
terviewed more than 400 victims and charged some 15 suspects, including
several high-level members of the security forces and the former junta leader,
Camara.
While the investigation appeared to enjoy increased political and financial sup-
port from the government, the failure to suspend high-level suspects from their
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government posts, the March appointment of accused Gen. Mathurin Bangoura
to the position of governor of Conakry, and the failure to close the investigation,
raised concern. 
At time of writing several investigative aspects remained outstanding, including
the questioning of key witnesses and locating mass graves believed to contain
the bodies of some 100 victims who remained unaccounted for. 
Accountability for Election-Related Crimes
During 2016, there was little progress in investigating or holding to account
members of the security forces or mobs allegedly involved in numerous episodes
of political and electoral violence, perpetrated both before and after President
Conde took office in 2010.
These include the alleged killing by the security forces of some 130 unarmed
demonstrators in 2007, some 60 opposition supporters protesting the delay in
holding parliamentary elections in 2013-2014, and at least 10 people in the run-
up to the 2015 presidential poll. 
There was similarly no accountability for other 2015 election-related abuses in-
cluding the beating to death of two men and rape of one woman by mobs linked
to the opposition, or the extensive looting and destruction of property in mar-
kets by mobs associated with the ruling party, at times allegedly in complicity
with the security forces. 
However, in October, the government agreed to pay reparations to victims of the
2013 political violence, including to the wounded, the families of those killed,
and victims of looting and pillage.  
Truth-Telling Mechanism and National Human Rights
Commission  
In August, the Provisional Commission on National Reconciliation (CPRN) sub-
mitted its final report to President Conde. The CPRN was established by presi-
dential decree in 2011 to explore the roots of decades of political and communal
violence and present a roadmap for addressing them. The report made 22 rec-
ommendations, including the creation of an independent truth-telling commis-
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sion, justice for key perpetrators, and reparations for victims of political and
communal violence. 
The National Human Rights Commission (INIDH), established in 2015 and man-
dated by Guinea’s 2010 constitution, largely failed to fulfil its mandate and suf-
fered from a lack of credibility as a few commissioners quit amid concerns over
lack of fiscal transparency.  
Judiciary and Detention Conditions
The year saw the beginning of a major reorganization of the justice system aimed
at strengthening its independence, impartiality, and efficiency. The changes are
part of a multi-year justice sector reform project and were mandated by a 2015
law which reorganized the judiciary. However, there were concerns that the low
budgetary allocation for the judiciary—around 0.5 percent of the national
budget—would slow down the implementation of the plan, which mandates the
construction and staffing of several new courthouses. 
Guinean prisons and detention centers operate far below international stan-
dards, with severe overcrowding due to the systematic use of provisional deten-
tion, weak case management, and the failure of the courts to meet regularly.
Overcrowding and conditions in Guinea’s largest detention facility in the capital
Conakry, designed for 300 detainees, worsened in 2016 as it regularly accommo-
dated more than 1500. The construction of a new prison to address overcrowding
stalled. An estimated 60 percent of prisoners in Guinea are held in prolonged
pretrial detention. Unprofessional conduct in the judicial sector, including ab-
senteeism and corruption, contribute to persistent detention-related abuses. 
The Superior Council of Judges (Conseil Supérieur de la Magistrature), estab-
lished in 2015, continued to fulfill its mandate to investigate and discipline
judges. During 2016, some 20 cases were investigated by the CSM, and several
judges sanctioned for corruption and unprofessional conduct.  
Women’s and Children’s Rights 
In September, the Guinean government and local organizations launched a cam-
paign to combat female genital mutilation (FGM). An estimated 97 percent of
women and girls aged 15 to 49 years have undergone FGM, despite laws banning
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and criminalizing the practice. In a rare case in January 2016, three women were
tried and convicted in a court in Kankan for performing FGM. 
In May, UNICEF, OHCHR, and UNFPA reported that since 2015 more than 50 chil-
dren have been raped, the majority less than 5 years old. 
Legislative and Institutional Framework for 
Human Rights Protection
In April, Guinea acceded to the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights
of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflict. In July, Guinea’s
National Assembly passed a new criminal code that abolished the death penalty
and, for the first time, criminalized torture. 
However, the new code failed to codify several abuses as torture, including elec-
tric shocks, stress positions, mock executions, and simulated drowning, defin-
ing them instead as “inhumane and cruel” treatment. The new code also
retained laws criminalizing and carrying penalties of up to five years for defama-
tion and “insults” directed at public figures, as well as laws criminalizing “un-
natural acts,” carrying terms of 6 months to 3 years in prison.  
Key International Actors 
The EU, Guinea’s biggest donor, continued to fund programs to strengthen judi-
cial reform and fight impunity, including by supporting victims of the September
2009 crimes. The country office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights
regularly documented abuses, monitored detention conditions, and supported
the human rights and interim reconciliation commissions, but rarely publicly de-
nounced human rights concerns. The UN Peacebuilding Commission funded pro-
grams supporting security sector reform, reconciliation, and employment.
UN Special Representative on Sexual Violence in Conflict Zainab Bangura—
whose office continued to support accountability for rapes and crimes commit-
ted during the 2009 stadium massacre—visited Guinea twice: in April, jointly
with US Under Secretary of State for Civilian Security, Democracy, and Human
Rights Sarah Sewall, and in August to encourage progress on investigation.  
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The International Criminal Court (ICC), which in October 2009 confirmed that the
situation in Guinea was under preliminary examination, continued to engage the
national authorities on progress in the investigation.
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Haiti
The continuing political crisis in Haiti, spurred by contested presidential elec-
tions in 2015, led to a power vacuum at the head of state. President Michel
Martelly’s term of office expired in February 2016, and the 120-day term of provi-
sional President Jocelerme Privert expired in June, though he remained in office
at time of writing. A new parliament took office in January 2016, after effectively
shutting down in 2015, but continued protracted stalemates over presidential
and remaining parliamentary elections hampered legislators’ ability to tackle
pending priorities. 
The crisis hindered the Haitian government’s ability to meet the basic needs of
its people, resolve longstanding human rights problems, or address continuing
humanitarian crises, even as a new crisis emerged. In October 2016, Hurricane
Matthew, a devastating storm, hit Haiti’s southwest. President Privert estimated
the losses surpassed the entire national budget and warned of an impending se-
rious food crisis, driven by the loss of crops from the storm.
As of August, authorities had failed to assist many of the 61,000 individuals still
living in displacement camps since the 2010 earthquake to resettle or return to
their places of origin, and many continued to face environmental risks and the
threat of forced evictions. An ongoing drought affecting much of the country
pushed the number of people living with food insecurity to one-third of the pop-
ulation. 
Haiti’s cholera epidemic has claimed more than 9,300 lives and infected more
than 780,000 people in five years. There were more than 21,000 suspected
cases and, as of July, 200 deaths in 2016. Cholera cases surged in October in the
communities most impacted by Hurricane Matthew. In November, an ambitious
campaign aimed to vaccinate more than 800,000 people in seven days. 
Electoral Crisis 
Presidential and run-off parliamentary elections in October 2015 were contested,
and second-round elections were deferred multiple times. To thwart a constitu-
tional crisis when President Martelly’s term ended on February 7 without an
elected successor, Martelly signed an agreement with the president of the Sen-
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ate and the Chamber of Deputies that established a short-term solution. Prime
Minister Evans Paul served in the presidency until the National Assembly se-
lected a provisional president, Jocelerme Privert, to serve for a 120-day term,
during which new presidential elections were scheduled. But the April elections
were postponed, and Privert’s term expired before a successor was elected. At
time of writing, Privert was still acting as president.
In June, a special commission confirmed fraud and irregularities in the 2015
presidential and run-off parliamentary elections and scheduled a new first-round
presidential election to be held in October. Presidential campaigning began in
September. Due to Hurricane Matthew, the elections were further postponed and
finally took place November 20. They proceeded without major reported inci-
dents. At time of writing, the outcome of the November elections was not known.
If none of the 27 candidates received more than 50 percent of the vote, a run-off
election was scheduled for January 29, 2017. 
Criminal Justice System
Haiti’s prison system remained severely overcrowded, with many inmates living
in inhumane conditions. According to United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-
moon, nearly all of the almost 11,000 inmates in Haiti’s national prison system
have access to less than one square meter of space and most face 23 hours of
confinement a day. Overcrowding is attributed to high numbers of arbitrary ar-
rests and overuse of pretrial detention. According to Ban, more than 70 percent
of suspects are held pending trial. Although the UN and international donors
have supported several initiatives to reduce the percentage, it barely budged in
2016. 
Illiteracy and Barriers to Education
Approximately one in two Haitians age 15 and older is illiterate. The UN inde-
pendent expert on Haiti said in 2015 that action to eradicate illiteracy is one of
the top human rights priorities in Haiti. 
More than 200,000 children remain out of primary school in the country. The
quality of education is generally low, and 90 percent of schools are run by pri-
vate entities that charge school fees that can be prohibitively expensive for low-
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income families. In March, the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child called on
Haiti to establish a comprehensive regulatory framework for—and to monitor reg-
ularly—private education providers, to ensure that, among other recommenda-
tions, they comply with quality standards and regularly report to relevant
authorities on their financial operations, including on school fees and salaries. 
Accountability for Past Abuses
The Human Rights Committee and the UN independent expert on Haiti have both
called on Haiti to continue investigations into financial and human rights crimes
allegedly committed during former President Jean-Claude Duvalier’s tenure as
president from 1971 to 1986. They have called on Haiti to bring to justice all
those responsible for serious human rights violations committed during Duva-
lier’s tenure. Allegations of violations include arbitrary detentions, torture, dis-
appearances, summary executions, and forced exile.
Duvalier died in 2014, six months after the Port-of-Prince Court of Appeal ruled
that the statute of limitations could not be applied to crimes against humanity
and ordered that investigations against him should continue. At time of writing,
a reopened investigation into crimes committed by Duvalier’s collaborators re-
mained pending.
Violence against Women
Gender-based violence is a widespread problem. Haiti does not have specific
legislation domestic violence, sexual harassment, or other forms of violence tar-
geted at women. Rape is only criminalized according to a 2005 ministerial de-
cree. In March, the UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against
Women called on Haiti to expedite the adoption of a draft law on violence
against women. The political crisis prevented progress towards consideration of
the bill or a similarly pending criminal code reform that would address gaps in
protection. 
Children’s Domestic Labor
Widespread use of child domestic workers—known as restavèk—continues.
Restavèks, most of whom are girls, are sent from low-income households to live
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with wealthier families in the hope that they will be schooled and cared for in ex-
change for performing light chores. Though difficult to calculate, some estimates
suggest that between 225,000 and 300,000 children work as restavèks. These
children are often unpaid, denied education, and physically or sexually abused.
Haiti’s labor code does not set a minimum age for work in domestic services,
though the minimum age for work in industrial, agricultural, and commercial en-
terprises is 15. In March, the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child called on
Haiti to criminalize the practice of placing children in domestic service.
Deportation and Statelessness for Dominicans 
of Haitian Descent
At least 135,000 Dominicans of Haitian descent and Haitian migrants working in
the Dominican Republic reentered Haiti between July 2015 and August 2016,
after Dominican officials deported more than 27,000 people and another 24,254
were deported without official documentation, others fled under pressure or
threat. This occurred in accordance with a controversial 2015 regularization plan
for foreigners in the Dominican Republic. Many deportations did not meet inter-
national standards and many people have been swept up in arbitrary, summary
deportations without any sort of hearing.  
Some of the poorest arrivals live in unofficial camps in the Anse a Pitres area, in
harsh conditions with little or no access to basic services. Humanitarians relo-
cated 580 families from these camps into housing in April and May 2016. 
Key International Actors
The UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) has been operating since 2004
and has contributed to efforts to improve public security, protect vulnerable
groups, and strengthen the country’s democratic institutions. The UN Security
Council has extended MINUSTAH’s mandate through April 15, 2017.
In August, prompted by a report of the UN special rapporteur on extreme poverty
and human rights, a spokesperson for the UN secretary-general said that MINUS-
TAH needed “to do more regarding its own involvement in the initial outbreak
and the suffering of those affected by cholera.” 
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In October, the special rapporteur formally issued his report, criticizing the UN’s
Office of Legal Affairs and alleging that the office came up “with patently artifi-
cial and wholly unfounded legal pretense for insisting that the [UN] must not
take responsibility for what it has done.” The same month, the UN deputy secre-
tary general announced the UN’s new approach to cholera in Haiti, which in-
cluded both an intensification to treat and eliminate cholera, and plans to
develop a framework for material assistance to those most affected by cholera. 
In a special session of the UN General Assembly in December, the UN secretary-
general apologized on behalf of the UN. “We simply did not do enough with re-
gard to the cholera outbreak and its spread in Haiti. We are profoundly sorry for
our role,” he said. He called the provision of material assistance a “concrete ex-
pression” of the UN’s “regret” for the suffering of many Haitians. Initial re-
sponses from victims were positive, although they highlighted that
consultations for implementing the UN plans needed to be robust.
In August, an appeal filed in 2013 by the Institute for Justice and Democracy in
Haiti and the Bureau des Avocats Internationaux on behalf of 5,000 victims of
the epidemic was dismissed in United States federal court. At time of writing, no
petition to the US Supreme Court had been filed. To date, there has been no in-
dependent adjudication of the facts surrounding the introduction of cholera and
the question of the UN’s involvement.  
According to figures from the UN Office of Internal Oversight Services, at least
102 allegations of sexual abuse or exploitation have been made against MINUS-
TAH personnel since 2007. 
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Honduras
Rampant crime and impunity for human rights abuses remain the norm in Hon-
duras. Despite a downward trend in recent years, the murder rate is among the
highest in the world. Journalists, peasant activists, and lesbian, gay, bisexual,
and transgender (LGBT) individuals are among those most vulnerable to vio-
lence. Berta Cáceres, a prominent environmental and indigenous-rights activist,
was killed in March 2016; police had failed to investigate threats on her life. 
Efforts to reform the institutions responsible for providing public security have
made little progress. Marred by corruption and abuse, the judiciary and police
remain largely ineffective. 
In April, members of a commission created by an agreement between the Organi-
zation of American States (OAS) and the government—the Mission to Support
the Fight against Corruption and Impunity in Honduras (MACCIH)—began operat-
ing in Honduras. The commission’s mandate includes selecting and overseeing
a group of judges, prosecutors, police officers, and forensic scientists to pursue
corruption cases.
Police Abuse and Corruption 
The use of lethal force by the national police is a chronic problem. Investigations
into police abuses are hindered by inefficiency and corruption; little information
about them is made public, and impunity is the rule. Efforts to address endemic
corruption have made little progress.
In April, police files surfaced showing that high-level commanders, acting under
orders from Winter Blanco, a cartel leader from the Caribbean coast, had ordered
the 2009 assassination of the chief of the Anti-Drug Directorate, Julián Arístides
González Irías, and, two years later, of his adviser, Alfredo Landaverde. A police-
reform commission appointed in response to the revelations announced the re-
moval from active duty of 27 police commanders, including two former chiefs of
the national police. Foreign Minister Arturo Corrales, a former security minister,
resigned. 
President Juan Orlando Hernández has expanded the military’s role in combating
violent crime. The National Human Rights Commission (CONADEH), in a Decem-
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ber 2015 report, listed complaints it has received against the Military Police and
Army personnel, alleging abuses that include killings, abductions, torture,
rapes, and robberies.
Judicial Independence
Judges face politically motivated intimidation and interference. In December
2012, Congress voted to remove four of the five justices in the Supreme Court’s
Constitutional Chamber after the justices ruled that a law aimed at addressing
police corruption was unconstitutional. 
The replacement of the four justices was part of a broader pattern of interfer-
ence. By December 2014, the Council of Judiciary, established in 2011 with au-
thority to appoint and dismiss judges, had fired 29 and suspended another 28,
according to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR), although
the basis for disciplinary action and the applicable penalties had yet to be de-
fined by law. 
Attacks on Journalists, Lawyers, Human Rights Defenders,
Environmental Activists
The IACHR described Honduras in August as “one of the most hostile and dan-
gerous countries for human rights defenders.” Journalists, lawyers, and human
rights defenders suffer threats, attacks, and killings. Twenty-one journalists were
murdered from 2014 through May 2016, according to the National Human Rights
Commission (CONADEH). Almost all killings of journalists go unpunished. 
In 2015, the government enacted a law that created a 14-member National Coun-
cil for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders (NCPHRD), as well as a “protec-
tion system” headed by the Secretariat of Justice, Human Rights, Governance,
and Decentralization. The Committee against Torture (CAT) noted that the
NCPHRD is moving slowly on 38 petitions for protection received through May
2016. 
In March, Berta Cáceres, an indigenous land rights and environmental defender,
was shot dead in her home. Although she had reported to police 33 threats on
her life, none were investigated. Cáceres, a member of Honduras’ largest indige-
nous group, the Lenca, had waged a campaign to stop the building of the Agua
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Zarca Dam, which the activists condemn as a threat to the Gualcarque River. Five
men, including an army major and the manager for social and environmental
matters for Desarrollos Energéticos (DESA), the firm contracted to build the dam,
were arrested in early May for alleged participation in Cáceres’s murder, which
prosecutors said was part of a conspiracy with DESA. A sixth suspect was ar-
rested in September.
Criminal Defamation
In July, Honduran television journalist Ariel Armando D’Vicente was convicted of
defamation, sentenced to three years in prison, and banned for three years from
working as a journalist. The charges arose from a series of reports in 2014, in
which D’Vicente linked the police commander of Choluteca Department to cattle
smuggling gangs. D’Vicente remains free pending appeal of his conviction.
Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity
Homophobic violence is a major problem in Honduras. In June, several United
Nations agencies working in Honduras urged the government to investigate
killings of LGBTI activists and noted that sexual violence against LGBTI individu-
als forces them into “internal displacement” or to flee the country in search of
international protection. 
Violence against Children
Fear of gang violence drives hundreds of children every year to leave the country
and head north, often unaccompanied. According to a report by UNICEF and the
National Violence Observatory of the Universidad Nacional Autónoma de Hon-
duras (UNAH), the number of child homicides rose from 434 in 2014 to 570 in
2015.
Prison Conditions
Inhumane conditions, including overcrowding, inadequate nutrition, and poor
sanitation, are endemic to Honduran prisons. Designed to hold up to 8,600 in-
mates, the country’s lockups held more than 16,000 in December 2015. Prison
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guards in many facilities have effectively relinquished control and discipline to
the inmates. 
Key International Actors
In January, the OAS signed an agreement with the Honduran government creat-
ing the Mission to Support the Fight against Corruption and Impunity in Hon-
duras (MACCIH). President Hernández had proposed the collaboration in July
2015, after protests demanding a commission similar to Guatemala’s Interna-
tional Commission Against Impunity (CICIG). MACCIH began operating in April.
In November 2015, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights found that Hon-
duras violated the rights of four judges who were dismissed for opposing the
2009 military coup against former President Zelaya. The ruling obligated Hon-
duras to reinstate three of the judges—one had already been reinstated—or, if
the government could show reinstatement was not possible, compensate them
for lost pay. In response to the ruling, the government claimed that lack of va-
cant posts prevented reinstatement of the judges, and opted to pay reparations.
The US Congress allotted US$98.3 million in bilateral aid for fiscal year 2016, of
which 75 percent was contingent on certification of the government’s progress
on issues including the protection of human rights, the combatting of corrup-
tion, and the strengthening of public institutions. 
On September 30, 2016, the Department of State certified to the US Congress
that Honduras has taken effective steps to meet the criteria specified in the Fis-
cal Year 2016 appropriation legislation.
In June, Honduras signed an agreement with the UN High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR) for the opening of a UNHCR office to aid in the protection of
people internally displaced by violence, as well as refugees who are returned by
the US and Mexico.
In May, in response to Cáceres’ killing and the filing of charges against an em-
ployee of DESA, the Dutch development bank, FMO, and the Finnish Fund for In-
dustrial Cooperation, Finnfund, announced they would withdraw their financing
for the Agua Zarca Dam.
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India
Limits on free speech and attacks on religious minorities, often led by vigilante
groups that claim to be supporters of the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), are
an increasing concern in India. In 2016, students were accused of sedition for ex-
pressing their views; people who raised concerns over challenges to civil liber-
ties were deemed anti-Indian; Dalits and Muslims were attacked on suspicion
they had killed, stolen, or sold cows for beef; and nongovernmental organiza-
tions (NGOs) came under pressure due to India’s restrictive foreign funding regu-
lations. 
A crackdown on violent protests in Jammu and Kashmir beginning in July killed
over 90 people and injured hundreds, fueling further discontent against govern-
ment forces. Impunity for police and security forces largely continued amid new
allegations of torture and extrajudicial killings, including reports of sexual as-
sault and other abuses by security forces in the central Indian state of Chhattis-
garh. 
There were also some positive developments in 2016. The Narendra Modi gov-
ernment took steps toward ensuring greater access to financial services such as
banking, insurance, and pensions for economically marginalized Indians and
launched a campaign to make modern sanitation available to more households.
In July, the Supreme Court of India took a strong stand against impunity for secu-
rity forces, ruling that the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act (AFSPA) does not
protect soldiers from prosecution for abuses committed while deployed in inter-
nal armed conflicts. The court also gave new life to a challenge to a discrimina-
tory colonial-era law criminalizing homosexuality.
Security Forces Abuses and Lack of Accountability 
Indian law makes it difficult, if not impossible, to prosecute public officials. Sec-
tion 197 of the Criminal Procedure Code bars courts from recognizing any of-
fenses (except sexual offenses) alleged to have been committed by public
servants in the discharge of their official duties unless the central or a state gov-
ernment permits prosecution. In August, a special court discharged Gujarat po-
lice officer Rajkumar Pandian from a 2005 extrajudicial killing case under this
provision. Pandian was the 12th defendant to be discharged in the case. 
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In rare cases in 2016, police were held accountable for abuses. In January, four
policemen in Mumbai were sentenced to seven years in prison for their role in
the death of a 20-year-old man in police custody. In April, 47 policemen were
sentenced to life in prison for involvement in the killing of 11 Sikhs in 1991 in the
Pilibhit district of Uttar Pradesh state. 
Despite calls for repeal of the Armed Forces Special Powers Act, soldiers con-
tinue to have immunity from prosecution when deployed in areas of internal con-
flict. In July 2016, however, the Supreme Court of India, in a decision ordering an
investigation into 1,528 cases of alleged extrajudicial killings in Manipur state,
ruled that the AFSPA does not provide immunity to security force personnel who
use excessive or retaliatory force, and that every alleged extrajudicial killing
should be investigated. The confession of a Manipuri policeman in January that
he had acted on orders to kill more than 100 suspected militants between 2002
and 2009 exposed how police had adopted illegal practices long associated
with the army and paramilitary forces. 
In October, authorities resisted calls for investigation into the killing of eight
prisoners who escaped a high security prison in Madhya Pradesh state, fueling
concerns that any wrongdoing by police would go unpunished.
Violent protests erupted in July after the killing of Burhan Wani and two other
Hizb-ul-Mujahedin militants in an armed exchange with government forces in
Jammu and Kashmir. In all, over 90 protesters and two police officers were killed,
and hundreds of others were injured. The Central Reserve Police Force, a para-
military unit, defended the use of shot guns that fired pellets and resulted in
hundreds of eye injuries, even as it told the Jammu and Kashmir High Court that
“it was difficult to follow the standard operating procedure given the nature of
the protests.”
Security forces operating against Maoist insurgents continue to be accused of
serious human rights violations, including sexual assault. Numerous tribal vil-
lagers have been arbitrarily arrested as Maoist sympathizers. In July, security
forces in Odisha killed five tribal villagers, including a 2-year-old child, claiming
they were killed in crossfire during anti-Maoist operations, an assertion disputed
by the National Commission of Scheduled Tribes. 
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In June, after 21-year-old tribal woman Madkam Hidke was killed in an alleged
gunfight with armed Maoists in Chhattisgarh’s Sukma district, family members
and rights activists alleged that security personnel had forcibly picked her up
from her home, gang raped her, and then killed her. In August, security forces
killed a 19-year-old in Bastar region in Chhattisgarh in what activists alleged was
an extrajudicial killing.
Treatment of Dalits, Tribal Groups, and Religious Minorities
Hindu vigilante groups attacked Muslims and Dalits over suspicions that they
had killed, stolen, or sold cows for beef. The violence took place amid an aggres-
sive push by several BJP leaders and militant Hindu groups to protect cows and
ban beef consumption. 
In March 2016 in Jharkhand state, a Muslim cattle trader, Mohammed Mazlum
Ansari, 35, and a 12-year-old boy, Mohammed Imteyaz Khan, were found hanging
from a tree, their hands tied behind their backs and their bodies bruised. In Au-
gust, a man was killed in Karnataka state by members of a nationalist Hindu
group while transporting cows. 
In July, four men in Gujarat were stripped, tied to a car, and publicly beaten with
sticks and belts over suspicions of cow slaughter. 
The government’s continuing failure to rein in militant groups, combined with in-
flammatory remarks made by some BJP leaders, has contributed to the impres-
sion that leaders are indifferent to growing intolerance.  
A 2016 report on caste-based discrimination by the UN special rapporteur on mi-
nority issues noted that caste-affected groups continue to suffer exclusion and
dehumanization. In January, the suicide of Rohith Vemula, a 25-year-old Dalit
student, drew renewed attention to entrenched caste-based discrimination in In-
dian society, and sparked nationwide protests by students and activists calling
for reforms in higher education.
In June, a special court in Gujarat convicted 24 people for their involvement in
the mass killing of 69 people by a Hindu mob in Gulberg Society, a Muslim
neighborhood in Ahmedabad, during the 2002 Gujarat riots. While pronouncing
the verdict, the court called the killings the “darkest day in the history of civil so-
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ciety.” But some victims’ families, lawyers, and rights activists criticized the ac-
quittals of senior BJP leaders and a police official.
Freedom of Speech
Authorities continue to use sedition and criminal defamation laws to prosecute
citizens who criticize government officials or oppose state policies. In a blow to
free speech, the government in 2016 argued before the Supreme Court in favor of
retaining criminal penalties for defamation. The court upheld the law. 
In February, authorities arrested three students at the Jawaharlal Nehru Univer-
sity in Delhi under the sedition law for alleged anti-national speech, acting on
complaints by members of the Akhil Bharatiya Vidyarthi Parishad (ABVP), the
student wing of the ruling BJP. These arrests led to widespread protests over the
arbitrary use of the sedition law. 
In August, police in southern Karnataka state filed a sedition case against
Amnesty International India based on a complaint by ABVP, alleging that anti-In-
dian slogans were raised at a meeting organized by Amnesty on abuses in Kash-
mir. Police later claimed, however, that they did not have sufficient evidence to
proceed with charges. The same month, an actor-turned-politician in the state
also faced sedition charge after she praised the friendship and courtesy she re-
ceived in Pakistan.
In August, the Karnataka High Court called the state government “clearly para-
noid” for pressing sedition charges against three people, including two former
policemen, for organizing a protest seeking better police wages and working
conditions.
In Chhattisgarh, journalists, lawyers, and civil society activists faced harassment
and arrest. In March, the Editors Guild of India reported that media in Chhattis-
garh state were “working under tremendous pressure” from authorities, Maoist
rebels, and vigilante groups. 
Civil Society and Freedom of Association
The Modi government continues to use the Foreign Contribution Regulation Act
(FCRA), which regulates foreign funding for civil society organizations, to cut off
funds and stymie the activities of organizations that question or criticize the gov-
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ernment or its policies. In April 2016, Maina Kiai, the UN special rapporteur on
freedom of assembly and association, analyzed the FCRA and said that restric-
tions imposed by the law and its rules “are not in conformity with international
law, principles and standards.” 
In May, the government temporarily suspended the FCRA status of the Lawyers
Collective, an organization founded by Indira Jaising, a former additional solici-
tor general, and her husband, Anand Grover, a former UN special rapporteur on
the right to health. The Lawyers Collective accused the government of attempting
to disempower and weaken the organization because of its work assisting peo-
ple in cases challenging Modi government policies. In June, three UN special
rapporteurs released a statement raising concerns over the suspension and call-
ing on the government to repeal FCRA. In November, the government refused to
renew FCRA for 25 NGOs, including several prominent human rights groups.  
Even as authorities were using FCRA to tighten restrictions on NGOs, the govern-
ment amended the law in March to retroactively legalize funding by foreign enti-
ties to political parties. 
Women’s Rights
Despite some high-profile rape and sexual assault prosecutions, new reports of
gang rapes, domestic violence, acid attacks, and murders of women in 2016 con-
tinued to spotlight the need for concerted government action to improve
women’s safety and ensure prompt police investigation of such crimes. Women
and girls with disabilities in particular continue to face barriers to accessing jus-
tice for violence against them. 
In March, the Bombay High Court directed the Maharashtra state government to
ensure that women are not denied entry to any place of worship that allows men
access. Following the decision, two temples in the state opened their inner sanc-
tum to women. In August, the High Court further ordered that women be allowed
to enter the Mumbai-based Muslim shrine, Haji Ali. A case pending before the
Supreme Court at time of writing will determine whether women of menstrual
age are allowed to enter the Kerala-based Sabarimala Ayyappa Hindu temple.
Sabarimala is one of the few Hindu temples to restrict entry of women aged 10 to
50, saying menstruating women are impure. In April, the Supreme Court had ob-
served that “[g]ender discrimination in such a matter is unacceptable.”
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In October, the government told the Supreme Court that the practice of triple
talaq (giving Muslim men the right to unilaterally divorce their wives by uttering
the phrase “I divorce you” three times), a part of Muslim personal law, violates
fundamental constitutional rights and inhibits gender equality. The govern-
ment’s statement was made in response to petitions filed by the organization
Muslim Women’s Quest for Equality and others seeking to have triple talaq
deemed unconstitutional.  
Children’s Rights
In January 2016, the new Juvenile Justice Act came into force, permitting prose-
cution of 16- and 17-year-olds in adult court when charged with serious crimes
such as rape and murder. The law was enacted despite strong opposition from
children’s rights activists and the National Commission for Protection of Child
Rights.
In July, the parliament approved a new law against child labor that bans all forms
of employment of children below age 14, with an exception for children of all
ages who work in family enterprises where such work does not interfere with
their schooling. Indian activists opposed the law saying it left children from
poor and marginalized communities open to exploitation in the absence of ef-
fective implementation of the right to education law, emphasizing that most
child labor occurs invisibly within families.
Violent protests in Kashmir that began in July 2016 led to disruption in children’s
education as schools were forced to close for months; at least 32 schools were
burned down and several were taken over by paramilitary forces who set up tem-
porary camps inside.
Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity
In February 2016, the Supreme Court of India allowed a challenge to section 377
of the penal code to proceed, referring the case to a five-judge bench. The colo-
nial-era provision, which the court had upheld in 2013, criminalizes same-sex re-
lations between adults. In June, several well-known LGBT professionals filed a
petition in Supreme Court arguing that section 377 violates the right to life and
personal liberty. 
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In August, the government introduced a new bill in parliament on the rights of
transgender persons. The bill was flawed, however, by provisions that were in-
consistent with the 2014 Supreme Court ruling that recognized transgender indi-
viduals as a third gender and found them eligible for quotas in jobs and
education.
Rights of People with Disabilities
Women and girls with psychosocial or intellectual disabilities in India continue
to be locked up in overcrowded and unsanitary state mental hospitals and resi-
dential institutions, without their consent, due to stigma and the absence of ad-
equate community-based support and mental health services. After a Human
Rights Watch report revealed the range of abuses such women face in institu-
tions, the National Commission for Women took up its first-ever study of the
issue. 
India’s Upper House of Parliament passed a new mental health bill in August
2016. The law fails, however, to comply fully with the United Nations Convention
on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, including its provision that people
with disabilities should enjoy legal capacity on an equal basis with others in all
aspects of life, with appropriate measures to provide support they may require in
exercising their legal capacity. 
Death Penalty
There were no executions in 2016, but some 385 prisoners remained on death
row. Most of the prisoners belong to marginalized communities or religious mi-
norities. Indian courts have recognized that the death penalty has been imposed
disproportionately and in a discriminatory manner against disadvantaged
groups in India. 
Foreign Policy
Relations between India and Pakistan deteriorated in 2016. Following the out-
break of renewed violence in Jammu and Kashmir in July, the government of Pak-
istan called on the UN secretary-general for an independent inquiry and
plebiscite under UN supervision. 
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The Indian government rejected Pakistan’s allegations and request, accusing
Pakistan of stirring up trouble in the region and of using terrorism as an instru-
ment of state policy. Meanwhile, Prime Minister Narendra Modi called attention
to what he called “atrocities” committed by Pakistan in Balochistan and Pak-
istan-administered Kashmir in his speeches, including on India’s Independence
Day. Tensions further escalated in September after the Indian government
claimed its security forces had attacked militant sites inside Pakistan in re-
sponse to an attack on an Indian army base in Jammu and Kashmir that killed 19
soldiers. 
India’s voting record on rights issues at the UN was disappointing. In May, the
government abstained from voting on a bid by the Committee to Protect Journal-
ists, an international press freedom group, for UN accreditation. In July, the gov-
ernment abstained on a resolution that created a UN expert post to address
discrimination against LGBT persons and voted in favor of amendments to
weaken the mandate, saying India’s Supreme Court was still to decide on the
issue of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) rights. 
India pushed Nepal to adopt an inclusive constitution that accommodated the
aspirations of minority groups in the southern plains adjoining the Indian bor-
der. India continued to press Sri Lanka to address the demands of minority
Tamils. 
India and US strengthened security collaboration. In July, Modi addressed a joint
session of the US Congress, noting a shared commitment to combating climate
change and terrorism. 
In October, India hosted the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa)
summit. While the prime minister spoke of partnering to address security chal-
lenges and economic uncertainties, there was no mention of working to uphold
international human rights principles.
In October, India ratified the Paris agreement on climate change, which 195
countries adopted in December 2015.  
Key International Actors
A US Congressional Commission held a hearing in July 2016 on the human rights
situation in India, coinciding with Modi’s visit to Washington. The hearing spot-
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lighted issues of violence against marginalized communities and religious mi-
norities such as Muslims and Christians.  
A 2016 report by the US Commission on International Religious Freedom said re-
ligious tolerance had “deteriorated” and “religious freedom violations” had in-
creased in India. During his visit to India in June, US Senator Ben Cardin, a
ranking member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, expressed concerns
over religious intolerance, anti-conversion laws, and extrajudicial killings in the
country. In August, during his India visit, US Secretary of State John Kerry empha-
sized the need to protect the rights to freedom of expression and peaceful
protest.
In a joint statement following the India-European Union summit in March at-
tended by Modi and the heads of European Council and European Commission,
the leaders “highlighted the need for efforts to ensure gender equality and re-
spect for women and girls’ human rights.” 
In August, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Zeid Ra’ad al-Hussein ex-
pressed regret at the failure of Indian and Pakistani authorities to grant his office
access to Jammu and Kashmir for a fact-finding visit. “Without access, we can
only fear the worst,” he said.
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Indonesia
President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo’s rhetorical support for human rights has yet to
translate into meaningful policy initiatives to address the country’s serious
rights problems. In 2016, Jokowi notably failed to speak out against or otherwise
address discriminatory statements and policies issued by senior government
and military officials that have fueled violations of the rights of religious minori-
ties and the country’s lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) population. 
Religious minorities in Indonesia continue to face discriminatory regulations and
violent attacks by Islamist militant groups. Impunity for the security forces in the
provinces of Papua and West Papua also remains a serious problem and dozens
of Papuans remain imprisoned for nonviolent expression of their political views.
In April 2016, the government broke a decades-long taboo on open discussion of
the state-backed massacres of up to 1 million alleged Communists and others in
1965-1966, hosting a symposium for survivors and victim’s families to chal-
lenge the official narrative that the killings were a heroic defense of the nation
against a Communist plot to overthrow the government. 
However, the government has provided no details of an officially mooted ac-
countability process for the massacres, including when it might begin opera-
tions. Jokowi’s decision in July 2016 to appoint as security minister former
General Wiranto, indicted by a UN-supported tribunal for crimes against human-
ity, has heightened concerns about his administration’s commitment to human
rights and accountability. 
Jokowi continues to be outspoken in his support for the death penalty, making
execution of convicted drug traffickers a symbol of his resolve as a leader. In-
donesia executed four convicted drug traffickers in July 2016, but ordered a last-
minute delay in the executions of 10 other death row prisoners pending a
“comprehensive review” of their cases. The government has indicated that exe-
cutions will continue in 2017.
Freedom of Religion
In January, Indonesian officials and security forces were complicit in the violent
forced eviction of more than 7,000 members of the Gerakan Fajar Nusantara reli-
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gious community, known as Gafatar, from their homes in East and West Kaliman-
tan.
Human Rights Watch research found that security forces failed to protect mem-
bers of Gafatar, standing by while mobs from the ethnic Malay and Dayak com-
munities looted and destroyed properties owned by group members, many of
whom originally came from Java. Government officials transferred Gafatar mem-
bers to unofficial detention centers and then to their home towns, not as a short-
term safety measure, but apparently to end their presence on the island and
dissolve the religious group. 
In March 2016, the Jokowi administration issued a decree banning Gafatar activi-
ties; punishments for violations include a maximum five-year prison term. The
government also arrested three Gafatar leaders who face possible prison terms
of life imprisonment on charges of blasphemy and treason.
In January 2016, local government authorities banned the activities of the Ah-
madiyah religious community in Subang, West Java. Neither Jokowi nor other na-
tional officials spoke out or intervened to lift the ban. That same month, local
government officials on Bangka Island, located off the east coast of Sumatra, in-
structed the island’s Ahmadiyah community to convert to Sunni Islam or face
forcible expulsion from the area. Neither Jokowi nor other central government of-
ficials spoke out in defense of the beleaguered Ahmadiyah communities.  
In July 2016, a mob in the city of Tanjung Balai in northern Sumatra attacked and
inflicted serious damage on three Buddhist temples associated with the city’s
ethnic Chinese community. Police deny that the attack was sectarian and ar-
rested seven suspects in the attack.
Women’s and Girls’ Rights
In June 2016, Indonesia’s Minister of Home Affairs Tjahjo Kumolo backtracked on
his commitment to abolish rights-violating local and regional Sharia (Islamic
law) regulations. Although his office annulled 3,143 other “problematic regional
regulations” for violating the country’s credo of “unity in diversity” and although
Indonesian law stipulates that regulation of religion is for national, not regional
or local authorities, the ministry left in place all existing Sharia provisions, many
of them discriminatory.
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Indonesia’s official Commission on Violence against Women reported that, as of
August 2016, the number of discriminatory national and local regulations target-
ing women had risen to 422, from 389 at the end of 2015. They include local laws
compelling women and girls to don the hijab, or headscarf, in schools, govern-
ment offices, and public spaces. While many of these laws require traditional
Sunni Muslim garb both for women and men, research by Human Rights Watch
indicates they disproportionately target women.
A local bylaw implemented in August in Sumedang, West Java, forbids anyone
with an “eye-catching appearance” from going out alone at night. The municipal
government justified the regulation on the basis that it would help discourage
sexual activity. 
Papua
The Jokowi administration has repeatedly said it intends to take a new approach
to Indonesia’s easternmost provinces, Papua and West Papua (“Papua”), home
to a low-level insurgency and a peaceful pro-independence movement, including
by addressing human rights concerns. The reality has not matched the rhetoric.
In April 2016, the government announced that it would seek accountability for 11
high-priority past human rights cases in Papua. They include the Biak massacre in
July 1998 when security forces opened fire on participants at a peaceful flag-rais-
ing ceremony on the island, the military crackdown on Papuans in Wasior in
2001 and Wamena in 2003 that left dozens killed and thousands displaced, and
the forced break-up of the Papuan People’s Congress in October 2011 that left
three people dead and hundreds injured. However, the government has not pro-
vided any details as to when, where, and how the cases would be addressed. 
Indonesian authorities continue to restrict access by foreign journalists and
rights monitors to the region. In January 2016, the Indonesian Embassy in
Bangkok informed Bangkok-based France 24 correspondent Cyril Payen that it
had denied his application for a journalist’s visa for a reporting trip to Papua. 
Indonesian government officials justified the visa rejection on the basis that
Payen’s previous reporting, which focused on pro-independence sentiment in
the region, was “biased and unbalanced.” Rather than engaging with Payen and
France 24 to publicly challenge any inaccuracies in the previous reporting, au-
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thorities threatened to deny visas to Payen and any other France 24 journalists
seeking to report from the country. Payen’s case highlights the gap between
Jokowi’s announced “opening” of Papua to foreign media and the reality facing
journalists still blocked from reporting there.
On May 2, Indonesian police detained more than 1,500 supporters of Papuan in-
dependence for “lacking a permit to hold a rally.” Police released the detainees
after several hours without charge, but their detention underlines the official
lack of tolerance for peaceful expression of political aspirations in Papua. At the
end of August 2016, 37 Papuan activists remained imprisoned after being con-
victed of rebellion or treason (“makar”), many for nonviolent “crimes” such as
public display of the pro-independence Morning Star flag.  
Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity
Starting in January 2016, high-ranking Indonesian officials made a series of vitri-
olic anti-LGBT statements and policy pronouncements, fueling increased threats
and at times violent attacks on LGBT activists and individuals, primarily by Is-
lamist militants. In some cases, the threats and violence occurred in the pres-
ence, and with the tacit support, of government officials or security forces.
State institutions, including the National Broadcasting Commission and the Na-
tional Child Protection Commission, issued censorship directives banning infor-
mation and broadcasts that portrayed the lives of LGBT people as “normal” as
well as so-called propaganda about LGBT lives. Ministries proposed discrimina-
tory and regressive anti-LGBT laws. 
In July and August, the Constitutional Court heard a petition that proposed
amending the criminal code to criminalize sex outside of marriage and same-sex
sexual relations. During the initial hearings, the petitioners—led by a group
called the Family Love Alliance—put forward ill-informed and bigoted testimony
similar to the anti-LGBT rhetoric espoused by Indonesian officials and politicians
earlier in the year. The government, the respondent in the case, said criminaliz-
ing sex out of wedlock would make “the sinner a criminal, and the government
authoritarian,” a view echoed in testimony by the National Commission on Vio-
lence Against Women and other groups opposed to the petition. At time of writ-
ing the court had not yet ruled on the petition.
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Military Reform and Impunity
Indonesia’s Attorney General Muhammad Prasetyo announced in May 2015 that
the government would form a “Reconciliation Commission” to seek a “perma-
nent solution for all unresolved human rights abuses” of the past half century.
Prasetyo said the cases would include the state-sanctioned massacres of 1965-
1966, in which the military and military-backed vigilantes killed up to 1 million
people. 
The government provided no further details of when the “Reconciliation Commis-
sion” might begin operations or how the process of accountability would pro-
ceed. Paramilitary and nationalist groups that oppose accountability have
criticized calls for redress for past rights abuses as an attempt “to revive commu-
nism.”
Jokowi’s July 2016 decision to appoint Wiranto, indicted as a crimes against hu-
manity suspect by a UN-backed tribunal, as security minister heightened con-
cerns about the Jokowi administration’s commitment to human rights and
accountability.
Children’s Rights
Thousands of children in Indonesia, some just 8 years old, are working in haz-
ardous conditions on tobacco farms. Child tobacco workers are exposed to nico-
tine, handle toxic chemicals, use sharp tools, lift heavy loads, and work in
extreme heat. The work can have lasting consequences for their health and de-
velopment. Indonesian and multinational tobacco companies buy tobacco
grown in Indonesia, but none do enough to ensure that children are not doing
hazardous work on farms in their supply chains. Human Rights Watch has called
on the Indonesian government and tobacco companies to prohibit children from
work that involves direct contact with tobacco, inspect farms to ensure children
are not in danger, and carry out an extensive public education and training pro-
gram to raise awareness of the health risks to children of work in tobacco farm-
ing.
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Disability Rights
Despite a 1977 government ban on the practice, more than 18,000 people with
psychosocial disabilities (mental health conditions) in Indonesia are currently
subjected to pasung—being shackled or locked up in small confined spaces—
sometimes for months or years at a time. 
Due to prevalent stigma and the absence of adequate community-based support
services or mental health care, people with psychosocial disabilities often end
up locked-up in overcrowded and unsanitary institutions without their consent,
where they face abuse ranging from physical and sexual violence to involuntary
treatment including shackling, electroshock therapy, isolation, and forced con-
traception.
The Rights of Persons with Disabilities Bill was passed by the Indonesian parlia-
ment in March 2016. While the bill represents a major advancement, it does not
fully comply with the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities,
which Indonesia ratified in 2011.
During a meeting with Human Rights Watch in April 2016, Indonesia’s minister of
health, Nila Moeloek, orally committed to providing mental health medication in
all 9,500 community health centers (puskesmas) across the country. Government
implementation of this commitment could help turn the tide against shackling.
Refugees and Asylum Seekers
In June, the government acceded to international pressure and allowed a boat-
load of 44 Sri Lankans stranded on a beach in northern Aceh province to come
ashore and receive assistance from UN and International Organization for Migra-
tion personnel. The decision followed a 10-day standoff in which Indonesian au-
thorities refused to allow the group to disembark and instead insisted that the
boat leave Indonesian waters after being resupplied and refueled. 
According to UN refugee agency data, as of February 2016 there were 13,829
refugees and asylum seekers in Indonesia, all living in legal limbo because In-
donesia is not a party to the Refugee Convention and lacks an asylum law. This
number included 4,723 people detained in immigration centers, including unac-
companied children. 
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Key International Actors
Jokowi’s support for the use of the death penalty against convicted drug traffick-
ers has strained ties over the past year with close bilateral allies, including Aus-
tralia. The likelihood of more executions in 2017 will continue to make that issue
a sore point in Indonesia’s foreign relations. 
A July 2016 decision by a UN-backed tribunal in The Hague against China’s
claims in the South China Sea will bolster and ensure the continuance of joint
military exercises and intelligence sharing with the United States in 2017. In-
donesia’s own claims of an exclusive economic zone in that area may fuel more
disputes between Indonesian navy patrols and Chinese fishing boats in the com-
ing year. However, the Indonesian government’s passive and active complicity in
hateful anti-LGBT rhetoric and moves toward discriminatory legislation over the
past year will likely continue to be an irritant in US ties. 
In August, the US government called on Indonesia to “respect and uphold inter-
national rights and standards” after Jokowi’s spokesman Johan Budi declared
that there was “no room” for the LGBT community in Indonesia. 
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Iran
Despite three years in his office, President Hassan Rouhani has not delivered on
his campaign promise of greater respect for civil and political rights. Executions,
especially for drug-related offenses, continued at a high rate. As Rouhani faces
elections for a second term in May 2017, the hardline factions that dominate the
security apparatus and judiciary continued to crackdown on citizens for the legit-
imate exercise of their rights, in blatant disregard of international and domestic
legal standards. Iranian dual nationals and citizens returning from abroad were
at particular risk of arrest by intelligence authorities, accused of being “Western
agents.”
Executions, Freedom from Torture, and Inhuman Treatment 
Despite an initial slowdown in executions in the first months of 2016, authorities
had executed at least 203 individuals by October 25. Human rights groups, how-
ever, report that the number might be as high as 437, with most executions tak-
ing place in the second half of the year. According to government authorities,
individuals convicted of drug charges constitute the majority of those executed
in the country. 
Under Iranian law, many nonviolent crimes, such as “insulting the Prophet,”
apostasy, same-sex relations, adultery, and drug-related offenses, are punish-
able by death. In December 2015, members of Parliament introduced a bill to
eliminate the death penalty for drug offences that do not involve violence. How-
ever, the initiative, while welcomed by several authorities, has not moved for-
ward.  
On August 2, authorities announced that they had executed at least 20 alleged
members of a group Iran considers a terrorist organization on charges of mo-
harebeh, or “enmity against God.” Rights groups believe that these individuals
were among a group of 33 Sunni Kurdish men arrested in 2009 and 2010, and
sentenced to death in unfair trials after enduring abuses and torture in deten-
tion. In August, authorities in Khuzestan province executed three Arab citizens
on alleged terrorism charges. 
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New amendments to Iran’s penal code allow judges to use their discretion not to
sentence children to death. However, Iran continued to execute children in 2016.
On July 18, Amnesty International reported that authorities had hanged Hassan
Afshar, who was arrested when he was 17 years old and convicted of “forced
male to male anal intercourse” (lavat-e be onf). At least 49 inmates on death row
were convicted of crimes committed when they were under 18 years old. 
In March, the United Nations Children’s Rights Committee noted that flogging
was still a lawful punishment for boys and girls convicted of certain crimes. The
committee noted reports that lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and intersex
(LGBTI) children had been subjected to electric shocks to “cure” them.
On May 25, Iranian media reported that authorities had flogged 17 miners in
Western Azarbaijan province after their employer sued them for protesting the
firing of fellow workers. 
Fair Trials and Treatment of Prisoners 
Iranian courts, and particularly the revolutionary courts, regularly fell short of
providing fair trials and allegedly used confessions obtained under torture as ev-
idence in court. Iranian law restricts the right for a defendant to access a lawyer,
particularly during the investigation period. 
According to Iran’s criminal procedure code, individuals charged with national or
international security crimes, political and media crimes, and those charged
with crimes that incur capital punishment, life imprisonment, or retributive pun-
ishment (qisas), can be denied legal counsel under detention for up to a week.
Moreover, they have to select their counsel from a pool of preapproved lawyers
determined by the head of the judiciary. 
Several political prisoners and individuals charged with national security crimes
suffered from a lack of adequate access to medical care under detention. In
April, Omid Kokabee, a young physicist who was sentenced to 10 years in prison
in 2012, underwent surgery to remove his right kidney due to complications from
cancer after authorities unduly delayed his access to appropriate medical treat-
ment. 
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Freedom of Expression and Information   
Space for free speech and dissent remained highly restricted, and authorities
continued to arrest and charge journalists, bloggers, and online media activists
for exercising their right to freedom of expression. 
In April, a revolutionary court sentenced journalists Afarin Chitsaz, Ehsan Mazan-
darani, and Saman Safarzaei to terms of ten, seven, and five years, respectively,
and Davoud Assadi, the brother of Houshang Assadi, a journalist who lives in
France, to five years. Mazandarani’s and Chitsaz’s sentences were reduced to
two and five years, respectively, by the appeals court. The intelligence branch of
the Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) arrested the four individuals, along with
journalist Issa Saharkhiz, accusing them of being part of an “infiltration net-
work” colluding with foreign media. 
In June, the country began implementing a political crime law which, while a
step forward in granting fair trials, could still limit free speech. According to the
law, insulting or defaming public officials, when “committed to achieve reforms
and not intended to target the system, are considered political crimes.” How-
ever, political prisoners have to be detained separately from ordinary criminals
and have to be tried publicly in the presence of a jury unless doing so is deemed
detrimental to family disputes, national security, or religious and ethnic senti-
ment. 
Hundreds of websites, including social media platforms such as Facebook and
Twitter, remained blocked in Iran. The intelligence apparatus heavily monitored
citizens’ activities on social media. Hundreds of social media users, in particular
on the Telegram messaging application and Instagram have been summoned or
arrested by the IRGC for commenting on controversial issues, including fashion.  
In the past year, the police and judiciary prevented dozens of musical concerts,
particularly those featuring female vocalists and musicians, in different
provinces. 
Freedoms of Association, Assembly, and Voting 
In February, millions of Iranians participated in elections for Parliament and the
Assembly of Experts. In the lead-up to these elections, the Guardian Council, the
body in charge of vetting candidates, disqualified the majority of candidates as-
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sociated with the reformist movement based on discriminatory and arbitrary cri-
teria. After the election, in an unprecedented move, the council disqualified
Minoo Khaleghi, who had been elected in the city of Isfahan, on allegations of
shaking hands with a man. 
Authorities continue to target independent unionists and restrict freedom of as-
sembly and association.
On February 22, a revolutionary court sentenced Ismail Abdi, secretary general of
the Teachers’ Association who has been detained since June 2015, to six years in
prison, in part for organizing a teachers’ demonstration in front of the Parliament
on May 15.  
On July 27, 92 student organizations published a letter to President Rouhani criti-
cizing the persistent “atmosphere of fear and intimidation” in Iran’s universities
following the cancelation of student programs or the unlawful interference in the
agendas of these programs by non-university authorities. While student and
women’s rights activist, Bahareh Hedayat was released from prison after six-
and-a-half years in September, Zia Nabavi a prominent student activist remained
in prison. Both had been jailed since 2009 for their peaceful activism following
the presidential election that year. 
Human Rights Defenders and Political Prisoners 
Scores of human rights defenders and political activists such as Abdolfattah
Soltani remained in prison for their peaceful activities. In May, a revolutionary
court sentenced prominent Iranian human rights activist Narges Mohammadi,
who had been detained for a year, to a total of 16 years in prison for charges in-
cluding “membership in the banned campaign Step by Step to Stop the Death
Penalty.” 
In 2010, a revolutionary court sentenced Mohammadi to six years in prison for
her rights-related activities, but authorities released her due to a serious med-
ical condition from which she still suffers.
In May, prominent Kurdish human rights defender Mohammad Sediq Kaboud-
vand, the former president of the Human Rights Organization of Kurdistan, em-
barked on a hunger strike in his ninth year of detention to protest new charges
that were brought against him. 
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Prominent opposition figures Mir Hossein Mousavi, Zahra Rahnavard, and Mehdi
Karroubi have remained under house arrest without charge or trial since February
2011. Tehran’s prosecutor, who has banned media from publishing the name of
Iran’s former president, Mohamad Khatami, also prohibited him from attending
several public gatherings. 
Women’s Rights 
Iranian women face discrimination in personal status matters related to mar-
riage, divorce, inheritance, and child custody. A woman needs her male
guardian’s approval for marriage regardless of her age and cannot pass on her
nationality to her foreign-born spouse or their children. Married women may not
obtain a passport or travel outside the country without the written permission of
their husbands. 
The UN Children’s Rights Committee reported in March that the age of marriage
for girls is 13, that sexual intercourse with girls as young as nine lunar years was
not criminalized, and that judges had discretion to release some perpetrators of
so-called honor killings without any punishment. Child marriage—though not the
norm—continues, as the law allows girls to marry at 13 and boys at age 15, as
well as at younger ages if authorized by a judge.
Authorities continue to prevent girls and women from attending certain sporting
events, including men’s soccer and volleyball matches. 
On July 31, 2016, President Rouhani suspended the hiring exam for public sector
jobs to investigate apparent discrimination against women in the job market. 
Treatment of Minorities   
The government denies freedom of religion to Baha’is and discriminates against
them. At least 85 Baha’is were held in Iran’s prisons as of October 2016. Security
forces also continued to target Christian converts of Muslim heritage, as well as
members of the “house church” movement who gather to worship in private
homes. 
In August, a number of Sunni figures in Kurdish areas were summoned and inter-
rogated after they criticized the executions of at least 20 individuals on August 2. 
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The government restricted cultural as well as political activities among the coun-
try’s Azeri, Kurdish, Arab, and Baluch minorities. However, in August participants
in the national entrance examinations for universities in Iran were allowed to
choose Kurdish and Turkish languages as their majors at the bachelor level. Last
year, the University of Kurdistan reportedly accepted 40 students to study the
Kurdish language at the bachelor level. 
Key International Actors 
On January 16, Iran and its international partners announced the “implementa-
tion day” of the nuclear agreement, known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of
Action, and the subsequent lifting of economic and financial sanctions related to
Iran’s nuclear activities. Since the agreement, several trade delegations have
shuttled between Iran and other countries, particularly in Europe. 
The Iranian government continued to provide the Syrian government with mili-
tary assistance in 2016. Human Rights Watch has documented a pattern of delib-
erate and indiscriminate attacks on civilians as well as torture by the Syrian
government. On August 15, media reports claimed that Russia had used an Iran-
ian military base in city of Hamedan for its airstrikes in Syria. 
On April 16, European Union High Representative and Vice-President of the Euro-
pean Commission Federica Mogherini and Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad
Javad Zarif announced in a joint statement that the EU and Iran intend to cooper-
ate on human rights, migration, and drugs.  
On October 25, the EU Parliament adopted the report on EU strategy towards Iran
after the nuclear agreement in which it expressed concerns about the alarming
rate of executions in Iran and called for the release of all political prisoners.
In September, the United Nations Human Rights Council elected Asma Jahangir
as the new special rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Iran. Iran did
not allow Jahangir’s predecessor, Ahmed Shaheed, who was appointed in 2011,
to visit the country. 
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Iraq
Clashes with the Islamic State (also known as ISIS) intensified in 2016, including
operations to retake Ramadi in February and Fallujah in June, and the beginning
of operations in October to retake Mosul, where fighting displaced over 45,000
Iraqis as of November 11. Credible allegations emerged of summary executions,
beatings of men in custody, enforced disappearances, and mutilation of corpses
by government forces during the operation in Fallujah.
ISIS executed hundreds in and around Mosul, and used civilians there as human
shields.
According to the United Nations Assistance Mission in Iraq (UNAMI), since Janu-
ary 2016 airstrikes, explosions, gunfire, or suicide attacks killed at least 9,153
Iraqis. A 2016 International Federation of Journalists report deemed Iraq the
deadliest country in the world for journalists and a UNICEF report deemed it one
of the deadliest for children. 
ISIS Abuses
A joint UNAMI and Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human
Rights (OHCHR) report from January said that ISIS had kidnapped between 800
and 900 children in Mosul for religious and military training.  
ISIS carried out over a dozen suicide and car bombings throughout 2016. In its
deadliest attack on July 3 a car bombing in Baghdad killed over 200 people and
injuring hundreds more. On July 7, ISIS carried out a triple suicide attack on a
Shia shrine in Balad, 100 km north of Baghdad, killing at least 35 and wounding
over 60.
In September and October, ISIS launched at least three chemical attacks on the
Iraqi town of Qayyarah, south of Mosul. The use of toxic chemicals as a means of
warfare is a serious threat to civilians and combatants and is a war crime.
As the operation to retake Mosul began, ISIS started forcibly evacuating civilians
under their control with its fighters apparently using them as human shields.
There were regular, but for the most part unconfirmed, media reports during the
year of executions carried out by ISIS. In November in Hammam al-Alil, 30 kilo-
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meters southeast of Mosul, authorities discovered an ISIS mass grave containing
the remains of between 50 and 100 bodies. As the battle for Mosul intensified,
Human Rights Watch received reports of ISIS carrying out hundreds of executions
of former Iraqi Security Forces in territory still under their control. 
ISIS’s Diwan al-Hisba (Moral Policing Administration) and online media appara-
tuses have publicly announced 27 executions of allegedly gay men, at least nine
of them in Iraq. The main method ISIS used to execute these men has been to
throw them off the roofs of high-rise buildings. 
Women and girls reported severe restrictions on their clothing and freedom of
movement in ISIS-controlled areas. They told Human Rights Watch that they were
only allowed to leave their houses dressed in full face veil (niqab) and accompa-
nied by a close male relative. These rules, enforced by beating or fines on male
family members or both, isolated women from family, friends, and public life. 
They also reported restricted access to health care or education because of dis-
criminatory ISIS policies, including rules limiting male doctors from touching,
seeing, or being alone with female patients. In more rural areas ISIS has banned
girls from attending school. ISIS fighters and female ISIS “morality police” hit,
bit, or poked women with metal prongs to keep them in line, making them afraid
to try to get services they needed.
ISIS also continues to torture, rape, murder, and sexually enslave Yezidi women
and children, many of whom were captured in Iraq and taken to Syria. According
to a June United Nations commission of inquiry report, ISIS still holds about
3,200 Yezidi women and children, most of whom are in Syria. Such abuses are
war crimes and may amount to crimes against humanity, and possibly genocide.
Abuses by Government Forces
On May 24 Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi stated that the government would
take measures to protect civilians during the operation to retake Fallujah from
ISIS. Nevertheless, the next day an airstrike on Fallujah General Hospital dam-
aged the emergency room. Over the next two weeks of fighting Human Rights
Watch documented summary executions, beatings of men in custody, enforced
disappearances, and mutilation of corpses by government forces. 
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As of mid-November, according to local officials, there were still at least 643 men
and boys missing, and possibly as many as 800. They said they believed that at
least 49 others had been summarily executed or tortured to death while in the
custody of Hezbollah Brigade, a prominent group within the government-affili-
ated Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF). 
On June 4, 2016 Prime Minister al-Abadi announced that he had ordered an in-
vestigation into allegations of abuse in the Fallujah operations and three days
later announced an unspecified number of arrests. Government officials, how-
ever, at time of writing had not responded to requests for further information
about the status of the investigation, who is conducting it, or steps taken so far.
In August, authorities implemented al-Abadi’s Office Order 91 from February,
making the PMF an “independent military formation” within Iraq’s security
forces. 
Despite government assurances that only the Iraqi Security Forces would screen
the thousands of civilians fleeing Mosul for possible ISIS affiliation, on at least
one occasion a Shabak militia, part of the PMF, arbitrarily detained men after
screening hundreds of families. The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and
Iraqi authorities have in some cases detained men and boys for weeks arbitrarily
as part of the screening process. In many cases, families of detainees did not
know where they were being held, for how long, or why.
During the Mosul operation, tribal militias unlawfully detained and mistreated
residents of areas retaken from ISIS.
Displacement and Movement Restrictions
Since 2014 and over the course of 2016, Human Rights Watch has documented a
pattern of unlawful destruction of Arab homes and sometimes of entire Arab vil-
lages, in tandem with the deportation of residents, in areas of Kirkuk and Nin-
eveh governorates where there was no imperative military necessity for such
measures. The destruction of homes in many cases amounted to a war crime. Au-
thorities have not allowed internally displaced people to freely move in the Kur-
distan region of Iraq and the disputed territories, requiring internally displaced
people to stay in camps with severe restrictions on their movement.
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Freedom of Media
A 2016 International Federation of Journalists report deemed Iraq the deadliest
country in the world for journalists—with more than 300 journalists killed be-
tween 1990 and 2015. In August, journalist Wedad Hussein Ali, who was al-
legedly affiliated with the armed Turkey-based Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK),
was abducted and killed in Dohuk. KRG Asayish forces had repeatedly interro-
gated him over the previous 12 months about his writings critical of Kurdish au-
thorities.
In addition to these killings, authorities continue to limit press freedom. In
March, Iraq’s specialized Media and Publishing Court summoned al-Alam al-
Jadeed’s website editor, Mountadar Nasser, for questioning over a story pub-
lished a month earlier which accused a regulatory telecommunication committee
of corruption. Ultimately the court acquitted Nasser and dropped the defamation
charges brought against him.
Also in March the Iraqi Communications and Media Commission shut down the
Cairo-based, privately owned al-Baghdadia TV. A month later, the commission
withdrew Qatar-based Al Jazeera’s operating license for 2016 because of “media
rhetoric that incites sectarianism and violence.”
Women’s Rights, Sexual Orientation, and Gender Identity
Many of the Yezidi women and girls who escaped ISIS and are displaced in the
Kurdistan Region of Iraq lack adequate access to mental health and psychoso-
cial services. Although some services have been provided for women who be-
came pregnant during their captivity, safe and legal abortion services are not
available. Iraqi law allows abortion only in cases of medical necessity such as a
risk to a mother’s life but not in cases of rape. 
Women have few legal provisions and protection mechanisms to shield them
from domestic violence. Iraq’s penal code includes provisions on physical assu-
alt but lacks any explicit mention of domestic violence. While sexual assault is
criminalized, article 398 provides that such charges will be dropped if the as-
sailant marries the victim. A 2010 United Nations factsheet stated that one in
five Iraqi women were subject to domestic violence, and a 2012 Ministry of Plan-
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ning study found that at least 36 percent of married women have experienced
some form of abuse at the hands of their husbands. 
In 2015, Iraqi officials published a draft law on protection against domestic vio-
lence that parliament has yet to pass. The law has serious flaws, among others
that it prioritizes reconciliation over justice for abuse victims and does not stipu-
late crimes of domestic violence nor adequate penalties. The law does not set
out duties for police and prosecutors to respond to domestic violence, and does
not provide for long-term protection for the victims.
Iraq’s penal code does not prohibit same-sex intimacy, although article 394
makes it illegal to engage in extra-marital sexual relations. Due to the fact that
the law does not expressly allow same-sex marriage, it effectively prohibits all
same-sex relations. In July Moqtada al-Sadr, the prominent Shia opposition
cleric, stated that although same-sex relationships are not acceptable, individu-
als who do not conform to gender norms suffer from “psychological problems,”
and should not be attacked. 
Children in War Zones
In a June report UNICEF warned that Iraq was “one of the most dangerous places
in the world for children,” with 3.6 million children at risk of death, injury, sexual
violence, and exploitation. 
In March, when Fallujah was still under the control of ISIS, a medical source at
Fallujah General Hospital said that starving children were gathering at the local
hospital, as there were no more food sources available and families were left
eating flat bread made from ground seeds and soup made from grass.
UNICEF estimated that the number of Iraqi children working had doubled since
1990, to more than 575,000.
In 2016, Iraqi government-backed tribal militias, known as Hashad al-Asha`ri, re-
cruited at least 10 children from the Debaga IDP camp in Erbil governorate to
fight against ISIS.
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Death Penalty
Iraqi courts continued to impose the death penalty. In 2016 there were at least
63 confirmed executions. In late August 2016 Iraqi authorities executed 36 men
convicted in a sham group trial for participating in the 2014 ISIS execution of be-
tween 560 and 770 Shia army recruits stationed at Camp Speicher, outside Tikrit. 
Key International Actors
A US-led coalition of states including Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark,
France, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom carried out over 9,000
airstrikes on ISIS targets since late 2014. 
The United States was the largest provider of equipment to the Iraqi military, and
Germany the largest provider to the KRG’s Peshmerga forces.
In September, the US deployed an additional 615 US troops, bringing the total
number of US troops stationed there to at least 5,180, in order to assist in the
operation to retake Mosul. 
Lebanon’s Hezbollah group and Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Al-
Quds Force sent forces into combat in Iraq against ISIS. 
Since 2015, the Turkish airforce has carried out airstrikes on PKK positions in
northern Iraq. In 2016, Turkish groundtroops entered northern Iraq and attacked
ISIS positions near Mosul.
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Israel/Palestine
Israel continued in 2016 to enforce severe and discriminatory restrictions on
Palestinians’ human rights, to facilitate the transfer of Israeli civilians to the oc-
cupied West Bank, and to severely restrict the movement of people and goods
into and out of the Gaza Strip. 
In 2016, a new escalation of violence that began in October 2015 continued,
characterized by demonstrations, some violent, in the West Bank and at the
Gaza border with Israel that Israeli forces have suppressed, often using live fire.
There was a wave of stabbings and attempted stabbings by Palestinians against
Israeli passersby and security forces, both in the West Bank and Israel, mostly by
people acting without the sponsorship of any armed group. 
Israeli security forces used lethal force against suspected attackers in more than
150 cases, including in circumstances that suggest excessive force and at times
extrajudicial executions. Overall, between January 1 and October 31, 2016, Pales-
tinians killed at least 11 Israelis, including 2 security officers, and injured 131 Is-
raelis, including 46 security officers, in the West Bank and Israel. Israeli security
forces killed at least 94 Palestinians and injured at least 3,203 Palestinians in
the West Bank, Gaza, and Israel as of October 31, including suspected as-
sailants, protesters, and bystanders, according to the United Nations. 
Palestinian authorities in the West Bank and Gaza restricted freedom of expres-
sion, tortured and ill-treated detainees, and in Gaza executed at least four peo-
ple, including one person accused of same-sex relations.
In the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, Israeli settlers attacked and injured
26 Palestinians and damaged their property in 66 incidents as of October 31, the
UN reported. 
In January 2016, an Israeli man and teenage boy, in custody since their arrest in
December 2015, were indicted for their role in an arson attack that killed a Pales-
tinian couple and their toddler son in 2015. In May 2016, an Israeli man was sen-
tenced to life imprisonment for the burning to death of a Palestinian child in July
2014.
Also in the West Bank, Israeli authorities destroyed homes and other property
under discriminatory practices that severely restrict Palestinians’ access to con-
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struction permits and forcibly displaced, as of October 17, 1,283 Palestinian resi-
dents in West Bank areas under direct Israeli administrative control.
Israel maintained severe restrictions on the movement of people and goods into
and out of Gaza, exacerbated by Egypt’s closure of its own border with Gaza
most of the time, and by Israel’s refusal to allow Gaza to operate an airport or
seaport.
Palestinian armed groups launched 20 rockets indiscriminately into Israel from
Hamas-controlled Gaza in 2016 as of October 31, in violation of the laws of war.
Hamas authorities have failed to prosecute anyone for alleged serious crimes
committed during Israel’s 2014 military campaign in Gaza. Israel has received
more than 500 complaints stemming from the military campaign but has prose-
cuted only three soldiers, for theft.   
The Palestinian Authority (PA) and Hamas arrested activists who criticized their
leaders, security forces or policies, some of whom alleged torture in detention.
The Independent Commission for Human Rights in Palestine, a statutory com-
mission charged with monitoring human rights compliance by the Palestinian
authorities, received 150 complaints of torture and ill-treatment by PA security
forces and 204 such complaints against Hamas security forces as of October 31. 
Gaza Strip
Israel
In the same period, Israeli forces killed 8 people in Gaza during demonstrations
at the border fence, and injured at least 188. The Israeli authorities have de-
clared an area inside Gaza but near the border with Israel to be a “no-go” zone,
and Israeli soldiers fire at people who enter it. They also continued to shoot at
Palestinian civilians in the “no-go” zone that Israel imposes just inside Gaza’s
northern and eastern borders and at fishermen who venture beyond six nautical
miles from the shore—the area to which Israel restricts Gaza fishing boats. In
April, Israel expanded the fishing zone to nine miles but reinstated the six-mile
limit in June. Israel says it restricts access to the sea to prevent weapons smug-
gling and restricts access to the no-go zone to prevent cross-border attacks.
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Israel’s military advocate general has received over 500 complaints from individ-
uals and human rights groups with regard to 300 incidents that occurred during
the 2014 Israel-Gaza fighting, and he launched criminal investigations into 37 in-
cidents. So far, however, criminal charges have been filed against only three sol-
diers, for theft. According to the UN, 1,462 Palestinian civilians, including 551
children, and 6 civilians in Israel, including a child, were killed during the fight-
ing.
Closure
Israel’s closure of the Gaza Strip, particularly restrictions on movement of people
and on outgoing goods, continued to have severe consequences for the civilian
population, separating families, restricting access to medical care and educa-
tional and economic opportunities, and perpetuating unemployment and
poverty. Approximately 70 percent of Gaza’s 1.9 million people rely on humani-
tarian assistance.
Travel through the Erez Crossing, Gaza’s passenger crossing to Israel, the West
Bank, and the outside world, is limited to what the Israeli military calls “excep-
tional humanitarian cases,” meaning mostly medical patients, their compan-
ions, and prominent businesspersons. In the first half of 2016, an average of
about 500 Palestinians crossed through Erez each day, compared to the average
of more than 24,000 Palestinians who crossed each day in September 2000, just
before the second “Intifida” or Palestinian uprising began. Outgoing goods in
the first 10 months of 2016 averaged 158 truckloads per month, mostly produce
to be sold in the West Bank and Israel, just 15 percent of the 1,064 truckloads per
month prior to the June 2007 tightening of the closure.
Israeli restrictions on the delivery of construction materials to Gaza and a lack of
funding have impeded reconstruction of the 17,800 housing units severely dam-
aged or destroyed during Israel’s 2014 military operation in Gaza. About 65,000
people who lost their homes remain displaced. Israel says construction materi-
als can be used for military purposes, including fortifying tunnels, and it allows
only limited quantities to enter under the supervision of international organiza-
tions.
Egypt also blocked all regular movement of goods at the crossing with Gaza that
it controls and imposed increased restrictions on the movement of people. In
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2016, the crossing was mostly closed, with narrow exceptions mostly for medical
patients, those holding foreign passports, residencies or visas, including stu-
dents, and pilgrims to Mecca. In the first 10 months of 2016, a monthly average
of about 3,196 people crossed through Rafah in both directions, compared with
an average of 40,000 per month in the first half of 2013, prior to the overthrow of
Egyptian President Mohamed Morsy. 
Hamas and Palestinian Armed Groups
In 2016 Palestinian armed groups launched 20 rockets into Israel from Gaza as
of October 31, causing no casualties but generating fear and disruption in af-
fected cities and towns. These rockets cannot be accurately aimed at military ob-
jectives and amount to indiscriminate or deliberate attacks on civilians when
directed at Israeli population centers, as was the case in many instances. A UN
Commission of Inquiry last year found that such attacks are serious violations of
the laws of war. Hamas, which has internal control over Gaza, is responsible for
policing the border and the territory it controls and acting to ensure that unlaw-
ful attacks do not take place.
The Hamas internal security agency and police allegedly tortured or ill-treated
204 people in their custody as of October 31, according to complaints received
by the Independent Commission for Human Rights (ICHR), the statutory Palestin-
ian rights body.
In Gaza, whose laws differ somewhat from the laws in the West Bank, having
“unnatural intercourse” of a sexual nature, understood to include same-sex rela-
tionships, is a crime punishable by up to 10 years in prison. In February 2016,
Hamas’s armed wing executed one of its fighters ostensibly for “behavioral and
moral violations,” which Hamas officials acknowledged meant same-sex rela-
tions.
In addition, Gaza’s civilian authorities executed three men convicted of murder
in May, amid concerns of due process violations.
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West Bank
Israel
In the West Bank, as of October 31, Israeli security forces and settlers fatally shot
at least 83 Palestinians and wounded at least 3,015, including passersby,
demonstrators and those suspected of attacking Israelis, according to UN moni-
toring. In some cases, video footage and witness accounts strongly suggest that
excessive force was used.
In March, an Israeli soldier fatally shot Abdel Fattah al-Sharif, who along with an-
other Palestinian had stabbed a soldier at a checkpoint in Hebron. Soldiers fa-
tally shot one of the assailants and wounded al-Sharif. A few minutes after the
incident, as al-Sharif lay unmoving on the ground, a video shows the soldier
shooting him in the head. A military court is trying the soldier.
As of October 31, the UN reported 26 attacks in which Israeli settlers injured
Palestinians and 66 attacks in which they damaged Palestinian property. Israeli
authorities are required to protect Palestinians in the West Bank, but they often
fail to apprehend or prosecute Israeli settlers who attack Palestinians and de-
stroy or damage Palestinian mosques, homes, schools, olive trees, cars, and
other property. According to the Israeli human rights group Yesh Din, between
2005 and 2014, police closed 92 percent of cases of reported settler violence
without prosecuting anyone.
In 2015, an arson attack against two houses in the Palestinian village of Duma
killed a toddler, Ali Dawabshe, and both his parents. In January 2016, a man, 21,
and a teenage boy, 17, both in police custody, were charged with three counts of
murder for that incident. 
Settlements, Discriminatory Policies, Home Demolitions
Israel continued to provide security, administrative services, housing, education,
and medical care for about 560,000 settlers residing in unlawful settlements in
the West Bank, including East Jerusalem. International humanitarian law bars an
occupying power’s transfer of its civilians to occupied territory.
Israel also increased its settlement activity, authorizing construction work to
begin on more than 1,000 new housing units in settlements in the West Bank,
351
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH
WORLD REPORT 2017
352
excluding East Jerusalem, in the first half of 2016, an increase of 17 percent over
the same period in 2015, according to Israel’s Central Bureau of Statistics. 
Building permits are difficult, if not impossible, for Palestinians to obtain in East
Jerusalem or in the 60 percent of the West Bank under exclusive Israeli control
(Area C). This has driven Palestinians to construct housing and business struc-
tures that are at constant risk of demolition or confiscation by Israel on the
grounds of being unauthorized. Palestinians in these areas have access to
water, electricity, schools, and other state services that are either far more lim-
ited or costlier than the same services that the state makes available to Jewish
settlers there.
As of October 31, Israeli authorities demolished 925 Palestinian homes and
other buildings in the West Bank (including East Jerusalem), mostly for failure to
have a building permit. Israel also destroyed the homes of family members of al-
leged attackers in reprisal for attacks on Israelis, a violation of the international
humanitarian law prohibition on collective punishment. In total, the demolitions
displaced 1,347 people. 
Freedom of Movement
Israel maintained onerous restrictions on the movement of Palestinians in the
West Bank, including checkpoints and the separation barrier, a combination of
wall and fence that Israel said it built for security reasons but often placed well
within the West Bank rather than on the Green Line separating the West Bank
from Israel. Israeli-imposed restrictions designed to keep Palestinians far from
settlements forced them to take time-consuming detours and restricted their ac-
cess to agricultural land.
Israel continued construction of the separation barrier around East Jerusalem.
Some 85 percent of the barrier falls within the West Bank, isolating 11,000 Pales-
tinians on the western side of the barrier who are not allowed to travel to Israel
and must cross the barrier to access their own property as well as services in the
West Bank.
353
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH
Arbitrary Detention and Detention of Children
Israeli military authorities detained Palestinian protesters, including those who
advocated nonviolent protest against Israeli settlements and the route of the
separation barrier.
Israeli security forces continued to arrest children suspected of criminal of-
fenses, usually stone-throwing; question them without a family member or a
lawyer present; and coerce them to sign confessions in Hebrew, which they did
not understand. The Israeli military detained Palestinian children separately
from adults during remand hearings and military court trials, but often detained
children with adults immediately after arrest.
As of April 2016, Israel held 692 Palestinian administrative detainees (including
2 women and 13 children) without charge or trial, based on secret evidence. Is-
rael jails Palestinian detainees inside Israel, violating international law requiring
that they be held within the occupied territory and thus leading to restrictions on
the ability of family members to visit them, due to Israel’s requirement that visit-
ing family members clear security screenings and receive permits to enter Israel.
A number of Palestinian prisoners have gone on hunger strikes to protest their
detention without trial.
Palestinian Authority
Complaints of torture and ill-treatment by West Bank Palestinian Authority secu-
rity services persisted. The ICHR reported 150 complaints in 2016 as of October
31.
PA security services arrested activists for political criticism, and some of those
arrested alleged mistreatment in detention. In arresting, abusing, and prosecut-
ing Palestinian journalists and activists engaging in peaceful speech under long-
standing laws whose penalties include incarceration, the PA violated its
obligations under international treaties, ratified in 2014, respecting free expres-
sion and detainee rights. 
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Israel
As part of an escalation of violence that began in 2015, in 2016 Palestinians
killed 11 Israelis, including two security officers, and injured 131 people in Israel
and the West Bank as of October 31, including 46 security officers, according to
the United Nations. 
Within Israel, as of October 31, Israeli security forces or bystanders killed 3
Palestinians, including those suspected of attacking Israelis.
A law passed in July imposes onerous reporting requirements on nongovernmen-
tal organizations (NGOs) receiving most of their funding from foreign governmen-
tal entities. By exempting from these requirements NGOs that receive private
foreign money, the law effectively targets human rights groups, groups run by or
for Arab citizens of Israel, and anti-occupation political groups.
Bedouin citizens of Israel who live in “unrecognized” villages suffered discrimi-
natory home demolitions on the basis that their homes were built illegally, even
though most of those villages existed before the State of Israel was established,
and others were created in the 1950s on land to which Israel transferred Bedouin
citizens. Israeli authorities refused to prepare plans for the communities or ap-
prove construction permits, and rejected plans submitted by the communities
themselves that would allow them to build lawfully. Many Bedouin communities
were uprooted by the establishment of Jewish towns and cities, and a succes-
sion of Israeli governments has moved them from place to place, failing to pro-
vide adequate housing. 
In al-Araqib, an unrecognized village that has been embroiled in a years-long
legal battle with the state, authorities demolished all the residents’ shacks 10
times between January 1 and August 18, according to the Negev Coexistence
Forum for Civil Inequality. Israeli authorities demolished 28 Bedouin structures
in the Negev, excluding al-Araqib, and destroyed the crops of unrecognized
Bedouin villages 14 times, between January 1 and August 18. 
Israel continued its openly stated policy of applying coercive measures designed
to render miserable the lives of the roughly 40,000 Eritrean and Sudanese asy-
lum seekers present in the country. These measures include prolonged deten-
tion; restrictions on freedom of movement; ambiguous policies on permission to
work; and restricting access to health care. Israel does not deport Eritrean and
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Sudanese nationals, but it has granted asylum to only four Eritreans to date. In
June, for the first time, Israel granted asylum to a Sudanese national.  
Key International Actors
Under commitments stemming from the 1978 Camp David accords, the United
States allocated US$3.1 billion in military aid to Israel in 2016. It also allocated
$400 million in assistance to Palestinian security forces and economic support
to the PA. In September, the United States and Israel signed a 10-year, $38 bil-
lion military aid deal, mostly to be spent on US-made military supplies. In Janu-
ary, the US Customs Authority issued a reminder of its requirement, originating
in 1995, to label imports from Israeli settlements as produced in the West Bank,
not in Israel.
The International Criminal Court (ICC) Office of the Prosecutor is conducting a
preliminary examination into the situation in Palestine to determine whether the
criteria have been met to merit pursuing a formal investigation into crimes com-
mitted in and from Palestine. In October, a delegation from the ICC prosecutor’s
office visited Israel and the West Bank and held meetings with Israeli and Pales-
tinian officials.
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Japan
Japan is a strong democracy with rule of law and an active civil society. Basic
freedoms of expression, association, and assembly are well-respected. However,
in February 2016 the Internal Affairs and Communications minister prompted an
outcry when she said the government may shut down broadcasters if they re-
peatedly air programs that run counter to political impartiality. The United Na-
tions special rapporteur on freedom of expression voiced concerns during his
visit in April that the Broadcast Act gives regulatory authority to the government
instead of an independent third party.  
The ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and its allies scored a sweeping victory
in Upper House elections in July, appearing to pave the way for Prime Minister
Shinzo Abe to realize his longstanding ambition to initiate significant constitu-
tional amendments. LDP proposals in 2012 for constitutional amendments
would significantly weaken human rights articles of the current constitution. 
Japanese criminal procedure law allows suspects to be detained for up to 23
days prior to prosecution without the possibility of release on bail. It also pro-
hibits lawyers from being present during interrogations, increasing the prospect
of coercive means being used to extract confessions. In May, a law requiring
video and audio recording of interrogations was passed, but it allows broad ex-
ceptions such as giving interrogators discretion to determine that a recording
will prevent suspects from providing a full statement. It also applies to just a
small segment of criminal cases, such as serious cases to be tried by the lay
judge system.
Refugees and Asylum Seekers
Japan ratified the Refugee Convention in 1981. While the number of asylum ap-
plications has increased dramatically in recent years (7,586 in 2015 and 5,011 in
the first half of 2016), only 27 asylum seekers were recognized as refugees in
2015 and 4 in the first half of 2016. In May, just before the G7 Summit, Japan an-
nounced a plan to accept up to 150 Syrian youths, including refugees as interna-
tional students, over five years. However, only six asylum seekers from Syria had
been recognized as refugees at time of writing.
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The Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act allows for asylum seekers
facing deportation orders to be detained for an unlimited period, deterring asy-
lum applications.  
Migrant Workers and Human Trafficking 
Since 2010, the labor law has fully applied to Technical Intern Trainees—about
200,000 people who mainly come from China and Vietnam and often work in fac-
tories and areas including agriculture, fishery, and construction. However, weak
legal protections for migrant workers still resulted in abuses in 2016. These in-
clude illegal overtime, unpaid wages, dangerous working conditions, confisca-
tion of passports, prohibitions on having cell phones and staying elsewhere
overnight, forced return, and forced payments to sending agencies in home
countries in case the training period does not finish successfully. Such limita-
tions combined with the current system that generally prohibits trainees from
changing employers, deter trainees from making complaints to their employers. 
The most recent statistics show that in 2015, the Labor Standards Bureau recog-
nized 3,695 cases of labor standards violations, the largest number since 2003,
when records were first kept.
While the Labor Standards Act does not apply to domestic work, 2015 guidelines
on migrant domestic workers attempt to protect workers by requiring them to be
employed by housekeeping service companies instead of by the household.
However, migrant domestic workers are generally prohibited from changing em-
ployers.
Racial and Ethnic Discrimination
Japan does not have an anti-discrimination law to protect racial or ethnic minori-
ties. However, in May, a so-called anti-hate speech law was passed, reflecting
the increase in recent years of hate speech against Korean residents (Zainichi) in
Japan. The new law requires the government to take measures to address hate
speech, although it excludes undocumented migrants and indigenous people.
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Women’s Rights
In December 2015, the Supreme Court ruled that article 750 of the Civil Code,
which requires a husband and wife to adopt the same surname, is constitu-
tional. Ninety-six percent of women change their surnames at the time of mar-
riage. The United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination
against Women (CEDAW) has repeatedly recommended that the article be
amended. 
In December 2015, Japan and South Korea announced an agreement to resolve
the issue of “comfort women” “finally and irreversibly.” Japan agreed to ac-
knowledge responsibility and anew apologies for its role. Based on the agree-
ment, Japan provided 1 billion yen (approximately US$10 million) to the
Foundation for Reconciliation and Healing established by the South Korean gov-
ernment. Women’s rights advocates widely criticized the agreement for reasons
including the lack of proper consultations with victims.
In March, CEDAW published concluding observations on the combined 7th and
8th periodic reports of Japan. The report included about 50 concerns and recom-
mendations, many repeating previous concluding observations. The committee
also expressed concerns related to the issue of comfort women, including the
lack of a full victim-centered approach, and the need for “full and effective re-
dress and reparation” for all victims, including those from countries not covered
by the agreement with South Korea. Comfort women were also from countries
such as the Philippines, China, Taiwan, the Netherlands, Indonesia, and East
Timor. 
The rights of female workers made some advances, including a March legal re-
form requiring that employers take measures to prevent their unfair treatment
due to pregnancy, childbirth, maternity leave, family care leave, and the April en-
forcement of the 2015 Act on Promotion of Women’s Participation and Advance-
ment in the Workplace. 
Japan has the second lowest proportion of female managers among OECD coun-
tries. In December 2015, Japan’s Cabinet adopted a new five-year “Fourth Basic
Plan for Gender Equality,” lowering the target set in 2003 to ensure that at least
30 percent of leadership positions are held by women in all areas by 2020.
Under the new target, the female leadership ratio goal was reduced to 7 percent
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for middle managerial positions in the central government and 15 percent for the
same in the private sector.
Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity
A bipartisan parliamentary group established in March 2015 continued to dis-
cuss legislation to address discrimination based on sexual orientation and gen-
der identity, but at time of writing it had yet to come up with an agreed draft bill. 
Japanese law treats those requesting legal recognition as transgender as having
a “Gender Identity Disorder” and requires obtaining such medical diagnosis. It
also requires forced sterilization, compulsory single status, not having any un-
derage children, and being 20 years or older.
While same-sex marriage is not legally recognized in Japan, Tokyo’s Shibuya
ward in April 2015 became the first municipality to pass a regulation recognizing
same-sex partnerships, with more municipalities recognizing such partnerships
in 2016.
Bullying is a problem in Japanese schools generally, and particularly so against
lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) students. A 2016 Human Rights
Watch report found that many students face discrimination and disregard for
gender identity, including mandatory gender-based uniforms. In April, the Min-
istry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT) for the first
time released a guidebook for teachers regarding sexual orientation and gender
identity.
Disability Rights
In April, the Act on the Elimination of Discrimination against Persons with Dis-
abilities, which the Japanese government enacted as part of ratification of the
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, came into effect. The law
prohibits unfair discriminatory treatment by governments and private entities
based on disability. It also requires that government-related agencies provide
reasonable accommodation to enable the elimination of social barriers, unless
the expense is “excessive.”
In July, a 26-year-old man stabbed 19 men and women to death and wounded
another 27 in a state-funded institution for people with disabilities in Sagami-
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hara, southwest of Tokyo, approximately five months after he was discharged
from involuntary psychiatric hospitalization. The suspect was quoted as saying,
“It is better that disabled people disappear” moments after the attack. Following
the incident, the Japanese government began examining the practice of involun-
tary hospitalization in psychiatric hospitals. However, at time of writing, no
major reform had been proposed to address stigma against people with disabili-
ties, including by guaranteeing their right to live independently by supporting
their inclusion in the community. 
Children’s Rights 
In May, the Diet passed an amendment of the Child Welfare Act that for the first
time explicitly refers to children as rights holders, in accordance with the Con-
vention on the Rights of the Child. As noted in a 2014 Human Rights Watch re-
port on the over-institutionalization (nearly 90 percent) of children in Japan’s
alternative care system, the revised law envisions a major shift from institutions
to families. Article 3.2 lays out a new principle for family-based care although
there are questions about the government’s commitment to enforce the new act.
Death Penalty 
Japan continued to use the death penalty in 2016, executing convicted criminals
by hanging. Two people in March and one in November were executed, bringing
the total to 17 since Abe returned to power in December 2012. Anti-death penalty
advocates have long raised concerns about death row inmates having inade-
quate access to legal counsel and only being notified of their execution on the
day it takes place. 
Foreign Policy 
Prime Minister Abe started his second cabinet by announcing in January 2013
“diplomacy based on the fundamental values of freedom, democracy, basic
human rights, and the rule of law,” partly to contrast his foreign policy from that
of China.
However, in practice Japan rarely speaks publicly about human rights, with For-
eign Ministry officials and diplomats sticking to their longstanding policy of
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quiet diplomacy. This is aimed at maintaining good relations, particularly in
Asia, in part to compete with China, maintain access, and promote trade. In his
2016 speeches, Abe only vowed to deepen ties with countries sharing these val-
ues. The one country that Japan has been willing to criticize publicly is North
Korea, which gets exceptional domestic attention because of Pyongyang’s past
abductions of Japanese nationals. 
In February 2016, Japan and Iran held their 11th Human Rights Dialogue in
Tehran. Like other human rights dialogues that Japan has convened, the an-
nouncement came only a few days before the meeting, without any briefing op-
portunities before, during, or after the meeting. This prevented any meaningful
input from human rights activists and organizations. The post-meeting online
announcement only noted that the two sides had “exchanged views” on human
rights.
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Jordan
King Abdullah II dissolved Jordan’s lower house of parliament on May 29, 2016,
after the resignation of Prime Minister Abdullah Ensour, who had been in office
since October 2012. Elections for Jordan’s 130-seat House of Representatives
took place on September 20 under a new list-based electoral system, resulting
in the election of 20 women, including five who won competitively outside the
women’s quota.
In March 2016, under instruction by King Abdullah, Jordanian authorities
launched the Comprehensive National Plan for Human Rights, a 10-year initiative
that calls for changes to numerous laws, policies, and practices. Positive
changes included a commitment to allow suspects the right to a lawyer at the
time of arrest and to move jurisdiction over crimes of torture and ill-treatment
from the police court to regular courts. Bassel Tararwneh, Jordan’s governmental
human rights coordinator, facilitated government interaction with local and in-
ternational nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and held open consultation
sessions on human rights issues.
In March 2016, Jordanian authorities proposed sweeping amendments to the
country’s association law that, if implemented, will hamper the ability of NGOs
to form and operate.
Freedom of Expression and Belief
Jordanian law criminalizes speech deemed critical of the king, foreign countries,
government officials and institutions, as well as Islam and speech considered to
defame others.
On June 14, Jordanian authorities detained university professor and popular Is-
lamic preacher Amjad Qourshah in connection with an October 2014 video
posted to his Facebook page in which he criticized Jordan’s participation in the
US-led coalition bombing of the Islamic State, or ISIS. Authorities released him
on bail in early September, but at time of writing he remained on trial before the
State Security Court charged with exposing Jordan to the danger of hostile acts, a
counterterrorism law provision. Authoriites defended Qourshah’s arrest as a
measure to combat hate speech and extremist thought.
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On August 14, authorities detained writer Nahed Hattar after he posted a cartoon
on his Facebook page critical of ISIS. The cartoon depicted an ISIS fighter in bed
with two women ordering God to bring him wine. Authorities charged him with
insulting religion under article 278 of the penal code. Authorities stated that Hat-
tar’s arrest was intended to prevent defamation of religion. Hattar was later mur-
dered on September 25 while entering an Amman court to attend a trial session.
Jordanian authorities increasingly relied on press gag orders in 2016 to prevent
public reporting on sensitive issues. In 2016, authorities imposed gag orders on
news stories such as: a complaint by orphans against the Ministry of Social De-
velopment; a street assault on an Egyptian worker in Jordan; a security operation
in the northern town of Irbid in March in which seven militants and one police-
man were killed; an attack on a General Intelligence Directorate (GID) office
north of Amman that led to four deaths; and the cases of Amjad Qourshah and
Nahed Hattar. 
On August 29, Jordan’s media commission prohibited local press outlets from
publishing any news about the king or the royal family other than information
circulated by the royal court.
A legislative overhaul of the penal code was put to parliament in 2015 proposing
to amend at least 180 articles of the 1960 code. At time of writing, lawmakers
had still to pass the reforms. For the first time, the draft amendments provided
alternatives to imprisonment, such as community service.
Freedom of Association and Assembly
In March, Jordan’s Ministry of Social Development issued a group of amend-
ments to Jordan’s 2008 Law on Associations. If enacted, the changes would se-
verely hamper the ability of NGOs to form and operate. The amendments place
onerous restrictions on the establishment of civil society groups and grant the
government legal authority to dissolve groups on vague grounds or deny their
ability to obtain foreign funding without justification. By November, the amend-
ments were still under consultation and had not been submitted to parliament.
Since the amended Public Gatherings Law took effect in March 2011, Jordanians
no longer require government permission to hold public meetings or demonstra-
tions. However, Amman hotels and other venues continued to seek permission
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to host public meetings and events. In April, authorities cancelled a concert by
the popular Lebanese music group Mashrou` Leila, reportedly over the claim that
their songs “contain lyrics that do not comply with the nature of the Jordanian
society.” Authorities reversed the decision the day before the concert was to be
held, but organizers said they did not have time to stage it. 
Refugees and Migrants
Between 2011 and 2016, over 656,000 persons from Syria had sought refuge in
Jordan, according to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR). Of these, approximately 79,000 were housed at the Zaatari Refugee
Camp in northern Jordan,; 54,000 were registered in Azraq Camp, 100 kilometers
east of Amman; and 7,300 were at the Emirates Jordan Camp in Zarqa Gover-
norate. The rest were living outside refugee camps.
Jordanian officials stated that the country did not receive enough international fi-
nancial assistance in 2016 to cope with the effects of the refugee crises on its
public infrastructure, especially in the areas of public education and health. The
UNHCR Jordan office, which coordinates the refugee response, said that by No-
vember it had raised only 57 percent of its US$1.1 billion budget goal for 2016.    
In February, authorities announced the Jordan Compact at the “Supporting Syria
and the Region” conference in London, which aims to promote economic growth
in Jordan and improve the livelihoods of Syrian refugees by granting new legal
work opportunities. By November, at least 28,000 work permits for Syrians had
been issued by labor authorities.
Between January and June 21, Jordanian authorities severely restricted the Ruk-
ban and Hadalat informal border crossings with Syria in the eastern part of the
country. These restrictions stranded tens of thousands of Syrian asylum seekers
at an earthen berm just inside Jordan’s border for days and weeks in harsh
desert conditions with limited access to food, water, and medical assistance.
Between March 9 and June 21, authorities transported over 20,000 Syrians from
the berm to a fenced area of Azraq Camp for additional security processing. 
On June 21, a suicide car bomb attack on a Jordanian military base near Rukban
killed seven Jordanian soldiers and security officers, prompting authorities to
classify the Jordan-Syria border as a closed military zone and halt humanitarian
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assistance to nearly 70,000 Syrians at the berm, other than water. Authorities al-
lowed the resumption of humanitarian assistance in late November at a new dis-
tribution point seven kilometers northwest of the Rukban camp.
In 2016, around 80,000 Syrian children in Jordan were not in formal education.
Jordan’s Ministry of Education took steps to address obstacles to access to edu-
cation such as relaxing documentation requirements, doubling the number of
schools operating “double shifts” to create spaces for up to 50,000 more Syrian
students, and establishing a “catch-up” program to reach another 25,000 chil-
dren ages 8 to 12, who have been out of school for three or more years. 
Jordan hosted around 80,000 migrant domestic workers in 2016, mostly from the
Philippines, Sri Lanka, and Indonesia. NGOs repeatedly referred domestic work-
ers who had suffered multiple abuses to labor ministry investigators. Abuses in-
cluded non-payment of salaries, unsafe working conditions, long hours,
document confiscation, and sometimes physical, verbal and sexual abuse.
Women’s and Girls’ Rights
Jordan’s personal status code remains discriminatory, despite a 2010 amend-
ment that included widening women’s access to divorce and child custody. Mar-
riages between Muslim women and non-Muslim men, for instance, are not
recognized.
Article 9 of Jordan’s nationality law does not allow Jordanian women married to
non-Jordanian spouses to pass on their nationality to their spouse and children.
By September 2016, Jordanian authorities distributed at least 56,000 special ID
cards to non-citizen children of Jordanian women, but affected persons reported
officials’ lack of follow-through on other “privileges” for these children an-
nounced in 2014, especially acquisition of work permits and drivers’ licenses.
Penal code articles 98 and 340, which allow reduced sentences for perpetrators
of “honor crimes,” remained in force. According to the Sisterhood is Global Insti-
tute/Jordan, news reports indicated that at least 26 women and girls were killed
between January and November, some of which perpetrators claimed were
“honor crimes”.
WORLD REPORT 2017
368
Criminal Justice System and Police Accountability
Jordanian authorities did not carry out any executions between January and No-
vember 2016, down from 2 in 2015 and 11 in late 2014, when it ended an eight-
year defacto moratorium.
In January, police court prosecutors filed torture charges under penal code arti-
cle 208 against five policemen in connection with the September 2015 death in
detention of 49-year-old Omar al-Nasr. It is only the second known instance in
which torture charges have been filed against police, and the trial was ongoing
as of September. In July, following a three-year trial, the Police Court cleared
seven drug squad officers accused of involvement in the March 2013 death in
detention of 33-year old Sultan al-Khatatba. 
Local governors continued to use provisions of the Crime Prevention Law of 1954
to place individuals in administrative detention for up to one year in circumven-
tion of the Criminal Procedure Law. The National Center for Human Rights re-
ported that 19,860 persons were administratively detained in 2015, some for
longer than one year.
In September, Jordan’s council of ministers approved amendments to the Crime
Prevention Law that institutionalize informal tribal practices including the jilwa,
which involves banishing family members of the alleged perpetrator of a murder
from their area of residence as part of a settlement between tribes. 
Authorities justified the change on the pretext that it would limit the jilwa to di-
rect family members rather than extended family members, but the move never-
theless gives officials the authority to punish individuals for a crime they did not
commit. The draft amendments had not been submitted to parliament for ap-
proval at time of writing.
Key International Actors
Jordan received approximately US$1.4 billion in economic and military assis-
tance from the United States in 2016 according to the Congressional Research
Service. The assistance is part of a three-year memorandum of understanding in
which the US pledged to provide $1 billion in aid to Jordan annually, up from
$660 million in recent years. The US did not publicly criticize human rights viola-
tions in Jordan in 2015, except in annual reports.
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In February, the EU pledged €1 billion ($1.2 billion) in assistance to Jordan for
2016 and 2017, of which nearly €700 million ($873 million) was allocated by July.
In April, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia announced the formation of a joint investment
council to oversee investments in Jordan by the Saudi Public Investment Fund,
which are expected to total billions of dollars. The two countries are also report-
edly working on agreements over nuclear power cooperation and uranium extrac-
tion.
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Kazakhstan
Against the backdrop of an economic downturn, Kazakh authorities in 2016
jailed peaceful protesters, targeted outspoken activists on vague and overbroad
criminal charges, and prosecuted independent journalists. Parliament adopted
laws placing unjustified burdens and restrictions on nongovernmental organiza-
tions (NGOs).
Opposition leader Vladimir Kozlov was released on parole in August, but two ac-
tivists faced politically motivated charges in connection with peaceful land re-
form protests. Impunity for torture persists. Authorities continued to restrict
workers’ rights. Kazakhstan took a rotating seat on the United Nations Security
Council and signed a strategic partnership agreement with the European Union,
despite lack of progress on human rights.
Parliamentary Elections
The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe’s Office for Democratic
Institutions and Human Rights (OSCE/ODIHR) monitoring mission found that
March parliamentary elections “were efficiently organized, with some progress,”
but identified “serious procedural errors and irregularities … during voting,
counting and tabulation,” and concluded Kazakhstan’s “legal framework re-
stricts fundamental civil and political rights.” 
Freedom of Assembly
The government took no steps to amend a restrictive public assembly law which
authorities regularly used to deny permits for peaceful protests, and to fine and
jail peaceful demonstrators. 
In advance of countrywide protests planned for May 21 against proposed land
code reforms, authorities jailed over two dozen people, including activists Maks
Bokaev and Talgat Ayan, each sentenced to 15 days’ detention for administrative
offences.  
Authorities brought criminal charges against Bokaev and Ayan while serving
those sentences. At time of writing they were on trial on charges of violating the
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public assembly law, inciting national discord, and disseminating false informa-
tion. The men deny the charges, calling them retaliation for their activism.  
On May 21, police aggressively broke up attempted peaceful gatherings against
land reforms in multiple cities, detaining hundreds of people, sometimes using
force, and sanctioned 51 of them on administrative charges. 
On May 26, the EU called on authorities to “release without delay all remaining
arrested peaceful activists, and to drop all criminal charges or penalties.” Four
UN special rapporteurs urged Kazakhstan to “halt the clampdown on land reform
protesters.”
Civil Society
In January 2016, an Almaty court found civil society activists Ermek Narymbaev
and Serikzhan Mambetalin guilty of “inciting national discord” for material
posted on Facebook that some felt insulted the Kazakh people, and sentenced
them to three and two years’ imprisonment, respectively. In March, an appeals
court conditionally released them, with restrictions on their movement. 
Also in January 2016, an Astana court found civil society activist Bolatbek Blyalov
guilty of “inciting social discord” for online videos of him discussing Kazakh na-
tionalism and other topics, and restricted his freedom of movement and associa-
tion for three years.
On August 20, opposition leader Vladimir Kozlov was released on parole. He
served four-and-a-half years of a seven-and-a-half-year prison sentence after an
unfair trial in 2012. He remained subject to restrictions on his movement and
freedom of association, and was required to report to police monthly.
In May, a court ordered government critic Natalya Ulasik undergo psychiatric ob-
servation after her ex-partner accused her of defamation. Authorities detained
her in August. In October, a court found her mentally incompetent and placed
her in forced psychiatric detention.
Civil society activist Vadim Kuramshin continued to serve a 12-year prison sen-
tence, despite fair trial violations and concerns that his December 2012 convic-
tion was retribution for government criticism. 
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Kazakh government critic and former banker Mukhtar Ablyazlov remained in de-
tention in France pending review of an executive decree ordering his extradition
to Russia. Rights groups fear that, if extradited, Ablyazov could be forcibly re-
turned to Kazakhstan. 
In December 2015, President Nursultan Nazarbaev signed into law amendments
to nongovernmental organization-related legislation, imposing burdensome re-
porting obligations and state regulation of funding through a government-ap-
pointed body. A February EU statement expressed concern that the “newly
created government controlled body could have a negative impact on NGO activi-
ties.” International Legal Initiative (ILI), a rights group in Kazakhstan, unsuccess-
fully contested the law’s legality in an Astana court. 
In July, parliament adopted amendments introducing new financial reporting ob-
ligations for individuals and legal entities, such as NGOs, on foreign funds re-
ceipt and expenditure. 
Media Restrictions and Freedom of Expression
Independent journalists and media outlets face harassment and interference, in-
cluding criminal prosecution on dubious or excessive charges. Media watchdog
group Adilsoz reported an increase in defamation lawsuits in the first half of
2016. Libel remains a criminal offense. In January, OSCE Representative on Free-
dom of the Media Dunja Mijatović called the situation for free expression and
media freedom in Kazakhstan “deeply worrying.” 
Authorities detained over 50 journalists reporting on the May land protests, and
blocked access to some websites, including Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty’s
Kazakh branch. In May, a court found journalist Gyuzal Baidalinova criminally
liable for “disseminating false information” for information she published
about a Kazakh bank, imprisoning her for 18 months. In July, she was released
on parole. 
On October 3, an Astana court sentenced Seitkazy Mataev, head of the National
Press Club, a platform for critical voices, to six years’ imprisonment on embezzle-
ment and tax evasion charges, and his son, Aset, also a journalist, to five years
in prison for embezzlement. They said the investigation—which media watch-
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dogs criticized for its lack of integrity—was retaliation their critical views of the
government.
Kazakh authorities sued Respublika, a critical website, in United States and Aus-
tralian courts, over leaked government documents seeking to capitalize on those
countries’ anti-hacking laws.
Torture
Kazakhstan’s prosecutor general acknowledged in August that torture remains a
problem, despite some efforts to tackle it. In September a court convicted one
prison official of rape and sentenced him to nine years in prison after a female
inmate alleged he was one of four prison officials who raped her. Following its
September visit, the UN Subcommittee on the Prevention of Torture noted that
despite improvements in conditions, the prison system overemphasizes restric-
tions and punishment, rather than reintegration and rehabilitation.
Despite a 2014 UN Human Rights Committee decision finding that officials tor-
tured Rasim Bayramov, detained in 2008 on suspicion of robbery and beaten in
custody, authorities have repeatedly declined to investigate citing “lack of evi-
dence of a crime,” most recently in July. 
Authorities have not credibly investigated torture allegations by people detained
in Zhanaozen in December 2011, following an extended labor strike that ended
in violent clashes. In its August concluding observations, the UN Human Rights
Committee called on the government to ensure “an independent, impartial and
effective investigation … into all allegations of torture and ill-treatment” related
to the Zhanaozen events.
Freedom of Religion
Authorities continue to fine and convict people for violating a restrictive 2011 re-
ligion law. Since December 2014, 40 people have faced criminal charges for
membership in the banned Tabligh Jamaat movement, according to Forum18, an
international religious freedom watchdog.
On March 25, police executed search warrants at five New Life church buildings
in Almaty and at several church leaders’ homes under a criminal investigation
into fraud charges, which church leaders deny. An appeals’ court ordered Sev-
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enth-day Adventist Yklas Kabduakasov, convicted in November 2015 for “inciting
religious discord” and initially given a seven-year suspended sentence, to serve
two years’ imprisonment in a labor camp.
Counterterrorism
President Nazarbaev called for harsher counterterrorism measures after 19 peo-
ple were killed in an armed attack in Aktobe in June, and other gunman killed
four people in Almaty in July. In September, the government proposed amend-
ments to 24 laws relating to counterterrorism and extremism. 
The UN Human Rights Committee criticized the overly-broad definitions of “ex-
tremism,” “inciting social or class hatred,” and “religious hatred or enmity,” and
use of extremism legislation “to unduly restrict freedoms of religion, expression,
assembly and association.”
Labor Rights
The trade union law and collective bargaining regulations restrict workers’ rights,
including the right to strike. After repeated registration denials, the Confedera-
tion of Independent Trade Unions of Kazakhstan registered under a new name in
February, but was unable to confirm its status, the second step in a burdensome
two-step registration process. 
The International Labour Organization again criticized Kazakhstan at its June
conference for limiting freedom of association and for failing to amend its re-
strictive labor union law. 
Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity 
Surveys of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) people reveal that
many hide their sexual orientation or gender identity—including to healthcare
providers—out of fear of reprisals or discrimination. When LGBT people report
abuse, they often face indifference and hostility from authorities.
Transgender people must undergo humiliating and invasive procedures—includ-
ing coerced sterilization—to change gender on official documents. Without iden-
tity documents, transgender people struggle to access employment, healthcare,
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and education. The UN Human Rights Committee called on the government to
end discrimination and violence against LGBT people and review gender-reas-
signment surgery procedures.
Key International Actors
A December 2015 Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement gives Kaza-
khstan upgraded trade and economic relations with the EU, despite the lack of
meaningful rights improvements in Kazakhstan. When negotiations began, the
EU had linked successful negotiations to reforms.
In March, EU Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker met with President
Nazerbaev and downplayed human rights concerns, calling reforms in Kaza-
khstan “promising.”
In a March resolution on Freedom of Expression in Kazakhstan, the European
Parliament noted “the serious deterioration of the climate for media and free
speech” and called on Kazakhstan to review legislation and stop harassing jour-
nalists.
Following Kazakhstan’s second periodic report, the UN Human Rights Committee
called on the government to redouble efforts to prevent violence against women,
eradicate torture, guarantee liberty and security of person, and safeguard inde-
pendent judiciary.
The United States Department of State’s top counterterrorism official, Sarah Se-
wall, visited Kazakhstan in August to discuss strengthening counterterrorism co-
operation. In October, the US Embassy in Kazakhstan issued a rare statement on
media freedom, expressing concern about the convictions and prison sentences
handed down to journalists Seitkazy and Aset Mataev.
In June 2016, Kazakhstan became an elected member of the UN Security Council
for the 2017-2018 term.
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Kenya
Respect for human rights in Kenya remained precarious in 2016, with authorities
failing to adequately investigate a range of abuses across the country and under-
mining basic rights to free expression and association. Human rights activists
and journalists working on a range of issues face increasing obstacles and ha-
rassment. Human rights organizations continue to implicate Kenyan police and
military in disappearances and killings of individuals allegedly linked to Al-
Shabab. 
With elections scheduled for August 2017, questions remain over the credibility
and competence of the judiciary to arbitrate electoral disputes fairly. The ability
of Kenya police to respond effectively and lawfully should violence occur before,
during, or after the 2017 elections remains a concern. 
In a positive step, four police officers were charged with murder in late June 2016
of an International Justice Mission lawyer, his client and their cabdriver. The case
illustrates the risks human rights defenders and others face when pushing for
police accountability. 
Industrial developments in neighboring Ethiopia have led to a drop in the water
levels of lake Turkana. These, combined with climate change, have negatively
impacted the livelihoods of about 300,000 indigenous people in Turkana
county, but the Kenyan government has failed to raise this issue with Ethiopia.
The Climate Change Law passed in May, if rigorously implemented, is expected
to improve coordination and governance of national and local policies related to
climate change.
Conduct of Security Forces
Kenyan and international human rights organizations documented military and
police units, including the Directorate of Military Intelligence, carrying out en-
forced disappearances, torture and beating of individuals suspected of links
with Al-Shabab. 
Kenyan authorities have not acknowledged, publicly condemned or investigated
at least 32 cases of enforced disappearances and 11 unexplained deaths of peo-
ple last seen in state custody in Nairobi and northeastern Kenya. Witnesses ob-
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served police and military drive with detainees into military bases and camps in
Garissa, Wajir, and Mandera for detention and interrogation. Two of the 34 miss-
ing people were in late July located in state custody, with one now facing terror-
ism related charges. Kenya National Commission on Human Rights, a statutory
human rights body, documented at least 100 cases of extrajudicial killings and
enforced disappearances of those allegedly linked with Al-Shabab and continue
to press for investigations.
The Commission on Administrative Justice received at least 25,000 reports of
killings by police across the country since 2013. Kenyan authorities have very
rarely investigated the killings or held anyone to account. In September, the Of-
fice of the Director of Public Prosecutions and the Kenya National Commission
on Human Rights separately announced intentions to initiate inquests in killings
by police in Kisumu in 2013 and security forces abuses at the coast, respectively. 
Accountability
The collapse of the last International Criminal Court (ICC) case directly related to
the 2007-2008 post-election violence devastated victims’ hopes for justice. Na-
tional authorities made no progress to address these crimes.
The ICC vacated charges against Deputy President William Ruto and Joshua arap
Sang, a former radio journalist, in April 2016 for lack of evidence. For one judge,
the combination of witness interference and political obstruction warranted a
mistrial. The case’s collapse followed that of cases against four others, including
President Uhuru Kenyatta.
Three men wanted by the ICC since 2013 and 2015 for witness interference have
yet to be surrendered. Although Kenyan authorities have issued arrest warrants,
Kenyan authorities are currently challenging, in Kenyan courts, the arrest warrant
of one individual. There have been no publicly available results of national in-
vestigations into the apparent murder in late 2014 of Meshack Yebei, named by
the Ruto ICC defense team as its witness. 
In September, an ICC trial chamber referred Kenya’s lack of cooperation in the
Kenyatta case to the ICC’s Assembly of States Parties.
The government continues its campaign to press the AU to consider calling on its
member countries who also belong to the ICC to leave the court, but several
WORLD REPORT 2017
380
countries blocked consensus at a July 2016 summit. A bill related to Kenya’s
withdrawal from the ICC remains pending in parliament.
The government continues to ignore the plight of thousands of women and men
who were raped during the post-election violence in 2007-08. It has failed to pro-
vide livelihood support, as well as medical and psychosocial care to them, in-
cluding for children who were born from rape and face violence and
discrimination. The government has not established a restorative justice fund
that was promised to survivors of historical injustices, including post-election vi-
olence. 
Hearings continued over the course of 2016 in the Kenyan high court on a peti-
tion brought by survivors of election-related sexual violence seeking to compel
the government to investigate. A second case, related to shootings by police dur-
ing the violence, is also pending. 
Threats to Civil Society and Media
Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) working on a range of issues face hos-
tile rhetoric from public officials, including draconian administrative measures
and attempts at introducing repressive amendments to the NGO law. In October
2015, the NGO regulatory body announced plans to deregister more than 900
NGOs over, among other reasons, alleged failure to comply with regulatory re-
quirements and links to terrorism. The cabinet secretary later suspended the
plan.   
On September 9, the cabinet secretary for devolution announced plans to imple-
ment the Public Benefits Organizations (PBO) Act, first signed into law by Presi-
dent Kibaki in January 2013. The announcement came just weeks after
parliament voted to compel the executive to implement the law without pro-
posed repressive amendments, such as capping NGO funding from foreign
sources at 15 percent.
The government continues to enforce laws that undermine media freedom. The
Kenya Information and Communication Act (KICA), the Media Act of 2013, and
the Security Laws Amendment Act of 2014 contain repressive provisions, which
introduce new harsh offences and penalties, that should be repealed. In 2016, at
least eight journalists and bloggers were arrested and charged under vaguely
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worded provisions in the new laws, including “misuse of a communications
gadget,” “annoying a public official” or “undermining the authority of a public
officer.” In May 2016, a High Court judge declared section 29 of KICA, which cre-
ates an offense of misusing a communications gadget, unconstitutional.  
Coerced Return of Refugees 
In April, authorities announced that Kenya would no longer grant Somali
refugees prima facie refugees status and in May, disbanded the Department of
Refugee Affairs (DRA), a statutory government body responsible for registration
of asylum seekers, issuing of travel permits and movement passes. At the same
time, Kenyan officials announced plans to close Dadaab refugee camp. The gov-
ernment justified the closure of the camp on the grounds that terrorist attacks
were mounted from Dadaab, without providing evidence.
At time of writing, Kenya’s repatriation program does not meet international
standards for voluntary refugee return. Refugees in Dadaab camp told Human
Rights Watch of intimidation by Kenyan officials, silence over alternative options
that would allow them to remain in Kenya, cuts in rations and inadequate and
misleading information on conditions in Somalia. In November, Kenyan authori-
ties postponed the closure of Dadaab camp by six months. 
Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity
Kenya’s penal code prohibits “carnal knowledge against the order of nature,”
generally understood as consensual sex between men, and “indecent practices
between males.” Civil society organizations and activists filed two landmark con-
stitutional petitions against these sections in April and June 2016, arguing that
the laws violate constitutional rights, including the rights to equality and non-
discrimination, human dignity, freedom and security of the person, privacy, and
health.
Kenya continued the prosecution of two men on charges of “carnal knowledge”
after police arbitrarily arrested them in Kwale County in February 2015. The case
remained open but was suspended pending the ruling of a constitutional peti-
tion filed by the two men, asserting that state officials had violated their rights
by subjecting them to a forced anal examination. The High Court rejected the pe-
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tition on the grounds that the men consented to the examination, ignoring that
the men were in police custody and not able to provide free and informed con-
sent. The men have appealed the ruling. 
The government appealed a 2015 High Court decision ordering the Non-Govern-
mental Organizations Board to register the National Gay and Lesbian Human
Rights Commission (NGLHRC), a civil society group. Parties were awaiting a hear-
ing date at time of writing.
The Kenya Film Classification Board overstepped its jurisdiction in asking
YouTube to remove a locally produced video addressing same-sex relationships,
prohibiting a lesbian speed-dating event, and attempting to ban a podcast with
alleged lesbian content. 
Key International Actors
Kenya plays a prominent regional role particularly regarding counterterrorism ef-
forts in East Africa. Kenyan forces remain in Somalia as part of the African Union
mission. President Kenyatta also participated in various attempts at peace nego-
tiations in South Sudan and Burundi.  
Kenya’s criticism of its Western partners has become less vociferous following
the end of its ICC cases, but there remain serious concerns about the human
rights situation in the country. Both US Secretary of State John Kerry and Japan-
ese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe held talks with President Kenyatta in Nairobi.
Kerry raised human rights concerns.  
International partners, including China, the UK, Turkey, Israel, Italy, and the US
pledged support for Kenya’s counterterrorism efforts and economic develop-
ment. The US consistently raised concerns—publicly and privately—about
abuses related to Kenya’s counterterrorism efforts and took steps to restrict as-
sistance to certain units. There was little indication that other international part-
ners expressed similar concerns. 
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Kuwait
Kuwait took further steps to improve migrant worker rights in 2016, including en-
acting a minimum wage for domestic workers, easing employer transfer rules,
and passing implementing regulations for a 2015 law that gave domestic workers
enforceable rights for the first time. 
Unlike many of its Gulf neighbors, Kuwait continued to allow Human Rights
Watch access to the country and engaged in constructive dialogue with the or-
ganization on a range of human rights issues. 
Provisions in Kuwait’s constitution, the national security law and other legisla-
tion continue to restrict free speech, and were again used in 2016 to prosecute
dissidents and stifle political dissent.
The emir also ordered authorities to amend a 2015 law, the first of its kind, that
requires all individuals in Kuwait to provide DNA samples in violation of their
right to privacy. 
Kuwait continued to exclude thousands of stateless people, known as Bidun,
from full citizenship despite their longstanding roots in Kuwaiti territory.
Migrant Workers
Two-thirds of Kuwait’s population is comprised of migrant workers. Kuwait con-
tinues to reform aspects of the kafala or sponsorship system, which ties a mi-
grant worker’s legal residence and valid immigration status to an employer. 
Kuwait issued a new standard contract for migrant workers in 2015 and an ad-
ministrative decision that allows some migrant workers to transfer their sponsor-
ship to a new employer without their current employer’s consent after three
years of work in 2016. Previously, migrant workers required their contract to end
and their employer’s consent to transfer employers. These reforms do not extend
to migrant domestic workers.
In 2015, the National Assembly passed a law that gave domestic workers the
right to a weekly day off, 30 days of annual paid leave, a 12-hour working day
with rest, and an end-of-service benefit of one month a year at the end of the
contract, among other rights. In July, the Interior Ministry passed implementing
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regulations for the law, including clarifying that employers must pay overtime
compensation. The same month, the ministry issued a decree that established a
minimum wage for domestic workers of KD60 (US$200).
Protections in the domestic workers law are still weaker than those in the labor
law, which provides for an eight-hour work day with one hour of rest after every
five hours of work and detailed provisions for sick leave. The domestic worker
law also falls short by failing to set out enforcement mechanisms, such as labor
inspections of working conditions in households, which can be done with due
regard to privacy. 
Migrant workers remain vulnerable to abuse, forced labor, and deportation for
minor infractions including traffic violations and “absconding” from an em-
ployer. Authorities deported 14,400 migrants in the first four months of 2016, ac-
cording to local media.  
During a September visit to Kuwait, the UN special rapporteur on trafficking wel-
comed Kuwait’s establishment of a shelter for domestic workers, but urged the
government to continue its reforms and abolish the kafala system.
Freedom of Expression
Kuwaiti authorities have invoked several provisions in the constitution, penal
code, Printing and Publication Law, Misuse of Telephone Communications and
Bugging Devices Law, Public Gatherings Law, and National Unity Law to prose-
cute journalists, politicians and activists over the last few years for criticizing the
emir, the government, religion, and rulers of neighboring countries in blogs or on
Twitter, Facebook, or other social media.
Dozens of prosecutions for protected speech are ongoing in Kuwaiti courts.
Kuwaiti officials and activists reported that many, if not most, initial complaints
in these cases are filed by individuals, underscoring the need to further amend
broadly written or overly vague Kuwaiti laws to ensure adequate protections for
speech and expression. Kuwaiti courts continued to issue deportation orders in
some of these cases, including against members of the Bidun population, al-
though Kuwaiti officials reported these orders would not be implemented.
In June 2016, Kuwait amended the election law to bar from running or voting in
elections all those convicted for “insulting” God, the prophets, or the emir. The
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law is likely to bar some opposition members of parliament from contesting or
voting in future election rounds. 
The Cybercrime Law, which includes far-reaching restrictions on internet-based
speech, such as prison sentences and fines for insulting religion, religious fig-
ures and the emir, went into effect in 2016.
Treatment of Minorities
At least 105,702 Bidun residents of Kuwait remain stateless.
After an initial registration period for citizenship ended in 1960, authorities
shifted Bidun citizenship claims to administrative committees that for decades
have avoided resolving the claims. Authorities claim that many Bidun are “illegal
residents” who deliberately destroyed evidence of another nationality in order to
receive benefits that Kuwait gives its citizens.
Members of the Bidun community have taken to the streets to protest the gov-
ernment’s failure to address their citizenship claims, despite government warn-
ings that Bidun should not gather in public. Article 12 of the 1979 Public
Gatherings Law bars non-Kuwaitis from participating in public gatherings.
In 2016, a Comoros Island official told Gulf News that the Comoros Island was
open to Kuwaiti officials’ suggestions that Kuwait may pay the Comoros Islands
to grant the Bidun a form of economic citizenship, thus regularizing Bidun as for-
eign nationals and rendering them liable to legal deportation from Kuwait—pos-
sibly violating their right to family life.  
Terrorism
The 2015 DNA law, requiring all citizens, visitors and residents to provide DNA
samples to the authorities, was introduced after the June 2015 suicide bombing
of the Imam Sadiq Mosque, which killed 27 people and wounded 227. Authori-
ties reported to local media that anyone failing to comply with the law would be
subject to sanctions, including cancelling their passports and a possible travel
ban. In July, the United Nations Human Rights Committee found the law imposed
“unnecessary and disproportionate restrictions on the right to privacy.” In 2016,
the emir directed the authorities to amend the law in line with constitutional
standards.
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Women’s Rights, Sexual Orientation, and Gender Identity
Kuwaiti personal status law, which applies to Sunni Muslims, the majority of
Kuwaitis, discriminates against women. For instance, some women require a
male guardian to conclude her marriage contract; women must apply to the
courts for a divorce on limited grounds unlike men who can unilaterally divorce
their wives; and women can lose custody of their children if they remarry some-
one outside the family. The rules that apply to Shia Muslims also discriminate
against women. 
Kuwait has no laws prohibiting domestic violence or marital rape. A 2015 law es-
tablishing family courts set up a center to deal with domestic violence cases, but
requires the center to prioritize reconciliation over protection for domestic vio-
lence survivors. Article 153 of the Kuwaiti penal code stipulates that a man who
finds his mother, wife, sister or daughter in the act of adultery and kills them is
punished by either a small fine or no more than three years in prison.
Kuwaiti women married to non-Kuwaitis, unlike Kuwaiti men, cannot pass citi-
zenship to their children or spouses. 
Adultery and extramarital intercourse are criminalized, and same-sex relations
between men are punishable by up to seven years in prison. Transgender people
can be arrested under a 2007 penal code provision that prohibits “imitating the
opposite sex in any way.” 
Death Penalty
Kuwait maintains the death penalty for non-violent offenses, including drug-re-
lated charges, and carried out five executions in 2013, the first time the country
had applied the death penalty since 2007. In 2015 and 2016, courts sentenced at
least nine people to death. 
Key International Actors
Kuwait joined the Saudi-led coalition that began attacking Houthi and allied
forces in Yemen on March 26, 2015. Human Rights Watch documented 58 unlaw-
ful coalition airstrikes in Yemen, some of which may amount to war crimes, that
killed nearly 800 civilians and repeatedly hit markets, schools and hospitals.
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Kuwait-hosted peace talks between Yemeni parties to the conflict broke down in
August.
In 2016, the United States classified Kuwait as a Tier 2 country in its annual Traf-
ficking in Persons report. After classifying Kuwait as a Tier 3 country for nine con-
secutive years, the report credits the improvement to the passing of the 2015
domestic workers law and an unprecedented number of convictions of traffickers
under the 2013 anti-trafficking law. The report found that Kuwait continued to
have a rampant forced labor problem and that victims of trafficking were still
being arrested, detained, and deported. 
In August 2016, the United Nations Committee against Torture expressed its con-
cern at reports of prolonged arrest and torture by Kuwaiti police and security
forces of protesters, members of minorities, and persons suspected of terrorist
activites. The committee also urged Kuwait to reinstate its de facto moratorium
on applying the death penalty.
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Kyrgyzstan
There were few meaningful improvements in Kyrgyzstan’s human rights record in
2016. Authorities failed to implement a March 2016 decision by the United Na-
tions Human Rights Committee calling for imprisoned human rights defender Az-
imjon Askarov’s immediate release. As in recent years, the government did not
take any steps to provide justice for the victims of interethnic violence in 2010.
Impunity for ill-treatment and torture remains the norm. Violence and discrimina-
tion against women and lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) people
continues. 
Although parliament rejected a draft law on “foreign agents,” another bill dis-
criminating against LGBT people is pending. In December 2015, Kyrgyzstan’s na-
tional security service banned a Human Rights Watch researcher from the
country without reason. 
Kyrgyzstan became a member of the UN Human Rights Council in January 2016.
Constitutional Reforms
An attempt in 2016 to amend the constitution was met by widespread criticism
from civil society and opposition politicians. Despite substantive and procedural
concerns, parliament approved legislation for authorities to hold a constitutional
referendum. It was due to be held on December 11, 2016. 
In its joint opinion, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe’s
Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (OSCE/ODHIR) and the
Venice Commission found in August that the proposed constitutional amend-
ments “would negatively impact the balance of powers by strengthening the
powers of the executive, while weakening both the parliament and, to a greater
extent, the judiciary.” 
Access to Justice
Authorities continue to deny justice to victims of the June 2010 interethnic vio-
lence in southern Kyrgyzstan and took no steps to review torture-tainted convic-
tions handed down in the aftermath of the violence. Ethnic Uzbeks were
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disproportionately killed, and victims of arbitrary detention, ill-treatment, and
torture, and house destruction during that violence. 
Following a November 2015 visit to Kyrgyzstan, the OSCE high commissioner on
national minorities, Astrid Thors, in May 2016 noted that “ethnic Uzbeks—the
biggest minority in the country—remain severely under-represented in the Parlia-
ment.” The commissioner “encourage[d] the authorities to step up activities
aimed at increasing the participation and representation of national minorities
as well as ensuring full access to justice.” 
Torture
Although the government acknowledges the problem of torture, impunity re-
mains the norm. Criminal investigations into ill-treatment and torture allegations
are rare, delayed, and ineffective, as are trials. After a five-year trial, a Bishkek
appeals court in July upheld the acquittal verdict of four policemen charged in
connection with the death in August 2011 of Usmanjon Kholmirzaev, an ethnic
Uzbek who died of injuries sustained in police custody. At time of writing, no one
had been held accountable for the torture leading to his death. 
In its annual report issued in May, the National Center for the Prevention of Tor-
ture (NPM), an independent anti-torture body, concluded that “the Kyrgyz Repub-
lic does not fully ensure either in law or practice freedom from torture,” and
noted some interference in its work. Authorities in 2015 registered 199 claims of
torture, but initiated criminal investigations in only 34 cases, the NPM reported.
Parliament in March rejected in its second reading a draft law that would have
curbed the NPM’s independence.
Civil Society
In its March decision, the UN Human Rights Committee found that Askarov was
arbitrarily detained, held in inhumane conditions, tortured, and otherwise mis-
treated without redress and not given a fair trial. The committee called on Kyr-
gyzstan to quash his conviction and release him immediately. The Office of the
High Commissioner for Human Rights and human rights groups, including
Human Rights Watch, echoed calls for Askarov’s immediate release. Kyrgyzstan’s
Supreme Court in July considered the UN’s decision as new evidence in the case,
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and ordered a retrial, but did not order Askarov’s release. The retrial was under-
way at time of writing. Authorities in May ordered that Askarov’s house be con-
fiscated, but his lawyer contested the order, which the state later withdrew. 
After sustained efforts by Kyrgyzstan’s civil society and others against the adop-
tion of a “foreign agents” bill, which would have required organizations that re-
ceive foreign funding and engage in broadly defined political activities to
register as “foreign agents,” parliament voted in May to reject the bill.
Rights lawyer Nurbek Toktogunov in January sued President Almazbek Atambaev
after the president publicly claimed that civil society had acted to destabilize the
nation and upend 2015 parliamentary elections, but the court declined to con-
sider his complaint. In June, rights defenders Aziza Abdurasulova and Tolekan Is-
mailova similarly sued the president for publicly smearing them in a May
speech. A Bishkek court ruled in Atambaev’s favor, declining to award damages.
In September, the decision was upheld on appeal. 
In a February 2016 report, UN Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human
Rights Defenders Michel Forst expressed “his deep concern at the increase of
verbal attacks, intimidation and harassment against civil society groups” and
urged the government to “ensure that human rights defenders are able to carry
out their legitimate work in a safe and enabling environment without fear of
threats or reprisals of any sort.”
In December 2015, Kyrgyzstan denied entry to a Human Rights Watch Central
Asia researcher based in Bishkek, informing her at the airport that she had been
banned from the country. No written explanation was given for the ban to date,
nor has the researcher been allowed to return. In late December 2015, UN special
rapporteurs on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and association and
the situation of human rights defenders sent a joint letter to the government ex-
pressing “serious concern.”
Violence against Women
Domestic violence against women and girls continues to be a serious problem.
Limited services and police hostility obstruct survivors’ access to protection and
justice. Pressure to keep families together, stigma, economic dependence, and
fear of reprisals by abusers hinder some women from seeking assistance. Few
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domestic violence complaints reach the courts and police do not systematically
enforce protection orders.
A new domestic violence bill, which aims to strengthen protections for domestic
abuse survivors, was adopted in its first reading on June 30, after a parliamen-
tary hearing in mid-June. The bill was put on the parliament’s agenda for Novem-
ber 2016, but had not been considered at time of writing.
On November 18, Kyrgyzstan’s president signed into law a bill that would intro-
duce criminal sanctions of three to five years’ imprisonment for parents found re-
sponsible for allowing their underage children to marry, religious leaders for
carrying out religious ceremonies for minors, and adults for marrying minors. 
Freedom of Expression
Parliament approved in its first reading on June 22 contentious amendments to
Kyrgyzstan’s media law that ban foreigners from setting up media outlets in Kyr-
gyzstan and limit foreign funding of local media. Journalists and rights groups
spoke out against the law. A second reading in parliament remained pending at
time of writing.
In mid-December 2015, OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media Dunja Mi-
jatović called on Kyrgyz authorities to refrain from imposing disproportionate,
excessive fines for civil defamation after a court upheld the ruling that Dayirbek
Orunbekov, a journalist, pay 2 million som (US$27,750) in damages to the presi-
dent. The journalist had written about the June 2010 events. In August 2016, the
Prosecutor’s Office opened a criminal case against Orunbekov for failing to pay
damages. In November 2016, the case was sent to court for consideration.
Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity
LGBT people in Kyrgyzstan experience ill-treatment, extortion, and discrimination
by both state and non-state actors. There is widespread impunity for these
abuses. On May 24, the law, order and fighting crime parliamentary committee
returned Kyrgyzstan’s anti-LGBT bill, which would ban “propaganda of nontradi-
tional sexual relations,” for a repeat second reading, where it then stalled. The
bill appears aimed at silencing anyone seeking to openly share information
about same-sex relations in Kyrgyzstan. 
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Following a live debate on LGBT rights on national television, Kyrgyzstan’s State
Committee on National Security on June 14 summoned the editor-in-chief of
Kloop.kg, an online media portal, for questioning about its coverage of the
show. The television’s supervisory board also formally reprimanded its general
director for airing the content. Also in June, Kyrgyzstan voted against a resolution
at the UN Human Rights Council establishing the mandate of an independent ex-
pert to address violence and discrimination against LGBT people.
Key International Actors
In late October 2015, US Secretary of State John Kerry visited Kyrgyzstan in part
to try and improve relations with Kyrgyzstan after the Kyrgyz government revoked
a 1993 cooperation agreement in response to the US State Department granting
Askarov its Human Rights Defender award in July 2015. Kyrgyzstan and the US
have not signed a new cooperation agreement.
During a March 31 visit to Kyrgyzstan in his capacity as OSCE chairperson-in-of-
fice, German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier downplayed human rights
concerns and focused on cooperation and counterterrorism. Steinmeier noted
Kyrgyzstan’s “dynamic parliamentary democracy” enables it to play a “crucial
role in bringing about stability.”
German Chancellor Angela Merkel on July 14 visited Kyrgyzstan to discuss bilat-
eral relations with President Atambaev. Her visit came three days after the
Supreme Court review of Askarov’s case. In her public comments, Chancellor
Merkel did not comment on Askarov’s continued wrongful imprisonment, but
said she hoped Kyrgyzstan would give Askarov a fair trial. 
The European Union in January 2016 granted Kyrgyzstan GSP+ status, an instru-
ment of the EU’s trade policy that grants tariff reductions for improved human
and labor rights and environmental protections. The EU continued to use its an-
nual human rights dialogue as the near-exclusive forum to raise human rights
concerns, but issued a rare stand-alone rights statement on Askarov in April. The
EU iterated that it “expects the Kyrgyz Republic to fully implement the recom-
mendations of the Human Rights Committee.”
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Lebanon
Lebanon elected a president on October 31, 2016, ending a 29-month presiden-
tial vacuum during which political institutions remained paralyzed. A draft law to
improve treatment of migrant domestic workers stalled in parliament. The gov-
ernment failed to take steps to end discrimination against women under
Lebanese personal status laws. 
The government’s failure to provide basic services, including garbage removal,
continued to spark protests, with some protesters being prosecuted before mili-
tary tribunals. Others who spoke out against the government were subject to
criminal defamation laws. Detainees continued to suffer from ill-treatment and
torture, but in one welcome development, parliament in October established a
National Human Rights Institute and national preventative mechanism against
torture. 
As the Syrian refugee crisis continued, new residency policies introduced in Jan-
uary 2015 caused an estimated 70 percent of Syrians to lose legal status, re-
stricting their movement and their ability to work, access healthcare, and send
their children to school. With limited international support, the government
struggled to meet refugees’ needs. 
Lengthy Pretrial Detention, Ill-Treatment, and Torture
Amid protracted security threats, suspects suffered from lengthy pretrial deten-
tion and reported ill-treatment and torture. Following the death of a man de-
tained in Roumieh prison on May 25, prisoners launched a protest amid
allegations of negligent care. 
In October, Parliament passed legislation creating a national preventative mech-
anism to monitor and investigate the use of torture, as required under the Op-
tional Protocol to the Convention against Torture, which Lebanon ratified in
2008. 
Hannibal Gaddafi, son of the late Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi, has re-
mained in “precautionary” pretrial detention since December 2015. He is facing
charges of withholding information, allegedly in relation to the disappearance of
Imam Musa Sadr in 1978. Gaddafi’s lawyer has expressed concern about his pos-
sible extradition to Libya, where he faces a risk of imprisonment and torture. 
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Freedom of Assembly, Freedom of Expression, and Use of
Military Courts 
While freedom of expression is generally respected in Lebanon, defaming or crit-
icizing the Lebanese president or army is a criminal offense. On August 22, 2016,
a woman was sentenced by a military court to a month in prison for “offending
the military institution,” after alleging that military intelligence members raped
and tortured her in detention in 2013. Such retaliation may further deter other
survivors from reporting abuse.
The Lebanese penal code also criminalizes libel and defamation of public offi-
cials, authorizing imprisonment of up to one year. Lebanese authorities arrested
a lawyer and human rights activist, Nabil al-Halabi, on May 30, 2016, over Face-
book posts criticizing government officials. He was detained for three days and
released after signing a “document of submission.” 
Fourteen protesters, arrested for demonstrating against the government’s failure
to resolve a trash crisis, as well as corruption, in 2015, have been referred to mil-
itary courts for rioting, violence against police, and destruction of property. Their
trials are set to take place in January 2017. If found guilty, they face up to three
years in prison. Military courts typically do not meet international fair trial stan-
dards and should not be used to prosecute civilians for criminal offenses. 
Migrant Workers
An estimated 250,000 migrant domestic workers, primarily from Sri Lanka,
Ethiopia, the Philippines, Nepal, and Bangladesh are excluded from labor law
protections. The kafala (sponsorship) system subjects them to restrictive immi-
gration rules and places them at risk of exploitation and abuse. 
The most common complaints documented by the embassies of labor-sending
countries and civil society groups include non-payment or delayed payment of
wages, forced confinement, refusal to provide time off, and verbal and physical
abuse. Migrant domestic workers suing their employers for abuse face legal ob-
stacles and risk imprisonment and deportation due to the restrictive visa sys-
tem. Several migrant domestic workers in Lebanon committed suicide or
attempted to commit suicide in 2016. 
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Women’s Rights
Despite women’s active participation in all aspects of Lebanese society, discrim-
inatory provisions remain in personal status laws, nationality laws, and the crim-
inal code.
A lack of coordination in the government’s response to sex trafficking continues
to put women and girls at risk. Syrian women appear to be at particular risk of
trafficking into forced prostitution and sexual exploitation. In March 2016, secu-
rity officers freed as many as 75 Syrian women from two brothels. Although the
country’s 2011 anti-trafficking law directs the Ministry of Social Affairs to estab-
lish a trust fund for victims, the ministry has yet to establish such a fund.
A 2014 Law on the Protection of Women and Family from Domestic Violence es-
tablished important protection measures and introduced policing and court re-
forms. But it failed to criminalize all forms of domestic violence, including
marital rape. The law called for family violence units within the police and a fund
to assist victims of domestic violence. But these have not yet been established.
Some women continued to face obstacles in pursuing criminal complaints of do-
mestic violence, mostly due to lengthy delays. In 2016, a man convicted for beat-
ing his wife to death was sentenced to just three years and nine months in
prison. The case was under appeal at time of writing.
Women also continue to suffer discrimination under 15 Lebanese personal sta-
tus laws, dependent on each individual’s religious affiliation, including unequal
access to divorce, residence of children after divorce, and property rights. Unlike
Lebanese men, Lebanese women cannot pass on their nationality to foreign hus-
bands and children and are subject to discriminatory inheritance laws.
Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity
Sexual relations outside of marriage—adultery and fornication—are criminalized
under Lebanon’s penal code. Furthermore, article 534 of the penal code pun-
ishes “any sexual intercourse contrary to the order of nature” with up to one year
in prison. In recent years, authorities conducted raids to arrest persons allegedly
involved in same-sex conduct, some of whom were subjected to torture includ-
ing forced anal examinations.
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In February, a Syrian refugee, arrested by Lebanese Military Intelligence officers
apparently on suspicion he was gay, was allegedly tortured while detained at
Military Intelligence, Ministry of Defense, Military Police, and Jounieh police cen-
ters. 
Refugees
There are more than 1 million Syrian refugees registered with the United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in Lebanon. The government esti-
mates the true number to be 1.5 million. 
Lebanon’s residency policy makes it difficult for Syrians to maintain legal status,
heightening risks of exploitation and abuse and restricting refugees’ access to
work, education, and healthcare. An estimated 70 percent of Syrians in Lebanon
now lack legal residency. Lebanon is not a signatory to the 1951 UN Refugee Con-
vention, and refugees lacking legal status risk detention for illegal presence in
the country.
Approximately 250,000 school-age Syrian children were out of school during the
2015-2016 school year, largely due to parents’ inability to pay for transport, child
labor, school directors imposing arbitrary enrollment requirements, and lack of
language support. Secondary-school age children and children with disabilities
faced particular barriers—only 5 percent of Syrians aged 15-18 were in enrolled in
secondary schools last year. 
Individual municipalities have imposed curfews on Syrian refugees and security
services have arrested hundreds of Syrians for lack of residency documents. Sev-
eral reports of attacks against Syrians by state and non-state actors emerged fol-
lowing a spate of eight suicide bombings in Al-Qaa on June 27, and July 2016
photos appeared to show municipal police in Amchit humiliating Syrian
refugees. Five officers were questioned, but all were released and the head of
the Amchit municipality reportedly stated “they didn’t carry out any violations.” 
Human Rights Watch has also documented isolated forcible deportations of Syri-
ans and Palestinians back to Syria, putting them at risk of arbitrary detention,
torture, or other persecution. In January 2016, Lebanese authorities, in violation
of their international obligations, sent hundreds of Syrians traveling through the
Beirut airport back to Syria without first assessing their risk of harm upon return.
399
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH
WORLD REPORT 2017
400
In 2016, Lebanon continued to impose entry regulations for Syrians that effec-
tively barred many asylum seekers from entering Lebanon.
Approximately 45,000 Palestinians from Syria live in Lebanon, joining the esti-
mated 260-280,000 Palestinian refugees already in the country, where they face
restrictions including their right to work. 
Legacy of Past Conflicts and Wars
In October 2012, Justice Minister Shakib Qortbawi put forward a draft decree to
the cabinet to establish a national commission to investigate the fate of those
“disappeared,” during the country’s 1975-1990 civil war and its aftermath but no
further action was taken. In September 2014, the government finally provided
the families of the disappeared with the files of the Official Commission of In-
quiry appointed in 2000 to investigate the fate of the kidnapped. These showed
that the government had not conducted any serious investigation.
Key International Actors
Syria, Iran, and Saudi Arabia maintain a strong influence on Lebanese politics
through local allies and proxies, and increasingly so as the conflict in neighbor-
ing Syria drags on.
Many countries, including the United States, United Kingdom, members of the
European Union, Canada, and various Gulf countries, have given Lebanon exten-
sive, albeit insufficient, support to help it cope with the Syrian refugee crisis and
to bolster security amid spillover violence.
Lebanese armed forces and police also receive assistance from a range of inter-
national donors, including the US, EU, UK, France, and Saudi Arabia. Some of
these actors have tried to ensure the forces adhere to international human rights
law, but compliance remains weak.
401
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH
WORLD REPORT 2017
402
Libya
The United Nations-backed, internationally recognized Government of National
Accord (GNA) struggled in 2016 to assert itself in the capital Tripoli, as two au-
thorities—one also based in Tripoli and another in eastern Libya—continued to
compete for legitimacy and control over resources and infrastructure. 
Forces aligned with all governments and dozens of militias continued to clash,
exacerbating a humanitarian crisis with close to half-a-million internally dis-
placed people. The civilian population struggled to gain access to basic services
such as healthcare, fuel, and electricity. 
Militias and armed forces affiliated with the two governments engaged in arbi-
trary detentions, torture, unlawful killings, indiscriminate attacks, abductions,
and forcible disappearances. Criminal gangs and militias abducted politicians,
journalists, and civilians—including children—for political and monetary gain.
The domestic criminal justice system remained dysfunctional, offering no
prospects for accountability, while the International Criminal Court, despite hav-
ing jurisdiction over Libya provided by the UN Security Council, failed to open
any new investigation into ongoing crimes.
The United States, United Kingdom, France, and the United Arab Emirates report-
edly expanded their military activities in Libya to support forces in fighting ex-
tremists in Sirte and Benghazi. 
The Islamic State (also known as ISIS) lost control over large parts of its self-pro-
claimed capital in Sirte, where it had been based since June 2015, and remained
embroiled in fighting with Libyan and foreign forces. ISIS groups summarily exe-
cuted people for alleged witchcraft and “treason” and imposed a severe and re-
strictive interpretation of Sharia law in areas under their control.
Tens of thousands of migrants, asylum seekers, and refugees from Africa and the
Middle East transited through Libya on their way to Europe, with 4,518 drowning
or going missing while crossing the Mediterranean in unsafe vessels. While in
Libya, armed groups and guards at migrant detention facilities subjected many
to forced labor, torture, sexual abuse, and extortion.
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Political Transition and Constitution 
The Presidential Council (PC), the highest body of the GNA, arrived in March in
Tripoli to take control of ministries and government facilities that had previously
been under the control of the self-proclaimed National Salvation Government,
which stepped down in April to make way for the GNA . 
In October, the former prime minister of the National Salvation Government an-
nounced a comeback together with the rump General National Congress, the for-
mer legislature, and took over the Tripoli premises of the State Council, the
advisory body attached to the GNA. 
The Interim Government, meanwhile, refused to recognize the cabinet proposed
by the Presidency Council and continued to operate as a rival authority from al-
Bayda and Tobruk in eastern Libya. Despite enjoying international recognition,
the GNA struggled to win support domestically and gain authority and control
over territory and institutions. 
The so-called Libyan National Army (LNA), under the command of General Khalifa
Hiftar and allied with the Interim Government, gained control of substantial terri-
tory in 2016, including in the oil crescent, where they took over major terminals.
Libya’s legislative body, the House of Representatives, remained allied with the
Interim Government . Throughout the year, deputies opposing the UN-backed
GNA obstructed voting for a proposed cabinet.
In June, the president of the House of Representatives, Agilah Saleh, declared
martial law, a de facto state of emergency, in the eastern region and appointed
the LNA chief of staff, Abdulrazeq al-Nadhouri, as military governor for that re-
gion. Since then, al-Nadhouri has replaced several elected civilian heads of mu-
nicipal councils with military governors.
In September, Abdurrahman Swehli, head of the High Council of State, declared
that, in light of the inability of the House of Representatives to confirm a cabinet,
the High Council of State would exercise all powers, including legislative ones. 
Libya’s Constitution Drafting Assembly failed to finalize a preliminary draft con-
stitution and remained embroiled in internal disagreements.  
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Security and Armed Militias
In the absence of a state authority exercising control over the national territory,
dozens of rival militia groups and military forces, with varying agendas and alle-
giances, continued to flout international law with impunity. They indiscriminately
shelled civilians, abducted and forcibly disappeared people, tortured, arbitrarily
detained, and unlawfully killed people and destroyed civilian property.
In the first half of 2016, fighters loyal to ISIS controlled the central coastal town
of Sirte and subjected residents to a rigid interpretation of Sharia law that in-
cluded public floggings, amputation of limbs, and public lynchings, often leav-
ing the victims’ corpses on display. 
Armed Conflict and War Crimes
Warring factions continued to indiscriminately shell civilian areas, mostly in
Benghazi and Derna in the east and in Sirte. From March until August, 141 civil-
ian were killed in the violence, including 30 children, and 146 injured, including
28 children, according to the UN Support Mission In Libya (UNSMIL).
In the east, the LNA and allied forces made substantial advances against the
Benghazi Revolutionaries Shura Council, an alliance of groups including Islamist
militias such as Ansar al-Sharia. As of November 2016, fighting remained con-
centrated in the Ganfouda neighborhood of Benghazi, where several hundred
civilians, including Libyans and foreign nationals, remained trapped by a stand-
off between LNA and militants since 2014. Civilians, including children, strug-
gled with limited access to medical care, electricity, and food.
In February, two Serbian civilians held by ISIS died in a US air strikes on targets
in the western coastal town of Sabratha, which also killed dozens of fighters. The
same month, unidentified aircraft attacked a hospital compound in the city of
Derna, killing at least two civilians and causing extensive damage.
In May, armed groups allied with the GNA, backed by US airstrikes, launched a
military offensive against ISIS fighters in Sirte. Hostilities continued at time of
writing.
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In Derna, the LNA continued to fight against the Derna Revolutionaries Shura
Council, an alliance of militias that participated in the ousting of ISIS from the
city in 2015. 
In July, 14 unidentified bodies were found close to a dumpster in Benghazi with
gunshot wounds, and in October, 10 unidentified bodies with gunshot wounds
and torture marks were found in a nearby neighborhood of Benghazi. Both inci-
dents took place in areas under LNA control. To date, authorities have not pub-
licly announced any conclusion to their investigations. In October, shelling by
unidentified forces killed one woman and injured six others in a camp for inter-
nally displaced people from Tawergha, in Tripoli.
Arbitrary Detention, Torture, and Deaths in Custody
Prison authorities and militias continued to hold thousands of detainees, includ-
ing some women and children, in long-term arbitrary detention without charges
or due process. While conditions varied, most prisons lacked a functioning med-
ical facility and hygienic sanitary installations. Guards and militia members mis-
treated and tortured detainees with impunity. 
In June, unidentified armed groups killed 12 detainees upon their conditional re-
lease from al-Baraka prison in Tripoli. All 12 were members of the former Gaddafi
government and had been accused of taking part in the violence against anti-
government protesters in 2011. According to the families, the bodies were found
in various locations around Tripoli. At time of writing, no investigation had been
conducted into these crimes. 
Judicial System 
Ongoing insecurity led to the collapse of the criminal justice system in Libya.
Courts in the east remained mostly shut, while elsewhere they operated at a re-
duced level. The Supreme Court failed to issue judgments on all cases that were
heard before it due to political divisions. In Sirte and environs, ISIS groups im-
plemented their own interpretation of Sharia law in areas under their control in-
cluding punishing people for smoking, wearing “immodest” dress, and adultery. 
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International Criminal Court
The ICC has the mandate to investigate war crimes and crimes against humanity
in Libya pursuant to UN Security Council Resolution 1970 passed on February 27,
2011. The ICC prosecutor has failed to open any new investigations into the grave
and ongoing crimes in Libya, citing resources limitations. 
Libyan authorities failed to surrender Saif al-Islam Gaddafi, son of former leader
Muammar Gaddafi, to the ICC where he is wanted for committing crimes against
humanity during the 2011 uprising. Gaddafi was held by a militia in Zintan since
his arrest in 2011, and was last seen by UN monitors in Zintan in June 2014. 
In her November 9 update to the Security Council, ICC Prosecutor Fatou Ben-
souda announced her office would expand the Libya investigations in 2017 to in-
clude recent and ongoing serious crimes.
Death Penalty
The penal code contains more than 30 articles that provide for the death
penalty. Since Gaddafi’s overthrow in 2011, civil and military courts around the
country have imposed death sentences, including against eight former officials
in the Gaddafi government in a flawed trial in 2015. No death sentences are
known to have been carried out since 2010.  
Internally Displaced People
The UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) estimated at 435,000 Libya’s
population of internally displaced people. UNHCR was unable to conduct vital
activities such as child protection services at detention centers due to inade-
quate funding for its humanitarian programs.
In what amounts to a crime against humanity, militias and authorities in Misrata
continued to prevent 40,000 residents of Tawergha, Tomina, and Karareem from
returning to their homes in relation for alleged crimes during the 2011 revolution
attributed to people from those cities against anti-Gaddafi activists and fighters. 
In August, representatives of Misrata and Tawergha signed a reconciliation
agreement that aims to ensure return home of the displaced from Tawergha as
well as compensation for both sides and reconstruction of damaged structures.
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The deal also foresees accountability for serious crimes. It has yet to come into
force. 
Freedom of Speech and Expression
In June, an ISIS fighter allegedly shot dead freelance reporter Khaled Al Zantani
in Benghazi. In Sirte, an ISIS fighter allegedly shot and killed photojournalist Ab-
delkader Fassouk in July, and in September, an ISIS fighter allegedly shot and
killed Dutch photojournalist Jeroen Oerlemans. 
The fate of Sofiane Chourabi and Nadhir Ktari, two Tunisian journalists who went
missing in September 2014 while on assignment in Libya, remained unknown.  
Armed groups kidnapped and disappeared other journalists. According to RSF, in
January, a unit allied with the LNA in Benghazi arrested and tortured a local cor-
respondent for a TV station, Libya HD, Badr Al Rabhi, for three days.
Women’s Rights, Sexual Orientation, and Gender Identity
The penal code permits a reduced sentence for a man who kills or injures his
wife or another female relative because he suspects her of extramarital sexual
relations. Libyan law inadequately prohibits domestic violence and its personal
status laws continue to discriminate against women, particularly with respect to
marriage, divorce, and inheritance.
Same-sex relations are prohibited and punished with up to five years in jail.
Abductions and Enforced Disappearances 
Militias continued to abduct and disappear civilians, including politicians, and
journalists, with impunity. Criminal groups abducted residents, including chil-
dren, demanding large ransoms from their families and often killing their victims
if relatives failed to come up with the money. 
Those still missing include Tripoli civil society activist Abdelmoez Banoon and
Benghazi prosecutor Abdel-Nasser Al-Jeroushi, both abducted by unidentified
groups in 2014. Saif al-Islam Gaddafi, wanted by the ICC for crimes against hu-
manity and sentenced to death in absentia by a Tripoli court for crimes commit-
ted during the 2011 revolution, was last seen in June 2014, in Zintan. Gaddafi
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was held by the Abu Baker al-Siddiq Brigade in Zintan following his arrest in
2011. 
Migrants, Refugees, and Asylum Seekers
Refugees, asylum seekers, and migrants, continued to flock to Europe via Libya.
As of November, UNHCR recorded over 342,774 arrivals to Italy by sea from North
Africa since January mostly from Libya. According to UNHCR, at least 4,518 died
or went missing while crossing the Mediterranean from Libya to Europe. The In-
ternational Organization for Migration estimated that 771,146 migrants and asy-
lum seekers were in Libya as of November. 
Members of the Libyan Coast Guards or Navy intercepted boats and returned the
migrants and refugees back to land and into detention centers, often subjecting
the migrants they intercepted to physical and verbal abuse. While the Depart-
ment for Combating Illegal Migration (DCIM), which is part of the Ministry of Inte-
rior, managed the majority of migrant detention centers, militias and smugglers
controlled other unofficial detention facilities. 
Conditions at migrant detention facilities remained abysmal. Officials and mili-
tias held migrants and refugees in prolonged detention without judicial review
and subjected them to poor conditions, including overcrowding and insufficient
food. Guards and militia members subjected migrants and refugees to beatings,
forced labor, and sexual violence. 
Key International Actors
The United States, European Union, and regional states all played significant
roles in the armed conflicts occurring in Libya. The US, France, and United King-
dom reportedly participated in military activities in support of Libyan forces
against militant groups, most notably ISIS in Sirte and Benghazi. 
Efforts to reach a political settlement between warring factions, led by the UN
envoy to Libya Martin Kobler, and backed by members of the international com-
munity most notably the US, UK, France, and Italy, failed to achieve the desired
results as parties remained engaged in hostilities, competing for legitimacy. 
On March 8, the UN Panel of Experts on Libya, established pursuant to UN Secu-
rity Council resolution 1973 (2011), issued its final report which said that several
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countries, individuals and companies were responsible for violations of the arms
embargo against Libya. According to the report, the UAE, Egypt, Qatar, Turkey,
Ukraine and Sudan have all violated the arms embargo against Libya since 2011,
by transferring weapons, ammunitions, aircraft or armored vehicles to the con-
flict parties. 
Also in March, a leaked document revealed that British special forces had been
actively fighting extremist groups in Libya since January. In July, France an-
nounced that three of its soldiers were killed in Libya after a helicopter crashed
during an intelligence-gathering operation. In August, the US expanded its air
campaign in Libya at the request of the GNA to include targets in the ISIS strong-
hold of Sirte. 
The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) released a re-
port in February documenting widespread violations and abuses committed in
Libya since 2014 that included unlawful killings; indiscriminate attacks; torture
and ill treatment; arbitrary detention; abductions and disapperances; and viola-
tions against women, journalists, human rights defenders, migrants, and chil-
dren.
Despite a recommendation by the High Commissioner that the Human Rights
Council consider establishing an independent expert on Libya to report on the
human rights situation and progress towards accountability, the council’s reso-
lution only requested a further report from the high commissioner in March 2017.
In a September update, the high commissioner’s office reported to the council
that the situation has not improved and that impunity prevails, and reiterated
the recommendation that the council create an independent expert mandate.
The UN Security Council extended for another 12 months in March an arms em-
bargo on Libya. In June, the council unanimously authorized the inspection of
vessels off Libyan high seas in an effort to crackdown on illicit weapons smug-
gling. The council also passed a resolution in July that authorized moving Libya’s
category 2 chemical weapons out of the country and destroying them. In Octo-
ber, the council renewed its authorization for the interdiction of vessels used for
smuggling migrants on the high seas off the coast of Libya.
The Rule of Law and Human Rights division at UNSMIL, which operates from
Tunis and visits Libya only rarely due to security concerns, scaled down its public
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reporting on human rights violations. However, in March, it started producing a
monthly bulletin on civilian casualties in Libya.
In June, the EU extended its anti-smuggling naval operation in the central
Mediterranean, Operation Sophia, to include training for the Libyan Coast Guard
and Navy. In July, NATO committed to supporting Operation Sophia by providing
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, as well as capacity-building for
the Libyan coastguard and navy.
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Malaysia 
Malaysia’s human rights situation continued to deteriorate in 2016, with human
rights defenders, activists, political opposition figures, and journalists facing ha-
rassment and politically motivated prosecution. Those criticizing the administra-
tion of Prime Minister Najib Razak or commenting on the government’s handling
of the 1 Malaysia Development Berhad (1MDB) corruption scandal have been
particular targets.
Freedom of Expression
The Sedition Act and the Communications and Multimedia Act (CMA) continue to
be the laws most frequently used against critical speech. In August 2016, vice
president of the Parti Amanah Negara (PAN) Youth, Mohd Fakhrulrazi Mohd
Mokhtar, was sentenced to eight months in prison for sedition for calling for the
release of jailed opposition leader Anwar Ibrahim at a rally in February 2015. In
April, a court sent activist Haris Ibrahim to prison for eight months on a sedition
charge for a speech he gave in May 2013 challenging the results of the 2013 gen-
eral election. 
Section 233(1) of the CMA provides criminal penalties of up to one year in prison
for a communication that “is obscene, indecent, false, menacing or offensive in
character with intent to annoy, abuse, threaten or harass another person.” The
broadly worded law has been repeatedly used against those who allegedly in-
sulted Najib or Malaysia’s royalty on social media, and against individuals call-
ing for Najib to resign. 
Graphic artist Fahmi Reza is facing two counts under section 233 for posting an
online image of Najib in clown make-up. Social media posts allegedly insulting
to the royal family of Johor led to at least a dozen criminal prosecutions in 2016.
In June 2016, a court sentenced 19-year-old Mohammed Amirul Azwan Moham-
mad Shakri to a year in prison after he pled guilty to 14 counts of insulting the
sultan of Johor on Facebook. Prosecutors charged activist Khalid Ismath with 11
counts of violating section 233 of the CMA and three counts of sedition for posts
on a solidarity page for Kamal Hisham Jaafar, a former legal adviser to the Johor
royal family who was detained on allegations of corruption.  
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On November 14, vice president of the opposition Parti Keadlian Rakyat, Rafizi
Ramli, was convicted of violating the Malaysian’s Official Secrets Act for disclos-
ing a page of the auditor-general’s report on the 1MDB scandal, which remains
classified as an official secret despite having been submitted to parliament in
April. He was sentenced to 18 months in jail, which disqualifies him from serving
in parliament for five years after his sentence finishes.
Although successive prime ministers have pledged not to censor the internet,
authorities have repeatedly used the CMA to block websites, including those re-
porting on allegations of corruption. Censors blocked the UK-based website
Sarawak Report in June 2015, and the website Medium, which was printing
Sarawak Report’s articles, in January 2016. Also blocked were the Malaysia
Chronicle, regional news website Asia Sentinel, and at least four local blog sites
commenting on political matters.  
On February 25, 2016, the government blocked the online news portal the
Malaysian Insider under section 233 of the CMA for publishing “unverified infor-
mation.” While the Malaysian Multimedia and Communications Commission
(MCMC) did not specify what articles led to the blockage, the Malaysian Insider
had recently published an article citing a source in the Malaysian Anti-Corrup-
tion Commission stating that the commission had “credible evidence” to charge
Najib with corruption. On March 14, still blocked by authorities, the Malaysian
Insider shut down, citing commercial reasons. The portal’s editor, Jahabar Sadiq,
told the BBC that the site had been losing money since it was blocked, with ad-
vertisers holding off buying ads until the block was lifted.
Freedom of Assembly and Association
The government continues to prosecute individuals for participation in peaceful
assembly, in violation of international human rights law. Those holding a
demonstration without giving notice or participating in “street protests” are rou-
tinely arrested or called in for questioning, and many charged with criminal of-
fenses. In August 2016, after the US Department of Justice issued a civil
forfeiture complaint seeking to seize assets purchased with funds allegedly
looted from 1MDB, a group of students organized a rally calling for the individual
referred to as “Malaysian Official No. 1” in the complaint and widely believed to
be Prime Minister Najib, to be identified and arrested. Although police did not
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interfere with the rally, they called in the organizers and several political figures
who spoke at the event for questioning for sedition, “activity detrimental to par-
liamentary democracy,” and violation of the overly restrictive Peaceful Assembly
Law.  
The Societies Act restricts the right to freedom of association by requiring that
organizations with seven or more members register with the registrar of soci-
eties. The law gives the minister of home affairs “absolute discretion” to declare
an organization illegal, and also provides the government supervisory authority
over political parties. According to the Registry of Societies’ website, as of Sep-
tember the registrar had rejected more than 36 percent of applications to form
organizations submitted in 2016.
Police Abuse and Impunity
Police torture of suspects in custody, in some cases resulting in deaths, and ex-
cessive use of force in apprehending suspects remained serious problems in
2016, as did a lack of accountability for such offenses. In January 2016,
Malaysian human rights NGO Suara Rakyat Malaysia (SUARAM) released letters
from six individuals detained without trial under the Security Offenses (Special
Measures) Act detailing the torture and ill-treatment they had suffered while in
custody, including beatings and sexual humiliation. 
To date, no one has been held accountable for the mistreatment. In April 2016,
the Enforcement Agencies Integrity Commission (EAIC) found that N. Dharmen-
dran, who died in police custody in 2013, was beaten to death and recom-
mended that the officers responsible be held to account. In June 2016, however,
a court acquitted all four officers of all charges, continuing the longstanding im-
punity for such offenses.  
Criminal Justice System
On August 1, the controversial National Security Council Act came into force. The
law gives sweeping powers to a council headed by Prime Minister Najib to de-
clare regions, including the entire country, as security areas to protect “any inter-
est of Malaysia.” Once a region is declared a security area, the law suspends
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many restraints on police powers there, allowing the authorities to conduct ar-
rests, searches, and seizures without warrants.
Malaysia continues to detain individuals without trial under restrictive laws.
Both the 1959 Prevention of Crime Act and the 2015 Prevention of Terrorism Act
give government-appointed boards the authority to impose detention without
trial for up to two years, renewable indefinitely, to order electronic monitoring,
and to impose other significant restrictions on freedom of movement and associ-
ation, with no possibility of judicial review. The similarly restrictive Security Of-
fenses (Special Measures) Act allows for preventive detention of up to 28 days
with no judicial review.   
Malaysia retains the death penalty for various crimes, with the sentence manda-
tory for 12 offenses, including drug trafficking. Nearly 1,000 people are esti-
mated to be on death row. The government is not transparent about when and
how decisions are made to carry out executions, and in March executed three
men after giving only two days’ notice to their families. The government has said
it is considering amending the law to change the mandatory death penalty provi-
sions, but has yet to take steps to do so.
Refugees, Asylum Seekers, and Trafficking Victims
Malaysia is not a party to the 1951 Refugee Convention, and refugees and asylum
seekers have no legal rights in the country. Over 150,000 refugees and asylum
seekers, the vast majority of whom come from Burma, have registered with
UNCHR in Malaysia but are unable to work, travel, or enrol in government
schools. The lack of status leaves them highly vulnerable to abuses. Many of
those who seeking refuge are treated as “illegal migrants” and locked up in over-
crowded and unsanitary immigration detention centers. Female refugees are par-
ticularly vulnerable to abuse, and there is evidence of large numbers of coerced
and forced marriages of ethnic Rohingya women and girls from Burma. 
No progress has been made in identifying and investigating suspects involved in
the deaths of over 100 suspected victims of trafficking whose bodies were found
in mass graves on the Thai-Malaysian border in 2015. The Malaysian government
has failed to effectively implement the amendments passed in 2014 to
Malaysia’s 2007 anti-trafficking law, in particular by taking the necessary admin-
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istrative steps to provide assistance and work authorization to all trafficking vic-
tims who desire it, while ensuring their freedom of movement. 
Despite these failures, Malaysia inexplicably remained on the Tier 2 “watch list”
in the annual Trafficking in Persons Report prepared by the United States Depart-
ment of State as a country viewed as making a “significant effort” to meet the
standards of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act.
Judicial Freedom 
The government has said it intends to introduce amendments to the Legal Pro-
fession Act that would allow the government to interfere with and obstruct the
bar’s actions. The proposed amendments would empower the minister in charge
of legal affairs to appoint two members of the Bar Council, and to issue rules and
regulations governing bar association elections. 
In addition, they would increase the quorum needed for a general meeting from
500 to 4,000 members, or 25 percent of the bar’s 17,000 membership, making it
virtually impossible for the bar to take action at its general meetings. The bill to
amend the Legal Profession Act is likely be introduced when parliament next sits
in March 2017. 
Discrimination Based on Gender, Sexual Orientation, and
Gender Identity
Discrimination against lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) people is
pervasive in Malaysia. Article 377A of the penal code criminalizes same-sex ac-
tivity between men with punishments of up to 20 years in prison and whipping.
Numerous Sharia-based laws and regulations prohibiting a “man posing as a
woman,” sexual relations between women, and sexual relations between men
effectively criminalize LGBT people.  
Child marriage is permitted under Malaysian law, and the government’s failure to
collect data on age of marriage of women and girls presents an obstacle to even
discussing the problem. An effort in 2016 by activists to raise the age of mar-
riage to 18 was blocked in the lower house of parliament.
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Key International Actors
Malaysia positions itself in the United Nations and the international community
as a moderate Muslim state prepared to stand up to Islamist extremism, and this
year established a Regional Digital Counter-Messaging Communications Centre
to counter Islamic State propaganda, earning support from the US and its allies.
Nevertheless, both the US Department of State and the European Parliament
have expressed concern about the country’s deteriorating human rights situa-
tion.  
In December 2015, the European Parliament passed a resolution deploring “the
deteriorating human rights situation in Malaysia and in particular the crackdown
on civil society activists, academics, media and political activists” and express-
ing concern about the number of people facing charges or arrest under the Sedi-
tion Act.”  
In March 2016, the US State Department issued a statement expressing its con-
cern about “actions to restrict access to domestic and international reporting on
Malaysian current affairs” and calling on the Malaysian government to ensure
that its laws fully respect the right to freedom of expression.  
In 2016, Malaysia served as a non-permanent representative to the UN Security
Council, where it acted as the chair of the Working Group on Children and Armed
Conflict. Malaysia continued its close engagement with China, its largest trading
partner. In November, Malaysia agreed to buy four Chinese naval vessels and
pledged with Beijing to handle disputes in the South China Sea bilaterally.
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Mali
Malian civilians endured a situation of “no war, no peace” in 2016, as implemen-
tation of the previous year’s peace accord to end the military and political crisis
in the north stalled, and armed groups linked to Al-Qaeda launched dozens of
attacks on Malian security forces and international peacekeepers, extending
their operations south.
The attacks, and the failure to disarm thousands of combatants from Mali’s
2012-2013 armed conflict, deepened a security vacuum, creating a precarious
human rights climate for civilians in central and northern Mali. Civilians suffered
increasing incidents of criminality, and the fall-out from clashes between armed
groups. Long-delayed local elections were held on November 20, but violence
and threats from armed groups prohibited voters in dozens of local administra-
tive areas from taking part.   
The insecurity undermined efforts by the Malian government and its interna-
tional partners to strengthen the rule of law and deliver basic health care, educa-
tion, and humanitarian assistance. Persistent intercommunal conflicts in central
and northern Mali left dozens dead and were exploited by armed groups to gar-
ner support and recruits.
Government forces responded to attacks by Islamist armed groups with countert-
errorism operations that often resulted in arbitrary arrests, executions, and tor-
ture and other ill-treatment. 
Malian authorities made scant effort to investigate and hold accountable those
implicated in recent abuses or those committed during the 2012-2013 armed
conflict. Rule of law institutions remain weak. Corruption was endemic at all lev-
els of government, further impeding Malians’ access to basic health care and ed-
ucation.
French forces and United Nations peacekeepers attempted to fill the security
vacuum. The failure of the Malian government and armed groups to implement
the 2015 accord and the spread of militant attacks to Burkina Faso and Cote
d’Ivoire generated impatience and growing diplomatic engagement by the inter-
national community.
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Abuses by Armed Groups in North and Central Mali
Throughout 2016, armed groups linked to Al-Qaeda, opposing ethnic Tuareg and
Arab groups, and government-supported militia attacked each other, Malian sol-
diers and neutral peacekeepers, and to a lesser extent aid workers and other
civilians. The increasing presence of Islamist armed groups in central Mali gener-
ated fear and engulfed more civilians in the conflict.
During 2016, Islamist armed groups executed at least 25 men, including civilians
and members of armed groups, allegedly for being informants for the govern-
ment and French engaged in counterterrorism operations.   
Several civilians were killed by landmines and improvised explosive devices
planted by some of these groups on major roads. In 2016, there were scores of
attacks, the vast majority by bandits, on humanitarian agencies.
At least 23 UN peacekeepers with the Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization
Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) were killed and 108 wounded in attacks by Islamist
armed groups in 2016, bringing the total to 67 killed since MINUSMA’s creation
in 2013. Armed groups linked to Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) took re-
sponsibility for most of these incidents, including a February attack that killed
seven peacekeepers from Guinea, and two incidents in May that killed five
peacekeepers from Togo and five from Chad.
AQIM claimed responsibility for the January kidnappings of a Swiss missionary in
Timbuktu and an elderly Australian doctor in Burkina Faso. In October, an Ameri-
can aid worker was kidnapped from Niger, bringing the number of foreign
hostages believed to be held by Islamist armed groups in Mali to six.  
Abuses by State Security Forces
Government forces committed numerous violations against suspected support-
ers and members of Islamist armed groups in 2016, including the summary
killing of at least five detainees, the torture of over a dozen suspects, and the
mock execution and ill-treatment of many more. 
Army soldiers and members of a pro-government militia, Groupe Autodéfense
Touareg Imghad et Alliés (GATIA), meted out the most frequent and serious
abuse. The abuses usually stopped after detainees were handed over to govern-
ment gendarmes. 
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Some 20 men accused of crimes against the state and terrorist-related offenses
were held outside the protection of the law within the headquarters of the state
security services. Members of the security forces were also implicated in fre-
quent acts of extortion, bribe taking, and theft, including from detainees. Secu-
rity forces used excessive force to respond to demonstrations in Gao and
Bamako, leaving at least four dead.   
The military made little effort to investigate and hold to account soldiers or mili-
tiamen implicated in violations against civilians. However, progress was made in
staffing and equipping the Military Justice Directorate in Bamako.  
Accountability for Abuses  
Progress in addressing impunity was evident in the trial of former coup leader
Gen. Amadou Haya Sanogo and 17 co-defendants, many members of the Malian
security services, for the 2012 abduction and killing of 21 elite “Red Beret” sol-
diers, which began on November 30.  
However, the Malian government made scant progress in holding to account
those responsible for many other violations committed during Mali’s 2012-2013
armed conflict. Serious crimes include the summary execution by armed Is-
lamists of approximately 150 Malian soldiers in Aguelhok, sexual violence, and
widespread pillage by various armed groups in the north, as well as the extraju-
dicial execution, enforced disappearance, and torture of suspected Islamist
rebels by Mali’s security forces. With a few exceptions, judicial authorities failed
to investigate over 100 complaints filed by victims and their family members.  
The judiciary investigated some cases of sexual violence perpetrated in 2015
and 2016 by armed groups in the north, as well as a deadly incident of commu-
nal violence near the central Malian town of Dioura. 
On September 27, the International Criminal Court (ICC) sentenced Malian
Ahmad al-Faqi al-Mahdi, formerly with Ansar Dine, to nine years in prison for his
role in destroying historical and religious monuments in Timbuktu in 2012. The
trial was the ICC’s first prosecution for this war crime and the first time an ICC de-
fendant pleaded guilty. ICC investigations in Mali are ongoing, but are limited in
part because of the precarious security situation. 
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Truth and Reconciliation Mechanism
The Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission, established by executive
order of the president in 2014 with a three-year mandate, made progress in
2016. In December 2015, the Council of Ministers approved the appointment of
14 commission members, and in May, an additional 10 commissioners were ap-
pointed. During 2016, the 25-member commission developed a work plan and
commenced research into past violations. The credibility of the body was under-
mined by the government’s failure to consult sufficiently with a wide variety of
stakeholders on the commission’s membership, mandated powers, and degree
of independence. The commission’s inclusion of nine members of armed groups
and lack of inclusion of those representing victims’ groups drew sharp criticism
from Malian civil society.   
Judiciary and Legal Framework for Human Rights
The Malian judiciary countrywide was plagued by neglect and mismanagement,
including insufficient staffing and logistical constraints. These shortfalls hin-
dered efforts to address impunity for perpetrators of all crimes, contributed to vi-
olations of the right to due process, and led to incidents of vigilante justice. Due
to the courts’ inability to adequately process cases, hundreds of detainees are
held in extended pretrial detention.
In April, the government adopted a bill providing greater independence for the
National Commission for Human Rights, and in September, adopted a five-year
action plan to strengthen human rights and access to justice. In July, the Na-
tional Assembly extended the state of emergency, first declared on November 21,
2015 in the aftermath of an attack on a hotel in Bamako, until March 2017. 
Recruitment of Child Soldiers
Armed groups in the north, including those allied with the government, contin-
ued to recruit and use child soldiers. During 2016, at least seven schools in the
north were at various times occupied by members of the armed groups. At least
six children suspected of supporting armed groups were detained in state run
detention centers, in contravention of a 2013 protocol stipulating that children
were to be placed in a care center managed by the UNICEF, the UN children’s
rights agency.  
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Key International Actors 
France and the United States took the lead on military matters, the European
Union led on training and security sector reform, and the UN led on rule of law
and political stability, though these actors were largely reluctant to publicly call
for investigations into past and ongoing crimes.
The UN and several members of the international mediation team that negoti-
ated the accord threatened targeted sanctions against those threatening Mali’s
security.   
In light of deteriorating security, the UN Security Council in June authorized an
additional 2,500 personnel for MINUSMA to a maximum strength of 13,289 mili-
tary and 1,920 police, included a more robust civilian protection mandate, and
authorized French forces to intervene in support of MINUSMA forces in imminent
danger.
MINUSMA forces on a few occasions engaged in excessive force, which in one
occasion led to the death of a detainee near Aguelhok. At time of writing, the re-
sults of the UN boards of inquiry into the cases were pending. 
Operation Barkhane, the 3,000-strong French regional counterterrorism opera-
tion launched in 2014 continued operations in Mali, Mauritania, Burkina Faso,
Niger, and Chad. The US military provided logistical support to Barkhane and is
building a major military and drone hub in Niger.  
The EU Training Mission in Mali (EUTM) began its third two-year mandate to train
the Malian army, and the EU Capacity Building Mission (EUCAP) continued train-
ing the Malian national guard, gendarmerie, and police forces. Since 2013, the
UN Peacebuilding Fund has allocated $12 million to address unemployment, ac-
cess to justice and education, and communal tension. 
MINUSMA, the UN Development Programme, the EU, the Netherlands, and
Canada took the lead in programs to support the justice sector and address cor-
ruption. The United States supported reform of military justice. 
The UN independent expert on the situation of human rights in Mali, Suliman
Baldo, conducted two missions to Mali. 
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Mexico
During the administration of President Enrique Peña Nieto, security forces have
been implicated in repeated, serious human rights violations—including extraju-
dicial killings, enforced disappearances, and torture—during efforts to combat
organized crime. The government has made little progress in prosecuting those
responsible for recent abuses, let alone the large number of abuses committed
by soldiers and police since former President Felipe Calderón (2006-2012) initi-
ated Mexico’s “war on drugs.” 
In April, the Interdisciplinary Group of Independent Experts (GIEI), which was es-
tablished through an agreement between the government and the Inter-Ameri-
can Commission on Human Rights (IACHR), issued its final report on the case of
the 43 disappeared students from Ayotzinapa, Guerrero State. The report docu-
mented egregious flaws in the government’s investigation of the case, refuted
key conclusions by the Attorney General’s Office, and called on authorities to
pursue fresh lines of investigation. Other continuing problems in Mexico include
attacks on journalists and limited access to reproductive rights and health care.
Enforced Disappearances 
Since 2006, Mexico’s security forces have participated in widespread enforced
disappearances.   
In August 2016, the government reported that the whereabouts of more than
27,000 people who had gone missing since 2006 remain unknown. Prosecutors
and police routinely fail to take basic investigative steps to identify those re-
sponsible for enforced disappearances, often telling the missing people’s fami-
lies to investigate on their own. Authorities have failed to identify remains of
bodies or body parts found in various locations, including in clandestine graves,
throughout the country.
The federal government has pursued potentially promising initiatives to find
people who have gone missing, but they have produced limited results. In 2013,
it created a unit in the Attorney General’s Office to investigate disappearances,
which became a Special Prosecutor’s Office in October 2015. However, when
consulted in April, members of that office said that they had brought charges in
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only four of a total of 830 cases of disappearances into which they had opened
investigations. 
In 2015, Congress approved a constitutional reform giving it authority to pass
general laws on enforced disappearance and torture that would establish a sin-
gle nationwide definition for each of the crimes and facilitate their prosecution
in all 31 states and Mexico City. At time of writing, President Peña Nieto had sub-
mitted the bills to Congress but neither had been enacted. 
Only one of the 43 missing students from the teachers college in Ayotzinapa, dis-
appeared in 2014 and believed killed, has been positively identified among re-
mains that the government says are those of the students. As of July, more than
100 people had been charged with alleged involvement in the abductions and
killings; at time of writing, none had been convicted.
Extrajudicial Killings
Unlawful killings of civilians by Mexican security forces “take place at an alarm-
ingly high rate” amid an atmosphere of “systematic and endemic impunity,” ac-
cording to the United Nations special rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary, or
arbitrary executions in 2014.
In August 2016, the National Human Rights Commission (CNDH) concluded that
federal police arbitrarily executed 22 of 42 civilians who died in a confrontation
in 2015 in Tanhuato, Michoacán State. Police fatally shot at least 13 people in the
back, tortured two detainees, and burned a man alive, the CNDH concluded,
then altered the crime scene by moving bodies and planting guns to justify the
illegal killings. 
At time of writing, a federal investigation into the Tanhuato killings remained open. 
Military Abuses and Impunity
Mexico has relied heavily on the military to fight drug-related violence and or-
ganized crime, leading to widespread human rights violations by military person-
nel. As of July, the CNDH had received almost 10,000 complaints of abuse by the
army since 2006—including more than 2,000 during the current administration.
It found in more than 100 cases that military personnel committed serious
human rights violations. 
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In 2014, Congress reformed the Code of Military Justice to require that abuses
committed by members of the military against civilians be handled by the civil-
ian criminal justice system rather than the military system, which had a history
of routinely failing to hold members of the military accountable for abuses.
Under the reform, abuses committed by military personnel against other soldiers
remain subject to military justice.
In May 2016, provisions included in a new Military Code of Criminal Procedure
and in reforms to the Code of Military Justice granted military prosecutors and
judges broad powers to search homes and public buildings, and to listen to pri-
vate telecommunications, without a judicial order issued by a civilian judge. In
June, the CNDH challenged the constitutionality of these provisions, and at time
of writing a Supreme Court decision was pending.
In the case of Tlatlaya, where soldiers killed 22 civilians in 2014—witnesses and
the CNDH reported that they extrajudicially executed at least 12 of them—nobody
has been convicted of the killings. In May 2016, a civilian, federal court absolved
the last of eight soldiers charged with homicide at Tlatlaya. 
Torture
Torture is widely practiced in Mexico to obtain confessions and extract informa-
tion. It is most frequently applied in the period between when victims are de-
tained, often arbitrarily, and when they are handed over to civilian prosecutors, a
period in which they are often held incommunicado at military bases or illegal
detention sites. Common torture techniques include beatings, waterboarding,
electric shocks, and sexual abuse. 
In its second report on the Ayotzinapa case, the Interdisciplinary Group of Inde-
pendent Experts, established through an agreement between the government
and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR), concluded that
80 percent of the suspects detained in connection with the case showed bodily
injuries possibly due to ill treatment and torture. 
According to the CNDH, Mexico State prosecutors sought to cover up military
wrongdoing in the Tlatlaya case by using torture to coerce false testimony from
witnesses. In July, authorities said they would fire seven or eight investigators
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and suspend 22 others—for as little as a month—for misconduct, but nobody
has been convicted in connection with the cover-up.
Despite a constitutional prohibition on using evidence obtained through torture,
some judges continue to disregard torture complaints and accept allegedly co-
erced confessions. 
Criminal Justice System
The criminal justice system routinely fails to provide justice to victims of violent
crimes and human rights violations. Causes of failure include corruption, inade-
quate training and resources, and complicity of prosecutors and public defend-
ers with criminals and abusive officials. The failure of law enforcement has
contributed to the emergence of armed citizen self-defense groups in several
parts of the country. 
In 2013, Mexico enacted a federal Victims Law intended to ensure justice, pro-
tection, and reparations for crime victims. After Senate approval in November
2016, reforms to the law, intended to reduce bureaucracy and improve access to
aid and reparations for victims, moved to the Chamber of Deputies for considera-
tion.  
Freedom of Media
Journalists, particularly those who report on crime or criticize officials, face ha-
rassment and attacks. Journalists are often driven to self-censorship by attacks
by authorities or criminal groups. 
The Attorney General’s Office documented 124 killings of journalists from 2000
through July 2016. The nongovernmental organization (NGO) Article 19 docu-
mented seven cases of journalists killed from January through June 2016.
By April 2016, 509 people had requested protection under a 2012 law to protect
human rights defenders and journalists. Protection has been slow to arrive or, in
some cases, insufficient. At time of writing, authorities had yet to bring charges
under the law against anyone believed responsible for threats or attacks. 
Authorities routinely fail to investigate crimes against journalists adequately,
often preemptively ruling out their profession as a motive. The CNDH reported in
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2016 that 90 percent of crimes against journalists in Mexico go unpunished, in-
cluding 82 percent of killings and 100 percent of disappearances. The Special
Prosecutor’s Office for Crimes against Freedom of Expression, created in 2006,
had by April 2016 opened 790 preliminary investigations, concluded 633, and
brought charges in 93, none of them involving disappearances or homicides. 
Women’s and Girls’ Rights
Mexican laws do not adequately protect women and girls against domestic and
sexual violence. Some provisions, including those that make the severity of pun-
ishments for some sexual offenses contingent upon the “chastity” of the victim,
contradict international standards. 
Eighteen states have passed laws establishing that there is a right to life from
the moment of conception. Although the Supreme Court ruled in 2010 that all
states must provide emergency contraception and access to abortion for rape
victims, many women and girls face serious barriers to accessing abortions after
sexual violence, including official intimidation.
Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity
Same-sex marriage has been legal in Mexico City since 2010. Since then, nine
states have legalized it; in 2015, the Supreme Court opened the door to recogni-
tion in all states by ruling that the definition of marriage as a union only between
a man and a woman constitutes discrimination and thus violates Mexico’s Con-
stitution. 
In May 2016, President Peña Nieto introduced a bill to legalize same-sex mar-
riage, to remove sexual orientation and gender identity as barriers to adoption,
and to recognize gender identity through the reissuance of birth notices, without
a doctor’s involvement. Two committees in the Chamber of Deputies voted
against the initiative in November. 
Palliative Care
The lack of access to palliative care results in needless suffering for large num-
bers of Mexicans with serious illnesses. In 2016, the National Commission for
Social Protection in Health added palliative care as a covered health service
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under Seguro Popular, a public health insurance scheme that covers more than
55 million people. By late 2016, more than 2,000 physicians were using the new
system, introduced in mid-2015, for prescribing strong pain medicines. Despite
such strides, obstacles remain, including a paucity of facilities offering palliative
care in many states.
Disability Rights
The UN Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, in a 2014 report,
found that, despite new laws and programs protecting the rights of the disabled,
serious gaps remained, including in access to justice, legal standing, and the
right to vote; access to buildings, transportation, and public spaces; violence
against women; and education. 
In 2015, Disability Rights International reported that Mexican women with psy-
chosocial disabilities were at high risk of being denied reproductive rights; that
state-run clinics in Mexico City sometimes pressured them into being sterilized
or, when pregnant, undergoing abortion; and that conditions were inhumane in
Mexico City’s government-funded facilities for people with disabilities, including
one institution that locked children in cages.
Key International Actors
The IACHR published a report in March documenting a wide range of abuses in
Mexico—including disappearances; extrajudicial executions; torture; and inse-
curity for women, children, migrants, human rights defenders, and journalists—
which they concluded amounted to a “crisis of gross human rights violations.”
The government criticized the report, responding that there was no “human
rights crisis” in Mexico. Later that month, Mexican authorities denied UN Special
Rapporteur on Torture Juan Méndez permission to return before the end of his
term, rejecting his conclusion that torture was widespread and accusing him of
acting “unethically.”
In April, the UN special rapporteurs on human rights defenders, freedom of ex-
pression, and freedom of assembly and association expressed concern regard-
ing a targeted campaign in the Mexican media accusing human rights defenders
and civil society organizations of fraud, corruption, and the promotion of im-
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punity through allegedly false claims about detainees being tortured. They urged
the government to ensure “a safe environment” in which such individuals and
organizations could operate “free of harassment.”
In October, the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights issued 14
recommendations to Mexico on the need to address impunity for human rights
violations, adopt laws to regulate the use of force and eliminate torture and en-
forced disappearances, and establish an independent forensic institution with
adequate resources. In May, the UN special rapporteur on extrajudicial, sum-
mary, or arbitrary executions released a report on Mexico identifying continuing
serious violations, including extrajudicial killings and excessive use of force by
security forces, impunity, and lack of reparations for victims. The UN Committee
on Enforced Disappearances has issued dozens of urgent actions on cases in
Mexico since 2012.
In September, the IACHR referred to the Inter-American Court of Human Rights
the case of 11 women who were arrested at a protest of flower growers in Mexico
State in 2006, when President Peña Nieto was governor there. The commission
described their arrest as “illegal and arbitrary” and said it “considered it proved”
that state agents subjected the women to physical and psychological torture and
raped seven of them. The Inter-American Court is scheduled to hear the case in
2017.
Since 2007, the United States has allocated more than US$2 billion in aid
through the Merida Initiative to help combat organized crime. In 2015, the US
secretary of state withheld $5 million in security aid, saying the State Depart-
ment could not confirm that Mexico had met the agreement’s human rights crite-
ria, but in September 2016 certified that Mexico had made sufficient human
rights progress to justify receiving its full Mérida aid of about $155 million.
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Morocco and Western Sahara
Morocco enacted laws in 2016 that advanced free expression and the rights of
domestic workers, victims of human trafficking, and person with disabilities.
However, authorities restricted the activities of local human rights associations
and extended restrictions on international human rights groups. Many persons
continued to serve long prison terms after unfair trials for politically motivated
offenses. While authorities often tolerated protest demonstrations, in Western
Sahara they systematically prevented gatherings supporting self-determination
for the contested territory.
Morocco granted temporary legal status to United Nations-recognized asylum-
seekers and thousands of economic migrants, pending an overhaul of its laws
on asylum and foreigners on Moroccan soil.
Freedom of Expression
On July 26, parliament adopted a new Press and Publications Code. One ad-
vance over the 2002 press code was the elimination of prison time as punish-
ment. But the new code still punishes many nonviolent speech offenses with
fines and court-ordered suspensions of publications or websites. 
Separately, the penal code maintains prison as a punishment for a variety of
nonviolent speech offenses. Five days before adopting the new press code, par-
liament added to the penal code provisions, imposing prison on those who cross
Morocco’s long-standing “red lines”—“causing harm” to Islam, the monarchy,
the person of the king and the royal family, and Morocco’s “territorial integrity”
(a reference to its claim to Western Sahara). 
The legal overhaul left intact prison as punishment for insulting state institutions
and for “praising” terrorism, while eliminating prison for defaming persons and
insulting foreign dignitaries, and for malicious publication of “false news.” 
Ali Anouzla, editor of the independent news website Lakome2.com, faced prose-
cution for harming Morocco’s “territorial integrity” after an interview with a Ger-
man newspaper in 2015 quoted him as referring to Western Sahara as
“occupied.” The court dropped the case in May after the newspaper confirmed
that this was a translation error. 
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Authorities require but often refuse to issue permits for foreign broadcast media
to film in Morocco. On April 3, police detained and then expelled a crew of the
French news program “Le Petit Journal” as it tried to film in a neighborhood of
Beni Mellal, a city 220 kilometers southeast of Casablanca  where a gay-bashing
assault had taken place. 
In November 2015, authorities expelled Rik Goverde, a freelance journalist for
the Dutch dailies NRC and AD, on the grounds that he lacked a press card.
Goverde had applied repeatedly for a card since moving to Morocco in October
2013 but never received a response. 
Moroccan state television allows some space for debate and investigative re-
porting but none for direct criticism of the palace or dissent on key issues.
Freedom of Assembly and Association
Authorities tolerated numerous marches and rallies demanding political reform
and protesting government actions while forcibly dispersing some, despite their
being peaceful. 
Officials continue to arbitrarily prevent or impede many associations from ob-
taining legal registration, although the 2011 constitution guarantees freedom of
association. On March 31, an Agadir Appeals Court upheld a decision closing the
Ifni Memory and Rights Association, partly on grounds that the association
harmed Morocco’s “territorial integrity” by the way that it asserted the rights and
identity of the population in the Ifni region.  
Among the many associations arbitrarily denied legal registration were scores of
charitable, cultural, and educational associations whose leadership included
members of al-Adl wal-Ihsan (Justice and Spirituality), a nationwide movement
that advocates an Islamic state and questions the king’s spiritual authority. Au-
thorities have kept sealed since 2006 houses belonging to the movement’s
leader and another member in eastern Morocco, without providing a legal basis.
Authorities frequently impeded events organized by local chapters of the Moroc-
can Association for Human Rights, by denying access to planned venues. They
also prevented the efforts by many chapters of the association to file documents
as required by the law, placing them in legal jeopardy. 
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An effective ban, imposed in 2015, remained in place on research missions by
Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch. This ban reversed relatively
unimpeded access that the two organizations had enjoyed for nearly 25 years.
On February 21, authorities expelled without explanation the lawyer directing the
Morocco office of Lawyers Without Borders-Belgium, which led the group to re-
duce its activities in the country. In June, the International Institute of Nonviolent
Action (NOVACT), announced it would close its Morocco office after authorities
expelled one staff member in 2015 and refused entry to two others in 2016, and
declined to grant the Spanish association legal recognition.  
In 2015, authorities charged historian Maâti Monjib, and four other associational
activists with accepting foreign funding “to harm internal security,” punishable
by up to five years in prison. The trial, delayed repeatedly and scheduled to
begin in January 2017, centers on a foreign-funded workshop to train Moroccans
in the use of a smartphone application to practice “citizen journalism.”
Authorities expelled several foreign visitors who came to witness human rights
conditions in Western Sahara or attend human rights events there. For example,
on October 9, they expelled Carlos Beristain, a Spanish expert on human rights
in Western Sahara, and two other Spaniards who the Saharan Association of Vic-
tims of Grave Human Rights Violations had invited to participate in the first pub-
lic event the association had organized since obtaining legal recognition in
2015. The police agent who intercepted Beristain at the airport told him his pres-
ence “endangered the public order.”
Police Conduct, Torture, and the Criminal Justice System
Courts failed to uphold fair trial rights in political and security-related cases. The
Code of Penal Procedure, amended in 2011, gives a defendant the right to con-
tact a lawyer after 24 hours in police custody, or a maximum of 36 hours if the
prosecutor approves this extension. In cases involving terrorism offenses, the
prosecutor can delay access to a lawyer for up to six days. The law does not give
detainees the right to a have a lawyer present when police interrogate or present
them with their statements for signature.
The 2003 counterterrorism law contains an overly broad definition of “terrorism”
and allows for up to 12 days of garde à vue (pre-charge) detention in terrorism
cases.
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Twenty-five Sahrawis won a retrial in civilian court after the Court of Cassation on
July 27 quashed their 2013 conviction before a military court. That court had im-
posed on 23 of them prison sentences of between 20 years and life. The men,
who include a few well-known activists, had been charged in connection with vi-
olence that erupted in 2010 when authorities dismantled the Gdeim Izik protest
camp in Western Sahara and 11 security officers died. The military court failed to
investigate defendants’ allegations that police had tortured or coerced them into
signing false statements, on which it relied almost exclusively for their convic-
tions. 
Prisons held hundreds of Islamists arrested in the wake of the 2003 Casablanca
bombings and since. Courts convicted many on charges of belonging to a “terror-
ist network,” recruiting, undergoing military training, or preparing to join ji-
hadists abroad. Often the main, if not only, evidence against the defendants was
their “confessions” to police incriminating themselves and their co-defendants,
which they later recanted in court.  
Courts continued, when convicting defendants, to invoke article 290 of the Penal
Procedure Code, which deems police statements inherently credible as evidence
unless the contrary is proven. The United Nations Working Group on Arbitrary De-
cision in 2014 criticized this law, which applies to infractions occasioning prison
sentences shorter than five years, as contrary to the presumption of innocence.  
Leftist activist Wafae Charaf was freed in July after completing a two-year prison
sentence for slander and “falsely” reporting an offense after she filed a com-
plaint alleging that unknown men abducted and tortured her following a work-
ers’ protest in Tangiers. Oussama Husn, a youth reform movement activist, was
serving a three-year prison sentence imposed in 2014 on similar charges after he
put online a video in which he recounts having been abducted and tortured by
unknown men. These sentences could have a chilling effect on people wishing to
file complaints of abuse by security forces.
Moroccan courts continued to impose the death penalty, but authorities have
not carried out executions since the early 1990s.
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Right to a Private Life
Moroccan courts continued to jail persons for same-sex conduct under article
489 of the penal code, which prohibits “lewd or unnatural acts with an individ-
ual of the same sex.” A Beni Mellal court convicted two men of homosexuality
after a group of youths on March 9 burst into the home of one and pushed the
two men naked into the street, filming the assault and later posting the clip on-
line. The two men were freed after spending one month in prison; in April, a
court imposed prison terms on two of their attackers. On October 27, police in
Marrakesh arrested two girls aged 16 and 17 who were reported for cuddling in a
private home. They were jailed for one week and then provisionally released
prior to a trial scheduled for November 25 on charges under article 489. 
Criminalization of adultery and sex outside marriage has a discriminatory gender
impact, as rape victims face prosecution if they file charges that are not sus-
tained. Women and girls also face prosecution if they are found to be pregnant
or have children outside marriage.
Migrants and Refugees
Implementation continued of a 2013 national strategy to overhaul national poli-
cies toward migrants and asylum-seekers, including by providing certain basic
rights. While a draft of Morocco’s first law on the right to asylum had yet to be
adopted, Morocco’s refugee agency granted one-year renewable residency per-
mits to more than 500 UNHCR-recognized refugees. At time of writing, Morocco
had not determined the status of more than 1,700 Syrians whom UNHCR recog-
nizes as prima facie refugees.
Morocco also granted one-year renewable residency permits to thousands of
sub-Saharan migrants who were not asylum-seekers but who met criteria set
forth in the 2013 plan. Some Syrians also obtained one-year residency permits
under this procedure.
Parliament adopted in May a law that defines and criminalizes human trafficking
and provides measures to protect its victims.
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Women’s and Girls’ Rights
The 2011 constitution guarantees equality for women, “while respecting the pro-
visions of the constitution, and the laws and permanent characteristics of the
Kingdom.”
The 2004 Family Code, which improved women’s rights in divorce and child cus-
tody, discriminates against women with regard to inheritance and procedures to
obtain divorce. The code raised the age of marriage from 15 to 18, but judges rou-
tinely allowed girls to marry below this age. There is no law that specifically crim-
inalizes domestic violence or establishes protections for domestic violence
victims. 
Domestic Workers
Parliament adopted on July 26 the first labor law that applies to domestic work-
ers. It requires written contracts and sets 18 as the minimum age for domestic
workers, after a five-year phase-in. It limits weekly working hours and guarantees
24 continuous hours of rest per week and a minimum wage that is 60 percent of
the minimum wage for jobs covered under the labor law. The law also provides
for financial penalties for employers who violate the law.
Despite a prohibition on the employment of children under the age of 15, thou-
sands of children under that age—predominantly girls—are believed to work as
domestic workers. According to the UN, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs),
and government sources, the number of child domestic workers has declined in
recent years.
People with Disabilities
Parliament in February adopted Framework Law 97.13 on the rights of persons
with disabilities, a step toward harmonizing legislation with the Convention on
the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD), which Morocco ratified in 2009.
However, the Framework Law fell short in some areas, such as in guaranteeing
access to inclusive education for children with disabilities, and in affirming the
right of legal capacity.
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Key International Actors
In December 2015, the European General Court ruled to annul application of the
European Union-Morocco trade agreement on agricultural and fishery products
insofar as it applied to Western Sahara. The court held that the agreement was
flawed because it does not “guarantee an exploitation of the natural resources
of Western Sahara that is beneficial to its inhabitants.” The EU has appealed the
ruling. 
In March, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon traveled to the Sahrawi refugee
camps in Algeria, where he referred to the Western Sahara as “occupied” and
raised the possibility of a referendum to determine the territory’s future, posi-
tions that are anathema to Morocco. In response, Morocco expelled the civilian
personnel of the peacekeeping mission in Western Sahara, MINURSO. At time of
writing, only some staff had been able to return.
The United States publicly acknowledged and corrected one small error, but
stood by the substance of the Morocco chapter of its Country Reports on Human
Rights Practices for 2015, after Morocco’s interior minister in May denounced it
as “truly scandalous, moving from semi-truths to invention pure and simple,
from misinterpretations to flagrant lies.” 
Pursuant to legislation passed by Congress for 2016, the US allowed its aid allo-
cated to Morocco to be spent in Western Sahara, despite the US’s non-recogni-
tion of Morocco’s sovereignty over the territory. The International Republican
Institute, an American NGO, received in April a US$1 million government grant to
conduct a two-year program in Western Sahara on civil society and participative
governance.
WORLD REPORT 2017
438
Mozambique
Human rights violations in Mozambique increased in 2016 due to rising tension
and armed clashes between the government and the former rebel group, now
political party, Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (Mozambican National Resist-
ance or RENAMO). 
Security forces were credibly implicated in abuses in operations against REN-
AMO, including summary executions and sexual violence that forced tens of
thousands of people to flee the country. RENAMO also committed abuses in
2016, including raids on health clinics. At least 10 high-profile figures were at-
tacked or killed in apparently politically motivated attacks, with incomplete in-
vestigations by authorities.  
The country also suffered an economic crisis due to the fall in commodity prices
and disclosure of the government’s enormous debt to state-owned companies.
The economic crisis had a significant impact on the country’s finances, making it
harder for people to enjoy basic economic and social rights.
Summary Executions 
Government security forces at times apparently conducted summary executions
of people they believed to be linked to RENAMO. In April, the Office of the United
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights said it received reports of at least
14 RENAMO officials who had been killed or abducted around the country by
unidentified individuals or groups since the beginning of the year. 
Mozambican refugees in Malawi said that soldiers in uniform, some driving army
vehicles, had summarily executed male villagers in Tete province in February
2016, or tied and taken them to undisclosed locations. Refugees also reported
soldiers torching homes, granaries, and cornfields of local residents whom the
soldiers believed were feeding or otherwise supporting RENAMO fighters. 
In August, the country’s leading human rights group, Liga Dos Direitos Humanos
(LDH), published a report accusing security forces of summary executions, de-
struction of property and other human rights violations. LDH also documented
human rights abuses committed by RENAMO fighters against people whom they
believed were cooperating with government security forces.
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Politically Motivated Attacks
At least 10 high-profile figures, including senior opposition members, state pros-
ecutors and investigators, and prominent academics, were either killed or in-
jured in apparently politically motivated attacks. 
Among those targeted were constitutional lawyer Gilles Cistac, who was shot
dead outside a Maputo café after receiving threats for publicly defending the
disputed constitutionality of RENAMO’s petition to create autonomous provincial
authorities; Manuel Bissopo, secretary general of RENAMO, who was shot and
severely wounded in Beira city center, Sofala province; José Manuel, a RENAMO
member of the National Council for Defence and Security, who was shot dead
outside Beira international airport; Jeremias Pondeca, a former member of par-
liament from RENAMO and a member of the peace talks team, who was shot
dead on a Maputo beach; and Jaime Macuane, a political commentator and aca-
demic, who was shot multiple times in the legs by men who told him they had
been ordered “to teach him a lesson.” 
Unresolved Killings
In May, local residents discovered at least 15 unidentified bodies under a bridge
in a remote area between the central provinces of Manica and Sofala. Local au-
thorities at first ignored calls for a prompt and thorough investigation. They then
announced that decomposition had made it impossible to conduct autopsies,
and that the bodies had since been buried. Facing pressure from human rights
groups and media, the government announced it would exhume the bodies and
investigate. At time of writing, no findings had been announced and a parlia-
mentary commission that established its own investigation team had not pub-
lished a detailed account of its findings.
Forced Displacement 
Since October 2015, at least 10,000 people have fled to neighboring Malawi and
Zimbabwe because of abuses committed by the army and RENAMO fighters. The
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees said that most of those who fled
had returned home by late 2016, following assurances of safety by the Mozambi-
can government. In 2016, the number of internally displaced people continued
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to grow, forcing the government to set up camps in Manica province, where au-
thorities said over 1,000 families were living.
Attacks on Health Facilities 
In the first half of 2016, armed men linked to RENAMO conducted raids on at
least four hospitals and health clinics in Zambezia and Niassa provinces, looting
medicine and supplies, and destroying medical equipment. The raids threatened
access to health care for tens of thousands of people in remote areas. The au-
thorities claimed that RENAMO gunmen carried out over a dozen attacks on
health clinics since the beginning of the year in other places, including Sofala,
Manica, and Tete provinces.
Attacks on People with Albinism 
Killings, kidnappings, and physical attacks against persons with albinism con-
tinued to grow, despite government efforts to stop the violence. According to
local civil society groups, over 100 people with albinism have disappeared since
2014, when the attacks were first reported. 
Authorities say the attacks are fueled by the witchcraft-linked belief that potions
made of body parts of persons with albinism can produce wealth and success. In
August 2016, the UN Independent Expert on the enjoyment of human rights by
persons with albinism, Ikponwosa Ero, visited Mozambique and praised the gov-
ernment’s efforts to stop attacks on persons with albinism. At the same time, Ero
expressed concerns over the authorities’ inability to identify and arrest perpetra-
tors of such crimes.
Child Marriage 
Mozambique continued to be among the countries with the highest rates of child
marriage in the world. According to UNICEF, 48 percent of girls marry before they
turn 18 and over 14 percent before they turn 15. In 2016, the government un-
veiled its national strategy to end child marriage by 2019, which includes im-
proving girls’ access to education, sexual and reproductive health services, and
legal reforms.
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Key International Actors
Once one of the fastest growing economies in the world following the discovery
of huge reserves of coal, oil, and gas, Mozambique continued to suffer from low
commodity prices, drops in foreign investment, and a debt crisis. In May 2016, a
group of 14 donor countries, including the United Kingdom and European Union,
and multilateral institutions that included the International Monetary Fund and
World Bank, suspended direct support to the state budget after revelations that
the government has more than US$1 billion in undisclosed loans. 
In June, the UK high commissioner in Maputo, Joanna Kuenssberg, expressed
concerns over rising political violence in the country, and the threat it poses to
freedom of expression and the press. 
In July, the EU and other international groups agreed to mediate talks between
the government and RENAMO. In September, Mozambican President Filipe Nyusi
visited the United States and met Secretary of State John Kerry and National Se-
curity Advisor Susan Rice, with whom he discussed the country’s ongoing vio-
lence. It is unclear whether they discussed human rights concerns. 
During the opening statement at the 33rd session of the UN Human Rights Coun-
cil in September, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Zeid Ra’ad al-Hussein
warned that Mozambique was showing signs of sliding into violence. He urged
the government to hold perpetrators to account and to address the corruption
that deprives many people of their economic and social rights. 
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Nepal
Political instability persisted through 2016, with yet another change in govern-
ment. A new political coalition, led by Maoist Prime Minister Pushpa Kumar
Dahal, took over in July, offering some hope for a breakthrough in the political
stalemate. It was the ninth government to be formed over the last eight years,
damaging efforts to implement human rights protections. 
A new constitution was adopted in September 2015 but violent protests over the
failure to address demands for greater inclusion by minority communities, par-
ticularly in the southern plains, stalled efforts to enforce rights or provide justice
for wartime abuses. 
There was little progress on relief for the victims of the devastating earthquakes
in 2015, which left an estimated 9,000 people dead, nearly 20,000 injured, and
over 100,000 displaced. 
Two transitional justice commissions set up to deliver justice to victims of the
country’s 1996-2006 civil war received a reported 59,000 submissions, but the
terms of reference of their future work remained unclear. 
Government efforts to halt the country’s high rate of child marriage inched for-
ward, but were stalled by lack of political will and buy-in across government min-
istries.
Failures in Earthquake Relief and Reconstruction
The earthquakes in 2015 left some 2.8 million people remain in need of humani-
tarian assistance in 14 of Nepal’s most severely affected districts. Many affected
communities live in rural areas that are difficult to access, and received minimal
assistance for emergency housing and other relief. 
Although the government received over US$4 billion in aid for earthquake assis-
tance, none of the funds had been paid out as late as August 2016. Political in-
fighting led to delays in setting up an earthquake reconstruction authority; even
though the body has been announced, parliament failed to legitimize it over on-
going political stalemates. As a result, earthquake victims spent two monsoons
and one winter surviving in makeshift shelters they managed to put together on
their own, or with the help of local initiatives. 
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The new government announced an increase in rehabilitation funds for earth-
quake victims, but as of October 2016, there was little information as to how and
when the money would be disbursed. 
Accountability and Justice
A hastily drafted constitution, promulgated after only one week of public consul-
tations, led to months of violent protests, particularly along Nepal’s southern
border with India. In some districts, the government responded by deploying the
army and in others by instituting curfews. Although some deaths were blamed
on excessive use of force by security forces, at time of writing the state had yet to
investigate, let alone prosecute, those responsible for killing civilians, some of
whom were children. 
A tense political stalemate between rival political parties was largely responsible
for this failure to provide redress. The then-ruling coalition, led by former Prime
Minister Khadja Prasad Oli, was deeply reluctant to accept responsibility for the
violence and humanitarian crisis arising from the new constitution. Following the
transition to a new government in July 2016, the government announced the for-
mation of an independent commission of inquiry to investigate and report on
protest-related violence. As of October, the terms of reference and the commis-
sion’s composition and mandate had not yet been made public.
Women’s and Girls’ Rights
Although child marriage has been illegal in Nepal since 1963, 37 percent of girls
are married by age 18, and 10 percent married before age 15. Recent research by
Human Rights Watch found that police rarely act to prevent a child marriage or
bring charges, and almost never do so unless a complaint is filed. Government
officials often officially register child marriages. 
Human Rights Watch found that poverty, lack of access to education, child labor,
social pressures, and dowry practices are among the factors driving child mar-
riage. The government has pledged to end child marriage by 2030, and in 2016
adopted a broad strategy on ending child marriage. Still missing, however, is a
practical plan, and a promised process to develop one has been slow and under-
mined by lack of coordination and political will. 
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Migrant Workers
More than 2 million Nepalis work abroad, although the numbers are believed to
be higher as many workers migrate through irregular channels including the
porous border of India. In 2015, Nepal introduced a “free visa, free ticket” policy,
whereby the employer in Gulf countries or Malaysia bears the costs of visas and
flights tickets for the Nepali worker. 
The Nepal Association of Foreign Employment Agencies (NEFEA) has pushed
back, insisting it should be able to charge higher fees. Some workers reported to
migrant rights organizations that agencies continue to charge high fees but
show a receipt of the government-approved maximum fee rates.
Nepal lifted its ban on women traveling to the Gulf states for employment as do-
mestic workers. Though motivated by protection concerns, the ban was discrimi-
natory and forced women desperate for work to migrate through irregular
channels, putting them at greater risk of exploitation. Nepal issued new guide-
lines allowing women over the age of 24 to migrate for domestic work in Gulf
states and Malaysia with approved recruitment agencies. 
The guidelines require that every domestic worker is entitled to accommodation,
health and life insurance, a weekly rest day, 30 days of annual leave, regular
contact with their families, and a minimum salary of $300. Such measures are
important but limited as host Gulf governments continue to retain the kafala
(visa sponsorship) system, which can trap domestic workers in abusive condi-
tions as they cannot change jobs without their employer’s consent, and are pun-
ished with imprisonment and deportation if they flee. 
Statelessness
The new constitution failed to address the rights of Nepal’s estimated 4 million
people who are without any official status and at risk of statelessness. Despite
promises of reform, many people, particularly women, children born out of wed-
lock, or children of a refugee or naturalized parent, remain unable to secure driv-
ers’ licenses, passports, bank accounts, voting rights, higher education, and
other government welfare schemes. 
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Transitional Justice
Nepal made little concrete progress on justice for serious abuses committed by
both sides during its civil war that ended in 2006. At least 13,000 people were
killed and over 1,300 were forcibly disappeared during the decade-long conflict.
Efforts to ensure prosecutions in civilian courts for serious human rights and hu-
manitarian law violations during the conflict remain stalled.
While Nepal has delivered interim monetary and in-kind compensation to the
families of those who were “disappeared” or killed during the conflict, others,
such as survivors of sexual violence or torture, have received no compensation
from the state. 
Despite victims groups and civil society protests against the lack of transparency
and consultation in the appointment of commissioners to the Truth and Recon-
ciliation Commission and the Disappearances Commission, the two commis-
sions started public hearings; as of August 2016, they had received nearly
59,000 complaints. 
Contrary to Supreme Court orders, the previous government had directed author-
ities to withdraw all wartime cases and to provide amnesty to alleged perpetra-
tors. The new government has pledged to amend the laws and ensure justice for
conflict-era victims but had yet to come up with a concrete roadmap at time of
writing.
Tibetan Rights
In late February, a Chinese security delegation urged Nepali counterparts to re-
main on high alert during March, when Tibetans mark a number of key political
anniversaries. In March, Nepali authorities attempted to prevent Tibetans from
participating in elections for the Tibetan government in exile. Despite previous
negotiations between the Tibetan community and Nepali authorities, Nepali po-
lice in July attempted to stop celebrations of the Dalai Lama’s birthday in Boud-
hanath, briefly detaining 30 people. 
Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity
In line with a 2007 Supreme Court decision and a subsequent court order, the
government in 2015 began issuing passports in three genders: “male,” “fe-
male,” and “other.” Some with “other” passports have successfully traveled
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abroad with their travel documents recognized by foreign governments. The new
constitution recognizes that citizenship is available in three genders, and pro-
tects “gender and sexual minorities” in clauses related to equality before the
law and social justice. Activists remain frustrated with the lack of implementa-
tion of a Supreme Court-mandated committee recommendation that the govern-
ment recognize same-sex relationships. 
Key International Actors
Relations with India became tense over the failure of the new constitution to ad-
dress the demands of the southern Terai communities, which have close kinship
ties to India. The Nepal government insisted that India was responsible for insti-
gating protests and blocking supplies. Relations between the two countries im-
proved after a new government led by Prime Minister Pushpa Kamal Dahal took
charge, but India has failed to press for effective transitional justice for victims
of the civil war. 
The international community remained largely silent on the failure of the Nepali
government to disburse the billions of dollars in aid received to help the earth-
quake affected community. The United Nations has been critical over delays in
the transitional justice process.
The international community similarly remained silent on the contentious consti-
tution drafting process, as well as on the transitional justice mechanisms. 
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Nigeria
The euphoria and optimism that followed the relatively peaceful 2015 elections
that brought in the administration of President Muhammadu Buhari gradually
gave way to concern in 2016. Many of the grave human rights challenges he
promised to address in his inauguration speech remain largely unaddressed and
unresolved. Changes in military leadership and improved regional coordination
resulted in a consistent push back against the insurgent group, Boko Haram,
forcing it to cede most of the territory it controlled in the northeast. The group
however continues to commit crimes against civilians, including abductions and
forced recruitment.
The waning intensity of Boko Haram attacks is overshadowed by an inadequate
response to the humanitarian crisis. Most of the 2.5 million internally displaced
people (IDPs) lack basic rights such as rights to food, shelter, education, health-
care, protection from harm, as well as the right to freedom of movement. Dis-
placed women and girls suffer rape and sexual exploitation perpetrated by
fellow IDPs, members of vigilante groups, policemen, and soldiers. 
In December 2015, the army killed 347 members of the Shia Islamic Movement of
Nigeria (IMN) after a road blockade by the group in Zaria. Hundreds of IMN mem-
bers including the leader, Ibrahim El Zakzaky, and his wife remained in custody
without charges at time of writing. 
The ban imposed on the IMN by the Kaduna State government in October 2016
triggered a wave of bans against Shia in four northern states. Since then, Shia
religious activities have been met with mob and police violence leading to the
death of scores of IMN members in Kaduna, Kano, Katsina, Plateau, Sokoto, and
Yobe States.
Elsewhere in the country, deadly communal violence between farmers and pas-
toralists, previously limited to north-central states spread southward in 2016.
The lack of justice for victims helped fuel reprisal attacks leading to cycles of vio-
lence. In the south, government response to agitation for a separate state of Bi-
afra and militant activities in the Niger Delta left scores of people dead and
entire communities destroyed. 
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Abuses by Boko Haram  
The seven-year old Boko Haram conflict is winding down as military operations
by Nigerian forces and its northeastern neighbors intensified against the insur-
gents. An estimated 550 civilians died in Boko Haram attacks in 2016 compared
to almost 3,500 in 2015. Insurgents resorted to suicide bomb attacks in crowded
places, like IDP camps, markets and mosques, using mostly women and girls to
bypass security. On February 11, two young women detonated suicide bombs in
a Dikwa, Borno camp, killing about 58 IDPs. A third girl confessed to security
agents that she backed out of the suicide assignment when she recognized her
relatives sheltering in the camp. 
Security forces recovered most areas controlled by the group, and rescued thou-
sands of residents. However, 197 of the 276 Chibok schoolgirls abducted in April
2014, as well as over 300 elementary school students abducted from Damasak,
Borno, in November 2014 are still missing. Apart from Maiduguri, Borno state
capital, which has been largely free from attacks, many parts of the state remain
unsafe and inaccessible. In July, a team of United Nations humanitarian aid
workers were attacked by suspected insurgents as they traveled the 53 mile
Bama to Maiduguri road. Two people were injured in the attack and UN tem-
porarily suspended aid deliveries following the incident. Aid supplies resumed a
few days later.
The naming in August by the Islamic State (ISIS) of Abu Musab Al-Barnawi as the
new leader of Boko Haram, spurred a rift between his followers and those of
Abubakar Shekau who insists he remains the leader. The Nigerian military de-
clared in late August that Shekau had been killed in a military air raid. Previous
claims of Shekau’s death proved untrue. 
Conduct of Security Forces
Across the country, allegations of abuses including arbitrary arrests and deten-
tion, torture, forced disappearance, and extrajudicial killings continue to trail se-
curity operations. 
In July, a state government-instituted commission of inquiry recommended that
soldiers involved in the killing of 347 members of the Shiite Islamic Movement of
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Nigeria in Zaria, Kaduna state between December 2015 12 and 14, be prose-
cuted. Authorities have yet to implement the commission’s recommendations.
In February and May, security forces were accused of killing at least 40 members
of the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB), and Movement for the Actualization of
the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB). The groups are advocating for the sepa-
ration of Biafra—mainly made up of Igbo-speaking people in the southeast—and
the release of Nnamdi Kanu, the IPOB leader detained and undergoing trial for
treason since October 2015. 
In the crude oil-rich Niger Delta, media reports say that on September 8, soldiers
seeking to arrest members of the militant group—Niger Delta Avengers—de-
stroyed 43 houses and other properties in Peremabiri, Akamabugo, and Tikog-
bene communities in Bayelsa State. 
The army seemingly yielded to the pressure for reform by establishing a yet-to-be
operational human rights office in February to receive complaints of abuses
against civilians, and in August the military trial of 20 soldiers for offences, in-
cluding human rights abuses committed in the northeast, commenced. In Octo-
ber, one of the indicted soldiers was convicted for abuse against a civilian in a
non-conflict related incident.
Local vigilante groups assisting Nigerian security forces to repel Boko Haram at-
tacks and apprehend insurgents are also implicated in the recruitment and use
of children, and the ill-treatment and unlawful killing of Boko Haram suspects. At
least 280 members of the groups were formally recruited into the security forces
in 2016. 
Inter-Communal Violence
Impunity for cycles of uncontrolled and unpunished violence between nomadic
and farming communities in the conflict prone “Middle-Belt” region has encour-
aged its spread to other areas. For two weeks in February, armed herdsmen al-
legedly in revenge for the killing of their cattle, attacked 11 communities, killing
scores of people in Benue State. Similar attacks left 12 people dead in Ukpabi
Nimbo, Enugu on April 25, while six died in Taraba’s Korum, Orawua and Gidan
Bature communities on May 7.   
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Solutions proffered by Nigerian federal authorities to end the clashes, including
enacting laws to specify cattle grazing routes, have been rejected by some state
governments allegedly for inequitably favoring rights of herders.   
Public Sector Corruption
Endemic corruption and mismanagement of public resources directly impact on
the enjoyment of basic rights by Nigerians, about 54 percent of whom live in dis-
mal poverty. One-third of school-age children are out of school, while one in five
children under five years die from treatable and preventable diseases. The gov-
ernment alleges that between 2006 and 2013, 55 public officials stole US$9 bil-
lion, amounting to more than 25 percent of the annual national budget. Many
officials of the previous Goodluck Jonathan administration are facing prosecu-
tion for corruption.
President Buhari said in May that corruption was largely responsible for previous
failure to end the Boko Haram insurgency. The Economic and Financial Crimes
Commission (EFCC), is prosecuting former government officials for embezzling
$2 billion allocated for the purchase of arms to prosecute the northeast conflict.
Political opponents however accuse the president of using the campaign against
corruption to carry out a political vendetta against previous administration offi-
cials.
Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity
The passage of the Same Sex Marriage (Prohibition) Act, SSMPA in January 2014,
has far reaching effects on members of the lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgen-
der (LGBT) community. The law is used to legitimize abuses against LGBT people,
including mob violence, sexual abuse, unlawful arrests, torture and extortion by
police. 
On February 13, the police arrested a homosexual couple in the federal capital
for allegedly attempting to conduct a wedding. The wedding sponsors and the
hotel venue owner were also arrested. The penalty for entering into a gay mar-
riage under the SSMPA is 14 years.
Ironically, former President Jonathan who defied global pressure before signing
the bill into law, said belatedly in June 2o16 that “with the clear knowledge that
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the issue of sexual orientation is still evolving, the nation may, at the appropri-
ate time, revisit the law.”
Freedoms of Expression, Media, and Association
Nigeria’s strong civil society and media play robust roles in lobbying for open-
ness and accountability in public office. It is this vibrancy, perceived as a chal-
lenge to unbridled exercise of government authority, which recent legislation
appear to target. 
The “Bill to Prohibit Frivolous Petitions and Other Matters Connected Therewith”
introduced in the Senate in December 2015 specifically targets users of social
and electronic media. The June 2016 “Bill to provide for the Establishment of
Non- Governmental Organizations (NGOs) Regulatory Commission in Nigeria”
seeks to monitor and control activities and funding of civil society organizations. 
The NGO regulation bill passed second reading at the federal House of Represen-
tatives in July, and was referred to the committee on civil society organizations
and development partners for review. Concerted advocacy by activists may have
aborted the passage of the “social media” bill, but regular display of high levels
of intolerance by government agents continue to imperil free speech.  
On August 8, blogger Abubakar Usman was detained for two days in Abuja by the
EFCC for writing a piece critical of Ibrahim Magu, chairman of the commission.
Barely a month later, another blogger, Emenike Iroegbu was arrested and his
computer and phones seized by Department of State Security agents in Uyo,
Akwa Ibom state, for criticizing state government officials in a publication. He
was released the following day without charges.
On a positive note, the Federal House of Representatives introduced in June, a
Digital Rights and Freedom bill, which aims to protect the rights and freedoms of
internet users. 
Key International Actors 
International actors, notably the United Kingdom, United States, European
Union, and United Nations significantly improved their support to the Nigerian
government in dealing with the Boko Haram conflict. Increased assistance in
form of military training, supply of intelligence, surveillance, and communication
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equipment might be an indication of confidence in President Buhari’s promise of
military reform. 
In an apparent reversal of the former assistance policy to the Nigerian military
suspected of rights violations, the US donated 24 mine-resistant and armor-pro-
tected vehicles valued at about $11 million to the army in January. In mid-Sep-
tember, Congress was notified of plans to sell 12 A-29 Super Tucano light attack
aircraft and weapons, including laser guided rockets and unguided rockets, val-
ued at over $592 million. Critics of the move have expressed concern about the
human rights implications of this sale, given the absence of genuine reform in
the Nigerian military.  
The UK also stepped up support to the Nigerian military in 2016, sending 300
personnel to provide medical, infantry, air defense and counter insurgency train-
ing. During the visit of then UK minister of state, Foreign and Commonwealth Of-
fice, Baroness Anelay to Nigeria in February, the UK government announced a
donation of £6.7 million (US$8.4 million) to support humanitarian assistance in
the northeast. The EU, UN, and World Bank established a tripartite recovery pro-
gram for the six insurgency-affected northeast states. 
A Post-Insurgency Recovery and Peace-building Assessment commissioned by
the group in January valued the cost of repairing damage to the region at $5.9
billion. In January, the head of the EU delegation in Nigeria, Michel Arrion, said
the EU had set aside a trust fund to assist in the rehabilitation and reconstruc-
tion of the beleaguered northeast.
In a November 2016 report, the Office of the Prosecutor of the International Crim-
inal Court (ICC), found that none of the allegations of crimes committed by so-
called Fulani herdsmen or by government forces against pro-Biafarn protesters
and civilians caught in the fight against Niger Delta Avengers were within the
ICC’s jurisdiction. The office continues an analysis of the Zaria incident involving
members of the IMN as well as the assessment of national efforts to prosecute
crimes committed in the Boko Haram violence as part of a preliminary examina-
tion of the situation in Nigeria.
In November 2015, the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights urged
the Nigerian government to review the SSMPA in order to prohibit violence and
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discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity and ensure
access to HIV prevention, treatment, and care services for LGBT individuals.
Foreign Policy
Nigeria took a stand in support of justice for grave crimes at the International
Criminal Court (ICC) during the African Union’s (AU) July summit in Kigali,
Rwanda. Nigeria joined Cote d’Ivoire, Tunisia, and Senegal in opposing an AU
call for African members of the ICC to withdraw from the court.
Despite domestic intolerance of online criticism of public officials, Nigeria co-
sponsored UN Human Rights Council (HRC) Resolution 32/20 on the Promotion,
Protection and Enjoyment of Human Rights on the Internet in July.
The country however took retrogressive steps against human rights when it voted
alongside five other members—including China, Russia, and Cuba—against HRC
31/32 on protecting human rights defenders addressing economic, social, and
cultural rights at the council’s 31st session in March. This follows a previous vote
against the first ever UN General Assembly Resolution Recognizing the Role of
Human Rights Defenders and the Need for their Protection in November 2015. 
A similar vote at the council’s 32nd session in July, against Resolution 32/31 on
civil society space, which “urges States to create and maintain, in law and in
practice, a safe and enabling environment in which civil society can operate free
from hindrance and insecurity,” signals a disturbing pattern of anti-human rights
and civil society rhetoric in the current Nigerian administration.
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North Korea
North Korea remains one of the most repressive authoritarian states in the
world, ruled for seven decades by the Kim family and the Worker’s Party of Korea.
During his fifth year in power, Kim Jong-Un continued to generate fearful obedi-
ence by using public executions, arbitrary detention, and forced labor; tighten-
ing travel restrictions to prevent North Koreans from escaping and seeking
refuge overseas; and systematically persecuting those with religious contacts in-
side and outside the country.
A 2014 United Nations Commission of Inquiry (COI) report on human rights in
North Korea stated that systematic, widespread, and gross human rights viola-
tions committed by the government included murder, enslavement, torture, im-
prisonment, rape, forced abortion, and other sexual violence, and constituted
crimes against humanity. 
On December 10, 2015, the UN Security Council discussed North Korea’s bleak
human rights record as a formal agenda item for the second year in a row, follow-
ing the COI’s recommendations. 
On March 23, the UN Human Rights Council adopted a resolution condemning
human rights abuses in North Korea. It authorized the creation of a group of in-
dependent experts tasked with finding practical ways to hold rights violators in
North Korea accountable and recommending practical accountability mecha-
nisms, including the International Criminal Court, to secure truth and justice for
victims. Lawyers Sonja Biserko and Sara Hossain joined the panel, supporting
Tomas Ojea Quintana, the new special rapporteur on human rights in North
Korea.
North Korea has ratified four key international human rights treaties and its con-
stitution includes rights protections. In reality, the government curtails all basic
human rights, including freedom of expression, assembly, and association, and
freedom to practice religion. It prohibits any organized political opposition, inde-
pendent media, free trade unions, and independent civil society organizations.
Arbitrary arrest, torture in custody, forced labor, and public executions maintain
an environment of fear and control. 
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North Korea discriminates against individuals and their families on political
grounds in key areas such as employment, residence, and schooling through
“songbun,” the country’s socio-political classification system that from its cre-
ation grouped people into “loyal,” “wavering,” or “hostile” classes. This classifi-
cation has been restructured several times, but continues to enable the
government to privilege or disadvantage people based largely on family back-
ground, personal performance, and perceived political loyalty. 
However, pervasive corruption enables some room to maneuver around the stric-
tures of the songbun system, even while it burdens people as government offi-
cials regularly demand and receive bribes from those seeking permissions,
pursuing market activities, or wishing to travel inside or outside the country. 
Tighter Border
In 2016, Kim Jong-Un’s government increased efforts to stop North Koreans from
crossing into China without permission. Some tactics included building barbed-
wire fences on the northern border; persecuting those caught in North Korea
using Chinese cellphones to communicate with people in China or South Korea;
and increasing efforts to block Chinese cell phone services near the border. 
Both North Korea and China have increased patrols and established barriers to
crossing the border. The Chinese and North Korean governments have also tar-
geted and broken up broker networks in China, meaning fewer people are willing
to guide North Koreans on the arduous journey to escape through China. 
China is a state party to the Refugee Convention of 1951 and its 1967 protocol,
but it considers all North Koreans in China to be “illegal aliens” and routinely
repatriates them without consideration of their claim to asylum. Human Rights
Watch believes all North Koreans fleeing into China should be considered
refugees, whatever their motivation for flight, because of the certain prospect of
severe punishment if they are returned. 
Fleeing North Korean women are frequently forced into marriages with Chinese
men, or into the sex trade. Even if they have lived in China for years, they face
possible arrest and repatriation at any time. Many children from these unrecog-
nized marriages lack legal identity or access to education or health services in
China.
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Former security officials who left North Korea told Human Rights Watch that
North Koreans handed back by China face interrogation, torture, sexual abuse,
and forced labor. North Koreans in exile with contacts inside the country told
Human Rights Watch that people caught trying to reach South Korea are treated
as enemies of the state, and sent to political prison camps. 
Freedom of Expression and Access to Information 
All domestic media and publications are strictly state-controlled, and foreign
media allowed inside the country are tightly controlled as well. Internet and in-
ternational phone calls are heavily monitored. 
Unauthorized access to non-state radio, newspapers, or TV broadcasts is se-
verely punished. North Koreans face punishment if they are found with mobile
media, such as Chinese mobile phones, SD cards or USBs containing unautho-
rized videos of foreign news, films, or TV dramas. 
Inhumane Treatment in Detention
The government practices collective punishment for alleged anti-state offenses,
effectively enslaving hundreds of thousands of citizens, including children, in
prison camps and other detention facilities. Detainees face deplorable condi-
tions, sexual coercion and abuse, beatings and torture by guards, and forced
labor in dangerous and sometimes deadly conditions.
Those accused of serious political offenses are usually sent to political prison
camps, known as kwanliso, operated by North Korea’s National Security Agency.
These camps are characterized by systematic abuses, including meager rations
that imperil health and can lead to starvation, virtually no medical care, lack of
proper housing and clothes, regular mistreatment including sexual assault and
torture by guards, and public executions. Political prisoners face backbreaking
forced labor, including in logging, mining, and agricultural. 
UN officials estimate that between 80,000 and 120,000 people are imprisoned
in political prison camps. 
Those whom authorities suspect of illicitly trading goods from and into China,
transporting people to China, and minor political infractions, such as watching
or selling South Korean films, may receive lengthy terms in detention facilities
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known as kyohwaso (correctional, reeducation centers). Detainees there face
forced labor, food and medicine shortages, and regular mistreatment by guards. 
People suspected of involvement in unauthorized trading schemes involving
non-controversial goods, shirking work at state-owned enterprises for more than
six months, or those unable to pay bribes to officials for various reasons are sent
to work in short-term forced labor detention facilities (rodong danryeondae, lit-
erally labor training centers). Beatings are common in these facilities, and dan-
gerous working conditions purportedly result in significant numbers of injuries.
Forced Labor
The government systematically uses forced labor from ordinary citizens to con-
trol its people and sustain its economy. A significant majority of North Koreans
must perform unpaid labor at some point in their lives. 
Former North Korean students who left the country told Human Rights Watch that
their schools forced them to work for free on farms twice a year, for one month at
a time, during ploughing and seeding time, and again at harvest time. A former
school teacher who escaped North Korea in 2014 said his school forced its stu-
dents (aged between 10 and 16) to work every day to generate funds to pay gov-
ernment officials, maintain the school, and make a profit. 
Ordinary North Korean workers, both men and unmarried women, are required to
work at government-assigned enterprises. Although they are theoretically enti-
tled to a salary, they usually are not compensated. All North Korean families also
have to send one family member for at least two hours per day, six days a week,
to support local government construction or public beautification projects, like
building structures, fixing roads, collecting raw materials like crushed stone, or
cleaning public areas. 
The government launched a 70-day “battle” to prepare for North Korea’s most
important political event in 36 years, the 7th Korean Workers Party Congress,
which took place between May 6 to 10. The government forced people across the
country to produce more goods and crops in order to cover the costs of the con-
gress. Posters, billboards, and media broadcasts demanded that North Koreans
complete their “battle plans,” and counted down the days until the congress
opened.
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Labor Rights
North Korea is one of the few nations in the world that has not joined the Interna-
tional Labour Organization. Workers are systematically denied freedom of asso-
ciation and the right to organize and collectively bargain. 
Since Kim Jong-Un’s rise to power, the government has sent more workers over-
seas to earn foreign currency salaries, most of which the government seizes. Al-
though the country does not release official data, some observers estimate that
more than 100,000 North Koreans worked overseas in 2015. 
The treatment of North Korean workers overseas falls short of international labor
standards, with no right to freedom of association or expression, control by min-
ders who limit freedom of movement and access to information from the outside
world, long working hours and no right to refuse overtime. 
Key International Actors
Japan continues to demand the return of 12 Japanese citizens whom North Korea
abducted in the 1970s and 1980s. Some Japanese civil society groups insist the
number of abductees is much higher.
South Korea has also stepped up its demands for the return of its citizens, hun-
dreds of whom were reportedly abducted during the decades after the Korean
War. The North Korean government has also kidnapped individuals from China,
Thailand, Europe, and the Middle East.
On February 10, the South Korean government closed down the Kaesung Indus-
trial Complex (KIC), a special joint venture industrial zone at the southern border
of North Korea. In March, South Korea passed the North Korean Human Rights
Act, to improve human rights and provide humanitarian aid for current and for-
mer North Korean citizens. 
In July 2016, US President Barack Obama imposed targeted sanctions for human
rights abuses on five institutions and ten North Koreans, including Kim Jong-Un.
The list included individuals responsible for hunting down North Korean es-
capees, and running labor and political prison camps. 
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Oman
The government of Oman continued in 2016 to restrict the rights to freedom of
expression, association, and assembly. Authorities continued to prosecute jour-
nalists, bloggers, and social media activists. 
Oman’s kafala (sponsorship) immigrant labor system and lack of labor law pro-
tections leaves the country’s more than 140,000 migrant domestic workers ex-
posed to abuse and exploitation by employers, whose consent they need to
change jobs. Those who flee abuse—including beatings, sexual abuse, unpaid
wages, and excessive working hours— have little avenue for redress and can
face legal penalties for “absconding.”
Freedom of Expression
Authorities, particularly from the Internal Security Service (ISS), continued to tar-
get pro-reform activists, particularly for views they expressed on social media
platforms like Facebook and Twitter. Several bloggers and online activists were
harassed, arrested, and sometimes detained up to several months for criticizing
the authorities’ policies. Courts across the country sentenced activists to prison
terms on the basis of vaguely defined laws that limit free speech, including
through criminalizing “insulting the Sultan” and “undermining the prestige of
the state.” 
Authorities often have relied on provisions in the 2002 Telecommunications Act
and 2011 Cybercrime Law to restrict freedom of expression online.
On February 8, a court of first instance in Sohar, northern Oman, sentenced Has-
san al-Basham, a former diplomat and online activist, to three years in prison for
insulting God and Sultan Qaboos bin Said al Said, who has led the country for
over 45 years, in a series of Facebook and Twitter posts in which he discussed re-
ligious, political, economic, and social topics. On June 13, the Court of Appeals
upheld al-Basham’s sentence, but struck down a fine related to the charge of
“insulting the Sultan.” Al-Basham has been detained since May 3, 2016. Authori-
ties had arrested al-Basham several times before, in 2011 and 2015. 
On April 15, authorities arrested Abdullah Habib,a poet and film critic, after he
appeared for investigation before the Special Division of the Omani Police Gen-
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eral Command in the capital, Muscat, for his online posts. He was reportedly de-
tained incommunicado, but was released from detention on May 4 without
charge.  
On April 28, Sulaiman al-Ma’mari, a journalist and human rights defender, was
arrested and detained in Muscat without access to his family or a lawyer. Rights
groups reported that al-Ma’mari’s arrest appears to be related to his calling for
the immediate release of his friend and colleague, Abdullah Habib.
In August, authorities ordered the immediate closure of the Azamn newspaper
and arrested at least three journalists affiliated with the paper following the pub-
lication of articles accusing senior judicial officials of corruption. 
Ibrahim al-Ma’mari, Azamn’s editor-in-chief, was arrested on July 28, and Zaher
al-Abri, who oversees the newspaper’s local coverage, was arrested on August 3.
Yousef al-Haj, the deputy editor, was subsequently arrested on August 9. 
In September, the court of first instance in Muscat sentenced al-Maamari and al-
Haj to three years in prison on charges that included disturbing public order,
misuse of the internet, publishing details of a civil case, and undermining the
prestige of the state. The court also sentenced al-Abri to one year in prison and
ordered the permanent closure of the paper. Previously, Azamn and its journal-
ists had been targeted for their peaceful dissent. In 2011, a court issued ordered
Azamn to shut down for a month, and sentenced al-Ma’mari and al-Haj to five-
month suspended jail sentences for insulting the justice minister and other offi-
cials.
On August 26, prominent Omani human rights defender Saeed Jaded was re-
leased after serving a one-year prison sentence. In November 2015, Jaded was
arrested and transferred to Raza Prison, west of Shalala, to serve a one-year
prison sentence for “inciting to break national unity and spreading discord
within society” in relation to a blog post he wrote in October 2014. In this post
he compared the 2011 protests in Shofar to the 2014 protests in Hong Kong.
In March 2015, in a separate case, a Muscat court sentenced Jaded to three years
in prison on charges of “undermining the prestige of the state,” incitement to “il-
legal gathering,” and “using information networks to disseminate news that
would prejudice public order” based on his online activities. These activities in-
cluded a public letter he wrote to United States President Barack Obama asking
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him to press for human rights improvements in Oman. The Court of Appeals in
Muscat later upheld his three years’ prison sentence, suspended for three years,
and payment of a 2000 Omani Rails fine (US$5,200).
Freedom of Assembly and Association
All public gatherings require official approval in advance; authorities arrest and
prosecute participants in unapproved gatherings. Some private gatherings are
also prohibited under article 137 of the penal code, which prescribes a punish-
ment of up to three years in prison and a fine for anyone who “participates in a
private gathering including at least 10 individuals with a view to commit a riot or
a breach of public order.” Authorities sharply increased the penalties under arti-
cle 137 after the pro-reform demonstrations of 2011.
Maina Kiai, the United Nations special rapporteur on the rights to freedom of
peaceful assembly and of association, had characterized the “legal environment
for the exercise of the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association
in Oman” as problematic during his visit to the country in 2014.
On May 4, Dr. Talia al-Maamari, a former Shure Council member from Lia, in Al
Bettina Region, northern Oman, was released from prison three months prior to
the end of his prison sentence, reportedly by a royal decree from Sultan
Qaboos. In August 2014, a court of appeals in Muscat sentenced him to four
years in prison on charges of “illegal gathering” and calling for anti-government
demonstrations. The case stemmed from an incident in August 2013 in Lia, when
police used tear gas to disperse people blocking the port’s entrance to protest
industrial pollution at the nearby port of Sohar. Authorities arrested al-Maamari
two days after the protest, denying him access to a lawyer for over two weeks.
The United Nations Working Group on Arbitrary Detention in December 2014
characterized Dr. Talia al-Ma’mari’s detention as arbitrary and stated that the
government should release him immediately and compensate him.
Women’s Rights
Article 17 of the Basic Law states that all citizens are equal and bans gender-
based discrimination. In practice, however, women continue to face discrimina-
tion. The Personal Status Law discriminates against women on matters such as
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divorce, inheritance, child custody, and legal guardianship. For instance, women
can lose child custody if they re-marry, and men continue to hold guardianship
of the child regardless of whether they have custody. 
Oman has no laws prohibiting domestic violence and marital rape. Cases can
only be brought under general assault or battery charges.
Oman’s penal code criminalizes sexual relations outside marriage and provides
three months to one-year imprisonment when the person is unmarried, and one
to three years’ imprisonment when the person is married. Criminalization of
such offenses apply disproportionately to women whose pregnancy can serve as
evidence of the offense.
Migrant Workers 
Migrant workers remained vulnerable to exploitation and abuse, due in part to
the kafala (visa sponsorship) system that ties migrant workers to their employers
and precludes them from changing employers without their current employer’s
consent. 
Human Rights Watch found female domestic workers in particular at high risk of
abuse, since Oman’s labor law currently excludes domestic workers from its pro-
tections, and those who flee abuse have little avenue for redress.
Human Rights Watch documented abuse and exploitation of domestic workers,
including employers frequently confiscating workers’ passports despite a legal
prohibition; not paying workers their salaries, in full or at all; forcing them to
work excessively long hours without breaks or days off; and denying them ade-
quate food and living conditions. In some cases, workers reported physical and
sexual abuse. Migrant domestic workers who fled abusive employers reported
facing “absconding” charges that can lead to imprisonment and deportation,
trumped-up criminal charges by employers to force them to drop their cases, and
lengthy delays when pursuing cases against employers. 
Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity
The Omani penal code punishes consensual sex between men or between
women with six months to three years in prison.
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Key International Actors 
Oman has yet to ratify key international human rights treaties, including the In-
ternational Covenants on Civil and Political Rights and on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, although the government agreed to ratify the latter when the UN
Human Rights Council last considered Oman under its Universal Periodic Review
(UPR) process in 2015. 
In March, Oman accepted, in full or in part, 169 recommendations out of the 233
recommendations it received during its second UPR cycle in November 2015.
However, authorities rejected 36 recommendations, including those on freedom
of expression, assembly, allowing women to pass their nationality on to their
children, and ratifying the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 
Both the US and the United Kingdom provide significant economic and military
aid to Oman. Oman’s Western allies offered muted, if any criticism, of its human
rights abuses in 2016, except in annual reports. In 2016, the US Trafficking in
Persons report downgraded Oman to its Tier 2 Watch List category, citing a de-
crease in the government’s anti-trafficking law enforcement efforts. 
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Pakistan
While there were fewer incidents of militant violence in 2016 than in previous
years, scores of people were killed in bombings that targeted courts and
mosques. Law enforcement and security agencies remained unaccountable for
human rights violations and exercised disproportionate political influence, espe-
cially on matters of national security and counterterrorism. The military contin-
ued to control implementation of a national plan to address terrorism, largely
without civilian oversight. 
At least 85 people on death row were executed in 2016. Secret military courts
continued to operate and hand down death sentences. 
The government muzzled dissenting voices in nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs) and media. It passed vague and overbroad cybercrimes legislation in-
stalling new curbs of freedom of expression and criminalizing peaceful internet
use. 
Women, religious minorities, and transgender people faced violent attacks, inse-
curity, and persecution, with the government failing to provide adequate protec-
tion and hold perpetrators accountable. 
Police pressure and abuses compelled thousands of Afghans living in Pakistan
to return to Afghanistan or flee elsewhere in 2016.
Counterterrorism and Law Enforcement Abuses
Suicide bombings, armed attacks, and killings by the Taliban, Al-Qaeda, and
their affiliates targeted nearly every sector of Pakistani society, including reli-
gious minorities, security personnel, health workers, lawyers, and journalists,
resulting in hundreds of deaths. Military courts sentenced at least 100 people to
death in connection with the attacks. Shrouded in secrecy, the proceedings
raised fair trial concerns. 
In May, Aftab Ahmad, a member of the Karachi-based political party, Mutahidda
Qaumi Movement (MQM), was killed while in the custody of the Pakistan
Rangers, a federal paramilitary force. An autopsy report found that over 35 per-
cent of his body was covered in bruises and abrasions inflicted while he was still
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alive, indicating torture. In an unusual step, the chief of army staff, Gen. Raheel
Sharif, ordered a military inquiry into the death.
Dr. Asim Hussain, a member of the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP), detained on
August 26, 2015, on charges including “harboring and treating terrorists and
gangsters” at his hospital, remained in custody. Local groups expressed serious
concerns about Hussain’s treatment in Rangers’ custody and its impact on his
mental health.
In April, Pakistani authorities used anti-terrorism laws and excessive force to
prevent tenant farmers in Okara district, Punjab province, from demonstrating in
favor of land rights.
Religious Minorities
At least 19 people remained on death row after being convicted under Pakistan’s
draconian blasphemy law and hundreds awaited trial. Most of those facing blas-
phemy are members of religious minorities, often victimized by these charges
due to personal disputes. 
The government continued to actively encourage legal and procedural discrimi-
nation against members of the Ahmadiyah religious community by failing to re-
peal discriminatory laws.
In March, at least 74 people were killed and 338 others injured in a suicide
bombing in a public park in Lahore. The primary target of the attack was Chris-
tians celebrating Easter.
Freedom of Expression and Attacks on Civil Society
Many journalists increasingly practice self-censorship, fearing retribution from
security forces, military intelligence, and militant groups. Media outlets in 2016
remained under pressure to avoid reporting on or criticizing human rights viola-
tions in counterterrorism operations. The Taliban and other armed groups threat-
ened media outlets and targeted journalists and activists for their work.
In January, the Pakistan Rangers entered and, without a warrant, searched the
Karachi house of Salman Masood, a New York Times journalist. The Interior Min-
istry issued an apology and ordered an inquiry, while other members of the ad-
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ministration claimed the raid was part of a broader search operation in the area.
However, only one other house was searched, raising concerns that the raid’s
aim was to harass and intimidate Masood.
In May, four unidentified gunmen killed Khurram Zaki in Karachi. Zaki had been
publicly critical of extremist cleric Abdul Aziz and militant sectarian groups, and
had been receiving threats. He had confided to friends that he was on several
militant “hitlists.”
In August, MQM supporters attacked the office of ARY, one of the country’s
largest news broadcasters, after Altaf Husain, the party chief, publicly encour-
aged them to attack media outlets for not covering party protests.
Militant groups targeted lawyers, courts, and teachers. In January, armed mili-
tants attacked Bacha Khan University in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, killing at least 20
people. In March, a suicide bombing at the district courts in Charsadda, Khyber
Pakhtunkhwa, killed 17 people. In August, a suicide attack in Quetta, Balochis-
tan, killed 70 people, most of them lawyers gathered at a hospital emergency
room following the shooting of Bilal Kasi, president of the Balochistan bar asso-
ciation. The Islamic State (ISIS) and Jamat-ul-Ahrar, a Pakistani Taliban offshoot,
claimed responsibility for the attacks. In September, a Jamaat-ul-Ahrar suicide
bombing at the district courts in Mardan killed 14 people. 
In August, the Prevention of Cybercrimes law was enacted, which allows the gov-
ernment to censor online content and to criminalize internet user activity under
extremely broad and vague criteria. The law also sanctions government authori-
ties to access data of internet users without judicial review or oversight.
A year after the government announced a policy for “Regulation of INGOs in Pak-
istan,” there were credible reports of the policy being used to harass and im-
pede the work of international humanitarian and human rights groups. In March,
three Islamabad-based human rights groups had to stop work for not complying
with regulatory requirements. Numerous nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs), particularly in Punjab province, were intimidated, harassed, and in
some case had their offices sealed on the pretext of implementation of the na-
tional plan against terrorism.
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Women’s and Girls’ Rights
Child marriage remains a serious concern in Pakistan, with 21 percent of girls
marrying before the age of 18. In January 2016, a proposal submitted to parlia-
ment by WHOM aimed to raise the legal minimum age to 18 for females and in-
troduce harsher penalties for those who arrange child marriage. However, on
January 14, 2016, the proposal was withdrawn following strong pressure from the
Council of Islamic Ideology, a body that advises the parliament on Islamic law.
The council criticized the proposal as “anti-Islamic” and “blasphemous.”
Violence against women and girls—including rape, murder through so-called
honor killings, acid attacks, domestic violence, and forced marriage—remained
routine. Pakistani human rights NGOs estimate that there are about 1,000
“honor killings” every year. 
The government continued to fail to address forced conversions of women be-
longing to Hindu and Christian communities.
In June, Zeenat Rafiq, 18, was burned to death in Lahore by her mother for
“bringing shame to the family” by marrying a man of her choosing. In May, family
members tortured and burned to death a 19-year-old school teacher in Murree,
Punjab, for refusing an arranged marriage. In May, the body of Amber, 16, was
found inside a vehicle that had been set on fire in Abbottabad, Khyber
Pakhtunkhwa, after a jirga, or traditional assembly of elders, ordered her death
for helping her friend marry of her own choice. In July, Qandeel Baloch, a well-
known Pakistani model was killed by her brother in a so-called honor killing.
Pakistani law allows the family of a murder victim to pardon the perpetrator. This
practice is often used in cases of “honor” killings, where the victim and perpe-
trator frequently belong to the same family, in order to evade prosecution. The
2004 Criminal Law (Amendment) Act made “honor killings” a criminal offense,
but the law remains poorly enforced. An anti-honor killing bill seeking to elimi-
nate the option of murder committed in the name of “honor” to be “forgiven”
was passed by the parliament in October.
Children’s Rights
Use of child suicide bombers by the Taliban and other armed groups continued
in 2016. 
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In May, the United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child concluded its
review of Pakistan and expressed concern about a number of issues affecting
children, including executions, the impact of sectarian violence and terrorism,
and alleged torture and ill-treatment in police custody.
Refugees
The Pakistan government failed to meet its international legal obligation to pro-
tect more than 2 million Afghans in the country, including those not registered as
refugees, from harassment and other abuses. 
The number of Afghans repatriating from Pakistan increased in 2016 due to coer-
cive pressure from local governments; at the end of August, about 70,000 regis-
tered refugees had been repatriated.
The uncertain residency status of Afghan refugees in Pakistan encouraged police
harassment, threats, and extortion, particularly in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.
Statements by senior Pakistani officials in 2016 raised concerns of new govern-
ment actions to restrict the rights of Afghan refugees in the country.
Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity
Pakistan’s penal code criminalizes sexual behavior between men with possible
life imprisonment. In 2009, Pakistan’s Supreme Court called for improved police
response to cases involving transgender people, and to ensure the rights of
transgender people to basic education, employment, and protection. However,
despite the court order, violent attacks on transgender and intersex women in
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province surged in 2016, with unknown assailants fre-
quently targeting those involved in activism. 
Official responses have been inadequate. Since January 2015, human rights
groups in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa have recorded dozens of threats to, and attacks
on, people and property, including abuses while in police custody. In a widely
publicized case in May, Alisha, a 23-year-old transgender activist, was shot eight
times in Peshawar, and died in hospital while staff debated whether to put her in
the male or female ward. In September, the National Commission for Human
Rights called on the government to investigate the attacks. 
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Death Penalty
Pakistan has more than 8,000 prisoners on death row, one of the world’s largest
populations of prisoners facing execution. Pakistani law mandates capital pun-
ishment for 28 offenses, including murder, rape, treason, and blasphemy. Those
on death row are often from the most marginalized sections of society, including
people with disabilities. At least 85 people were executed in 2016.
Key International Actors
Pakistan’s volatile relationship with United States, the country’s largest develop-
ment and military donor, deteriorated amid signs of mistrust. US foreign assis-
tance to Pakistan fell to the lowest level since 2007. In August, the US stopped
payment of US$300 million in military reimbursements to Pakistan for not taking
adequate action against the Haqqani network, a Taliban-affiliated group that is
accused of planning and carrying out attacks on civilians, government officials,
and NATO forces in Afghanistan. 
Pakistan and China deepened extensive economic and political ties, and work
continued the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, a project consisting of con-
struction of roads, railways and energy pipelines. 
The United Nations high commissioner for human rights expressed concern after
historically tense relations between Pakistan and India further deteriorated in
2016, with both countries accusing each other of facilitating unrest and mili-
tancy. Scheduled talks to resolve longstanding disputes over security, territory,
and sharing river water resources stalled. 
In September, an armed group attack on an Indian military base in the Indian
state of Jammu and Kashmir heightened tensions between the two sides. India
claimed that the attackers were backed by the Pakistan government. Pakistan
denied involvement.
The United Nations high commissioner for refugees termed Pakistan’s treatment
of Afghan refugees as a “concerted push” to repatriate a large number of
refugees. Relations with Afghanistan remained characterized by mutual hostility
and mistrust. The Afghan government accused Pakistan of allowing the Haqqani
network to operate from Pakistan to carry out attacks in Afghanistan. Pakistan
maintained that the network had been dismantled.
WORLD REPORT 2017
474
Papua New Guinea
Despite Papua New Guinea’s (PNG) economic boom led by extractive industries,
almost 40 percent of the country’s population lives in poverty. The government
has not taken sufficient steps to address gender inequality, violence, corruption,
or excessive use of force by police. Rates of family and sexual violence are
among the highest in the world, and perpetrators are rarely prosecuted. 
The government led by Prime Minister Peter O’Neill was the focus of sustained
protests throughout 2016, including student boycotts and acts of civil disobedi-
ence across a number of sectors of the economy, over allegations of corruption.
In July, O’Neill survived a parliamentary no-confidence vote. In June, police
opened fire on a student protest in Port Morseby, injuring 23. 
Women’s and Girls’ Rights
Papua New Guinea is one of the most dangerous places in the world to be a
woman, with the majority of women experiencing rape or assault in their lifetime
and women facing systemic discrimination. While such acts have long been
criminalized and domestic violence was specifically proscribed under the 2013
Family Protection Act (FPA), few perpetrators are brought to justice. Three years
since the FPA was passed, it has not been implemented.
Police and prosecutors rarely pursue investigations or criminal charges against
people who commit family violence—even in cases of attempted murder, serious
injury, or repeated rape—and instead prefer to resolve such cases through medi-
ation and/or payment of compensation.
Police also often demand money (“for fuel”) from victims before acting, or sim-
ply ignore cases that occur in rural areas. There is also a severe lack of services
for people requiring assistance after having suffered family violence, such as
safe houses, qualified counselors, case management, financial support, or legal
aid.
Violent mobs have attacked individuals accused of sorcery or witchcraft, the vic-
tims mostly being women and girls. In February, a mob killed a family of four
over accusations of sorcery. In August, reports emerged of villagers attacking a
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number of women suspected of involvement in sorcery in PNG’s Enga province,
including one woman who had her hand chopped off. 
PNG has one of the highest rates of maternal death in the world, second only to
Afghanistan in the Asia Pacific region. Only slightly more than 50 percent of
women and girls give birth in a health facility or with the help of a skilled birth
attendant, and although the PNG government supports universal access to con-
traception, two out of three women still are unable to access and use it. 
Abortion remains illegal in PNG, except in cases where the mother’s life is at
risk. In October 2015, a husband and wife were found guilty of killing their un-
born child and were each sentenced to four years in prison, the first convictions
under PNG’s 1975 abortion law. The woman had experienced difficulties in previ-
ous pregnancies and an obstructed labor during the second, leaving her afraid
and traumatized. The two were released in June and August 2016, with the re-
mainder of their sentences suspended.
Government Corruption
In 2016, the government continued to weaken the country’s most successful
anti-corruption agency, Task Force Sweep, by starving it of funding. 
Since 2014, the National Fraud and Anti-Corruption Directorate (Anti-Corruption
Directorate), led by Matthew Damaru, has had a warrant for the arrest of the
prime minister on corruption charges, but a court ordered a stay of execution
and the warrant still had not been executed at time of writing. In April 2016,
PNG’s Supreme Court dismissed a suit brought by Prime Minister O’Neill that
sought to prevent anti-corruption police from investigating him.
Following a number of high profile arrests in April by the Anti-Corruption Direc-
torate—including of a Supreme Court judge, the attorney-general, and the prime
minister’s lawyer—Police Commissioner Gari Baki suspended Damaru and or-
dered the closure of the directorate. The police commissioner said it was closed
for “administrative reasons” and “a lack of accountability.” In May, the unit was
reopened after the PNG Supreme Court urged Baki to do so. 
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Police Abuse
In January, Baki declared 2016 as the year to discipline police officers responsi-
ble for abuse. Baki stated that more than 1,600 complaints of police abuse were
filed between 2007 and 2014, with 326 classified as criminal cases. It is unclear
how many, if any, resulted in criminal convictions of police officers. Police
abuse, including of children, continues to be reported with little accountability
even for fatalities or egregious physical abuse. 
In June, police opened fire on protesting university students in Port Moresby as
they attempted to march on the national parliament. Police confirmed that at
least 23 students were injured. In a statement, O’Neill blamed “agitators” for the
violence and announced an inquiry “to determine the underlying reasons for
continued student unrest promoted by individuals outside the student body.’’
O’Neill maintains that the protests were funded by the political opposition.
Asylum Seekers and Refugees 
Australia transfers asylum seekers that arrive in Australian waters by boat to
PNG’s Manus Island for refugee status determination and settlement. More than
900 asylum seekers and refugees remain on Manus Island. Approximately 872 of
these are held in a center on a naval base, of whom about 675 are recognized
refugees. 
In April, the PNG Supreme Court ruled that the detention of asylum seekers and
refugees on Manus Island was unconstitutional. O’Neill asked that Australia find
alternative arrangements for its detainees and for recognized refugees who do
not wish to stay in PNG. Australia resisted the decision but in August, both gov-
ernments announced they would close the center. 
Since April 2016, the center has remained fenced off and guarded, but at time of
writing center staff were allowing refugees and asylum seekers to leave the cen-
ter at scheduled times by bus or on foot under security escort. 
To date, neither Australia nor PNG has taken steps to close the center. Many
refugees are afraid to leave the center due to acts of violence in the community.
For instance, in August, Manus locals robbed and assaulted three refugees; one
of the locals attacked them with an iron bar. 
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Children’s Rights
Even though the government has officially abolished school fees, primary educa-
tion is not compulsory and barriers remain, including long distances to school,
insecurity, lack of water and sanitation facilities, and limited access for children
with disabilities. Thirteen percent of primary school-aged students and 60 per-
cent of secondary school students were out of school in 2012, the latest year for
which information is available. The adult literacy rate was an estimated 63 per-
cent.
Disability Rights
Despite the existence of a national disability policy, people with disabilities are
often unable to participate in community life, go to school, or work because of
lack of accessibility, stigma, and other barriers associated with disability. Access
to mental health care is limited, and traditional healers are the only option for
many people with psychosocial disabilities.
Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity
The PNG criminal code outlaws sex “against the order of nature,” which has
been interpreted to apply to consensual same-sex acts, and is punishable by up
to 14 years’ imprisonment. Gay asylum seekers on Manus Island have reported
being shunned, sexually abused, or assaulted by other asylum seekers. 
Key International Actors 
Australia remains PNG’s most important international partner, providing over 70
percent of the country’s total overseas development aid. The Australian govern-
ment will provide A$558.3 million (approximately US$430 million) in total over-
seas development aid to PNG in 2016-17.
In May 2016, the Australian government issued the report of a parliamentary in-
quiry into the delivery and effectiveness of its aid to PNG, recommending that it
“renew” and “increase” its commitment to PNG’s development.
In May, during the periodic review of PNG’s human rights record at the UN
Human Rights Council, countries made more than 150 recommendations on is-
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sues including ratification of international treaties, establishing a national
human rights commission, promoting gender equality, addressing domestic vio-
lence and sorcery-related violence, decriminalizing consensual same-sex rela-
tions, and abolishing or placing a moratorium on the death penalty.
In September, PNG responded that it would ratify all core human rights treaties
“on the basis of priorities” and that, while there are challenges to implementing
reforms, it is committed to establishing a human rights commission, improving
gender equality, and addressing domestic violence and sorcery-related violence.
It also noted, however, that “LGBT is currently not a priority of the Government”
and that the “death penalty is in our national law, however despite this, the cur-
rent government directive is not to implement until further directions are is-
sued.”
479
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH
Peru
In recent years, security forces have repeatedly wounded and killed civilians
when responding to occasional violent protests over mining and other large-
scale development projects. These killings steeply decreased in 2016. 
Efforts to prosecute grave human rights abuses committed during the 20-year
armed conflict that ended in 2000 have had mixed results.
Despite a 2015 law intended to eradicate violence against women, thousands
took to the streets of the capital Lima and other cities in August, demanding that
the government do more to protect the lives and rights of women. 
Police Abuse 
In August 2016, Interior Minister Carlos Basombrío convened a special commis-
sion to investigate what he called “overwhelming indications” that members of
the National Police (PNP) engaged in extrajudicial killings. Later that month, Vice
Minister of Interior Rubén Vargas confirmed “serious indications” that a group of
police officers, including a general, had carried out at least 20 extrajudicial
killings between 2009 and 2015, and falsely reported the victims as criminals
killed in combat, in order to receive promotions and awards. At time of writing,
at least nine PNP members remained under criminal investigation for involve-
ment in the killings.    
Security forces reportedly shot dead two protesters in 2016, compared to 12 in
2015. According to local human rights groups, police killed Pedro Valle Sandoval
and another unidentified protester on November 6, after protestors blocked a
highway in the province of Pataz. Since 2006, security forces have killed at least
130 people during protests in Peru; at least 50 during the administration of Ol-
lanta Humala (2011-2016), and 80 during the second administration of Alan Gar-
cia (2006-2011).  
In August 2015, then-President Humala issued a decree that limits the use of
force by police. Under the decree, police are permitted to employ lethal force
only when it is “strictly necessary” in the face of a “serious and imminent risk”
of grave harm. However, Law 30151, passed in January 2014, still grants legal im-
munity to “armed forces and police personnel who in fulfillment of their duty and
WORLD REPORT 2017
480
using their weapons or other means of defense, cause injury or death.” This
amendment to the criminal code eliminated language that made immunity con-
ditional on police using lethal force in compliance with regulations. The law may
make it impossible to hold police officers who use lethal force unlawfully ac-
countable. 
Confronting Past Abuses
Peru’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission estimated that almost 70,000 peo-
ple died or were subject to enforced disappearance during the country’s armed
conflict between 1980 and 2000. Many were victims of atrocities by the Shining
Path and other insurgent groups; others were victims of human rights violations
by state agents.
In a landmark trial, former President Alberto Fujimori was sentenced in 2009 to
25 years in prison for killings and “disappearances” committed in 1991 and
1992. In July 2016, he requested a pardon on humanitarian grounds, but with-
drew it in September after newly elected President Pedro Pablo Kuczynski said
he would likely reject it. Fujimori’s intelligence advisor, Vladimiro Montesinos,
three former army generals, and members of the Colina group, a government
death squad, are also serving sentences ranging from 15 to 25 years for the 1991
assassination of 15 people in the Lima district of Barrios Altos, and for six “dis-
appearances.”
Courts have made much less progress in addressing violations, including extra-
judicial killings, disapeareances, and torture, committed during the earlier ad-
ministrations of Fernando Belaúnde (1980-1985) and Alan García (1985-1990). 
Only a tiny percentage of the human rights violations committed during the
armed conflict had been brought to trial, according to Human Rights Trials in
Peru, a project based at George Mason University that monitors human rights
prosecutions. In 2016, court hearings continued into their sixth year in the case
of torture and disappearances at the Los Cabitos military base in Ayacucho in
1983. Abuses committed in that military base in 1984 and 1985 have been under
criminal investigation for over 10 years, but had not been brought to trial at time
of writing. 
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In September 2016, a court convicted 11 former soldiers—including a com-
mander—of a 1985 massacre at Accomarca in which an army unit killed more
than 60 civilians. The case had been under criminal investigation for 11 years, in-
cluding almost 6 years of trial. 
In July 2016, a trial began against 11 soldiers accused of raping 14 women in the
municipalities of Manta and Vilca between 1984 and 1998. 
Also in July, a prosecutor decided to close the investigation against former Presi-
dent Alberto Fujimori for forced sterilizations of mostly poor and indigenous
women committed during his administration. A month later, a higher-ranking
prosecutor requested that the closure be reconsidered, but a ruling on his re-
quest remained pending at time of writing. More than 2,000 forced sterilizations
have been reported to authorities, but human rights groups contend that these
represent only a small portion of such cases.  
In November 2015, then-President Humala signed a decree creating a national
registry of victims of forced sterilizations. In June 2016, he signed into law a bill
to search for victims of disappearances committed during the armed conflict.
The law creates a national registry of the disappeared and orders that the Justice
Ministry approve and implement a national search plan.
In May 2016, a court ordered that the government pay reparations to victims of
abuses committed by both sides of the conflict and their relatives for each of the
abuses they suffered, overturning the limits on reparations established by the
Peruvian legislature.  
Freedom of Expression
Journalists investigating corruption by regional government officials, mayors,
and business people are frequent targets of physical attack, threats, and crimi-
nal defamation suits.
In April 2016, a court in Lima convicted the then-director of the newspaper Diario
16, Fernando Valencia Osorio, of defamation and sentenced him to 20 months in
prison—which it suspended—and over US$30,000 in fines and compensation in
a case brought by former President Alan García. In 2013, Diario 16 suggested that
when President Humala said in a speech that that “thieves should be in prison,
not in power” he was referring to García.  
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In May 2016, a court convicted local journalist Carol Villavicencio Lizarraga of
defamation and sentenced her to a suspended year in prison and a fine of al-
most $1,500. She had written a piece in the local magazine El Huacón arguing
that a lawmaker had evaded taxes.  
The same month, a court convicted reporter Rafael León of defamation and sen-
tenced him to a suspend year in prison and a fine of almost $1,800. León had
written a satirical article about how Meier Miró Quesada, a journalist and former
editor of newspaper El Comercio, had criticized a former mayor of Lima in an arti-
cle. A higher court overturned the ruling in September. 
Women’s Rights
Women and girls in Peru remain at high risk of gender-based violence. More than
700 women have been killed in Peru in “femicides” (the killing of a woman in
certain contexts, including domestic violence and gender-based discrimination)
between 2009 and August 2015, according to official statistics.  
In September 2015, Peru’s Congress passed a law that provides for comprehen-
sive measures to prevent and punish violence against women. The law builds on
existing judicial measures to protect women at risk, and mandates the creation
of shelters to provide temporary refuge from abuse. 
Still, in August 2016, thousands demonstrated in Lima and other cities calling on
authorities to do more to curb gender-based violence. 
In August, a Lima court ordered the national government to distribute free emer-
gency contraceptive pills in public health facilities throughout the country. In
2009, the Constitutional Court had forbidden the free distribution of emergency
contraceptive pill, undermining the reproductive rights of women. In its ruling,
the court had stated that the decision could be changed if there was “consen-
sus” that pills are not abortive, something the Lima court found in more recent
decisions by international courts and statements by the World Health Organiza-
tion (WHO). 
Women and girls in Peru have the right to access abortions only in cases of risk
to their health or lives. In July 2014, the Committee on the Elimination of Discrim-
ination Against Women asked Peru to decriminalize abortion when pregnancy
was the result of rape and severe fetal impairment. A broad bill to reform the
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criminal code, which remained pending in Congress at time of writing, would
continue to prohibit abortion in these cases. In October, lawmakers from three
political parties introduced a bill in Congress to decriminalize abortion in cases
of rape and severe fetal impairment.
Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity
In March 2015, Congress rejected a bill to recognize civil unions for same-sex
couples. In September 2016, a Congressional supporter of President Kuczynski
announced that he would introduce a new legislative proposal to recognize
same-sex civil unions.
People in Peru are required to appear before a judge in order to revise the gen-
der noted on their identification documents. In an August 2016 report, the
human rights ombudsman noted that courts had rejected most of these re-
quests, often applying inconsistent criteria. 
Key International Actors
In June, the United Nations Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappear-
ances commended the passage of the bill to search for victims of disappear-
ances committed during the armed conflict. 
President Kuczynski has been one of the few leaders in the region who has con-
sistently expressed concern over the human rights situation in Venezuela. In
July, days before taking office, he said that leaders in the region should work to
address “the lack of respect for human liberties and the humanitarian crisis” in
Venezuela. 
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Philippines
Rodrigo Duterte took office as president of the Philippines on June 30, 2016.
Duterte campaigned on an explicit platform to “kill all of you who make the lives
of Filipinos miserable,” including criminal suspects, as part of his vow to “solve
drugs, criminality, and corruption in three to six months.” At his inauguration, he
pledged that his administration would “be sensitive to the state’s obligations to
promote, and protect, fulfill the human rights of our citizens … even as the rule
of law shall at all times prevail.” During the government’s campaign against ille-
gal drugs, however, Duterte has publicly praised the extrajudicial killing of sus-
pected drug dealers and drug users. 
Philippine human rights groups have linked the campaign and Duterte’s often-
fiery rhetoric to a surge of killings by police and unidentified gunmen since he
took office, with nearly 4,800 people killed at time of writing. Police say that in-
dividuals targeted by police were killed only after they “resisted arrest and shot
at police officers,” but have provided no evidence to support the claim. The
killings have highlighted the country’s long-standing problem of impunity for
abusive state security forces.
Other key issues confronting the Philippines this past year include the rights of
indigenous peoples, violations of reproductive health rights, child labor, and
stigma and discrimination related to the HIV/AIDS crisis.
Extrajudicial Killings
The Philippines has seen an unprecedented level of killing by law enforcement
since Duterte took office. Police statistics show that from July 1 to November 3,
2016, police killed an estimated 1,790 suspected “drug pushers and users.” That
death toll constitutes a nearly 20-fold jump over the 68 such police killings
recorded between January 1 and June 15, 2016. Police statistics attribute an addi-
tional 3,001 killings of alleged drug dealers and drug users to unknown vigi-
lantes from July 1 to September 4. The police categorize those killings as “deaths
under investigation,” but there is no evidence that police are actively probing
the circumstances in which they occurred. 
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In August, Philippine National Police Director-General Ronald Dela Rosa stated
that he did not “condone” extrajudicial killings. In September, police Internal Af-
fairs Service sources said they were “overwhelmed” by the scale of police
killings could only probe “a fraction” of the deaths.
Duterte has ignored calls for an official probe into these killings. Instead, he has
said the killings show the “success” of his anti-drug campaign and urged police
to “seize the momentum.” Key senior officials have endorsed this view.
Duterte’s top judicial official, Solicitor-General Jose Calida, defended the legality
of the police killings and opined that the number of such deaths was “not
enough.”  
Attacks on Indigenous Peoples
In March 2016, some 6,000 protesters, primarily indigenous peoples, farmers,
and their supporters from drought-stricken areas in North Cotabato and Bukid-
non provinces gathered in Kidapawan City in Mindanao to call for government
food aid and other assistance. The police response included shooting live am-
munition into the crowd, killing two people. At time of writing, neither the Senate
and nor police have released the results of their respective investigations into
the incident. 
Reproductive Health Rights
In his July 25 State of the Nation Address, President Duterte pledged to “put into
full force and effect” the Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Law
(the RH Law). Such support is greatly needed because on January 8, 2016, the
Philippine Congress eliminated funding in the 2016 national budget for contra-
ception guaranteed under the RH Law, cutting vital support for lower-income in-
dividuals. Millions of Filipinos rely on state-provided contraceptive services and
supplies for protection from sexually transmitted infections, and for safe birth-
spacing and family planning. The United Nations Population Fund has criticized
the congressional action as a threat to “the basic human right to health as well
as the right to reproductive choices.”  
Human Rights Watch has also documented policies implemented by local gov-
ernments designed to derail full enforcement of the RH Law. In Sorsogon City in
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the Bicol region, Mayor Sally Lee issued an executive order in February 2015 that
declared the city a “pro-life city.” Although the order does not explicitly prohibit
family planning services and contraceptive supplies, health workers and advo-
cates said that the city government gave oral guidelines to the city’s public clin-
ics to cease the distribution of family planning supplies and instead promote
only “natural” family planning methods such as the Catholic Church-approved
“rhythm method.” 
In Balanga City, the municipal government banned local public health officials
and clinics from procuring or distributing contraceptives. That interruption com-
pelled low-income people to either buy them from pharmacies or clandestinely
from local government-employed midwives at relatively high cost. 
Children’s Rights
In November 2015, the Philippine government detained more than 140 children
in advance of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in Manila.
The arbitrary detentions were part of so-called clearing operations aimed at
beautifying the city ahead of the summit. Police detained the children under
guard in government facilities for the homeless and orphans and then released
them without charge when the summit concluded. 
Child labor in small-scale gold mines remains a serious problem. Children work
in unstable 25-meter-deep pits, dive underwater to mine, and process gold with
mercury. Small steps taken by authorities to tackle child labor—such as voca-
tional training for former child miners in one mining town—have been under-
mined by continued lack of regulation of the small-scale gold mining sector, and
by the government’s failure to address child labor systematically.
HIV Epidemic
Although national prevalence is still low, the country has experienced a sharp
rise in new HIV infections in recent years. Prevalence among men who have sex
with men (MSM) has increased 10-fold since 2010. In 2015, the Department of
Health reported that at least 11 cities registered HIV prevalence rates among
MSM of more than 5 percent, with one—Cebu City, the second largest city—
recording a 15 percent prevalence rate in 2015. That compares to a 0.2 percent
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HIV prevalence rate for the Asia-Pacific region and a 4.7 percent HIV prevalence
rate in Sub-Saharan Africa, which has the most serious HIV epidemic in the
world. 
There has also been an increase in Cebu City in HIV among pregnant women, and
in newly recorded infections among people who inject drugs in Cebu City, where
the prevalence rate among such people has been recorded at between 40 and
50 percent. Many of these new infections among people who inject drugs are
due to sharing contaminated needles. 
The growing HIV epidemic is driven by a legal and policy environment hostile to
evidence-based policies and interventions that could help prevent HIV transmis-
sion. Such restrictions are found in national, provincial, and local government
policies, and are compounded by the resistance of the Catholic Church to sexual
health education and condom use. Government policies create obstacles to con-
dom access and HIV testing, limit educational efforts on HIV prevention, and
have ended harm reduction programs in Cebu City that were previously distribut-
ing sterile injecting equipment to people who inject drugs.
Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity
The House of Representatives began consideration of House Bill 267, the “Anti
SOGI (Sexual Orientation or Gender Identity) Discrimination Act” in June 2016. If
approved, it will criminalize discrimination in the employment of lesbian, gay, bi-
sexual, and transgender (LGBT) individuals, and prohibit schools from refusing
to register or expelling students on the basis of sexual orientation or gender
identity. The Senate has introduced companion legislation, Senate Bill No. 935,
otherwise known as the Anti-Discrimination Bill (ADB), which had its first hear-
ing in August.
House Bill 267 will also sensitize police and law enforcement officers on LGBT is-
sues and train them to attend to complaints. These initiatives are essential given
that LGBT rights advocacy groups have warned that hate crimes against LGBT
people are on the rise and that the Philippines has recorded the highest number
of murders of transgender individuals in Southeast Asia since 2008. The bill
would also prohibit anti-LGBT discrimination in access to health care.
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Key International Actors
The United States remains a key source of military financial assistance, with the
Obama administration allotting US$120 million for 2016. Earlier military financ-
ing was conditioned on improvements of the human rights situation in the
Philippines but this conditionality has been lifted as part of the Obama adminis-
tration’s so-called “Asia pivot.” President Duterte has expressed dissatisfaction
with US-Philippines relations, even saying he is willing to expel US military per-
sonnel stationed in the Philippines, but conceded that the country still needs US
military help because of the South China Sea dispute with China.
Other countries such as Canada and Australia, as well as the European Union,
continue to provide assistance to the Philippines for, among other things, capac-
ity-building programs to improve the human rights situation. Spain has given
funds and resources to the national Philippine Commission on Human Rights. 
In November, the US State Department announced that it had suspended the
sale of 26,000 military assault rifles to the Philippine National Police due to
human rights concerns raised by Duterte’s abusive “war on drugs.” The EU has
transitioned its rule of law program called EPJUST II, which involved training the
police and other law enforcement agencies, into GOJUST, which is tasked with in-
stituting justice sector reforms. 
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Qatar
Low-paid migrant workers continued to face abuse and exploitation, and reforms
that took effect in 2016 leave the exploitative elements of the old kafala (spon-
sorship) system in place and do not cover domestic workers. Qatar-based jour-
nalists criticized the manner in which the authorities applied the provisions of a
2014 cybercrime law.
Migrant Workers
Less than 10 percent of Qatar’s population of 2.1 million are Qatari nationals.
The country has been increasingly dependent on migrant labor as Qatar contin-
ued to build stadiums and develop infrastructure in preparation for hosting the
2022 FIFA World Cup. 
Low-paid migrant workers, mostly from Asia and to a lesser extent Africa, contin-
ued to face abuse and exploitation. Workers typically pay exorbitant recruitment
fees. Employers regularly take control of workers’ passports when they arrive in
Qatar. Many migrant workers complain that employers failed to pay their wages
on time, and sometimes not at all.
In December 2016, changes to Qatar’s kafala system came into force. Law No. 21
of 2015, on the regulation of the entry and exit of expatriates and their residency,
referred to “recruiters” instead of “sponsors” but left the fundamentally ex-
ploitative characteristics of the kafala system in place, whereby a migrant
worker’s legal residence in the country continues to be tied to their employer or
sponsor. 
The new law still requires foreign workers to obtain a “No Objection Certificate”
from their current employer in order to transfer legally to another employer be-
fore the end of their contracts, as well as permission from an unspecified “com-
petent authority” along with the Interior and Labor and Social Affairs Ministries. 
If the contract does not specify any time frame, under the new law workers must
wait five years before leaving an employer. The workers also must still obtain exit
permits from their employers to leave Qatar. The new law provides for a griev-
ance committee for workers in cases in which sponsors refuse to grant exit visas,
but the arbitrary restriction on the workers’ right to leave the country remains in
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place. In practice, this enables employers to arbitrarily prevent their employees
from leaving Qatar and returning to their home country.
Qatar’s labor law prohibits migrant workers from unionizing or engaging in
strikes, although they make up 99 percent of the private sector workforce. 
The new labor law explicitly excludes domestic workers from its remit, and
leaves them still more vulnerable to abuse and exploitation. In addition to labor
abuses, many domestic workers faced physical and sexual abuse. A law on do-
mestic workers continued to remain in draft form and has not been made public.
Freedom of Expression
In March, Qatar’s emir pardoned and released the poet, Mohamed al-Ajami,
whom an appeal court had sentenced to 15 years in prison in 2013 on the basis
of the content of poems posted online that criticized Qatar’s ruling family and
other Arab rulers. 
Qatar issued a law “on the suppression of electronic crimes” in September 2014.
The 2014 law criminalizes the spreading of “false news” on the internet and pro-
vides for a maximum of three years in jail for anyone who posts online content
that “violates social values or principles,” or “insults or slanders others.” 
Authorities used the law to detain a journalist from an independent news web-
site, Doha News, after he wrote an article naming a man convicted of a serious
criminal offence. Authorities did not press charges, but a Doha News editorial
published in October criticized the manner in which authorities were applying
the law, and quoted a Qatari attorney who said the law was “like a knife held
close to the necks of writers, activists and journalists.”
Qatar’s penal code provides for a maximum of five years in jail for criticism of the
emir.
Women’s Rights, Sexual Orientation, and Gender Identity
Qatar’s Law No. 22 of 2006 on family and personal status continues to discrimi-
nate against women. Under article 36, a marriage contract is valid when a
woman’s male guardian concludes the contract and two male witnesses are
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present. Article 58 states that it is a wife’s responsibility to look after the house-
hold and to obey her husband. 
Other than Article 57 of the family law forbidding husbands from hurting their
wives physically or morally, and general provisions on assault, the penal code
does not criminalize domestic violence or marital rape.
Qatar’s nationality law does not allow Qatari women, unlike Qatari men, married
to non-Qatari spouses to pass on their nationality to their children.
Qatar’s penal code punishes “sodomy” with one to three years in prison. Mus-
lims convicted of zina (sex outside of marriage) can be sentenced to flogging
(non-married persons) or the death penalty (married persons). Non-Muslims can
be sentenced to imprisonment. According to media reports, authorities have
flogged dozens of people since 2004, including at least 45 between 2009 and
2011. In 2016, according to media reports, a Dutch woman was arrested after she
reported that she was raped. A court handed down a suspended one-year im-
prisonment sentence for engaging in extramarital sex, and deported her. It also
sentenced the man accused of raping her with 100 lashes for having extramarital
sex and 40 lashes for drinking alcohol. 
Key International Actors
Qatar maintained ground troops in Yemen, where they have been assisting the
Saudi-led military campaign against Houthi forces, also known as Ansar Allah. In
March, France approved the sale of 24 Dassault Rafael fighter jets to Qatar, in a
deal worth US$7.5 billion. In September, the US approved the sale to Qatar of 36
Boeing F-15 fighter jets valued at around $4 billion.
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Russia
The government in 2016 further tightened control over the already-shrinking
space for free expression, association, and assembly and intensified persecu-
tion of independent critics. Parliament adopted laws expanding the power of law
enforcement and security agencies, including to control online speech. The par-
liamentary vote in September resulted in the ruling party, United Russia, gaining
a constitutional majority in the State Duma, the parliament’s lower chamber.
Russia continued to support rebels who commit abuses in eastern Ukraine. Rus-
sia’s actions in occupied Crimea created a human rights crisis.  
Freedom of Association 
The authorities used a 2012 law to demonize as “foreign agents” dozens of non-
governmental organizations (NGOs), including leading rights groups and inde-
pendent think tanks. At time of writing, the “register of foreign agents” by
Russia’s Ministry of Justice includes 148 NGOs. Between 2012 and 2016 at least
thirty groups closed rather than accept the label. 
In June, authorities for the first time criminally prosecuted an activist under the
law, charging Valentina Cherevatenko, chair of Women of the Don, a human
rights and peace-building group, with “malicious evasion” of registration as a
“foreign agent.” If found guilty, she faces up to two years’ imprisonment.
In February, a court dissolved AGORA, an association of lawyers defending civil
and political activists, after the Justice Ministry alleged AGORA violated the “for-
eign agents” law and undertook work beyond its mandate. 
Authorities fined many groups for failing to display “foreign agent” labels on
publications. In October 2015, an appeals court upheld a 600,000 ruble
($10,000) fine against Human Rights Center "Memorial," a leading human rights
group, for not labeling materials actually produced and published by a different
group.
Russia’s prosecutor general designated three more foreign organizations “unde-
sirable” under the 2015 law authorizing bans on foreign or international groups
that allegedly undermine Russia’s security, defense, or constitutional order,
bringing the total number of banned groups to seven. All seven are American
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democracy promotion or civil society capacity-building organizations. Russians
maintaining ties with “undesirables” face penalties ranging from fines to up to
six years in prison.
Freedom of Assembly
Authorities increasingly refused to sanction public protests organized by govern-
ment critics and political opposition and punished protesters participating in un-
sanctioned peaceful gatherings and single-person pickets.
In December 2015, a Moscow court sentenced peaceful protester Ildar Dadin to
three years’ imprisonment, later reduced to two-and-a-half, for repeated
breaches of public assembly regulations. Dadin is the first activist imprisoned
under this criminal provision. In fall 2016, Dadin alleged beatings, threats, and
degrading treatment by staff of the Segezha penal colony in northern Russia
where he is serving his sentence. An investigation into his allegations was pend-
ing at time of writing.
Authorities launched similar proceedings against several others, including
Vladimir Ionov, 76, an outspoken critic of Russia’s role in eastern Ukraine. Ionov
fled Russia in August.
New Restrictive Laws
In December 2015, parliament passed a law empowering Russia’s Constitutional
Court to determine whether international human rights bodies’ rulings, including
the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) judgments, contradict the Russian
Constitution and could therefore be deemed “non-executable.” A ruling deemed
“non-executable” will not be implemented unless the constitution is amended.
In April, the court found unconstitutional a July 2013 ECtHR ruling finding the ab-
solute ban on prisoner voting a violation of the right to choose one’s govern-
ment. 
In December, parliament adopted amendments requiring media outlets, broad-
casters, and publishers to report funding from all international sources, includ-
ing Russian NGOs designated as “foreign agents,” or face fines. 
In June, parliament adopted legislation holding internet search engine owners
with more than 1 million daily users accountable for content appearing on their
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sites and requiring Russian-language search engines and those advertising for
Russian audiences be owned by Russian companies or citizens. Dunja Mijatović,
the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe representative on free-
dom of the media, said the vaguely worded legislation would “result in govern-
mental interference of online information and introduce self-censorship in
private companies.” 
A June law empowers law enforcement agencies to place on watch lists individu-
als allegedly engaging in “anti-social behavior,” or “actions that run contrary to
commonly accepted norms of behavior and morality.” 
In July, President Vladimir Putin signed into law counterterrorism and counterex-
tremism amendments known as the “Yarovaya Law,” after their key author. The
law requires that cellular and internet providers store all communications data
for six months and all metadata up to three years for potential access by security
services. The law also bans religious activities outside of “specially designated
places,” such as officially recognized religious institutions; criminalizes “failure
to report a crime” without specifying when such a requirement would apply; in-
creases penalties for vaguely defined “public justification of terrorism” online;
and severely penalizes “inducing, recruiting, or otherwise involving” others in
so-called mass unrest.
Prosecutions for Online Speech
From mid-2014 through 2016, Russian courts delivered at least five guilty ver-
dicts, with at least 15 cases pending, on criminal separatism charges for material
posted online. Most charges pertained to remarks about Crimea being part of
Ukraine, not Russia.
For example, in May, officials charged and placed under a travel ban Ilmi
Umerov, formerly a local official in Crimea and deputy chairman of the Crimean
Tatars’ elected representative body, the Mejlis, after his March interview criticiz-
ing Russia’s occupation of Crimea. In August, authorities forcibly confined
Umerov to a psychiatric hospital for three weeks. At time of writing, his case was
pending. 
In May, a court sentenced Andrei Bubeev to two years and three months in
prison for extremist and separatist calls based on two posts on Vkontakte, Rus-
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sia’s largest social network: a photo with a toothpaste tube saying “Squeeze
Russia out of you,” and an article “Crimea is Ukraine.”  
In November, Russia’s Supreme Court recommended that law enforcement au-
thorities exercise good judgement and take into account relevant context, when
launching criminal extremism cases based solely on reposts in social media.
North Caucasus 
Armed confrontations between Islamist insurgents and law enforcement agen-
cies continued in the North Caucasus, particularly in Dagestan. Russia media
continued to report on North Caucasus residents leaving Russia and joining the
Islamic State (also known as ISIS) as well as on cases of detentions of North
Caucasus residents allegedly affiliated with ISIS.
Salafi Muslim communities in Dagestan were subject to intense scrutiny and ha-
rassment as law enforcement largely equated them with insurgents or their col-
laborators. Authorities placed Salafis on watch lists, repeatedly detained and
questioned many of them without specific grounds; raided Salafi mosques; and
carried out mass detentions of believers. They closed several Salafi mosques, in-
cluding in Makhachkala, Dagestan’s capital. 
Chechnya’s strongman, Ramzan Kadyrov, asserted that Salafis have no place in
Chechnya, instructing police to punish those who stray from Sufi Islam, tradi-
tional for the region. Police raids against Salafis were widespread. Authorities
also pursued collective punishment, including punitive house burnings, against
relatives of alleged insurgents. 
Ahead of September elections for the head (governor) of Chechnya, local author-
ities targeted critics and those deemed disloyal to Kadyrov, including through
abductions and enforced disappearances, ill-treatment, death threats, and
threats of violence against relatives. 
Chechnya’s authorities also attacked critical journalists and human rights de-
fenders. In March, a group of masked men believed to be Chechen officials’
proxies, attacked a minibus carrying Russian and foreign journalists traveling to
Chechnya, beat the journalists, and burned the bus. 
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The following week, thugs apparently acting as Chechen authorities’ proxies
physically attacked the leader of Joint Mobile Group for Human Rights Defenders
in Chechnya (JMG). JMG withdrew its team from Chechnya for security reasons.
In May, Chechen police arbitrarily detained and threatened a Russian journalist
researching a punitive house-burning. In September, following an unfair trial, a
Chechnya court sentenced 23-year-old local journalist Zhalaudi Geriev to three
years’ imprisonment on fabricated drug possession charges, apparently in retali-
ation for his work with Caucasian Knot, known for critical coverage of Chechnya.  
In Beslan, North Ossetia, during events commemorating victims of the Septem-
ber 2004 school hostage-taking, police roughed up and detained several ac-
tivists wearing T-shirts and holding a sign saying: “Putin is the Slaughterer of
Beslan.” Thugs apparently acting as proxies of local law enforcement attacked
journalists Elena Kostyuchenko, of Novaya Gazeta, and Diana Khachatryan, of
Takie Dela. Doctors diagnosed Kostyuchenko with a brain contusion afterwards. 
Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity 
Authorities continued to implement discriminatory policies and laws against les-
bian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) people. 
In March, police found journalist and theater critic Dmitry Tsilikin dead in his St.
Petersburg apartment from stab wounds. The perpetrator, arrested a week later,
confessed that he planned to blackmail Tsilikin about his homosexuality, but
killed him during a confrontation. The police did not categorize the killing as a
hate crime.  
In January, a court in Murmansk, northwestern Russia, found LGBT activist Sergei
Alekseenko guilty of violating the discriminatory “gay propaganda” law which
prohibits allowing children access to positive information about LGBT relation-
ships. The court called several publications on the website of an LGBT organiza-
tion formerly run by Alekseenko “gay propaganda” and fined him 100,000 rubles
(US$1,300). 
Authorities continued legal action against Deti-404, an online support group for
LGBT children. In April, a court in the Siberian town of Barnaul ruled to ban the
website. As of November, Deti 404’s website remained blocked. 
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In September, a court in Siberia ruled to block BlueSystem.ru, a highly popular
LGBT news site. As of November, the site was blocked.
Palliative Care 
According to Russian experts, 1 million Russians need effective pain treatment,
and at least 300,000 die annually without it. A July government roadmap sets
out plans to improve access to and quality of pain relief, including for children.
However, access to morphine, an inexpensive and effective pain remedy, re-
mains overly restricted.
Disability Rights 
In March, the European Court of Human Rights found the government violated
the right to family life of Vitalii Kocherov and his daughter, Anna. In 2007, St. Pe-
tersburg authorities placed Anna, born while Kocherov and Anna’s mother lived
in a state institution, in an orphanage shortly after birth and denied Kocherov
parental rights, citing his intellectual disability. The family was reunited.  
Reports of serious physical and emotional abuse against children and adults
with disabilities in state institutions persist. For example, prosecutors monitor-
ing an institution in Ulyanovsk region in July found that an employee had pun-
ished a 13-year-old boy with an intellectual disability by burning him with an
iron. Authorities opened a criminal investigation. In June, the Ministry of Labor
and Social Affairs proposed reforms intended to improve conditions in institu-
tions for adults with disabilities but has no immediate plans to expand commu-
nity-based living for adults with disabilities. 
Federal curricular standards on primary education for children with disabilities,
mandatory for all educational institutions, including mainstream schools, went
into effect in September. The standards require a more individualized approach
and reasonable accommodations based on children’s educational requirements
and aim to increase inclusion of children with disabilities in mainstream
schools, but children may continue to be placed in specialized classrooms, spe-
cial schools, or receive home education. The number of children with disabilities
enrolled in education increased although many, including those living in institu-
tions, do not receive a quality and inclusive education. 
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Russia and Ukraine (see also Ukraine chapter)
The government provides political and material support to rebels in eastern
Ukraine, but Russian authorities took no measures to rein in abuses by rebels.
Russia’s actions in occupied Crimea created a human rights crisis. (See Ukraine
chapter for details.) 
In March, a court in southern Russia found Nadezhda Savchenko—a military
pilot and a member of Ukraine’s parliament—guilty of premeditated murder in
the deaths of two Russian journalists in a 2014 shelling attack in eastern
Ukraine. In an unfair trial the court sentenced her to 22 years’ imprisonment. In
May, authorities exchanged Savchenko for two Russian servicemen captured by
Ukrainian authorities. 
Oleg Sentsov, a Ukrainian filmmaker from Crimea, continued to serve a 20-year
prison sentence in a penal camp in Yakutia, northern Russia. A court convicted
Sentsov in 2015 on politically motivated charges of running a “terrorist organiza-
tion” in Crimea. 
Russia and Syria (see also Syria chapter)
Russia continued combat in Syria, mainly through air strikes. Civilian casualties
increased, including from unlawful aerial attacks. While it is challenging to de-
termine whether Russian or Syrian aircraft conducted any particular attack, Rus-
sia, because it plays an active role in joint military operations, shares
responsibility for violations even when its aircraft were not directly involved. 
Unlawful attacks included attacks on schools and hospitals, the use of air-
dropped cluster munitions, and use of incendiary weapons in populated areas.
Despite repeated official denials, convincing evidence indicates that Russia
used both cluster munitions and incendiary weapons in attacks on opposition-
controlled areas.
In September, airstrikes hit a United Nations aid convoy and a Red Crescent
warehouse in Aleppo. Only Syrian and Russian air forces are known to be active
in this part of Syria. Russia denied responsibility for the attack.
At a special session held in October, the UN Human Rights Council adopted a
resolution calling for an end to aerial bombardments and mandating the Syria
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Commission of Inquiry to conduct a “comprehensive, independent special in-
quiry into the events in Aleppo.” 
Russia presented a series of hostile amendments that would have removed all
references to aerial bombardments, suppressed reference to the responsibility
of the Syrian government “and its allies,” limited the focus of the special inquiry
to only the actions of opposition and terrorist groups, and removed references to
the International Criminal Court. All were rejected. 
Despite its involvement in the conflict, Russia has not offered to resettle any Syr-
ian refugees, but only to provide scholarships for 300 students. As of April 2016,
only two Syrian asylum seekers in Russia had been granted asylum since the
conflict began in 2011, and another 1,300 temporary asylum. About 2,000 re-
portedly have some other form of legal basis for residence, but thousands more
live in limbo.
Key International Actors
In January 2016, International Criminal Court judges authorized the court’s pros-
ecutor to conduct an investigation into crimes allegedly committed during the
August 2008 Russia-Georgia conflict over South Ossetia. On November 15, the
ICC’s Office of the Prosecutor, in its annual report, characterized the armed con-
flict in eastern Ukraine and Russia’s occupation of Crimea as international armed
conflicts to which Russia is a party. 
The next day, President Putin issued an order to notify the UN that Russia was
withdrawing its signature from the Rome Statute, the founding treaty of the ICC.
The European Union high representative for foreign affairs and security policy is-
sued a statement to express regret over Russia’s decision “not to become a party
to the Rome Statute.”
Russia’s role in the Syria conflict, sanctions against Russia for occupying Crimea,
and engagement with the Russian authorities to end hostilities in eastern
Ukraine, dominated the agenda of key international actors. Some raised con-
cerns about the human rights crackdown. 
In September, the EU External Action Service’s spokesperson urged the authori-
ties to stop branding NGOs “foreign agents,” and said the law is “clearly aimed
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at restricting their independence and threatening their very existence.” Also in
September, the EU made a similar statement at the UN Human Rights Council. 
In June, the European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commis-
sion) stated that the law enabling Russia’s Constitutional Court to block Euro-
pean Court rulings “is in direct conflict with Russia’s international obligations …
and should be removed.” The commission also found the law on “undesirable”
organizations interferes with freedom of expression and assembly, and should
be significantly amended. 
The US commission on international religious freedom condemned the
“Yarovaya Law” and warned that “under the guise of confronting terrorism, [it]
would grant authorities sweeping powers to curtail civil liberties, including … re-
ligious practices.” 
Numerous international actors criticized the deteriorating human rights situation
in Russia-occupied Crimea, particularly the crackdown on Crimean Tatars. The
European Parliament called for an “immediate reversal” of the April ruling of the
Crimean Supreme Court banning the Mejlis.The Council of Europe urged the gov-
ernment to re-open Crimea to its monitoring mechanisms. The US called on Rus-
sia to “advocate for the dignity and rights of the people of Crimea, and to hold
human rights violators to account.”
In July, the UN high commissioner for human rights urged the government to en-
sure investigations into all allegations of disappearances and killings in Crimea
and provide “direct and unfettered access to the Crimea for the High Commis-
sioner’s office and other international human rights monitoring mechanisms.”
Foreign Policy
Russia played an increasingly obstructive role at the UN Human Rights Council. It
opposed the long-standing practice of NGOs proposing language during negotia-
tions on resolutions and presented more than 30 amendments to a Norwegian
resolution on human rights defenders that were designed to strip previously-
agreed resolution language. Russia also used procedural tactics such as points
of order to attempt to block the appointment of UN Human Right Council experts.
In October, the UN General Assembly declined to re-elect Russia to the Human
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Rights Council for 2017, likely reflecting deep concern over how its aerial bom-
bardments have been carried out in Syria. 
In December 2015, Russia voted for a UN Security Council resolution that called
on all parties to the conflict in Syria to “immediately cease any attacks against
civilians and civilian objects,” but in October 2016 vetoed a resolution that
would have demanded safe delivery of humanitarian assistance to people
trapped in Aleppo and an end to unlawful attacks on the city. Russia’s staunch
support for the government of Bashar al-Assad government and opposition to an
arms embargo in South Sudan made progress on issues like sanctioning the Syr-
ian government or taking meaningful steps on South Sudan nearly impossible.
For nine months, Russia suppressed the publication of a report by the Security
Council’s sanctions monitoring panel for Darfur, which found the Sudanese gov-
ernment in violation of international law. The report was eventually published in
September. The Russian delegation also blocked the UN from appointing new ex-
perts to the Darfur sanctions monitoring panel.
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Rwanda
In a referendum in December 2015, Rwandan citizens overwhelmingly voted in
favor of constitutional amendments that allow President Paul Kagame to run for
a third term in 2017 and two additional five-year terms thereafter. Very few voices
inside the country publicly opposed the move. 
The referendum took place in a context of tight restrictions on freedom of expres-
sion. The Rwandan government continues to limit the ability of civil society
groups, media, and international human rights organizations to function freely
and independently and criticize its policies or practices. 
Military and police arbitrarily arrested and detained people in unofficial deten-
tion centers, torturing and ill-treating some of them. 
Civil Society
Civil society in Rwanda is very weak, due to many years of state intimidation and
interference. The government remains hostile to criticism of its human rights
record and strongly favors service-delivery over independent human rights re-
porting or advocacy.  
Onerous registration requirements and bureaucratic obstacles have also pre-
vented human rights groups from operating effectively. The regional human
rights group Human Rights League in the Great Lakes Region (LDGL) struggles to
work effectively, partly because of the arduous official registration process. The
organization only obtained its nongovernmental organization (NGO) registration
in November. In May, immigration services ordered Epimack Kwokwo, LDGL’s for-
mer executive secretary and a Congolese national, to leave the country. 
Freedom of Media
Few Rwandan journalists challenge official government narratives or policies or
investigate allegations of human rights abuses, especially against senior gov-
ernment officials. Many journalists engage in self-censorship. However, some
radio and television debates and call-in programs have occasionally allowed
space for discussion of more sensitive topics, such as the constitutional
changes, the role of journalism, and illegal detention in so-called transit centers. 
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John Williams Ntwali, one of Rwanda’s few investigative journalists, was arrested
in late January 2016 and accused of allegedly raping a minor. Judicial officials
later changed the charge to indecent assault and eventually dropped the case
for lack of evidence. Ntwali was released after 10 days. Prior to his arrest, he had
been investigating a number of sensitive issues, including the circumstances
surrounding the 2015 death of prominent businessman Assinapol Rwigara.
On February 3, police confiscated the computers of East African newspaper jour-
nalists Ivan Mugisha and Moses Gahigi. They had been investigating cases of al-
leged tax evasion and corruption. The police briefly detained and questioned
Mugisha.
On August 8, John Ndabarasa, a journalist at Sana Radio, went missing. The po-
lice said they had opened an investigation, but his whereabouts remained un-
known at time of writing. Ndabarasa is a family member of Joel Mutabazi, a
former presidential bodyguard sentenced to life imprisonment in 2014 for secu-
rity-related offenses. 
Rwandan media organizations are advocating for the decriminalization of press
offences and stronger self-regulation in the context of an ongoing review of the
penal code and media laws. 
The BBC Kinyarwanda service remains suspended since 2014.
Political Pluralism
All parties represented in parliament supported the constitutional amendments
and the 2015 referendum. Only one registered party, the Democratic Green Party
of Rwanda (DGPR), opposed the moves. There was limited competition during
local elections in February and March. Political space remains very limited in ad-
vance of the 2017 presidential elections. 
The DGPR and several unregistered opposition parties continue to face serious
challenges, including arrests and harassment of members, preventing them from
functioning effectively. Victoire Ingabire, president of the FDU-Inkingi, a party
which has been unable to register, and several other opposition party members
remain in prison. 
Illuminée Iragena, a nurse and member of the FDU-Inkingi, went missing on
March 26. People close to her fear she was detained and may have died in de-
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tention, although authorities neither confirmed nor denied her detention, rein-
forcing concerns that she may have been forcibly disappeared. 
Just hours before Iragena went missing, Léonille Gasengayire, another FDU-
Inkingi member, was arrested after visiting Ingabire in prison. The police de-
tained her for three days, beat her, questioned her, and denied her access to a
lawyer. She told the police that Iragena had helped to arrange the delivery of a
book to Ingabire. The police released her without charge, but re-arrested her on
August 23, and charged her with inciting insurrection or disorder among the pop-
ulation. They also accused her of stirring up local opposition to the expropriation
of local residents and of promoting the FDU-Inkingi. She remained in pretrial de-
tention at time of writing.   
On September 18, Théophile Ntirutwa, Kigali representative of the FDU-Inkingi,
was arrested, allegedly by military, in Nyarutarama, a Kigali suburb. He was de-
tained, beaten, and questioned about his membership of the FDU-Inkingi. He
was released two days later. Ntirutwa had complained several times to authori-
ties about threats and harassment by local officials.
Several other opposition party members have also been arrested and briefly de-
tained. 
Justice
On February 29, the Rwandan government withdrew its declaration allowing indi-
viduals to file complaints with the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights,
on the grounds that the declaration was being exploited by convicted genocide
fugitives. The court was due to hear a complaint against Rwanda, brought by Vic-
toire Ingabire. On September 5, the court ruled that the withdrawal would only
take effect after one year and would not affect pending cases. 
On March 31, a military court sentenced Col. Tom Byabagamba, former head of
the presidential guard, and retired Brig. Gen. Frank Rusagara, former secretary
general of the Defense ministry, to 21 and 20 years in prison respectively, includ-
ing for inciting insurrection and tarnishing the government’s image. The prose-
cution had accused them of criticizing the government, alleging state
involvement in assassinations of opponents, and complaining about foreign and
economic policy. A prosecution witness said he was forced to testify against
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Rusagara and Byabagamba. Co-accused retired Sgt. François Kabayiza was sen-
tenced to five years and said in court that military personnel had tortured him in
detention.
Arbitrary Detention and Ill-Treatment
As in previous years, authorities rounded up street vendors, sex workers, street
children, and other poor people and detained them in so-called transit centers
across the country. The conditions in these centers are harsh and inhumane, and
beatings are commonplace. Authorities made a few changes to a center in
Gikondo, in the capital Kigali, resulting in improvements to some facilities and
infrastructure, but overall conditions did not significantly improve. Similar de-
grading conditions prevail in transit centers in Muhanga (Muhanga district),
Mbazi (Huye district), and Mudende (Rubavu district). 
Three security agents were sentenced to 10 years in prison for killing a street
vendor in Kigali’s Nyabugogo bus station in May. The government opened sev-
eral designated market places for former street vendors and said it would im-
pose fines on street vendors and their customers operating outside these
places. 
Police, intelligence, and military officials also detained and ill-treated people in
other unofficial detention centers, such as Chez Gacinya, a police detention cen-
ter in Kigali, and military detention sites. 
Justice for the Genocide
In December 2015, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) closed
its doors after delivering its final judgement against former minister Pauline Nyi-
ramasuhuko and five co-accused. Former mayor Ladislas Ntaganzwa, indicted by
the ICTR , was arrested in December 2015 in the Democratic Republic of Congo
and extradited to Rwanda, where his trial started in April.  
Jean-Bosco Uwinkindi, a pastor, and Léon Mugesera, an academic and former
government official, were sentenced to life in prison, respectively in December
2015 and April 2016, for genocide and crimes against humanity. Uwinkindi was
the first case referred by the ICTR to Rwanda. 
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In July, a French court found Octavien Ngenzi and Tito Barahira, two former may-
ors, guilty of genocide and crimes against humanity, and sentenced them to life
imprisonment. It was only the second time that Rwandan genocide suspects
were convicted in France, a close ally of the Rwandan government before and
during the genocide. A German court convicted another former mayor, One-
sphore Rwabukombe, to life imprisonment for his role in the genocide in Decem-
ber 2015, and a Swedish court sentenced Claver Berinkindi to life imprisonment
in May.  
A court in London in December 2015 denied an extradition request for five geno-
cide suspects (Vincent Brown or Bajinya, Charles Munyaneza, Célestin Muta-
baruka, Emmanuel Nteziryayo, and Célestin Ugirashebuja). In the Netherlands,
an appeal court in July overruled an earlier decision and allowed the extradition
of Jean-Claude Iyamuremye and Jean-Baptiste Mugimba to Rwanda, which took
place on November 12. Léopold Munyakazi, a professor, was extradited from the
United States to Rwanda in September, and Jean Claude Seyoboka, a former mili-
tary official, was transferred from Canada to Rwanda in November. 
Key International Actors  
The US and European Union expressed concern about the lack of sufficient time
and space for debate about the proposed amendments to the constitution and
the conduct of the referendum. After President Kagame announced he would run
again in the 2017 elections, the US expressed “deep disappointment” and called
upon the Rwandan government to ensure and respect citizens’ rights to exercise
their freedom of expression, conscience, and peaceful assembly. 
In March, the UN Human Rights Council adopted the outcome of the Universal
Periodic Review (UPR) of Rwanda. Rwanda accepted recommendations to ensure
freedom of opinion and expression and promised to strengthen its policy on
human rights defenders. In June, Rwandan authorities presented a roadmap on
the implementation of the recommendations to civil society and donors.  
The Human Rights Committee reviewed civil and political rights in Rwanda in
March, expressing concern about torture in unofficial detention centers, govern-
ment interference in the judiciary and enforced disappearances.
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In October, the European Parliament adopted a resolution on Rwanda, focusing
on the case of Victoire Ingabire. A European Parliament delegation that visited
Rwanda in September 2016 was denied access to Ingabire. 
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Saudi Arabia
Deputy Crown Prince and Minister of Defense Mohammad Bin Salman emerged
as the most visible Saudi leader in 2016 and launched Vision 2030, an ambi-
tious government road map for economic and developmental growth that aims
to reduce the country’s dependence on oil. Vision 2030 was later accompanied
by the National Transformation Program (NTP), which sets specific benchmarks
to achieve by 2020.
Through 2016 the Saudi Arabia-led coalition continued an aerial campaign
against Houthi forces in Yemen that included numerous unlawful airstrikes that
killed and injured thousands of civilians. Saudi authorities also continued their
arbitrary arrests, trials, and convictions of peaceful dissidents. Dozens of human
rights defenders and activists continued to serve long prison sentences for criti-
cizing authorities or advocating political and rights reforms. Authorities contin-
ued to discriminate against women and religious minorities. 
Yemen Airstrikes and Blockade
As the leader of the nine-nation coalition that began military operations against
the Houthis and allied forces in Yemen on March 26, 2015, Saudi Arabia has
committed numerous violations of international humanitarian law. Since coali-
tion airstrikes began, more than 4,125 civilians have been killed and 7,207
wounded; according to the OHCHR, air strikes are the single largest cause of
civilian casualties.
Human Rights Watch has documented 58 unlawful airstrikes by the coalition,
some of which may amount to war crimes, killing nearly 800 civilians and hitting
homes, markets, hospitals, schools, and mosques. An airstrike on a crowded fu-
neral in October killed at least 100 people and wounded 500. Human Rights
Watch also documented how the Saudi Arabia-led coalition repeatedly attacked
civilian factories, warehouses, and other protected sites in violation of the laws
of war. 
The conflict exacerbated an existing humanitarian crisis. By early 2016 an esti-
mated 14.4 million Yemenis were unable to meet their food needs, according to
the United Nations.
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Human Rights Watch documented at least 16 coalition attacks using internation-
ally banned cluster munitions, which killed and wounded dozens of civilians.
Saudi Arabia is not a party to the Convention on Cluster Munitions, which bans
the weapon. The Saudi military spokesman denied the use of cluster bombs in
Yemen’s capital, Sanaa, but admitted their use in one attack in Hajjah.
In 2016 the Saudi-led coalition was added to the UN Secretary-General’s “list of
shame” for children in armed conflict for its role in killing and maiming children
and attacking schools and hospitals in Yemen. After Saudi Arabia and its allies
threatened to withdraw hundreds of millions of dollars in assistance to the UN,
the coalition was removed from the list “pending review.” The Houthis have
been on the list since 2011 for their use of child soldiers. 
In July, the Saudi-led coalition announced findings of preliminary investigations
into eight widely publicized coalition airstrikes causing civilian casualties. The
coalition-appointed panel of investigators recommended compensation for vic-
tims of only one attack. In another, the panel found the coalition should have
warned medical staff at a Doctors Without Borders (MSF)-supported hospital in
Saada governorate, but dismissed the severity of the hospital attack by conclud-
ing there had been no “human damage.” In August, the coalition struck another
MSF facility, killing 19, and the organization withdrew staff from six hospitals in
northern Yemen. 
In September, the UN Human Rights Council adopted a resolution expressing
“deep concern” at the killing of civilians and attacks on civilian infrastructure in
Yemen, and requested that the high commissioner strengthen his in-country
presence in order to “establish the facts and circumstances of alleged violations
and abuses” and report back to the council.
Freedoms of Expression, Association, and Belief
Saudi Arabia continued to repress pro-reform activists and peaceful dissidents.
In 2016 over a dozen prominent activists convicted on charges arising from their
peaceful activities were serving long prison sentences.
Prominent activist Waleed Abu al-Khair continued to serve a 15-year sentence im-
posed by Saudi Arabia’s terrorism court that convicted him in 2014 on charges
stemming solely from his peaceful criticism in media interviews and on social
511
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH
media of human rights abuses. Prominent blogger Raif Badawi served the fourth
year of his 10-year sentence, but authorities did not flog him in 2016, as they
previously did in January 2015.
In March, Saudi Arabia sentenced journalist Alaa Brinji to five years in prison
and an eight-year travel ban for tweets in which he criticized religious authorities
and voiced support for the right of women to drive and jailed human rights ac-
tivists.
By mid-2016 Saudi Arabia had jailed nearly all the founders of the banned Saudi
Civil and Political Rights Association (ACPRA). In April and May, Saudi Arabia’s
Specialized Criminal Court, the country’s terrorism tribunal, convicted ACPRA ac-
tivists Abd al-Aziz al-Shubaily and Issa al-Hamid to eight and nine years in prison
respectively, in addition to lengthy travel bans based solely on their peaceful
pro-reform advocacy.
In December 2015, the Saudi Cabinet approved a new law permitting the estab-
lishment of civil society organizations for the first time, and authorities pub-
lished the law’s implementing regulations in 2016. The new regulations permit
authorities to dissolve or deny registration to any nongovernmental organization
on vague grounds, including “contradicting Islamic Sharia, infringing upon pub-
lic order, contradicting public morals, breaching national unity, or contradicting
other laws and regulations.” By September, Human Rights Watch was unaware of
any registration of an independent human rights group under the new law.
Saudi Arabia does not tolerate public worship by adherents of religions other
than Islam and systematically discriminates against Muslim religious minorities,
notably Twelver Shia and Ismailis, including in public education, the justice sys-
tem, religious freedom, and employment. Government-affiliated religious au-
thorities continued to disparage Shia Islam in public statements and
documents.
In February, a Saudi court reduced Palestinian poet Ashraf Fayadh’s punishment
from the death penalty to eight years in prison for alleged blasphemous state-
ments in a book of his poetry and during a discussion group.
Saudi Arabia has no written laws concerning sexual orientation or gender iden-
tity, but judges use principles of uncodified Islamic law to sanction people sus-
pected of committing sexual relations outside marriage, including adultery,
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extramarital and homosexual sex, or other “immoral” acts. If such activity occurs
online, judges and prosecutors utilize vague provisions of the country’s anti-cy-
bercrime law that criminalize online activity impinging on “public order, religious
values, public morals, and privacy.”
In February, the Saudi Gazette reported that the Bureau of Investigation and Pub-
lic Prosecution is considering requesting the death penalty for anyone “using so-
cial media to solicit homosexual acts.”
Criminal Justice
Saudi Arabia applies Sharia (Islamic law) as its national law. There is no formal
penal code, but the government has passed some laws and regulations that sub-
ject certain broadly-defined offenses to criminal penalties. In the absence of a
written penal code or narrowly-worded regulations, however, judges and prose-
cutors can criminalize a wide range of offenses under broad, catch-all charges
such as “breaking allegiance with the ruler” or “trying to distort the reputation of
the kingdom.”
Detainees, including children, commonly face systematic violations of due
process and fair trial rights, including arbitrary arrest. Authorities do not always
inform suspects of the crime with which they are charged, or allow them access
to supporting evidence, sometimes even after trial sessions have begun. Author-
ities generally do not allow lawyers to assist suspects during interrogation and
sometimes impede them from examining witnesses and presenting evidence at
trial.
Judges routinely sentence defendants to floggings of hundreds of lashes. Chil-
dren can be tried for capital crimes and sentenced as adults if there are physical
signs of puberty.
During 2016 authorities continued to detain arrested suspects for months, even
years, without judicial review or prosecution.
As of September, Ali al-Nimr, Dawoud al-Marhoun, and Abdullah al-Zaher re-
mained on death row for allegedly committing protest-related crimes while they
were children in 2011 and 2012. Saudi judges based the capital convictions pri-
marily on confessions that the three defendants retracted in court and said had
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been coerced, and the courts did not investigate the allegations that the confes-
sions were obtained by torture. 
In April, Saudi Arabia’s Council of Ministers issued a sweeping new regulation
curtailing the powers of the Committee for the Promotion of Virtue and the Pre-
vention of Vice, or religious police, to arrest, pursue, or request documents or ID
cards from suspects.
In February 2016, Saudi Arabia began a high-profile trial of 32 men for allegedly
spying on behalf of Iran, but the charge sheet contained numerous allegations
that do not resemble recognizable crimes, including “supporting demonstra-
tions,” “harming the reputation of the kingdom,” and attempting to “spread the
Shia confession.” All but one of the detainees have been in detention since
2013.
On January 2, 2016, Saudi Arabia carried out a mass execution of 47 men for
“terrorism offenses.” Forty-three were associated with Al-Qaeda attacks in the
2000s, and four were Shia allegedly involved in protest-related crimes in 2011
and 2012. It was Saudi Arabia’s largest mass execution since 1980. Among those
executed were Ali Sa’eed al-Ribh, whose trial judgement indicates that he was
under 18 when he allegedly committed some of the crimes for which he was sen-
tenced to death, and Sheikh Nimr al-Nimr, a prominent Shia cleric sentenced to
death in 2014 after a Saudi court convicted him on a host of vague charges, ap-
parently based largely on his peaceful criticism of Saudi officials.
According to Interior Ministry statements, Saudi Arabia executed 144 persons
between January and mid-November, mostly for murder and terrorism-related of-
fenses. Twenty-two of those executed were convicted for non-violent drug
crimes. Most executions are carried out by beheading, sometimes in public.
Women’s and Girls’ Rights
Saudi Arabia’s discriminatory male guardianship system remains intact despite
government pledges to abolish it. Under this system, adult women must obtain
permission from a male guardian—usually a husband, father, brother, or son—to
travel, marry, or exit prison. They may be required to provide guardian consent in
order to work or access healthcare. Women regularly face difficulty conducting a
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range of transactions without a male relative, from renting an apartment to filing
legal claims. All women remain banned from driving cars in Saudi Arabia. 
Following municipal elections in December 2015, 38 women were elected or ap-
pointed to councils with a total of 3,159 members across the country for the first
time. In February, however, authorities ordered that the councils must be segre-
gated by sex, with women members sitting in separate rooms away from their
male colleagues and participating only by video link.
Saudi Arabia continues to discriminate against women and girls by denying
them the same opportunities to exercise and play sports as men and boys. As of
July 2016, most public schools did not offer physical education for girls and
women were not allowed to attend or participate in national tournaments or
state-organized sports leagues. But, in a positive move, on August 1, the General
Authority for Sports, which functions like a sports ministry, announced a new fe-
male department. In August, four women represented Saudi Arabia in the Rio
Olympics.
Migrant Workers
Over 9 million migrant workers fill manual, clerical, and service jobs, constitut-
ing more than half the workforce. Some suffer abuses and exploitation, some-
times amounting to conditions of forced labor.
The kafala (sponsorship) system ties migrant workers’ residency permits to
“sponsoring” employers, whose written consent is required for workers to
change employers or exit the country under normal circumstances. Some em-
ployers illegally confiscate passports, withhold wages, and force migrants to
work against their will. Saudi Arabia also imposes an exit visa requirement, forc-
ing migrant workers to obtain permission from their employer to leave the coun-
try. Workers who leave their employer without their consent can be charged with
“absconding” and face imprisonment and deportation. Such a system can trap
workers in abusive conditions, and punish victims who flee abuse.
Faced with a domestic unemployment rate of 12 percent that may rise as the do-
mestic population increases, Saudi authorities have introduced labor reforms
since 2011 that create a tiered quota system for the employment of Saudi citi-
zens in the private labor sector that differs according to the nature of the busi-
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ness. As a part of these reforms, Saudi labor authorities in 2016 allowed foreign-
ers working in firms that do not employ the required percentage of Saudis to
change jobs without employer approval.
During 2016, low oil prices and an economic downturn dramatically undermined
Saudi Arabia’s major construction companies, leaving them unable to continue
projects or pay salaries of migrant construction workers. By August, tens of thou-
sands of workers— mainly from south Asian countries—were stranded without
salaries and unable to return to their home countries due to restrictions such as
the exit visa requirement. Many were reportedly living in makeshift camps, rely-
ing on humanitarian assistance from their embassies.
Police and labor authorities continued to arrest and deport foreign workers
found in violation of existing labor laws, targeting workers without valid resi-
dency or work permits, or those found working for an employer other than their
legal sponsor.
Saudi Arabia is not a party to the 1951 Refugee Convention and has not estab-
lished an asylum system whereby people who fear being returned to places
where their lives or freedom would be threatened may apply to prevent their
forced return.
Domestic workers, predominantly women, faced a range of abuses including
overwork, forced confinement, non-payment of wages, food deprivation, and
psychological, physical, and sexual abuse without the authorities holding their
employers to account. Workers who attempted to report employer abuses some-
times faced prosecution based on counterclaims of theft, “black magic,” or “sor-
cery.”
Key International Actors
The United States offered only muted criticism of Saudi human rights violations.
Meanwhile, as a party to the armed conflict in Yemen, the US provided logistics
and intelligence support to Saudi-led coalition forces, which reportedly included
assistance with military targeting. In August, the US approved a US$1.15 billion
arms sale to Saudi Arabia, despite significant opposition from members of Con-
gress concerned about Saudi conduct in Yemen.
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In March, Human Rights Watch called on the US, United Kingdom, France, and
other arms- exporting countries to suspend weapons sales to Saudi Arabia until
it curtails its unlawful airstrikes in Yemen and credibly investigates alleged viola-
tions. In June, a coalition of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), including
Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International, called on the United Nations
General Assembly to suspend Saudi Arabia’s membership rights on the UN
Human Rights Council over its engagement in “gross and systematic violations of
human rights” in Yemen. 
NGOs including Human Rights Watch similarly opposed Saudi Arabia’s bid to be
re-elected as a Human Rights Council member for the 2017-2019 term. In early
October, in the face of strong opposition by Saudi Arabia, the UN Human Rights
Council passed a new resolution on Yemen mandating the UN to work with an ex-
isting Yemen-led effort to investigate abuses related to the conflict. 
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Serbia
Progress in human rights protection was limited in 2016. Asylum seekers and mi-
grant arrivals decreased, but the asylum system remains flawed with inadequate
protections for unaccompanied children. Attacks and threats against journalists
remain a problem. War crimes prosecutions progress remains slow. The Roma
minority continue to face housing discrimination and lesbian, gay, bisexual, and
transgender (LGBT) activists are subject to threats and attacks. 
Migrants, Asylum Seekers, and Displaced Persons
Numbers of asylum seekers and migrants in Serbia significantly decreased in
2016 due to border closures along the entire Western Balkan migration route, in-
cluding by Serbia. During the first eight months of 2016, Serbia registered 8,003
asylum seekers compared to 103,891 during the same period in 2015. Afghans
comprised the largest national group (3,359), followed by Syrians (1,579). At time
of writing there were 4,800 registered asylum seekers and migrants in Serbia,
according to UNHCR estimates. 
As of October 31, Serbia had granted refugee status to a mere 17 asylum seekers
and subsidiary protection to 17 others in 2016. In addition to low recognition
rates, there are significant backlogs in the country’s asylum procedure with
thousands of pending claims.
During the first seven months of 2016, the Ministry of Interior registered 127 un-
accompanied children in Serbia, most from Afghanistan, compared to 4,112 dur-
ing the same period in 2015. Serbia lacks formal age assessment procedures for
unaccompanied children, putting older children at risk of being treated as adults
instead of receiving child protection. Only three institutions exist in Serbia for
unaccompanied children and have a total of 32 places. Other unaccompanied
children stay in temporary shelters known as “refugee aid centers” together with
unrelated adults or open reception centers, where in some cases unaccompa-
nied children can be accommodated separately from unrelated adults.  
Progress in finding durable solutions for refugees and internally displaces per-
sons (IDPs) from the Balkan wars living in Serbia was insignificant. According to
UNHCR, as of July 1, there were 35,300 refugees in Serbia, most from Croatia—
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432 fewer than one year earlier—while the Serbian government recorded 203,140
internally displaced people, the majority from Kosovo—the same number as last year. 
Freedom of Media
Journalists in Serbia continue to operate in a hostile environment. Between Janu-
ary and July, the Independent Journalists’ Association of Serbia (NUNS) regis-
tered 33 incidents of assaults, threats or other pressure against journalists. 
The killing of radio journalist Luka Popov in June drew international calls for an
investigation, including by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Eu-
rope’s representative on media freedom. Police arrested three suspects. It is un-
clear whether the killing was connected to Popov’s work as a journalist. 
Smear campaigns by pro-government media and members of the government
against independent media and journalists continued. In one case, Prime Minis-
ter Aleksandar Vucic targeted the independent online news site Balkan Investi-
gate Reporting Network (BIRN) for criticism, and the pro-government media
outlets TV Pink and Informer accused it of being an enemy of the state. 
The work of a commission established to investigate the murders of three promi-
nent journalists—Dada Vujasinovic in 1994, Slavko Curuvija in 1999, and Milan
Pantic in 2001— progressed slowly. The ongoing prosecution of four state secu-
rity officials suspected of involvement in Curuvija’s murder was stalled during
2016 as a key witness failed to appear at the trial. The deaths of the other two
journalists remained unsolved. 
Accountability for War Crimes
War crimes prosecutions progressed slowly in 2016 due to a lack of political sup-
port, resources or staff at the Office of the War Crimes Prosecutor and inade-
quate witness support. Few high-ranking officials have been prosecuted for war
crimes in Serbian courts. Between January and August, the War Crimes Prosecu-
tor’s Office indicted 15 people for war crimes. 
During the same period, four people were convicted by the first instance court
for war crimes, and given sentences of between 8 and 10 years’ imprisonment.
The Appeals Court sentenced six people to imprisonment for between 6 and 12
years. One person was acquitted on appeal. Eighteen cases were pending at first
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instance and 15 cases were still at investigation stage. Since the establishment
of the War Crimes Prosecution Office in 2003, 110 judgments have been issued:
75 convictions and 35 acquittals. 
The March 2015-ordered retrial against nine defendants, most of them low rank-
ing officials, for the wartime killing of 118 Albanians in Kosovo in 1999 has been
hampered by delays and progressed slowly. No high-ranking officials have been
indicted for involvement in the killings. 
The High Court in Belgrade started proceedings against a former Bosnian Serb
army officer charged with killing four civilians and raping two women in Bosnia
and Herzegovina in 1992. The case was transferred to Serbian authorities by the
Bosnian state court under a war crimes cooperation protocol between Serbia and
Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
In February, the Serbian government adopted a war crimes strategy which sets
out criteria for prioritizing cases and commitment to prosecute high ranking offi-
cials suspected of war crimes, while failing to specify how. The war crimes strat-
egy is part of the EU requirements under negotiating Chapter 23 that focuses on
rule of law, and part of EU’s enlargement process with Serbia. The War Crimes
Prosecutor’s Office separately was drafting another strategy concerning war
crimes prosecutions. The chief prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal
for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) Serge Brammertz expressed concern in June that
Serbia had failed to appoint a new chief war crimes prosecutor after almost a
year. At time of writing, Serbia had still yet to do so.  
In March the ICTY acquitted Serbian Radical Party leader Vojislav Seselj on nine
counts, including crimes against humanity, citing insufficient evidence. A prose-
cution appeal filed in May was pending before the ICTY appeals chamber at time
of writing. 
In June, ICTY President Carmel Agius said that Serbia had not fully cooperated
with the tribunal when failing to extradite three members of the Serbian Radical
Party indicted for contempt. 
Human Rights Defenders
Attacks and harassment of human rights defenders continued. According to local
LGBT and human rights organizations, the majority of attacks and threats against
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members of the LGBT community go unreported with only known LGBT activists
filing complaints. 
In June, in Vojvodina in Northeast Serbia, an LGBT activist was attacked and
kicked in the head by four unidentified perpetrators. No one had been prose-
cuted at time of writing. In August, LGBT activist Boban Stojanovic, one of the
Belgrade Pride organizers, was punched and called a “fag” in downtown Bel-
grade by two unidentified men. Police were investigating at time of writing. 
Hundreds of police officers deployed in Belgrade to protect the LGBT Pride march
in September, which occurred without violence. This was a marked improvement
from previous years when protesters attacked the parade, or the government had
cancelled the event citing security concerns instead of providing adequate secu-
rity.
Treatment of Minorities
Roma face discrimination and harassment primarily in areas of housing. Forced
evictions of Roma living in informal settlements continued without prior consul-
tation with families concerned, with insufficient recourse to challenge decisions,
and with inadequate provision of alternative accommodation. Serbian authori-
ties failed to provide adequate housing solutions for the approximately 50 Roma
families evicted from the informal Belvil settlement in Belgrade in 2012 despite
designated funds. 
The Council of Europe human rights commissioner in a letter to the Serbian gov-
ernment in February expressed his concerns with respect to forced evictions and
the lack of legal safeguards and failure to provide adequate alternative housing.
The commissioner called on Serbian authorities to halt further evictions of Roma
without providing alternative housing.
UN Special Rapporteur on Right to Housing Leilani Farha in February expressed
concerns about aspects of a new housing law that fails to guarantee consulta-
tion with affected communities prior to evictions; lacks adequate provisions
with respect to the period of notice prior to evictions; and fails to outline ap-
peals. 
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Disability Rights
In April 2016, the UN Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities ex-
pressed deep concerns about the number of children and adults with disabilities
living in institutions and about the poor living conditions in institutions in Ser-
bia. The committee urged Serbia to deinstitutionalize people with disabilities
and to ensure access to inclusive and quality education. The committee also
called on Serbia to replace its guardianship system and ensure all people with
disabilities have access to services and support in the community of their own
choice and preference.
Key International Actors
In July, Federica Mogherini, European Union high representative for foreign af-
fairs and security, said that the opening of EU accession negotiating Chapters 23
and 24, on rule of law and justice, freedom and security, would allow Serbia to
develop a track record of implementing reforms in the area of the rule of law, but
failed to emphasize the need for improving the country’s human rights record.
Croatia, an EU member, in August blocked Serbia from opening Chapter 23, cit-
ing Serbia assertion of its right to prosecute war crimes committed anywhere in
the former Yugoslavia during the Balkan wars. 
The European Commission’s annual progress report on Serbia expressed con-
cerns about interference with press freedom, pointing to continued attacks and
threats against journalists. The commission called on authorities to create an en-
vironment enabling journalists to work without interference and to investigate
and adjudicate threats and attacks. The report also called on authorities to
tackle political influence on the judiciary as well as addressing the backlog of
cases in the courts and adopting a free legal aid system. The report raised con-
cerns about the government’s failure to appoint a new war crimes prosecutor
and Serbia’s lack of full cooperation with the ICTY.
During a visit to Belgrade in August, US Vice President Joe Biden offered condo-
lences to victims killed by the NATO bombing campaign against Serbia and en-
couraged Serb authorities to take responsibility for their involvement in the
1990s wars in former Yugoslavia. 
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Kosovo
Human rights protections progressed slowly in Kosovo in 2016, though serious
abuses persisted. Talks over the ratification of a border demarcation agreement
with Montenegro were marred by repeated tear gas attacks in the Kosovo Assem-
bly by the political opposition, blocking free debate, impeding the passage of
legislation and halting progress on the Kosovo’s s visa liberalization agreement
with the European Union. 
A special court based in the Netherlands to try serious crimes committed during
and just after the 1998-1999 Kosovo war was awaiting final approval by the
Dutch parliament. Journalists faced threats and intimidation, and prosecutions
of crimes against them remained slow. Tensions between Serbs and Kosovo Al-
banians continued, particularly in the north. Roma, Ashkali, and Balkan Egyptian
communities continued to face discrimination. The process of normalizing rela-
tions with Belgrade made limited progress.
Accountability for War Crimes
In January, Kosovo and the Netherlands signed a host-state agreement for the
Netherlands to host a special court with international judges and prosecutors
that will try serious crimes allegedly committed during and immediately after the
Kosovo war by members of the Kosovo Liberation Army against ethnic minorities
and political opponents. The Dutch parliament was expected to ratify the agree-
ment by year’s end so the court could begin its work. In September, the EU ap-
pointed former US prosecutor David Schwendiman as the court’s lead
prosecutor.
The mandate of the European Rule of Law Mission (EULEX), which terminated on
June 14, was extended on June 30 for another two years. EULEX’s mandate was
modified to focus mainly on monitoring, mentoring, and advising, while continu-
ing its work on ongoing cases but may only deal with new cases in exceptional
circumstances and with the approval of the Kosovo judiciary.  
In January, Oliver Ivanovic, a former Serbian government official and the head of
a Kosovo Serb political party, was convicted of war crimes at the Basic Court in
Mitrovica and sentenced to nine years’ imprisonment. Ivanovic was found guilty
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of ordering the murder of nine ethnic Albanians in Mitrovica in 1999 during the
NATO bombing of Yugoslavia. 
In March, the Appeals Court in Pristina upheld the convictions against three men
charged with organized crimes in connect with organ trafficking at Kosovo’s
Medicus clinic in 2008, but acquitted two others due to insufficient evidence.
One of the convicted men failed to present himself at the prison facility to serve
his sentence at the March 25 deadline; his whereabouts were unclear at time of
writing. 
In November, the Appeals Court in Pristina cleared former KLA commander and
mayor of Skenderaj, Sami Lushtaku, of the murder of an Albanian civilian dating
to the 1998-1999 war. The court upheld the conviction on other charges of war
crimes but reduced the sentence from 12 to 7 years imprisonment. Lushtaku de-
clared in November that he will appeal to the Supreme Court.
By early September, mixed panels consisting of the EULEX and local judges
handed down two decisions related to war crimes at first instance level, two
cases at Court of Appeals level, and were involved in three decisions at Supreme
Court level. EULEX has been involved in a total of 38 verdicts since it was estab-
lished in 2008. 
Accountability of International Institutions
The Human Rights Review Panel, an independent body set up in 2009 to review
allegations of human rights violations by EULEX, did not rule on any cases be-
tween January and September. Forty-nine cases were pending before the panel
at time of writing.  
The Human Rights Advisory Panel (HRAP), an independent body set up in 2006
to examine complaints of abuses committed by or attributable to the United Na-
tions Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), ceased its operations
on July 1. In a critical July report, HRAP found that UNMIK had violated human
rights; had not properly investigated serious allegations of wrongdoings, and
had failed to comply with the panel’s recommendations. 
Abuses by UNMIK include lack of adequate criminal investigations in relation to
disappearances, abductions, killings, and excessive use of force by UNMIK po-
lice during a crowd control operation in 2007, resulting in deaths and serious in-
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juries of four protesters. The panel found violations in all nine cases that it ad-
dressed between January and July. 
Treatment of Minorities
Roma, Ashkali, and Balkan Egyptians continue to face problems acquiring per-
sonal documents, affecting their ability to access health care, social assistance,
and education. A lack of political will and insufficient allocation of funds re-
sulted in the failure to adequately implement the 2009-2015 Strategy and Action
Plan for the Integration of Roma, Ashkali, and Egyptian communities.
During 2016, a new strategy and action plan for the integration of Roma, Ashkali,
and Egyptian communities was drafted, aiming to replace the former strategy
that came to end in 2015. The new strategy focuses on improving civil registra-
tion, access to housing, education, health care, and employment. 
In February, the Human Rights Advisory Panel held UNMIK responsible for plac-
ing Roma, Ashkali, and Egyptian families in five camps highly contaminated with
toxic lead, where residents subsequently suffered lead poisoning. HRAP recom-
mended that UNMIK issue a public apology and pay compensation to the vic-
tims. 
In April, the UN special rapporteurs on internally displaced persons and minority
issues, urged UNMIK to implement the panel’s recommendations. UNMIK ex-
pressed regret for the communities’ suffering. However, at time of writing, no
compensation has been paid to the affected families. 
Inter-ethnic tensions continued during 2016, particularly in Kosovo’s divided
north. In August, two unknown suspects torched a popular café terrace in north
Mitrovica, in the Serb populated part of the city. No injuries were reported and
police were investigating at time of writing. 
In August, a Kosovo Serb attempted to demolish the minaret of a mosque in Gji-
lan municipality. The suspect was in pretrial detention at time of writing. Also in
August, several hundred Albanians prevented 150 Kosovo Serbs from visiting an
Orthodox church in the village of Mushtisht, throwing rocks and stones at
Kosovo police trying to secure safe passage for the Serbs. In June, a Kosovo Serb
man was attacked in Mitrovica by a gang of Albanians and sustained injuries re-
quiring hospital treatment. Police were investigating at time of writing.  
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Kosovo police registered eight cases of inter-ethnic violence between January
and July 2016, without specific references to whether incidents involved physical
and/or material violence, making effective scrutiny of police response to inter-
ethnic violence difficult.  
The Kosovo Constitution protects against sexual orientation-based discrimina-
tion and a 2015 anti-discrimination law enumerates protections for both sexual
orientation and gender identity; however, implementation remains weak.
Women’s Rights
Domestic violence is widespread in Kosovo. According to a November 2015 sur-
vey by the Kosovo’s Women Network, a nongovernmental organization, 68 per-
cent of women respondents have experienced domestic violence in their
lifetime. 
Inadequate police response, few prosecutions and failure by judges to issue re-
straining orders against abusive spouses contribute to the problem. At time of
writing, the government was drafting a new National Strategy and Action Plan
against Domestic Violence replacing a 2011-2014 strategy.
Asylum Seekers, Displaced Persons, and Returning Deportees
During the first nine months of the year, the United National High Commissioner
for Refugees registered 307 voluntary minority returns, including people from
outside Kosovo and internally displaced persons, down from 619 during that pe-
riod in 2015. 
The Kosovo Ministry of Internal Affairs registered 4,534 forced returns between
January and August 31, including 370 Roma, 224 Ashkali, and 46 Egyptians.
Among those forcible deported, 1,474 were children. Most minorities were de-
ported from Germany and returnees are provided limited assistance upon return.  
Freedom of Media 
Threats and attacks against journalists continued in 2016; investigations and
prosecutions were slow. Between January and July, the Association of Journalists
of Kosovo registered eight cases of threats and violence against journalists. 
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In March, Vehbi Kajtazi, an investigative journalist, stated that Kosovo Prime
Minister Isa Mustafa threatened him over the phone, saying that Kajtazi would
“pay heavily” for a piece Kajtazi had written criticizing the Kosovo health service,
including a reference to Mustafa’s brother and his health treatment abroad.
Mustafa denied making threats. Kajtazi reported the threat to the police and the
case was under investigation at time of writing. 
In August, the home of the head of public broadcaster Radio TV Kosova (RTK)
was fire bombed. Nobody was injured in the attack. The incident was under in-
vestigation at time of writing. 
Key International Actors
European Union High Representative Federica Mogherini, following a meeting in
June with President Hashim Thaci, welcomed the extension of the EULEX man-
date and stressed the need for continuing normalizing relations between Kosovo
and Serbia but failed to raise human rights or rule of law concerns in Kosovo. The
EU has supported, and is funding, the special court for serious crimes that is ex-
pected to begin operating soon in The Hague.
US Assistant Secretary of State Victoria Nuland, during a Balkan tour in July,
called on Kosovo authorities to strengthen the rule of law, the justice system,
and the fight against corruption and organized crimes. In an August visit to
Kosovo, US Vice President Joe Biden stressed the importance of normalizing re-
lations with Serbia in order to make progress towards joining the EU, and called
on Kosovo authorities to fight corruption but failed to mention work on improv-
ing the country’s human rights and rule of law record. The US government has
supported the special court to be based in the Netherlands, providing the former
and current lead prosecutor.
The November EU Commission progress report on Kosovo stated that administra-
tion of justice is slow and inefficient, there is insufficient accountability for judi-
cial officials, and the judiciary is subjected to undue political influence. The
report stated that threats and attacks against journalists continued and called
on authorities to effectively investigate and prosecute cases. The report also
stated that while some progress was made in human rights protection, particu-
larly on lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) issues, authorities must
significantly strengthen the rights of minorities and people with disabilities.
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In a May quarterly UN report on the situation in Kosovo, UN Secretary-General
Ban Ki-moon stated that much work is needed to ensure the protection of minor-
ity rights, facilitate the return of displaced persons, and safeguard religious tra-
ditions.
The UN special rapporteur on human rights for internally displaced persons,
Chaloka Beyani, in September urged authorities in Kosovo to intensify efforts to
achieve durable solutions for the 16,000 IDPs with displacement related needs. 
The US State Department Human Rights Report on Kosovo, published in June,
raised concerns about opposition parties violently obstructing parliament, re-
sulting in the blocking of free debate and passage of legislation, endemic gov-
ernment corruption, and lack of accountability for corruption. The report also
noted violence and discrimination against minorities, police mistreatment of de-
tainees, intimidation of media, and violence against displaced persons seeking
to return to their homes. 
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Singapore
Singapore’s political environment is stifling, and citizens continued in 2016 to
face severe restrictions on their basic rights to freedom of expression, associa-
tion, and peaceful assembly. The government effectively controls print media,
and online media outlets are forced to register with the government and post a
significant bond. Bloggers and online media that comment on political issues
are targeted for prosecution with vague and overly broad legal provisions on
public order, morality, security, and racial and religious harmony. 
Freedom of Peaceful Assembly, Association, and Expression
The government maintains restrictions on the right to freedom of peaceful as-
sembly through the Public Order Act, which requires a police permit for any
“cause-related” assembly if it is held in a public place, or if members of the gen-
eral public are invited. Permits are routinely denied for events addressing politi-
cal topics.
An area of Hong Lim Park known as the “Speaker’s Corner” is the only place in
Singapore where an assembly can be held without a police permit, but only citi-
zens may speak there, and only citizens or permanent residents may participate
in assemblies there. The government forbids speeches about religion or reli-
gious belief, or about anything “that may cause feelings of enmity, hatred, ill-will
or hostility between different racial or religious groups in Singapore.” Violation
of any of these restrictions is a criminal offense. 
Associations of more than 10 people are required to register with the govern-
ment, and the Registrar of Societies has broad authority to deny registration if he
determines the group could be “prejudicial to public peace, welfare or good
order.” The Registrar of Societies has refused to allow any lesbian, gay, bisexual,
or transsexual (LGBT) organization to register as a society on the ground that “it
is contrary to the public interest to grant legitimacy to the promotion of homo-
sexual activities or viewpoints.”
The government’s Media Development Authority (MDA) compels online news
websites covering domestic political issues to register under the Broadcasting
Act. Registration requires posting a monetary bond, paying fees, undergoing an-
531
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH
nual registration, and, on notification, immediately removing anything the MDA
deems to be against “public interest, public order or national harmony” or to of-
fend “good taste or decency.” Registered websites are also prohibited from re-
ceiving any foreign funding.
Criminal laws are also used against online speech. The two co-editors of the
news portal The Real Singapore were charged with sedition for publishing arti-
cles with allegedly “anti-foreign” content. Ai Takagi pled guilty to four counts of
sedition in March 2016 and the court sentenced her to 10 months in prison. Yang
Kaiheng, who co-founded the website with Takagi, pled guilty in June 2016 and
was sentenced to 8 months in prison.
On May 26, 17-year-old blogger Amos Yee Pang Sang was charged with six counts
of “wounding religious feelings” in violation of penal code article 298 for online
posts authorities allege were derogatory of Islam and Christianity. Yee, who rep-
resented himself in court, pled guilty to six counts of wounding religious feel-
ings. On September 29, he was sentenced to six weeks in prison. 
In August 2016, the government passed new legislation codifying the law of con-
tempt. The new Administration of Justice (Protection) Act provides penalties of
up to S$100,000 (US$70,000) and three years in prison for several forms of con-
tempt of court, including the archaic offense of “scandalising the court.” The lat-
ter prohibition has been repeatedly used to penalize those who criticize the
judiciary or judicial opinions.
Government officials continue to use criminal and civil defamation as a means to
silence critics. In December 2015, a court ordered Roy Ngerng Yi Ling to pay
Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong 150,000 Singapore dollars (US$105,000) in
damages and S$29,000 (US$20,300) in legal costs for a single blog post criticiz-
ing the management of the government’s central provident fund. 
All films and videos shown in Singapore must be pre-approved by the Board of
Film Censors. Theater productions must also obtain a license under the Public
Entertainment and Meetings Act, and to do so must submit their scripts for ap-
proval. In June 2016, a production of “Les Miserables” was forced to delete a
scene containing a same-sex kiss. 
Outspoken activists are subject to government harassment. In May 2016, the po-
lice interrogated and searched the homes of political activist and blogger Roy
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Ngerng Yi Ling and long-time activist Teo Soh Lung, seizing phones and comput-
ers. The two were investigated for posts on their personal Facebook pages that
allegedly violated an election law restricting political campaigning during a
“cooling-off period” before a by-election. The law, however, specifically permits
“the transmission of personal political views by individuals to other individuals,
on a non-commercial basis, using the Internet,” and this use of it against private
individuals was unprecedented.
Criminal Justice System
Singapore uses the Internal Security Act (ISA) and Criminal Law (Temporary Pro-
visions) Act to arrest and administratively detain persons for virtually unlimited
periods without charge or judicial review. On October 6, the Ministry of Home Af-
fairs stated that 17 individuals were currently detained under the ISA, and an ad-
ditional 25 had been issued with restraining orders under the law. There is little
publicly available information about those detained or the basis for their deten-
tions, but the family of Zulfikar Mohamad Shariff, detained under the ISA in
2016, has publicly contested the alleged grounds for his detention. 
Singapore retains the death penalty, which is mandated for many drug offenses
and certain other crimes. Under provisions introduced in 2012, however, judges
have some discretion to bypass the mandatory penalty and sentence low-level
offenders to life in prison and caning. Malaysian Kho Jabing, whose death sen-
tence for murder was reduced to life in prison and 24 strokes of the cane pur-
suant to the new provisions, was executed in May 2016 after the Court of Appeal
overturned the resentencing and Singapore’s highest court rejected his appeal
of that decision. 
Use of corporal punishment is common in Singapore. For medically fit males
ages 16 to 50, caning is mandatory as an additional punishment for a range of
crimes, including drug trafficking, violent crimes (such as armed robbery), and
even some immigration offenses. Sentencing officials may also order caning for
some 30 additional violent and non-violent crimes.
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Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity
The rights of Singapore’s LGBT community are severely restricted. Sexual rela-
tions between two male persons remains a criminal offense, and there are no
legal protections against discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation or
gender identity. The Media Development Authority effectively prohibits all posi-
tive depictions of LGBT lives on television or radio.
The annual Pink Dot Festival in support of LGBT rights celebrated its eighth year
in Hong Lim Park in June 2016, supported by the sponsorship of corporations in-
cluding Google, Barclays, J.P. Morgan, Goldman Sachs, BP, Bloomberg, Twitter,
Apple, and Facebook. A few days after the event, the Ministry of Home Affairs
warned multinational companies to stop funding the event, saying such support
constitutes “foreign interference” with domestic affairs. In October, the Ministry
of Home Affairs announced that, under newly promulgated rules, any entity that
is not incorporated in Singapore and does not have a majority of Singapore citi-
zens on its board is now required to apply for a permit to sponsor an event in
Hong Lim Park.
Migrant Workers and Labor Exploitation
Foreign migrant workers are subject to labor abuse and exploitation through
debts owed to recruitment agents, non-payment of wages, restrictions on move-
ment, confiscation of passports, and sometimes physical and sexual abuse. In
March 2016, a Singapore couple was convicted of starving their domestic
worker, who lost more than 20 kilograms during her 15 months of employment. 
The work permits of migrant workers in Singapore are tied to a particular em-
ployer, leaving workers vulnerable to exploitation. Foreign domestic workers are
still excluded from the Employment Act and many key labor protections, such as
limits on daily work hours. Labor laws also discriminate against foreign workers
by barring them from organizing and registering a union or serving as union
leaders without explicit government permission. Local nongovernmental organi-
zations have reported an increase in the past year in underage domestic work-
ers, particularly from Burma.
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Key International Actors
Singapore is a regional hub for international business and maintains good politi-
cal and economic relations with both the United States and China. The country is
a key security ally of the United States and a staunch supporter of the Trans-Pa-
cific Partnership.
In August, the UN special rapporteur on freedom of expression, David Kaye, criti-
cized Singapore’s “broadening crackdown on controversial expression, as well
as political criticism and dissent,” noting that the increased criminalization of
speech was in breach of Singapore’s international obligations. No governments
publicly criticized Singapore’s poor human rights record. 
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Somalia 
Civilians in Somalia, enduring abuses by all warring parties and dire humanitar-
ian conditions, continue to bear the brunt of the country’s long-running conflict.
Government commitments to improve security in areas under its control, and
build capacity of rule-of-law institutions, bore limited results in 2016. 
Targeted attacks on civilians and civilian infrastructure, particularly by the Is-
lamist armed group Al-Shabab, with suicide bombings and improvised explosive
devices (IEDs), continue to have a devastating impact. Over 1 million Somalis re-
main internally displaced, facing serious abuses and very limited access to basic
services. Fighting, linked both to military operations against Al-Shabab and clan
fighting over resources and political power, and forced evictions resulted in new
civilian displacement and casualties. 
Much of the focus of the Somali authorities and their international partners has
been on the electoral process. Tight deadlines as well as ongoing political ma-
neuvering and infighting around the electoral process, including between the
federal and regional authorities, largely detracted from progress in justice and
security sector reform.
The Somali president took a positive step in August by signing a law establishing
a national human rights commission. The government also made important com-
mitments to human rights protections during its Universal Periodic Review at the
United Nations, but in practice it failed to address violations against the inter-
nally displaced and attacks on journalists, among other serious abuses.  
Abuses by Government and Allied Forces
Somalia’s national intelligence agency, NISA, continues to conduct mass secu-
rity sweeps despite having no legal mandate to arrest or detain. NISA held de-
tainees for prolonged periods without charge or judicial review and on occasion
beat suspects during interrogations. On July 21, NISA agents arrested five mem-
bers of a policy center, Mogadishu Center for Research and Studies, held them
without charges or legal counsel until September 6, before releasing them. 
Security forces continue to arbitrarily detain and recruit children. Media reported
that NISA used children in their custody as informants to identify Al-Shabab
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members. According to the UN, a government investigation later corroborated
the allegations. 
The military court in Mogadishu continues to try cases that are not legally within
its jurisdiction and in proceedings falling short of international fair trial stan-
dards. According to the UN, at least 64 death sentences were issued in 2016. The
majority of these were handed down in Puntland, following a large-scale Al-
Shabab offensive in Puntland and Galmudug, when a military court sentenced
43 people to death for their association with Al-Shabab in June. According to the
UN, 12 of those on death row are believed to be children. 
Large-scale forced evictions of internally displaced persons, including by govern-
ment forces, continued. According to UN figures, during the first eight months of
2016, over 80,000 people were forcibly evicted by government forces and private
actors, primarily in Mogadishu. 
Inter-clan and inter-regional fighting primarily linked to tensions around the cre-
ation of new federal states resulted in civilians deaths and injury and the de-
struction of property. Fighting broke out in October between the Galmudug
interim administration, which was established in 2015, and Puntland forces. At
least 22 civilians were killed and dozens injured, and according to the UN, nearly
90,000 people were displaced.
Al-Shabab Abuses
Al-Shabab committed targeted killings, beheadings, and executions, particularly
of those accused of spying and collaborating with the government. The armed
group continues to administer arbitrary justice, forcibly recruits children, and se-
verely restricts basic rights in areas under its control. Some young men and boys
who returned from Kenya’s refugee camps to Al-Shabab-controlled areas, includ-
ing Buale and Sakoow, have faced pressure to join Al-Shabab.
Al-Shabab regularly targets civilians and civilian structures, with an increase in
attacks on schools, hotels, and restaurants in Mogadishu, resulting in numerous
casualties. On January 21, Al-Shabab conducted a complex attack on popular
restaurants in Mogadishu’s Lido beach, in which over 20 people were killed and
dozens injured, including women and children. 
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Al-Shabab controls and carries out attacks along many supply routes and im-
poses blockades on towns captured by AMISOM and government forces, restrict-
ing movement of goods and assistance.
Al-Shabab continues to threaten and target journalists in government-controlled
areas and bans independent media from reporting in areas it controls. It claimed
responsibility for a December 3, 2015 car bomb that killed 31-year-old reporter
Hindiya Haji Mohamed, who worked for the state-run media.
Abuses by Foreign Forces
Reports persist of indiscriminate killings of civilians by AMISOM and other for-
eign forces, including during operations against Al-Shabab and airstrikes. 
On July 17, Ethiopian forces indiscriminately killed 14 civilians during an opera-
tion against Al-Shabab in Somalia’s Bay region. So far, despite public commit-
ments from AMISOM’s leadership, the incident has not been investigated.
Airstrikes by Kenya in the Gedo region following the January 15 attack on its base
in El Adde resulted in significant civilian deaths, displacement, and destruction
of livestock and civilian property. The UN raised concerns of use of cluster muni-
tion by Kenya in the Gedo region, which Kenya denied. 
The UN Security Council repeatedly called on troop-contributing countries to
share information with AMISOM’s Civilian Casualty Tracking Analysis Research
Cell, but this has not regularly occurred in practice. 
Sexual Violence 
While the full scope of sexual violence in Somalia remains unknown, internally
displaced women and girls are particularly vulnerable to rape by armed men, in-
cluding government soldiers and militia. Protection of the most vulnerable com-
munities is largely non-existent. 
AMISOM took measures to strengthen its capacity to follow up on sexual ex-
ploitation and abuse. However, this capacity remains at the headquarters’ level
with restricted reach within the missions’ sectors thus limiting its ability to in-
vestigate abuses. The UN reported allegations of gang-rape by 14 AMISOM sol-
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diers of two girls in the Galgudud region; an AMISOM investigation found the al-
legations were unfounded. 
Displaced Persons and Access to Humanitarian Assistance
According to the UN, there are currently 1.1 million internally displaced people in
Somalia, an estimated 400,000 living in Mogadishu alone, who remain very vul-
nerable and reliant on assistance. Human Rights Watch and other organizations
continue to document serious abuses against displaced people living in govern-
ment-controlled areas including rape and forced evictions. A number of refugees
returning from Kenya as part of a UN-supported repatriation drive ended up in in-
formal displacement camps. 
Humanitarian agencies faced challenges accessing needy populations due to in-
security, restrictions imposed by parties to the conflict and targetted attacks. 
Attacks on Media, Human Rights Defenders, and Political
Opposition 
Targeted attacks on media, including harassment, and intimidation by federal
and regional authorities and the Al-Shabab continue. 
Sagal Salad Osman, working for the state-run media, was killed on June 5, and
Abdiaziz Mohamed Ali, a journalist at Radio Shabelle, was killed on September
27, by unknown gunmen.
The Somali authorities rarely investigate cases of killings or attacks on journal-
ists or prosecute perpetrators; the authorities have only investigated and prose-
cuted attacks attributed to Al-Shabab, relying on the national intelligence
agency, and the country’s military court, whose investigations and trials do not
meet international due process standards.
On March 3, the military court sentenced Hassan Hanafi, a journalist who worked
for Al-Shabab’s Radio Andalus, to death for his alleged involvement in the killing
of at least five journalists; he was excuted on April 11. Hanafi had been held
without being brought before a court for over a year, was filmed “confessing”
prior to his trial on the state-run media and only met the lawyers representing
him on the day of his sentencing.
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In January, President Hassan Sheikh signed a new media law that risks further
hampering freedom of expression by including many vague media restrictions.
In Puntland, on June 23, the minister of information ordered the closure of
Daljir’s FM radio stations throughout the region, reportedly as a result of an in-
terview with a critic of the government. Daljir was off air for 12 days. 
Somaliland
Somaliland authorities continue to restrict public criticism of their governance
and policies. In May, the justice minister revoked the license of human rights
lawyer, Guleid Ahmed Jama, on dubious grounds that his work as a lawyer and as
the chairman of a human rights organization were incompatible. The chief jus-
tice later revoked the suspension. Authorities regularly detained journalists;
some resulted in criminal charges. 
Somaliland continued with its negative trend of executions with seven people
executed in 2016. 
Somaliland authorities have failed to sufficiently control and regulate private
mental health centers that have confined patients involuntarily and subjected
them to chaining, and, on occasion, beatings. One private center improved it
treatment of those with mental disabilities by closing its inpatient facilities and
providing support to patients in their communities. 
Key International Actors 
Foreign and regional partners continued to provide financial and other assis-
tance to AMISOM, and the United States and United Kingdom paid the salaries
of the Somali national army. Donors also provided direct support to regional se-
curity and police forces. In addition to Turkey’s ongoing humanitarian, political,
and economic engagements, the Gulf states, primarily the United Arab Emirates,
increased their military and political support to Somalia.
US airstrikes and ground operations against Al-Shabab significantly increased in
2016. In November, the US Defense Department acknowledged a September 28
strike had killed local militia forces and not Al-Shabab members, as they had ini-
tially claimed.
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At the political level, much of the international and regional community has fo-
cused on the electoral process, despite limited progress in key reform areas. 
In September, the US imposed partial military sanctions on Somalia due to its
continued recruitment and use of child soldiers, barring commercial arms sales
and several other categories of military assistance for the 2017 fiscal year. 
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South Africa 
In South Africa, public confidence in the government’s willingness to tackle
human rights violations, corruption, and respect for the rule of law has eroded.
The government has failed to ensure that an estimated half-million children with
disabilities have access to basic education. Rights groups expressed concerns
about the government’s failure to develop a national strategy to combat the high
rate of violence against women and the continued underreporting of rape. In No-
vember, the Claassen Board of Inquiry into suspended National Police Commis-
sioner Victoriah Phiyega’s fitness to hold office completed its inquiry. Its
recommendations were not made public. 
In March, the Supreme Court of Appeal of South Africa ruled that South Africa
had acted unlawfully when the government failed to arrest Sudanese President
Omar al-Bashir when he visited South Africa in June 2015 for an African Union
(AU) summit. Al-Bashir is subject to arrest warrants for the International Criminal
Court on charges of genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity in con-
nection with crimes committed in the conflict in Darfur.
South Africa continued to face a number of human rights challenges, as the gov-
ernment failed to hold accountable those responsible for xenophobic attacks on
the businesses and homes of refugees, asylum-seekers, and migrants between
March and May, 2015. The South African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC) on
September 30 said Zulu King Goodwill Zwelithini’s March 2015 speech calling for
foreign nationals to “pack their bags and go home,” was hurtful but did not in-
cite xenophobic violence.
South Africa has taken significant steps to improve coordination between gov-
ernment and civil society in combatting violence (including rape and murder)
against lesbians and transgender men. To protect the human rights of lesbian,
gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) people, in September, the government de-
clared homophobic United States pastor Steven Anderson an undesirable per-
son and barred him and his associates from entering the country.
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Right to Education 
In September, widespread countrywide student protests for the government to
provide free education, the sometimes violent #FeesMustFall demonstrations,
resulted in many institutions suspending their academic programs. President
Jacob Zuma on October 3, hosted a consultative meeting with stakeholders to
find a solution. President Zuma said the purpose of the consultation was to
“seek the wisdom of all sectors including parents, students, business and
labour, to seek solutions, given that education is a societal issue.” 
South Africa became the first country to endorse the Safe Schools Declaration at
a global conference in Norway in May 2015. By joining the declaration, it agreed
to protect students and education during conflict, and to avoid using educa-
tional buildings for military purposes. 
Access to Education for Children and Adults with Disabilities
The South African government has failed to guarantee the right to education for
many children and young adults with disabilities, affecting an estimated half-
million children. Contrary to the government’s international and domestic obli-
gations, many children with disabilities do not have equal access to primary or
secondary education and face multiple forms of discrimination and barriers
when accessing schools. They are turned away from mainstream schools, denied
access to inclusive education, and referred instead to special schools by school
officials or medical staff simply because they have a disability. The referrals sys-
tem needlessly forces children to wait for up to four years at care centers or at
home for placement in a special school. 
While education in mainstream government schools is free, children with dis-
abilities who attend special schools are forced to pay school fees, and many
who attend mainstream schools are asked to pay for their own class assistants
as a condition to stay in mainstream classes. Once in school, many children with
disabilities do not have access to the same curriculum as children without dis-
abilities. Many children with disabilities are exposed to high levels of violence
and abuse by teachers and students.
The government has not implemented key aspects of a national policy to provide
inclusive education for all children with disabilities adopted in 2001. South
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Africa has not adopted legislation that guarantees the right to inclusive educa-
tion for children with disabilities. The majority of the government’s limited
budget for learners with disabilities is allocated to special, segregated schools
rather than to inclusive education. 
Accountability for Xenophobic Attacks on Foreign Nationals
On September 30, SAHRC cleared Zulu King Goodwill Zwelithini of inciting xeno-
phobic violence, that left seven people dead and over 5,000 displaced between
March and May 2015. The Africa Diaspora Forum, Lawyers for Human Rights, and
some individuals filed a complaint against Zwelithini to the SAHRC, stating that
Zwelithini’s statement to media on March 21, 2015, that foreigners should “pack
their bags and go home,” had incited violence against foreign nationals and led
to xenophobic attacks that started in KwaZulu-Natal and spread to other
provinces. The government did not publicly condemn Zwelithini’s reckless and
inflammatory statements.
The SAHRC found that Zwelithini’s speech was hurtful towards foreigners and
could perpetuate discrimination, but did not amount to hate speech. It gave
Zwelithini 60 days to reconcile with foreign nationals and migrants in the
KwaZulu Natal province, but he has not said or done anything to comply. Author-
ities neither thoroughly investigated nor successfully prosecuted those involved
in the attacks. 
Inquiry into National Police Commissioner’s Fitness 
to Hold Office
On June 3, the Claassen Board of Inquiry into suspended National Police Com-
missioner Victoriah Phiyega’s fitness to hold office completed its investigations.
President Zuma established the Board of Inquiry in line with a recommendation
of the Farlam Commission of Inquiry into the August 2012 Marikana killings of 44
people, including the police killing of 34 miners. The Farlam Commission called
for an inquiry into whether Phiyega, and the North West Provincial Police Com-
missioner, Lieutenant Zukiswa Mbombo, were fit to hold office. On October 14,
2015, President Zuma suspended Phiyega. 
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Lawyers who investigated the case told the Claassen Board of Inquiry that evi-
dence showed Phiyega breached the constitution and police code of conduct, is
unfit for office, and is unable to carry out her duties in accordance with the law.
They asked the board to recommend Phiyega’s removal from office. Phiyega re-
fused to testify before the board, which was expected to present its findings and
recommendations to president Zuma in August. At time of writing, the Claasen
Board of Inquiry had completed its investigations but had not yet submitted its
report and recommendations to President Zuma. 
Women’s Rights
Violence against women, including rape and domestic violence, remained wide-
spread and underreported. Although annual crime statistics released by the
South African Police Services showed that sexual offences decreased slightly by
3 percent, many gender activists and human rights groups expressed concerns
about the continued under-reporting of rape and the government’s failure to in-
troduce a national strategy to combat violence against women.
Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity
South Africa has a progressive constitution that prohibits discrimination on the
basis of sexual orientation and protects the human rights of LGBTI people. The
Department of Justice and Constitutional Development has taken significant
steps to improve coordination between government and civil society in combat-
ting violence (including rape and murder) against lesbians and transgender
men.
On September 6, Home Affairs Minister Malusi Gigaba announced that due to
widespread homophobic attitudes within South African society, and to protect
the rights of LGBTI people, homophobic US pastor Steven Anderson and mem-
bers of his church were banned from entering the country because they promote
hate speech and advocate social violence. He said constitutional and legislative
guarantees, including the rights of LGBTI persons, must be respected by all. Do-
mestic LGBTI groups lauded the decision. 
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Foreign Policy
During 2016, South Africa missed key opportunities to consistently place respect
for human rights at the center of its foreign policy practice. While South Africa
played an active mediation role, as part of the Southern African Development
Community (SADC), in the Lesotho political crisis that followed a failed military
coup in August 2014, it remained silent in the face of a rapidly deteriorating
human rights situation in Zimbabwe. South Africa did not press Zimbabwe to
end police brutality and respect the rights of protesters. Instead, in July, Secre-
tary General of the ruling African National Congress (ANC) party Gwede Mantashe
labeled the protesters in Zimbabwe “sponsored elements seeking regime
change.” 
Some of South Africa’s votes at the United Nations were contrary to the country’s
stated human rights principles. For example, in July, South Africa voted against a
UN Human Rights Council resolution on the protection of human rights on the in-
ternet and abstained on a key HRC vote to appoint an independent expert on
sexual orientation and gender identity. The abstention went against the coun-
try’s strong constitutional protections and domestic laws around sexual orienta-
tion and gender identity. But on November 21, in the UN General Assembly
committee, South Africa voted to allow Vitit Muntabhorn, the newly appointed
UN expert on sexual orientation and gender identity, to continue his work. The
vote was taken after the African Group put forward a resolution to stop the oper-
ations of the UN expert who was appointed in September by the Human Rights
Council. 
On October 21, 2016, Foreign Minister Maite Nkoana-Mashabane announced
that South Africa had submitted a notice to the UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-
moon of its intent to withdraw as a party to the Rome Statute, the treaty that es-
tablished and governs the International Criminal Court (ICC). Notification is
necessary to trigger the withdrawal, which comes into effect a year after such no-
tice is given. The move comes after it hosted the Sudanese president at the AU
Summit in June 2015. Al-Bashir is the subject of two ICC arrest warrants on
charges of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes allegedly commit-
ted in Darfur. South African courts confirmed the government had a duty to arrest
al-Bashir. 
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Various individuals and organizations, including human rights activists and ju-
rists, in South Africa expressed dismay that their government submitted a notifi-
cation of withdrawal without parliamentary authorization. Former South African
Constitutional Court judge Richard Goldstone called the move unconstitutional.
Goldstone was the first chief prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for
the Former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. The
Democratic Alliance, one of South Africa’s main opposition parties, and the
Southern Africa Litigation Centre, a prominent human rights organization, chal-
lenged the move in South Africa’s courts.
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South Sudan
South Sudan’s civil war, which began in December 2013, continued in 2016 with
serious abuses against civilians by both government forces and opposition fight-
ers despite a peace agreement signed in August 2015. 
Government soldiers killed, raped, and tortured civilians as well as destroying
and pillaging civilian property during counterinsurgency operations in the south-
ern and western parts of the country, and both sides committed abuses against
civilians in and around Juba and other areas. An additional 200,000 people were
forced to flee their homes, bringing the total displaced to 2.4 million. Those left
behind, including people with disabilities, have faced serious abuses. 
The conflict began in December 2013 when soldiers loyal to President Salva Kiir,
a Dinka, and those loyal to former Vice President Riek Machar, a Nuer, fought in
the capital following months of growing political tensions. In December 2015,
President Kiir dissolved South Sudan’s 10 regional states and created 28 new
states, fueling conflict in many areas.
Although the two sides formed a national unity government in April 2016, follow-
ing the August 2015 peace agreement, they continued to fight in various loca-
tions. In July, clashes in the capital, Juba, caused Machar to flee the country.
President Kiir then appointed a former ally of Machar, Gen. Taban Deng Gai, as
first vice president, prompting Machar’s group to call for a return to war.
In November, UN Special Advisor on the Prevention of Genocide Adama Dieng
said the ongoing violence had transformed the conflict into an “ethnic war” and
warned of a “potential for genocide.”
Lack of accountability for grave crimes by both sides since 2013 has fuelled the
current conflict. Government investigations have rarely led to concrete and last-
ing accountability measures. A hybrid court envisioned by the peace agreement
to investigate and prosecute international crimes committed during the recent
conflict has yet to be established by the African Union and the South Sudanese
government. 
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Attacks on Civilians and Civilian Property
Government forces clashed with rebel groups and conducted counterinsurgency
operations in the Equatoria and Western Bahr el Ghazal regions throughout
2016.  
During operations in Yambio, Wau and Yei towns, soldiers targeted and killed
dozens of civilians and committed a range of other abuses, including enforced
disappearances, arbitrary detentions in poor conditions, beating and torture of
detainees, and sexual violence. Soldiers pillaged civilian property and burned
homes, forcing hundreds of thousands of civilians to flee. 
Government forces clashed with rebel groups in various other locations in the
Equatorias, with both sides committing abuses against civilians. In Wau, ten-
sions and abuses by soldiers flared again in June after the president sacked and
jailed the governor, Elyas Waya Nyipuoch, for criticizing abuses committed by
the army.
In Juba, government and opposition forces clashed from July 8 to 11, when the
government declared a ceasefire after opposition leader Riek Machar fled the
town. Both forces fired and shelled indiscriminately in densely populated areas,
injuring and killing scores of civilians. A clinic in a displaced person’s camp lo-
cated in the main United Nations base in Juba was also hit by shelling, forcing
patients to relocate. South Sudan’s army restricted the movements of United Na-
tions Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) peacekeepers during and after the July
fighting. 
On February 17 and 18, in Malakal, Upper Nile State, a group of armed Dinka
SPLA soldiers and civilians attacked a UN base hosting more than 45,000 mostly
Nuer and Shilluk displaced people, killing at least 30 civilians. The attackers sys-
tematically burned thousands of shelters to the ground. A UN special investiga-
tion concluded that armed Dinka men in SPLA uniforms had breached the UN
compound and were responsible for violence and destruction.
Sexual and Gender-Based Violence
On July 11, shortly before the ceasefire that followed Riek Machar’s retreat from
the capital, government soldiers attacked a residential compound in Juba host-
ing expatriate and national staff of humanitarian organizations, executed a
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prominent Nuer journalist, beat staff members and raped or gang raped several
women. In the days following the ceasefire, soldiers raped hundreds of mostly
Nuer displaced women near the main UN base in Juba. 
In other parts of the country, government soldiers reportedly continued to rape
women and girls selected as targets based on their ethnicity. 
While some survivors were able to access basic physical and mental healthcare,
many did not due to insecurity and limited availability of services. No SPLA sol-
diers were prosecuted for the sexual violence crimes committed in July.
Recruitment and Use of Child Soldiers
Both government and opposition forces have used child soldiers since the be-
ginning of the conflict. In April, the UN secretary-general’s report on children and
armed conflict noted a sharp increase in the number of incidents of child recruit-
ment, with more than 2,500 children recruited or used, mostly by government
forces. Forces aligned with the opposition also continued to recruit and use chil-
dren. 
The UN also reported that hundreds of children were forcibly recruited in August
by government affiliated politicians in Unity state. Child soldiers were also re-
portedly used by opposition fighters in Western Equatoria and Western Bahr el-
Ghazal. 
Soldiers or armed actors often use schools as homes, preventing children from
accessing the premises and attending classes.
Restrictions on Freedom of Expression
South Sudan’s government authorities, especially the National Security Services
(NSS), continued to harass, intimidate, and arbitrarily arrest and detain journalists. 
In March, Joseph Afandi, a writer with the Arabic daily Al-Tabeer was found
beaten and bearing signs of torture in a Juba cemetery after being abducted by
security forces. In October, Malek Bol, a journalist with Al-Maugif, was abducted
for two days, tortured, and later dumped at a graveyard. 
On July 16, Alfred Taban, a veteran journalist and editor of the Juba Monitor, was
arrested and detained for 13 days for publishing an op-ed calling for the replace-
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ment of the South Sudanese leadership. His newspaper was shut down for a day
following his arrest. The Nation Mirror was shut down indefinitely on September
14 for publishing texts critical of President Kiir. 
Civil society actors were also harassed and threatened by security forces. Shortly
before a visit to Juba by the UN Security Council in September, the government
threatened to shut down or deny registration to a number of civil society organi-
zations, including the Community Empowerment for Progress Organization
(CEPO) and the South Sudan Action Network on Small Arms (SSANSA).
Legislative Developments
In a contested decision in December 2015, President Kiir dissolved South
Sudan’s 10 states and created 28 new ones, raising fears that the new disposi-
tion would benefit certain ethnicities over others.
On February 1, 2016, the South Sudan Legislative Assembly (SSLA) passed a bill,
amid controversy, which gives the government sweeping powers to regulate,
shut down, and seize assets of nongovernmental and civil society organizations
based on declarations or activities deemed political. 
Accountability and Justice
Despite official investigations ordered by President Kiir into alleged crimes and
human rights violations committed in 2016 by soldiers in Juba, Malakal, and
Wau, the government has rarely made the reports of such investigations public,
acted on their recommendations, thoroughly investigated, or held perpetrators
to account in civilian courts. 
The government has not prosecuted soldiers for crimes against civilians in civil-
ian courts in accordance with human rights norms. Two dozen soldiers were tried
for crimes committed in Wau and Juba in July and August, but these trials did not
meet international fair trial standards. Victims could hardly access the proceed-
ings and the accused were barely investigated prior to their trials. The SPLA re-
ported that at least two soldiers were executed in late July following their
conviction by a military court for murder in Wau. 
The African Union Commission has yet to establish the hybrid court envisioned
in the August 2015 peace agreement to investigate and prosecute international
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crimes committed in the conflict. The government expressed renewed commit-
ment to the court during a visit by the UN Security Council that followed the Juba
fighting in July. 
Key International Actors
The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), as well as China, the
European Union, Norway, the United Kingdom, and the United States continued
to support and monitor the implementation of the peace agreement signed in
August 2015. 
In March 2016, the UN Human Rights Council established a UN human rights
mission to South Sudan to monitor the human rights situation and efforts to pro-
mote transitional justice. 
UNMISS continued to shelter more than 200,000 civilians forced to flee their
homes because of the fighting. UNMISS peacekeepers struggled to protect civil-
ians outside their bases.
There was a marked increase in attacks against the property and staff of UNMISS
and humanitarian organizations throughout 2016, amid increasingly hostile rhet-
oric against the international community.  
In early August 2016, following fighting in Juba, the UN Security Council author-
ized the deployment within UNMISS of a 4,000 strong Regional Protection Force
(RPF) tasked with protecting civilians and key infrastructure in the capital. The
council threatened to impose an arms embargo should South Sudan continue to
restrict the movement of UN peacekeepers or block the deployment of the RPF. At
time of writing, no RPF member has been able to enter the country. 
In October, following a damning report from an independent UN investigation
into the peacekeepers’ failure to respond to the July crisis in Juba, the UN secre-
tary-general sacked the Kenyan force commander of UNMISS. Kenya retaliated by
pulling out its entire contingent from the mission.
The UN secretary-general reported continued obstructions to the peacekeeping
mission by government forces and authorities. In November, the United States
Mission to the United Nations announced it would submit a proposal for an arms
embargo over South Sudan, as well as additional targeted individual sanctions.
At time of writing, the Security Council had yet to approve a draft resolution.
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Sri Lanka
Sri Lanka acted to address some longstanding demands for accountability and
political reconciliation linked to the 27-year civil war with the Liberation Tigers of
Tamil Eelam, which ended in 2009. The government conducted two public con-
sultations, one on constitutional reform and another on implementing an Octo-
ber 2015 United Nations Human Rights Council resolution on transitional justice. 
Although the government, elected in January 2015, did not deliver all reformist
promises made during the election campaign, media and civil society groups in
the country largely enjoyed continued freedom from surveillance, harassment,
and attacks. A long-promised Right to Information bill was enacted in June 2016.
There was some progress on emblematic cases linked to the civil war, such as
the murder of a prominent newspaper editor, the enforced disappearance of a
political cartoonist, and the killing of five youths by state security forces in the
eastern district of Trincomalee. 
However, despite its pledges, the government failed to abolish the draconian
Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA), and instead used the preventive detention law
during a series of arrests in April and May. A draft version of a law intended to re-
place the PTA retained many problematic clauses including troubling expansions
of police powers. The government’s unwillingness to consult adequately before
enacting legislation to establish a permanent Office of Missing Persons dam-
aged public trust during the transitional justice process.
The newly appointed Constitutional Council moved rapidly through the year to
appoint members to the National Human Rights Commission and the Police
Commission, and is expected to continue to work towards restoring the inde-
pendence of other public service commissions. 
Constitutional Reforms
A government-appointed independent task force on constitutional reform, con-
stituted in December 2015, conducted nationwide public consultations that
ended in May 2016. The taskforce heard from over 2,500 individuals, and re-
ceived several hundred other submissions. Despite government-imposed time
limits, it published a comprehensive public report on its findings on May 31. 
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The task force recognized some contentious political issues, such as whether Sri
Lanka should be a unitary or a federal state, the exact nature of devolution of
powers from the center, and the supremacy of Buddhism. Importantly for the
protection of fundamental rights, the task force recommended that the constitu-
tion be regarded as the supreme law of the land and that the judiciary be tasked
with ensuring all legislation complies with the constitution. 
Accountability for Past Abuses
In October 2015, the UN Human Rights Council adopted a consensus resolution
in which Sri Lanka pledged to undertake many human rights reforms, including
resolving the many transitional justice demands arising out of the civil war.
Under the resolution, Sri Lanka promised to establish four transitional justice
mechanisms, including a special court “integrating international judges, prose-
cutors, lawyers and investigators” with an independent investigative and prose-
cuting body. The resolution also called for an office on missing and disappeared
persons, a truth-telling mechanism, and a mechanism designed to guarantee
non-recurrence and reparations. 
A government task force designed to hold public consultations nationally on the
four transitional justice mechanisms was slow to get off the ground. Shortly
after, the government announced a framework to create an office to discover the
fate of those missing and forcibly disappeared, leading to an outcry over inade-
quate public consultations. This lack of trust has marred the ongoing public con-
sultations on the other three mechanisms.
The government failed to properly implement important recommendations to im-
prove the human rights situation in the country, including a repeal of the PTA
and reforms to the Witness and Victim Protection Law. Other undertakings, such
as broader reform of the security sector and return of private lands confiscated
by the military, were halting at best. An update from the UN High Commissioner
for Human Rights in June 2016 mentioned the need for greater progress, and was
due to provide a more comprehensive report to the Human Rights Council in
early 2017. 
Senior members of government continued issuing contradictory statements on
the need to have international participation in the four transitional justice mech-
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anisms, with the president and prime minister both claiming these would be
wholly domestic processes, contrary to the Human Rights Council resolution.
Police Torture and Ill-Treatment
Sri Lankan police are not held accountable for routine torture and ill-treatment of
individuals taken into custody. Sometimes torture is carried out to extract “con-
fessions,” but it is also used for personal vendettas or to extort funds. Police
often used methods designed to leave no visible marks, suggesting a level of in-
stitutionalization. The National Human Rights Commission, though limited in re-
sources, visited and actively monitored prisons and detention centers in 2016,
and issued directives on procedures to be followed following arrest. 
In April and May 2016, the UN special rapporteur on torture, Juan Mendis, visited
Sri Lanka and reported that torture by the police Criminal Investigation Depart-
ment was common. The rapporteur also found an increase in torture in cases of
real or perceived threats to national interests by the Terrorism Investigation Divi-
sion. He reported a near total impunity in both old and new torture cases.  
Prevention of Terrorism Act and Politically Motivated Torture
The government attempted a redraft of the Prevention of Terrorism Act but was
forced to withdraw it when it failed to meet international standards. A second
draft forwarded in October did not ease concerns about ensuring rights of de-
tainees and protecting against custodial torture. The special rapporteur on tor-
ture expressed particular concern about detainees held under the PTA and called
for its unequivocal repeal. 
The PTA allows for arrests for unspecified “unlawful activities” without warrant
and permits detention for up to 18 months without the suspect appearing before
a court. It has facilitated thousands of abuses over the years, including torture,
enforced disappearances, and extrajudicial executions. 
While especially problematic during Sri Lanka’s long civil war, authorities contin-
ued to use the PTA even after the war ended. Following the discovery of suicide
vests in Chavakchcheri in the north, security forces reportedly arrested 11 men in
April and May. Many of the arrests were first undeclared, with families reporting
only that security forces had abducted the men. Following pressure, particularly
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from the National Human Rights Commission, security forces admitted to hold-
ing them under the PTA. 
Overseas Migrant Workers 
More than 1 million Sri Lankans are employed overseas, mostly in the Middle
East, and many remained at risk of abuse at every stage of the migration cycle,
from recruitment and transit, to employment, repatriation, and reintegration.
More than a third of Sri Lanka’s migrants are domestic workers, almost exclu-
sively female. 
The government took some steps to protect their rights abroad, but many contin-
ued to face long working hours with little rest, delayed or unpaid wages, confine-
ment in the workplace, and verbal, physical, and sexual abuse. The kafala
(sponsorship) systems in the Middle East ties workers’ visas to their employers;
in several countries they cannot transfer jobs without employer consent, and can
be punished with imprisonment and deportation if they leave employers. 
In June, the government announced that it appointed a committee to study
strategies to reduce the number of domestic workers abroad. 
In 2016, the UN Committee on Migrant Workers reviewed Sri Lanka’s record
under the International Convention on Migrant Workers and their Families.
Among other recommendations, the committee called on Sri Lanka to withdraw
the Ministry of Foreign Employment Promotion and Welfare January 2014 circular
that required a “family background report” for women migrants, as it discrimi-
nated against women and denied them the right to seek employment abroad in-
stead of providing support they may need. 
Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity
State and non-state discrimination and abuses against the lesbian, gay, bisex-
ual, transgender, and intersex (LGBTI) population persist. Sections 365 and 365A
of the Sri Lankan Penal Code prohibit “carnal knowledge against the order of na-
ture” and “gross indecency,” commonly understood in Sri Lanka to criminalize
all same-sex relations between consenting adults. 
Sri Lankan law does not specifically criminalize transgender or intersex people.
But no laws ensure that their rights are protected, and police have used several
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criminal offenses and regulations to target LGBTI people, particularly transgen-
der women and men who have sex with men (MSM) involved in sex work. These
include a law against “cheat[ing] by personation,” and the vaguely worded Va-
grants’ Ordinance, which prohibits soliciting or committing acts of “gross inde-
cency,” or being “incorrigible rogues” procuring “illicit or unnatural intercourse.”
Some trans women and MSM said that repeated harassment by police, including
instances of arbitrary detention and mistreatment, had eroded their trust in Sri
Lankan authorities, and made it unlikely that they would report a crime. The
community also reported abuse and harassment at the hands of medical author-
ities, leading many transgender people to self-medicate rather than seeking pro-
fessional assistance.
Women’s Rights
Allegations of sexual and other violence committed against women during the
civil war are expected to be addressed through the transitional justice mecha-
nisms, although there are concerns that many women will be reluctant to come
forward absent an independent victim and witness protection program. 
Key International Actors
The Sri Lankan government continued its engagement with the international
community in stark contrast to the hostility of the previous government, with key
actors such as the United States and European Union voicing cautious optimism
regarding the government’s efforts to implement the 2015 Human Rights Council
resolution. 
There were several visits by UN special mandate holders over the course of the
year. The commissioner for human rights, Zeid Ra’ad al-Hussein, visited the
country in February, and Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon visited in September.
Both lauded the progress made by the government, although Zeid called for
speedier implementation of the resolution, for greater efforts at confidence-
building with the minority populations, and the need for international participa-
tion in transitional justice mechanisms.
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The Human Rights Council resolution remained largely unimplemented although
the government was able to report progress on certain aspects and did seek
technical expertise from the relevant branches of the UN and other countries. 
The Sri Lankan government initiated discussions with the UN and other stake-
holders on the possibility of incorporating Sri Lankan security forces in interna-
tional peacekeeping operations, although the mechanism for doing so had yet to
be finalized given the difficulty of vetting forces who might have been engaged
in war crimes. 
In November, Sri Lanka appeared before the UN’s Commission Against Torture to
respond to allegations of abuse, where it denied allegations of torture and
abuse.
WORLD REPORT 2017
560
Sudan
Sudan’s human rights record remains abysmal in 2016, with continuing attacks
on civilians by government forces in Darfur, Southern Kordofan, and Blue Nile
states; repression of civil society groups and independent media; and wide-
spread arbitrary detentions of activists, students, and protesters. The ruling Na-
tional Congress Party proceeded with a national dialogue process to pave the
way for a new constitution and government, following the independence of
South Sudan in 2011, despite a boycott by several opposition parties. 
Conflict and Abuses in Darfur 
In January, Sudan’s armed forces, including the Rapid Support Forces and allied
militia, launched coordinated ground and air attacks on populated villages in
Jebel Marra, the rebel stronghold in Central Darfur. These attacks continued for
much of the year, following Sudan’s “Operation Decisive Summer” campaigns in
Darfur in 2014 and 2015. 
Government forces killed civilians, raped women and girls, and destroyed hun-
dreds of villages. In September, the United Nations found the violence had dis-
placed up to 190,000 people, many of whom are not accessible to humanitarian
agencies. Elsewhere in Darfur, attacks on civilians by government forces and
inter-communal fighting over land and resources also resulted in deaths, de-
struction and displacement.  
Amnesty International alleged that the government used chemical weapons
against civilians. However, Sudan, a party to the Chemical Weapons Convention
since 1999, denied the findings and limited the scope of investigation by the Or-
ganization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). 
Government authorities continued to block the African Union/United Nations
peacekeeping mission, UNAMID, from much of the Jebel Marra region, undermin-
ing the mission’s ability to protect civilians. 
Amid the ongoing violence and abuses, authorities held a referendum on the ad-
ministrative status of Darfur in April in which voters opted to keep Darfur’s cur-
rent five states. Displaced communities and opposition groups boycotted the
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process, arguing the administrative divisions serve to undermine Darfur’s ethnic
groups and empower Sudan’s ruling party.
Conflict and Abuses in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile  
For the fifth year, armed conflict continued between government forces and
armed rebels in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile, despite a declared ceasefire.
In the Nuba Mountains, government forces and allied militias attacked civilians
in villages and other populated areas in ground offensives and through indis-
criminate bombing, particularly from March through June. 
In May alone, attacks killed six children in Heiban, injured several more at their
funeral and destroyed part of a school in Kauda, wounding a teacher. Govern-
ment forces burned crops, looted food, and displaced people from farming
areas. The attacks caused unjustified civilian deaths, including children, many
injuries and destruction of civilian property. 
The government has barred humanitarian agencies from working in rebel-held
areas of Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile, and has failed to agree terms for hu-
manitarian access with the rebel group (SPLM-N). 
Arbitrary Detentions, Ill-Treatment, and Torture 
Sudan’s National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS)—known for its abusive
tactics, including torture, against real or perceived political opponents—de-
tained activists, students, lawyers, doctors, community leaders and those per-
ceived to be critical of the government.  
In April, security officials detained dozens of students and activists in Khartoum,
some for more than two months without charge, during violent crackdowns on
protests at university campuses. In early May, armed security officials raided the
offices of a prominent lawyer, Nabil Adeeb, and beat and arrested a group of stu-
dents, their family members, and office staff. In July, security officers detained
around 20 displaced community members who spoke to the United States spe-
cial envoy in Niertiti, South Darfur. In October, security officials detained 14 doc-
tors and summoned scores more for protesting working conditions and violence
against medical professionals.
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Many detainees were beaten and subjected to other forms of ill-treatment. Some
female activists reported being sexually harassed by national security officers
while in detention—exemplifying a pattern Human Rights Watch has docu-
mented of authorities using arbitrary detentions, sexual violence and public
order codes to restrict or silence female human rights activists.
Freedoms of Peaceful Assembly, Association, and Expression 
In January, security forces used live ammunition to disperse a protest in West
Darfur over an attack on a village there. At least seven people including a child
were killed in the incident.
In April, security forces violently suppressed student protests, using rubber bul-
lets and tear gas to break up protests at the University of Khartoum and used live
ammunition to disperse protests in North Kordofan and Omdurman, killing two
students and injuring dozens.  
To date, there has been no accountability for the victims of the violent crack-
down on protests that took place in September 2013, when more than 170 indi-
viduals were killed, many by gunshot wounds to the chest or head.  
Authorities also restricted civil society and blocked their participation in interna-
tional events, including Sudan’s Universal Periodic Review (UPR) at the UN
Human Rights Council in Geneva. In February, for the second time in a year, na-
tional security officers raided the Khartoum-based Tracks for Training and Human
Development, confiscating equipment and detaining and interrogating staff.
Criminal charges—including crimes against the state, which carry the death
penalty—are pending against several affiliated activists, including three men
who were detained in May and remained in detention at time of writing. 
Security officials restricted media freedom, threatened journalists, and regularly
confiscated newspapers throughout the year. In May, editions of the daily news-
paper Al Jareeda were confiscated five times, most likely because of its reporting
on the student demonstrations. In October, al-Watan was confiscated for its cov-
erage of a countrywide medical workers’ strike.
Sudan also restricted religious freedoms and detained clerics. Three pastors and
a Darfuri activist detained since December 2015 face espionage and other
charges that carry the death penalty. 
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Refugees and Migrants
The head of Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces, implicated in wide-ranging abuses,
announced that his forces intercepted migrants on the Libyan border, raising
concerns that European Union support to East African states on migration,
known as the Khartoum Process, may provide resources to abusive forces. 
In August, the Italian government deported 48 Darfuris back to Sudan as part of
a new agreement between Sudan and Italy to curb migration, in proceedings that
appeared not to adequately protect the rights of asylum-seekers.
In December 2015, Jordanian authorities deported 800 Sudanese back to Sudan,
and in July, Egypt deported 36 Sudanese without assessing their claims to asy-
lum. In May 2016, Sudanese officials deported hundreds of Eritreans, again with-
out assessing their protection claims as required under international law, to
likely abuses in Eritrea.
Legal Reform
The National Security Act of 2010 and laws governing media, voluntary organiza-
tions, and public order regime are especially problematic and violate interna-
tional human rights norms to which Sudan is bound.
The NISS has broad powers to arrest and detain people for up to four-and-a-half
months without judicial review, months beyond the international standard. Con-
stitutional amendments in January 2015 further empowered the NISS by desig-
nating it as a regular force with a mandate to combat a wide range of political
and social threats. 
Authorities continued to apply Sharia (Islamic law) sanctions that violate inter-
national prohibitions on cruel, inhuman, or degrading punishment. The penal-
ties are applied disproportionately to women and girls, typically for morality
“crimes” such as adultery or violations of the public order regime.
Sudan continues to criminalize consensual same-sex sexual activity and other
behavior that impacts lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) communi-
ties, including anal sex between males with penalties as harsh as life imprison-
ment or death, and “indecent” or “immoral” behavior with a fine or up to 40
lashes.
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Child Soldiers
In September, Sudanese authorities released 21 children allegedly associated
with armed groups. Sudan signed an Action Plan with the UN to protect children
from recruitment and use in conflict. 
Key International Actors 
The African Union’s High-Level Implementation Panel for Sudan and South
Sudan continued to mediate peace talks for Southern Kordofan, Blue Nile, and
Darfur with little success. 
Sudan effectively expelled the fourth senior UN official in two years when author-
ities declined to renew the visa for the head of UN’s Office for the Coordination
of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) in June. Sudan shut down an international aid
agency in December 2015 and expelled three other humanitarian officials in
early 2016.
In October, the European Parliament adopted an urgency resolution on Sudan
calling on the EU to impose targeted punitive sanctions against those responsi-
ble for continued war crimes and non-cooperation with the International Crimi-
nal Court (ICC).
The UN Security Council renewed UNAMID’s mandate through June 2017, despite
efforts by Sudan to restrict and even end the mission’s operations, and extended
the mandate of the UN Interim Security Force for Abyei through mid-May 2017 
In September, the Human Rights Council extended the mandate of the independ-
ent expert for one year. The UN Panel of Experts on the Sudan released the find-
ings of its monitoring of the Darfur sanctions regime in 2015, citing evidence of
continued aerial bombardments, use of cluster munitions, and other violations
of international humanitarian and human rights law. 
Since June 2005, the ICC has conducted investigations into crimes committed in
Darfur. The ICC has issued arrest warrants for five individuals, including for Presi-
dent Omar al-Bashir, for war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide. At
time of writing, all remain outstanding, and Sudan has refused to cooperate with
the court in any of the cases. Al-Bashir remains a fugitive, but his travel has been
restricted. A number of anticipated trips abroad have been cancelled, resched-
uled, or relocated amid diplomatic and public outcry, particularly by African civil
society groups.
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Swaziland
Swaziland, ruled by absolute monarch King Mswati III since 1986, continued to
repress political dissent and disregard human rights and rule of law principles in
2016. Political parties remained banned, as they have been since 1973; the inde-
pendence of the judiciary is severely compromised, and repressive laws contin-
ued to be used to target critics of the government and the king despite the 2005
Swaziland Constitution guaranteeing basic rights. 
In September, the High Court of Swaziland ruled that sections of the Suppression
of Terrorism Act and the Sedition and Subversive Act were unconstitutional and
violated freedom of expression and association. The government has appealed
the judgement to the Supreme Court, which was pending at time of writing. 
Proposed amendments to the Public Order Act and the Suppression of Terrorism
Act are under consideration in Parliament but rights activists say that these
amendments are insufficient to curb the security services, which have been
given sweeping powers by the two laws to halt pro-democracy meetings and
protests and to curb any criticism of the government.  
Freedom of Association and Assembly  
Restrictions on freedom of association and assembly continued in 2016. The
government took no action to revoke the King’s Proclamation of 1973, which pro-
hibits political parties in the country. Police used the Urban Act, which requires
protesters to give two weeks’ notice before a public protest, to stop protests and
harass protesters. In February, police arrested Mcolisi Ngcamphalala and
Mbongwa Dlamini, two leaders of the Swaziland National Association of Teach-
ers (SNAT), when they participated in a protest action. Two days later, the police
raided their homes. 
In February, the police blocked a Trade Union Congress of Swaziland (TUCOSWA)
march to parliament to present a petition. In April, the police twice invaded and
searched the offices of the leaders harassed leaders of the Swaziland Union of
Financial Institutions and Allied Workers (SUFIAWU) without the necessary
search warrant. In the same month, the commissioner of police threatened trade
unionists with death for unspecified reasons. In June the police assaulted Gladys
Dlamini, a trade union activist. 
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Human Rights Defenders 
Political activists faced trial under security legislation and charges of treason
under common law. The Suppression of Terrorism Act of 2008 placed severe re-
strictions on civil society organizations, religious groups, and media. Under the
legislation, a “terrorist act” includes a wide range of legitimate conduct such as
criticism of the government. The legislation was used by state officials to target
perceived opponents through abusive surveillance, and unlawful searches of
homes and offices. 
Two leaders of a banned political party, the People’s United Democratic Move-
ment (PUDEMO), Mario Masuku and Maxwell Dlamini, remained on bail in 2016
pending finalization of their trial on charges under the Suppression of Terrorism
Act for allegedly criticizing the government by singing a pro-democracy song and
shouting “Viva PUDEMO” during a May Day rally in 2014. The Swaziland High
Court granted them bail in July 2015 after more than a year in custody. The trial
continued at time of writing. If convicted, they could serve up to 15 years in
prison. Both men attended the May Day rally of TUCOSWA in 2016, but their bail
conditions prohibited them from addressing the workers. 
Freedom of Expression and the Media
The Sedition and Subversive Activities Act continued to restrict freedom of ex-
pression through criminalizing alleged seditious publications and use of alleged
seditious words, such as those which “may excite disaffection” against the king.
Published criticism of the ruling party is also banned. Many journalists practice
self-censorship, especially with regards to reports involving the king, to avoid
harassment by authorities.
On September 16, the High Court of Swaziland ruled that sections of the Sup-
pression of Terrorism Act and the Sedition and Subversive Act were unconstitu-
tional and violated freedom of expression and association. The invalid
provisions relate to the definition of the offences of sedition, subversion, and
terrorism. Classification of organizations as terrorist, which the government had
used to ban political parties like the People’s United Democratic Movement
(PUDEMO), was also ruled to be unconstitutional.
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Eight trade union leaders and human rights defenders, including Masuku and
Dlamini, had challenged the constitutionality of the Suppression of Terrorism Act
before the High Court in September 2015. An appeal by the government against
the decision was pending before the Supreme Court.
Rule of Law 
Although the constitution provides for three separate organs of government—the
executive, legislature, and judiciary—under Swaziland’s law and custom, all
powers are vested in the king. Swaziland’s prime minister is supposed to exer-
cise executive authority, but in reality, King Mswati holds supreme executive
power and controls the judiciary. The king appoints 20 members of the 30-mem-
ber senate, 10 members of the house of assembly, and approves all legislation
passed by parliament. 
The constitution provides for equality before the law, but also places the king
above the law. In 2011, the then Swaziland Chief Justice Michael Ramodibedi is-
sued a directive which protected the king from any civil law suits, after Swazi vil-
lagers claimed police had seized their cattle to add to the king’s herd.
Women’s Rights 
Swaziland’s dual legal system where both Roman Dutch common law and Swazi
customary law operate side by side, has resulted in conflicts leading to numer-
ous violations of women’s rights, despite constitutionally guaranteed equality.
In practice, women, especially those living in rural areas under traditional lead-
ers and governed by highly patriarchal Swazi law and custom, are often sub-
jected to discrimination and harmful practices. 
The government has yet to enact the Sexual Offences and Domestic Violence Bill
developed in 2009 to protect women’s rights. Neither has the government
amended the Girls’ and Women Protection Act, concerned with sexual abuse of
girls under 16, but excludes marital rape. Violence against women is endemic.
Survivors of gender-based violence have few avenues for help as both formal
and customary justice processes discriminate against them. 
Civil society activists have criticized the widely held view among traditional au-
thorities that human rights and equal rights for women are foreign values that
should be subordinated to Swazi culture and tradition. 
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Key International Actors 
In August, Swaziland took over the leadership of the Southern African Develop-
ment Community (SADC), the 15-nation regional economic institution, for a year.
Swaziland’s poor and deteriorating human rights record could weaken further
the regional body’s ability to press for human rights improvements across south-
ern Africa. 
Neighboring South Africa and regional bodies, the SADC and the African Union,
have done little to press Swaziland to improve respect for human rights.   
The United Nations Human Rights Council assessed Swaziland’s human rights
record under the Universal Periodic Review. In May 2016, Swaziland accepted
121 of 181 recommendations made by council member states to improve the
human rights environment in the country. Authorities committed to improve pro-
tections of freedom of expression and association, and to take action to end
child marriage. Swaziland rejected recommendations to end the death penalty
and on the protection of migrant workers. 
The International Labour Organization (ILO) provided technical assistance to re-
form repressive laws within the framework of the UN Universal Periodic Review,
but achieved little progress towards desired reforms to guarantee freedom of as-
sociation. The ILO, the Southern African Trade Union Co-ordination Council (SAT-
UCC), and the International Trade Union Confederation visited Swaziland in
February to push for reforms. 
In 2016, the European Union said it continued to monitor progress towards the
implementation of recommendations of the May 2015 European Parliament reso-
lution that called on the government of Swaziland to immediately and uncondi-
tionally release Thulani Maseko and Bheki Makhubu, and all political prisoners,
including Mario Masuku, President of the People’s United Democratic Move-
ment, and Maxwell Dlamini, Secretary-General of the Swaziland Youth Congress. 
The resolution further urged Swaziland authorities to take steps to respect and
promote freedom of expression, guarantee democracy and plurality, and estab-
lish a legislative framework allowing the registration, operation and full partici-
pation of political parties.
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Syria
Greater United States and Russian engagement on Syria and efforts to reach a
political settlement in 2016 failed to significantly reduce egregious violations of
human rights and humanitarian law that have come to characterize the armed
conflict there. 
According to the Syrian Center for Policy Research, an independent Syrian re-
search organization, the death toll from the conflict as of February 2016 was
470,000. The spread and intensification of fighting has led to a dire humanitar-
ian crisis, with 6.1 million internally displaced people and 4.8 million seeking
refuge abroad, according to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian
Affairs. By mid-2016, an estimated 1 million people were living in besieged areas
and denied life-saving assistance and humanitarian aid.
More than 117,000 have been detained or disappeared since 2011, the vast ma-
jority by government forces, including 4,557 between January and June 2016, ac-
cording to the Syrian Network for Human Rights. Torture and ill-treatment are
rampant in detention facilities; thousands have died in detention.
The Islamic State (also known as ISIS), and the former Al-Qaeda affiliate in Syria,
Jabhat al-Nusra, which changed its name to Jabhat Fath al-Sham, were responsi-
ble for systematic and widespread violations, including targeting civilians with
artillery, kidnappings, and executions. Non-state armed groups opposing the
government also carried out serious abuses including indiscriminate attacks
against civilians, using child soldiers, kidnapping, unlawfully blocking humani-
tarian aid, and torture. 
In its fourth report, released this year, the Joint Investigative Mechanism be-
tween the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and the
UN concluded that Syrian government forces used chemicals in an attack in Idlib
in March 2015. The inquiry also identified the military units responsible for
flights connected to the attacks but could not name the commanders of the units
due to the Syrian government’s failure to respond to crucial queries. In an earlier
report, the joint inquiry had reached the same conclusion for two other attacks,
in 2014 and 2015. The inquiry also previously found that ISIS had used sulfur
mustard gas in an attack on areas held by armed opposition groups in August
2015. 
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On October 28, Russia lost its seat at the Human Rights Council after failing to
secure enough votes for re-election from UN member states. Several human
rights and humanitarian relief organizations, including Human Rights Watch,
had urged UN member states to hold Russia accountable for its involvement in
possible war crimes. 
Targeting Civilians, Indiscriminate Attacks, Use of Incendiary
Weapons, Cluster Munitions, and Chemical Weapons
The number of civilian deaths from airstrikes and artillery decreased slightly fol-
lowing internationally brokered ceasefires in February and September, but only
briefly, and unlawful attacks on civilians by all parties to the conflict persisted
throughout the year. Syrian and Russian airstrikes continued to target, or indis-
criminately strike civilian areas, including homes, markets, schools, and hospi-
tals, using wide-area explosives, barrel bombs, cluster munitions, and
flammable incendiary weapons.
In 2016, Human Rights Watch documented several attacks on homes, medical fa-
cilities, markets, and schools that appeared to be targeted, including a major
airstrike by the Syrian-Russian coalition that hit al-Quds Hospital and surround-
ing areas on April 27, 2016, killing 58 civilians and patients. In August alone,
there were several attacks on health facilities including in Idlib, Aleppo, Hama,
and Homs. 
Government forces used at least 13 types of internationally banned cluster muni-
tions in over 400 attacks on opposition-held areas between July 2012 to August
2016, killing and injuring civilians, including children. The Syrian-Russian joint
military operations, which began on September 30, 2015, have also extensively
used internationally banned cluster munitions. Cluster munitions have been out-
lawed by most countries since their submunitions fall over a wide area, failing to
distinguish between fighters and civilians and because many submunitions fail
to explode and become de facto land mines that can explode, if disturbed, even
after many years if they are not cleared. 
Government forces, and their allies, also increasingly resorted to the use of in-
cendiary weapons, with at least 18 documented attacks on opposition-held
areas in Aleppo and Idlib between June 5 and August 10. In June, Russia Today
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broadcasted footage of incendiary weapons—specifically RBK-500 ZAB-2.5SM
bombs—being mounted on a Russian Su-34 fighter-ground attack aircraft at a
Syrian airbase. Incendiary weapons induce a chain of chemical reactions that ig-
nite fires which are hard to extinguish and cause excruciatingly painful burns
that are difficult to treat. A total of 113 countries including Russia (but not Syria)
have ratified the Convention on Conventional Weapons protocol prohibiting the
use of air-delivered incendiary weapons in areas with a “concentration of civil-
ians.”
While Russia continues to deny its involvement in incendiary weapons attacks in
Syria, Syria has persistently ignored calls to sign the protocol and its military
forces’ use of incendiary weapons has been documented since the end of 2012. 
Government forces also continued using toxic chemicals in several barrel bomb
attacks in violation of the Chemical Weapons Convention. Syrian government
helicopters dropped barrel bombs with toxic chemicals on residential neighbor-
hoods in opposition-controlled parts of Aleppo city on August 10 and September 6.
In a report issued on August 24, 2016, a UN-appointed investigation attributed
two chemical weapon attacks earlier in 2016 to the Syrian government and one
to ISIS, which is already under UN sanctions.
Unlawful Restrictions on Humanitarian Assistance
The siege of civilian areas by government and pro-government forces and by
armed opposition groups and blocking of humanitarian aid continued in 2016.
The Syrian government continued requiring aid agencies to go through a bureau-
cratic approval system to obtain permits before accessing these areas. The UN
secretary-general said that even in areas where aid was allowed in, the Syrian
government has removed life-saving items from convoys. In February alone, the
government prevented 80,000 medical treatment items, including diarrhea kits,
emergency health kits, antibiotics, and other medicines, from going into be-
sieged areas, the UN said. 
Humanitarian conditions in areas besieged by government and pro-government
forces rapidly deteriorated, forcing civilians to leave these areas. Residents of
Daraya, Damascus countryside, were forced to evacuate the city following a four-
year siege on August 25. 
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On September 19, 2016, airplanes struck a UN humanitarian aid convoy and a
Syrian Red Crescent warehouse in Urum al-Kubra in Aleppo, killing 20 civilians
and one staff member as they unloaded trucks. Most of the aid, including food
and medical supplies, was to be distributed to at least 78,000 people, according
to a Syrian Red Crescent statement. The UN said that the convoy had received
proper permits from the Syrian government in advance to cross from govern-
ment-controlled Aleppo to parts of opposition-held western Aleppo to deliver the
aid.
Arbitrary Arrests, Enforced Disappearances, Torture, and
Deaths in Custody
Arbitrary detention, ill-treatment, torture, and forced disappearances by govern-
ment forces continue to be widespread and systematic in Syria, and take place
within a climate of impunity. Deaths in government detention from widespread
torture, abuse, starvation, beatings, and disease is also extensive with at least
12,679 persons dying in custody between March 2011 and June 2016, according
to local monitors. 
A September report by the UN Independent International Commission of Inquiry
on Syria noted that while stigma and trauma has led to an underreporting of sex-
ual violence, they were able to document some cases of sexual violence against
male and female detainees by government officials.
Government security forces used excessive force to quell a riot inside the Hama
Central Prison that began on May 1, resulting in some injuries, according to pris-
oners who spoke to Human Rights Watch.
On April 1, Judai Abdallah Nawfal, director of the Syrian Center for Civil Society
and Democracy, was arrested by Syrian forces at a border checkpoint on his way
to Lebanon. He was previously detained in 2014 and 1992. He was being held by
the Military Intelligence Branch 235, barred from meeting lawyers and his family.
Likewise, the fate of Bassel Khartabil, a 34-year-old free speech advocate, re-
mains unknown with unconfirmed information indicating that he might have
been tried and sentenced to death by a military court in the al-Qaboun Syrian
Military Police headquarters, notorious for closed-door proceedings that lack
fairness. 
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Jabhat al-Nusra and ISIS Abuses
In July 2016, Jabhat al-Nusra announced it was splitting from Al-Qaeda and form-
ing Jabhet Fath al-Sham. Jabhat al-Nusra and ISIS were responsible for abuses
including intentionally bombing civilian targets, abductions, arbitrary deten-
tions, executions, and unlawful sieges in 2016. While information about ISIS and
Jabhat al-Nusra abuses is hard to obtain because of the difficulties independent
monitors have accessing areas under their control, both groups have publicized
their unlawful attacks. 
ISIS claimed responsibility for several car bombings and suicide attacks in
Latakia governorate on May 23, including near bus stations and a hospital, an-
nouncing that it was targeting areas where “Alawites gather.” The attacks killed
145 civilians, according to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights. 
On February 21, a series of ISIS bombings also targeted a Shia religious site in
Damascus and a civilian neighborhood in Homs, according to media reports,
killing 109 and injuring 235, including children.
On July 27, ISIS also claimed to have bombed Qamishli, northeast Syria, which is
held by the People’s Protection Units (YPG) military forces and Kurdish police
(the Asayish). A truck bomb exploded near a PYD security center, killing 48 peo-
ple and injuring about 140 others.
ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusra have also both targeted and executed civilians when
conducting military operations in Syria. On January 17, according to media re-
ports, ISIS killed at least 85 civilians and 50 Syrian soldiers during an offensive
in the city of Deir al-Zour.  
Women and girls continue to face discrimination and severe restrictions includ-
ing on their freedom of movement in ISIS-held areas. A September report by the
UN Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Syria noted that ISIS
fighters forcibly married Sunni women living in ISIS-controlled areas.
ISIS also continues to torture, rape, murder, and sexually enslave Yezidi women
and children, many of whom were captured in Iraq and taken to Syria.  
News reports in 2016 also indicate that ISIS continues to execute men accused
of homosexuality. In one reported case from Deir al-Zour governorate, a 15-year-
old boy was stoned to death on January 3 after he was accused of being gay. At
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least 25 men have been murdered by ISIS in Syria on suspicion of homosexuality
or for sodomy, according to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights. 
Abuses by Other Non-State Armed Groups
Non-state armed groups have launched indiscriminate mortar and other artillery
strikes from areas under their control killing civilians in neighborhoods under
government control in Aleppo, Damascus, Idlib, and Latakia. These attacks re-
peatedly hit known civilian objectives, including schools, mosques, and mar-
kets.
According to the Syrian state news agency SANA, 16 civilians were killed and 41
injured when an opposition armed group shelled a mosque on April 29 during
Friday prayers in Aleppo city. On June 5, SANA reported that five people were
killed and 77 injured when opposition armed groups fired rockets on govern-
ment-held parts of Aleppo, including al-Ramouseh, the Electricity Company, al-
Midan, and the public park, also hitting an Armenian church. Opposition armed
group shelling also hit a maternity hospital in a government-held district of
Aleppo on May 3, according to media reports.
Areas under Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD) Control
The Democratic Union Party (PYD) and allied parties have set up local gover-
nance structures in large parts of northern Syria.
Despite some progress in the demobilization of child soldiers in 2014 and 2015
and disciplining officers who allowed children to serve, the People’s Protection
Units (known as the YPG affiliated with the PYD) is still not meeting its commit-
ment to demobilize children and to stop using boys and girls under the age of 18
in combat. Concerns also remain over the creation of a YPG “non-combatant cat-
egory” for children aged 16 and 17. 
Displacement Crisis
Relentless airstrikes, shelling, and widespread and systematic arbitrary deten-
tion, ill-treatment, torture, and forced disappearances have exacerbated a dis-
placement crisis, both internally and externally, which has been further
aggravated by shortfalls in international humanitarian aid funding. 
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Neighboring countries, including Lebanon, Jordan, and Turkey, sought to curb
the massive inflow of refugees with unlawful administrative, legal, and even
physical barriers. Despite a bilateral open-door treaty, Lebanon since early 2015
has imposed visa-like restrictions for Syrians seeking entry and maintains strin-
gent residency renewal regulations, negatively impacting refugees’ freedom of
movement, access to education, and access to healthcare. During the year, Jor-
danian border authorities blocked entry of migrants and asylum seekers along
the eastern stretch of its border with Syria, except for a period in the early sum-
mer when it allowed 20,000 to enter for security screening.
Following a June 21 attack by ISIS on the Rukban crossing, Jordan allowed no one
to enter and blocked humanitarian assistance to nearly 70,000 Syrians stranded
at the border, except for one delivery of aid lowered from a crane in early August.
Turkish border authorities, likewise, continue to push back refugees. In March
and April, Turkish border guards killed five Syrian asylum seekers, including a
child, and smugglers trying to enter the country. 
The Supporting Syria and the Region conference, held in London on February 4,
raised over US$12 billion, half of which was for 2016. Countries attending
UNHCR’s Geneva Conference on March 30, however, failed to commit to more
than a modest increase in resettlement places for refugees. 
The lengthy procedures and limited number of resettlement places, coupled with
dwindling aid resources and restrictions on access to the European Union by
land, led many Syrian refugees to choose to attempt to enter the EU by sea. 
Key International Actors
Efforts to push the UN Security Council to take more meaningful action in Syria
failed. Peace talks held by the International Syria Support Group, meant to re-
solve the conflict in Syria, stalled in February 2016 with only some bilateral
meetings between Russia and the United States (the ISSG co-chairs) resuming. A
cessation of hostilities was negotiated for the end of February, which saw the de-
crease of civilian casualties, but it collapsed rapidly. Another cessation of hostil-
ities was negotiated in September but broke down after an airstrike hit a UN aid
convoy killing at least 20 people.  
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The Syrian government continued to repeatedly violate Security Council resolu-
tions demanding safe and unhindered humanitarian access—including across
conflict lines and across borders; that all parties cease “indiscriminate employ-
ment of weapons in populated areas, including shelling and aerial bombard-
ment, such as the use of barrel bombs;” and an end to the practices of arbitrary
detention, disappearance, and abductions, and the release of everyone who has
been arbitrarily detained. 
In addition to persistently discouraging or pre-emptively rejecting suggestions
for meaningful Security Council action to curb violations by the Syrian govern-
ment, Russia, along with the Iranian government, continued to provide the Syr-
ian government with military assistance in 2016.
The United States also continued to lead a coalition of other states targeting ISIS
in Iraq and Syria. France promised to increase its airstrikes in ISIS-controlled
areas after ISIS claimed a series of attacks in Paris in November. 
On October 21, the UN Human Rights council held a special session to discuss
the grave human rights situation in Aleppo, adopting a resolution which calls for
an end to aerial bombardments, affirms the need for humanitarian access, high-
lights the need for accountability, and mandates the Syria Commission of Inquiry
to conduct a “comprehensive, independent special inquiry into the events in
Aleppo,” identifying perpetrators of alleged violations and abuses, and report-
ing to the council no later than March 2017.
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Tajikistan
Tajikistan’s human rights situation deteriorated sharply in 2016, as authorities
sentenced the leadership of the country’s main opposition party to lengthy
prison terms, imprisoned human rights lawyers and other perceived government
critics, and predetermined the result of a constitutional referendum that will
allow authoritarian President Emomali Rahmon to remain president for life.
Authorities organized and led numerous acts of retaliation, including incidents
of mob violence, against relatives of government critics abroad. Activists re-
ported cases of torture and deaths in custody of persons imprisoned on politi-
cally motivated charges. The government continued its multi-year campaign to
enforce severe restrictions on religious practice.
While the government took steps to enforce a 2013 law on the prevention of do-
mestic violence, activists and service providers report that implementation of
the law’s core legal protections, including prosecutions of those who repeatedly
engage in domestic violence, are lacking.
Harassment of Critics 
The Tajik government has imprisoned more than 150 activists on politically moti-
vated charges since the middle of 2015. Most are lawyers, perceived critics, and
members of the Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan (IRPT)—the country’s
largest opposition party before the government banned it in September 2015. It
also continued to seek the extradition of peaceful opposition activists living
abroad, mainly those from the opposition movement Group 24. 
In February, following pressure from human rights groups and various govern-
ments, Belarusian authorities released Tajik activist Shabnam Khudoydodova,
who had been detained in June 2015 in Brest, Belarus, pursuant to a Tajik extra-
dition request and Interpol warrant. Khudoydodova, who had called in a series
of online posts for democratic reforms and was living in St. Petersburg, was de-
tained after Polish border guards refused her entry to Poland where she planned
to seek asylum. Tajik authorities have charged her with extremism and are still
seeking her extradition.
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In May, a Dushanbe court sentenced businessman and government critic
Abubakr Azizkhojaev to two-and-a-half years’ imprisonment. Azizkhojaev, a suc-
cessful entrepreneur, made public allegations of government corruption. He was
detained on February 26, at his home in the capital, Dushanbe, initially, as a wit-
ness, but later was charged with “inciting national, racial, regional, or religious
hatred” under article 189 of Tajikistan’s criminal code for his remarks about Rah-
mon’s son-in-law. 
Friends and family who were able to visit Azizkhojaev in early May said they had
seen burns on his body, and Azizkhojaev told relatives that jail officials had
beaten him. A lawyer for Azizkhojaev told Human Rights Watch that his corrup-
tion allegations against the government formed the basis of the charges. 
In June, Tajikistan’s Supreme Court sentenced IRPT leaders to lengthy prison
terms on charges of attempting to overthrow the government. The sentences fol-
lowed an unfair trial initiated in retaliation for their peaceful political opposition
and reflect the government’s pervasive manipulation of the justice system and
egregious violations of the right to freedom of expression.
The court sentenced the IRPT’s first deputy and deputy chairmen, Saidumar Hu-
saini and Mahmadali Hayit, to life in prison. Rahmatulloi Rajab, Sattor Karimov,
Kiyomiddini Azav, and Abdukahhori Davlat, other party leaders, were all sen-
tenced to 28 years in prison. Senior IRPT legal adviser, Zarafo Rahmoni, the only
woman among the defendants, was sentenced to two years. 
Other sentences for senior party members were: Zubaidullohi Rozik 25 years;
Muhammadalii Fayzmyhammad, 23 years; while Vokhidhoni Kosiddin and Sadid-
dini Rustam, 20 years; Hikmatulloh Sayfullozoda, editor of the now-banned IRPT
newspaper Najot, 16 years; Muhammadsharif Nabiev and Abdusamad Gayratov,
14 years. 
The trial, which began on February 24, was closed to observers and according to
their lawyers marked by serious violations of due process. Sources told Human
Rights Watch that several defendants were subjected to torture or ill-treatment in
pretrial detention. A lawyer who represented one of the defendants and was
present in court throughout the trial stated that the government presented no ev-
idence of the defendants’ guilt, citing the allegations made in the indictments as
established facts.
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On June 2, the day the verdict was handed down, wives of several defendants
announced they would hold a peaceful protest and walk to the local United Na-
tions office to seek a consultation on the sentences. As the women proceeded
toward the UN building, police detained them. They were fined for an administra-
tive violation of “failure to obey police.”
In September, during the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
(OSCE) Human Dimension Implementation Meeting (HDIM) in Warsaw, opposi-
tion activists staged peaceful protests to raise attention to human rights issues
in Tajikistan and also spoke at the conference’s several public sessions. In re-
sponse, mobs attacked homes belonging to relatives of the activists over the
next several days in the cities of Kulob, Khujand, Rudaki, Dushanbe, and Dan-
gara. The government organized rallies among college students labeling the ac-
tivists “enemies of the people.” 
The coordination and timing of these attacks across several cities on the same
days, and authorities’ failure to unequivocally condemn them, pointed to tacit
endorsement, if not outright coordination, by the government.
Imprisonment and Harassment of Lawyers
In 2016, authorities continued a pattern of arresting, imprisoning, and intimidat-
ing numerous attorneys in retaliation for representing political opponents or
their willingness to take on politically sensitive cases.
Since 2014, authorities have arrested or imprisoned at least six human rights
lawyers: Shukhrat Kudratov, Fakhriddin Zokirov, Buzurgmehr Yorov, Jamshed
Yorov, Nuriddin Makhkamov, and Dilbar Dodojonova. Zokirov was released after
two lengthy periods of imprisonment, charges were ultimately dropped against
Dodojonova, and Kudratov was amnestied in September. But the others remain
behind bars, after dubious convictions or awaiting trial on specious charges.
Others, including a well-known human rights lawyer Fayzinisso Vohidova, have
been harassed and threatened with spurious criminal charges.
On February 11, 2016, a Vakhdat court sentenced Firuz Tabarov to 13-and-a-half
years in prison for various crimes, including “extremism” (article 307) and “facil-
itating mercenary fighters” (article 401). He is the son of a prominent attorney
Iskhok Tabarov, the only member of imprisoned opposition figure Zayd Saidov’s
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legal team who did not face criminal charges. Tabarov was arrested on July 3,
2015, and, his father said, was tortured in pretrial detention and forced to make
a false confession. He said authorities had provided no evidence of his son’s in-
volvement in extremist or mercenary activity and that the case was in retaliation
for the father’s role in defending Saidov.
On March 14, 2016, journalists reported that police arrested Firuz’s brother,
Daler Tabarov, on charges of failing to report a crime (article 347). He was in pre-
trial detention in Dushanbe awaiting trial at time of writing. 
In October, following a largely closed trial, a Dushanbe court sentenced lawyers
Buzurgmehr Yorov and Nuriddin Makhkamov to 23 and 21 years in prison, re-
spectively, on various charges, including fraud and “extremism,” in what ap-
peared to be retaliation for their legal representation of IRPT members. Yorov’s
arrest on September 28, 2015, came one day after he gave an interview in which
he said that officers from the Police Unit for Combating Organized Crime had
beaten his client IRPT, deputy party chairman Umarali Hisaynov, following arrest.
On August 23, authorities arrested Buzurgmehr’s brother, lawyer Jamshed Yorov,
on charges of “disclosing state secrets,” accusing him of defying an order for-
bidding the publication of the June 2016 sentence of the IRPT leaders. He was re-
leased in September but was denied access to a lawyer or his relatives
throughout his detention.
The Tajik government has also taken steps to extend its control over the legal
profession, significantly curtailing its independence. In November 2015, authori-
ties approved a new law requiring all lawyers to renew their legal licenses with
the Justice Ministry, instead of the independent bar association or licensing
body, and to retake the bar examination every five years. 
Lawyers told Human Rights Watch and the Norwegian Helsinki Committee that
the exam included questions on a broad range of subjects unrelated to law, such
as history, culture, and politics, and that they are concerned it is being used to
exclude those who take on politically sensitive cases.
Freedom of Expression
Under the pretext of protecting national security, Tajikistan’s state telecommuni-
cations agency regularly blocks websites that carry information potentially criti-
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cal of the government, including Facebook, Gmail, Radio Ozodi, the website of
Radio Free Europe’s Tajik service, and opposition websites. In early November,
authorities forced the closure of Nigoh, one of Tajikistan’s last independent
newspapers after it had ostensibly insulted president Rahmon by misspelling
the word “president.” Also in November, another news outlet, TojNews, shut
down also citing political pressure.
Domestic Violence
By September 2016, authorities had taken several steps to combat domestic vio-
lence against women and children, operating at least 12 police stations staffed
by female police inspectors who underwent training in gender-sensitive, commu-
nity policing. The Ministry of Internal Affairs also developed further guidelines on
the implementation of Tajikistan’s 2013 law on the prevention of violence in the
family. 
However, survivors of domestic violence, lawyers, and service providers reported
that the law remains largely unimplemented and that victims of domestic vio-
lence continue to suffer inadequate protection.
Key International Actors
With a few notable exceptions, the response of key international partners to
Tajikistan’s crackdown on the opposition and perceived critics has remained
largely muted.
In June, the European Union held its annual human rights dialogue with Tajik-
istan, raising concerns about torture and restrictions on freedom of expression
and religion. On June 9, in a resolution on the “situation of prisoners of con-
science” in Tajikistan, the European Parliament called specifically for the release
of all those “imprisoned on politically motivated charges.”
On April 15, the US State Department designated Tajikistan a “country of particu-
lar concern” with respect to religious freedom, highlighting “systematic, ongo-
ing, [and] egregious violations of religious freedom.” The designation allows the
US government to sanction Tajikistan, although the Obama administration de-
clined to do so based on national security concerns.
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Following a country visit to Tajikistan in March, the UN special rapporteur on the
right to freedom of opinion and expression stressed his “grave concern about in-
creasing restrictions on opposition parties, civil society and the media over the
past year.” In June, he expressed his dismay at the lengthy sentences imposed
on the IRPT leadership.
Following its Universal Periodic Review in May, the Tajik government accepted
recommendations to ensure fair trials for activists, political leaders, and lawyers
on trial, which contrasted sharply with authorities’ actions on the ground, but re-
jected recommendations to release activists and lawyers detained on politically
motivated grounds.
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Thailand
The year was tumultuous for Thailand with the passing of King Bhumibhol
Adulyadej on October 13 after a reign of 70 years. The Thai government, led by
Prime Minister Gen. Prayut Chan-ocha, repeatedly failed in 2016 to fulfill pledges
made to the United Nations General Assembly and Human Rights Council to re-
spect human rights and restore democratic rule. A new constitution, which will
entrench unaccountable and abusive military power, was adopted in a referen-
dum marked by repressive tactics against critics of the proposed constitution.  
Referendum and New Constitution 
In the lead up to the constitutional referendum on August 7, the ruling National
Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) junta curtailed the rights to freedom of ex-
pression, association, and peaceful assembly through repressive laws such the
Referendum Act, the Computer Crime Act, and article 116 of the penal code on
sedition, as well as NCPO orders censoring media and preventing public gather-
ings of more than five people. 
Thai authorities arrested at least 120 politicians, activists, journalists, and sup-
porters of political movements who had criticized the proposed constitution,
publicly announced they would vote “no,” urged voters to reject the draft consti-
tution, or sought to monitor voting. 
The government also did not provide equal access to state media for opponents
of the proposed constitution, and failed to ensure that the election commission
overseeing the referendum acted impartially. The constitution passed with sup-
port from 61 percent of voters.
The 2014 interim constitution permitted the NCPO to wield unlimited administra-
tive, legislative, and judicial power without effective oversight or accountability,
including for human rights violations. The new constitution endorses such pow-
ers, and ensures that the junta cannot be held accountable for abuses it has
committed since taking power in the May 2014 coup. Instead of paving the way
for a return to democratic civilian rule as promised in its so-called road map, the
junta has created and imposed a political structure that appears designed to
prolong the military’s grip on power. 
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Censorship and Restrictions on Free Expression
The junta continued to censor public discussions related to human rights,
democracy, the monarchy, and the NCPO’s performance. On September 28,
Amnesty International cancelled its Bangkok press conference to launch a report
on torture in Thailand after authorities threatened to arrest senior Amnesty Inter-
national staff for working illegally as foreigners in the country.
The NCPO granted power to the National Broadcasting and Telecommunications
Commission to punish critical media. Outspoken news analysts at Voice TV and
Spring News channels were suspended because of their critical reporting about
military rule. In July 2016, Peace TV channel was forced off the air for 30 days.
The junta regularly exercises its power to ban political assembly of more than
five persons. Protesters who take part in peaceful protests to express disagree-
ment with the junta face up to two years in prison. 
The junta also broadly used sedition charges, which carry up to seven years in
prison, to prosecute those who express opposition to military rule. In March, the
military in Chiang Mai province arrested and charged Theerawan Charoensuk
with sedition for posting a photo on Facebook 0f her holding a red bowl in-
scribed with Thai New Year greetings from former Prime Ministers Thaksin Shi-
nawatra and Yingluck Shonawatra. Since the coup, at least 38 people have been
charged with sedition.
The junta continues to prosecute people under the lese majeste (insulting the
monarchy) laws, an offense punishable by up to 15 years in prison. Since the
May 2014 coup, Thai authorities have charged at least 68 persons with lese ma-
jeste, mostly for posting or sharing comments online.  
The crackdown has intensified since the death of King Bhumibhol Adulyadej on
October 13, with the authorities arresting 10 people and investigating 194 new
cases. There were at least seven cases of vigilante violence targeting those ac-
cused of making negative comments about the late king or Crown Prince Maha
Vajiralongkorn, or not wearing black during the 30-day mourning period. 
The government in 2016 also requested that the United States, United Kingdom,
Sweden, France, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, Cambodia, and Laos send back
Thai citizens who sought political asylum from persecution under lese majeste
charges.   
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Arbitrary Detention and Military Courts
On September 12, General Prayut revoked three NCPO orders that empowered
military courts to try civilians for national security offenses, including sedition
and lese majeste. However, the action is not retroactive and does not affect the
more than 1,800 cases already brought against civilians in military courts. The
military also retains power to arrest, detain, and interrogate civilians for a wide
range of offenses without safeguards against abuse or accountability for human
rights violations. 
The NCPO summarily dismissed allegations that the military has tortured and ill-
treated detainees, even after the death of fortune-teller Suriyan Sucharitpolwong
and Police Maj. Prakrom Warunprapa—both charged with lese majeste—during
their detention at the 11th Army Circle military base in Bangkok in November
2015. 
At time of writing, 45 civilians were detained at the remand facility inside the
11th Army Circle military base in Bangkok without effective safeguards against
abuse.
The NCPO has summoned members of the Pheu Thai Party and the United Front
for Democracy against Dictatorship (UDD), known as the “Red Shirts,” as well as
other activists accused by authorities of opposing military rule, for “attitude ad-
justment.” Failure to report to the NCPO’s summons is considered a criminal of-
fense. The NCPO compelled persons released from “attitude adjustment”
programs to sign an agreement stating they will not make political comments, be
involved in political activities, or travel abroad without permission. Failure to
comply with such agreements can result in a new detention or two years in
prison.
Lack of Accountability for Politically Motivated Violence 
Despite evidence showing that government security forces were responsible for
the majority of casualties during the 2010 political confrontation, which left at
least 90 dead and more than 2,000 injured, no policymakers from the then Ab-
hisit Vejjajiva government or military personnel have been charged for unlawfully
killing and wounding protesters or passersby. 
While UDD leaders and supporters faced serious criminal charges for the 2010
street protests, there has been little progress in investigating or prosecuting al-
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leged criminal offenses by the People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD), knowns as
the “Yellow Shirts,” during political confrontations in 2008 or the People’s Dem-
ocratic Reform Committee (PDRC) in 2013-2014. 
Violence and Abuses in Southern Border Provinces
Since January 2004, more than 6,000 ethnic Malay Muslims and Thai Buddhists
have been killed in the armed conflict in Thailand’s southern border provinces. 
An ongoing peace dialogue between the government and the Barisan Revolusi
Nasional and other separatist groups in the loose network of Majlis Syura Patani
made little progress. Insurgents continue to violate the laws of war by targeting
civilians in bombings, roadside ambushes, drive-by shootings, and assassina-
tions. Evidence strongly suggests that separatist groups expanded their opera-
tions beyond Thailand’s southern border provinces and carried out a string of
explosions and arson attacks in seven tourist towns on August 11 and 12. 
On September 6, a bomb detonated outside a school in Narathiwat province as
parents dropped off their children, killing a father and his 4-year-old daughter.
The blast also wounded at least 10 teachers, parents, and traffic police. Since
2004, alleged insurgents have torched or bombed more than 200 schools, and
killed at least 184 teachers. 
The government still failed to prosecute security force personnel responsible for
illegal killings, torture, and other abuses against ethnic Malay Muslims. In many
cases, Thai authorities provided financial compensation to victims or their fami-
lies in exchange for their agreement not to pursue criminal prosecution of abu-
sive officials.
Enforced Disappearances
Thailand signed the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons
from Enforced Disappearance in January 2012, but has yet to ratify the treaty. The
penal code still does not recognize enforced disappearance as a criminal of-
fense. 
Since 1980, the UN Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances
has recorded 82 cases of enforced disappearance in Thailand. Many of these
cases implicated Thai officials—including the disappearances of prominent Mus-
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lim lawyer Somchai Neelapaijit in March 2004, and ethnic Karen activist Por Cha
Lee “Billy” Rakchongcharoen in April 2014. None have been successfully re-
solved. 
Human Rights Defenders 
The killing and enforced disappearance of more than 30 human rights defenders
and other civil society activists since 2001 remains a serious blot on Thailand’s
human rights record. Even high-profile cases investigated by the Justice Min-
istry’s Department of Special Investigation rarely result in prosecution. Police
made no progress in investigating the fate of land rights activist Den Khamlae,
who went missing in a forest near his home in Chaiyaphum province in April
2016. Government pledges to develop measures to protect human rights defend-
ers remained unfulfilled.  
Thai authorities and private companies continue to use defamation lawsuits to
retaliate against those reporting human rights violations. On September 20, the
Bangkok South Criminal Court found British labor rights activist Andy Hall guilty
of criminal defamation and violating the Computer Crime Act and sentenced him
to four years in prison (which the judge suspended because Hall’s work was con-
sidered beneficial to Thai society). 
Hall’s conviction was based on a complaint filed by Natural Fruit Co. Ltd.—one of
Thailand’s biggest pineapple processors—regarding a report alleging serious
labor rights abuses at one of its factories. Hall left Thailand on November 7, say-
ing he feared for his safety amid legal problems and growing harassment. 
In July, the military filed a complaint against prominent activists Somchai Hom-
laor, Pornpen Khongkachonkie, and Anchana Heemmina, accusing them of crim-
inal defamation and violating the Computer Crimes Act for reporting about
torture and other ill-treatment of insurgent suspects in the southern border
provinces. In September, the military accused Sirikan Charoensiri, a key member
of Thai Lawyers for Human Rights, of sedition for accompanying and providing
legal assistance to activists from the New Democracy Movement during their
peaceful anti-coup protest in Bangkok in June 2015.
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Refugees, Asylum Seekers, and Migrant Workers
Thailand has not ratified the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol. Thai
authorities continued to treat asylum seekers, including those whom the UN rec-
ognized as refugees, as illegal migrants who are subject to arrest and deporta-
tion. 
The government has failed to provide information regarding the current where-
abouts and well-being of the over 100 ethnic Uighurs and Chinese dissidents de-
ported to China in 2015, in violation of international law.
The government announced in June that it needed more time to put in place a
process, in collaboration with Burma and the UN, to repatriate more than
120,000 refugees living in the nine camps on the Thai-Burma border.
The government did not allow the office of the UN High Commissioner for
Refugees to conduct refugee status determination screenings for ethnic Ro-
hingya from Burma. Rohingya men, women, and children have been placed in in-
definite detention in immigration detention centers and government shelters
across Thailand. 
Migrant workers from Burma, Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam are vulnerable to
physical abuses, indefinite detention, and extortion by Thai authorities; severe
labor rights abuses and exploitation by employers; and violence and human traf-
ficking by criminals, sometimes in collaboration with corrupt officials. 
The government declared combating human trafficking to be a “national prior-
ity,” including by enforcing the Human Trafficking Criminal Procedure Act, with
mixed results. At time of writing, efforts by the Command Center to Combat Ille-
gal Fishing to suppress human trafficking in fishing and seafood food processing
sectors were still limited. 
There was little progress in the trial of Lt. Gen. Manas Kongpa—together with 52
local politicians, community leaders, businessmen, and alleged criminals—for
trafficking ethnic Rohingya to Malaysia. Migrant workers remain fearful of report-
ing trafficking crimes or cooperating with Thai authorities due to lack of effective
protection. 
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Anti-Narcotics Policy 
The government has failed to pursue criminal investigations of extrajudicial
killings related to anti-drug operations, especially the more than 2,800 killings
that accompanied then-Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra’s “war on drugs” in
2003.
In June, the government announced a plan to remove methamphetamine from
category 1, the most serious substance on the controlled substance list, in order
to ease prison overcrowding and facilitate drug users’ access to rehabilitation.
While the government indicated in September that it would transfer drug de-
pendency treatment to the Ministry of Public Health, alleged drug users are still
held in drug detention centers operated by the Ministry of Interior and the mili-
tary without due process and subject to an exhausting regime of exercise and
military-style drills the government claims constitute “treatment.” 
Environment 
The Pollution Control Department received a budget allocation in January 2016 to
clean up Klity Creek in Kanchanaburi province. The creek is contaminated by lead
from a badly regulated and now-defunct lead processing factory that presents a
health threat to hundreds of ethnic Karen families living downstream. In a land-
mark 2013 ruling, the Supreme Court ordered the government to clean up the
site. At time of writing, however, no clean-up had begun.
Key International Actors 
In June, Thailand was defeated by Kazakhstan in a bid to seek a non-permanent
seat on the UN Security Council for 2017-2018.
UN bodies and Thailand’s major allies continued to urge the junta to respect
human rights and return the country to democratic civilian rule through free and
fair elections. During the Human Rights Council’s Universal Periodic Review of
Thailand in May, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights and
many countries expressed concerns regarding violations of fundamental rights
and freedoms since the May 2014 coup. 
In January 2015, based on recommendations from the International Coordinating
Committee of National Institutions for the Promotion and Protection of Human
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Rights, Thailand’s National Human Rights Commission was downgraded due to
the lack of independence in selecting commissioners and its own poor perform-
ance. 
The US State Department upgraded Thailand from a Tier 3 ranking to Tier 2
(Watch List) in its annual Trafficking in Persons Report despite concerns by
human rights groups about the lack of significant progress in government ac-
tions. The European Commission raised human trafficking and forced labor on
Thai fishing boats when putting Thailand on formal notice for possible trade
sanctions connected to illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing.
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Tunisia 
Six years after ousting its authoritarian president, Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali,
Tunisia continued to consolidate human rights protections, even as serious vio-
lations continued. 
A reform of the code of criminal procedures gave detainees the right to a lawyer
in pre-charge detention, thus improving their protection against torture, ill-treat-
ment, and coerced confessions. 
Tunisian lawmakers adopted laws establishing the High Judicial Council, a step
that should enhance judicial independence and the constitutional court, a body
that will have the power to strike down laws that are not in harmony with the
constitution, including its chapter on rights and freedoms.These two institutions
had not yet been set up at time of writing.  
Serious human rights violations continued, including torture, arbitrary house ar-
rests, and travel restrictions under a state of emergency declared in November
2015. Violations of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) rights, as well
as lack of accountability for past human rights violations, also persisted. 
President Beji Caid Essebsi declared the state of emergency after a suicide at-
tack on a bus killed 12 presidential guards; it remained in effect at time of writ-
ing after being renewed on September 16, 2016. The state of emergency is based
on a 1978 decree that empowers authorities, after declaring a state of emer-
gency, to ban strikes or demonstrations deemed to threaten public order, and to
prohibit gatherings “likely to provoke or sustain disorder.” It gives the govern-
ment broad powers to restrict media and to place persons under house arrest. 
Constitution
The 2014 constitution upheld many key civil, political, social, economic, and cul-
tural rights. However, the constitution does not abolish the death penalty, even
though authorities have observed a de facto moratorium on its application since
the early 1990s.
Authorities made progress in harmonizing legislation with the constitution.  For
example, on February 2, 2016, parliament adopted revisions to the Code of Crim-
inal Procedure granting suspects the right to a lawyer from the onset of deten-
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tion, and shortening the maximum duration of pre-charge detention to 48 hours,
renewable once, for all crimes except for terrorism cases where pre-charge de-
tention can last up to 15 days. 
The 2014 constitution guarantees judicial independence and calls for establish-
ing a Supreme Judicial Council (SJC). On November 16, 2015, parliament ap-
proved a law creating the SJC, whose functions will include making judicial
appointments and overseeing discipline and the career progression of judges.
The president, justice minister, and other executive branch officials are all
barred from sitting on the SJC, unlike the discredited High Judicial Council (HJC)
of the Ben Ali era. 
Despite these positive steps, Tunisia had yet to carry out other extensive reforms
to bring its legislation in line both with the constitution and international stan-
dards. 
The constitution envisages the creation of a constitutional court that is empow-
ered to rule on the constitutionality of laws, and that can invalidate laws that are
not in conformity with human rights standards affirmed in the constitution. On
December 3, 2015, the parliament adopted law No.50 creating the Constitutional
Court, which is empowered to invalidate laws that are not in conformity with the
constitution’s human rights provisions. However, at time of writing, authorities
had yet to set up the court and appoint its members. 
Freedom of Expression
In 2011, the transitional authorities liberalized the press code and law pertaining
to the broadcast media, eliminating most of the criminal penalties these laws
impose on speech offenses. However, the penal code, Code of Military Justice,
and the Telecommunications Law still contain articles that impose prison terms
as a punishment for speech offenses. 
On September 26, a military prosecutor charged journalist Jamel Arfaoui with
“offending the army,” under article 91 of the Code of Military Justice, which pro-
vides for up to three years in prison for this offense. His accusation stems from
an article he published on July 30, in which he questioned the lack of investiga-
tion by the army into a military plane crash that killed two officers. He was free
pending trial at time of writing.
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Penal code article 125 that criminalizes “insulting a public official” has served,
in practice, as a means by which the police can arrest individuals—some of
whom ended up being prosecuted and imprisoned—merely for arguing with po-
lice, for being slow to heed orders, or when they filed a complaint or were sus-
pected of being likely to file a complaint against police. 
A journalist and a blogger were prosecuted in 2016 under article 125. Moez
Jemai, who works for an online newspaper, was arrested in Gabes, on September
18, and charged the following day with insulting the police. On September
19, well-known blogger Lina Ben Mhenni appeared before the first instance tri-
bunal in Mednine on a charge of insulting the police. The case goes back to 2014
when she alleged she was beaten up by police in front of the Jerba police sta-
tion. 
Transitional Justice and Accountability
Although ex-President Ben Ali’s security forces used torture extensively, authori-
ties have failed in the five years since his overthrow to investigate or hold any-
one accountable for the vast majority of torture cases. They also have held no
one accountable for the politically motivated long-term imprisonment of thou-
sands of persons after unfair trials during his tenure.  
On December 24, 2013, the National Constituent Assembly (NCA) adopted the
Law on Establishing and Organizing Transitional Justice.
The law sets out a comprehensive approach to addressing past human rights
abuses. It provides criminal accountability via specialized chambers within the
civil court system for human rights violations that occurred between July 1955
and December 2013. 
The law also established a Truth and Dignity Commission tasked with uncovering
the truth about abuses committed between July 1955, shortly before Tunisia’s in-
dependence from France, and the law’s adoption in 2013. The NCA elected 15 of
the commission’s members on May 15, 2014. The commission declared that it
had received 62.065 complaints from people alleging human rights abuses and
had begun processing them. On November 17 and 18, the Truth and Dignity Com-
mission held the first public hearings of victims of human rights violations. The
hearings were aired live on national TV and radio stations.
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The family and friends of ex-President Ben Ali diverted public funds and lands for
their benefit, instrumentalizing state institutions such as public banks, the judi-
ciary, and the police to benefit themselves and to punish those who resisted
their business initiatives, according to the 2012 report of the National Commis-
sion to Investigate Corruption and Embezzlement.
In June 2016, parliament started debating the Law on Economic and Financial
Reconciliation, which the government approved in 2015 with strong support from
President Caid Essebsi. The bill, if adopted would halt ongoing and future prose-
cutions and trials of public servants and business people for financial corruption
or misuse of public funds, provided that the person negotiates a “reconciliation”
agreement with a state-run commission to repay unlawfully obtained money to
the state treasury. 
Counterterrorism and Security
Tunisian security forces continued to clash sporadically with Islamist militants,
causing casualties on both sides. On March 7, a group of militants attacked the
town of Ben Guerdane, close to the border with Libya, targeting an army barracks
and the homes of military officers. Thirty-six militants were killed in the battle
that followed, along with 7 civilians and 12 members of the security forces. 
In terrorism cases, a law adopted on February 2 gives to the investigative judge
and prosecutor the authority to delay access to a lawyer for 48 hours after the
beginning of detention, and empowers police to hold a terrorism-related suspect
for up to 15 days. 
Since the emergency law came into force in November 2015 at least 139
Tunisians have been confined without charge pursuant to indefinite house arrest
orders that the police deliver orally, providing no document and thus hindering
the ability of the affected person to mount a court challenge. The measures have
created economic hardship, stigmatized those targeted and prevented them
from pursuing their study or business.
Torture and Ill-Treatment
The National Constituent Assembly in October 2013 approved legislation to cre-
ate the High Authority for the Prevention of Torture. Parliament elected its 16
597
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH
members only on March 30, 2016. The High Authority has the mandate to carry
out unannounced inspections of detention sites.
In its concluding observations, after considering the third periodic report of
Tunisia during its sessions held on April 19 and 21, 2016, the UN Committee
against Torture welcomed constitutional and legislative progress in the fight
against torture. However, it also noted with concern the persistence of torture in
police custody, and the consistent reports of the lack of due diligence exercised
by judges and judicial police during investigations into torture or ill-treatment.
Women’s Rights
Tunisia, long viewed as the most progressive Arab country with respect to
women’s rights, marked additional strides in this field. The adoption of a gender
parity requirement in the new electoral law required political parties to alternate
male and females on each of their lists of candidates. This resulted in the elec-
tion of 68 women to parliament in 2014, out of 217 seats. In June 2016, parlia-
ment adopted an amendment to the electoral law that required political parties
to have at least half of their electoral lists headed by women, in future local and
regional elections.  
Parliament adopted a law on November 10, 2015 that allows women to travel
with their minor children without getting permission from the children’s father.
While Tunisia’s personal status code gives women a wide array of rights, the
code retains some discriminatory provisions, especially with respect to inheri-
tance. 
Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity
The penal code punisheds consensual same-sex conduct with up to three years
in prison. Anal testing is used as the main evidence in order to convict men for
homosexuality. In two high-profile cases in 2015, at least seven young men were
arrested and subjected to anal examinations by forensic doctors, whose reports
were used as evidence to convict them of sodomy and imprison them, even
though it is well-documented that such exams lack medical value. 
On appeal, their sentences were reduced to two months in the first case, and
one month in the second. 
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The United Nations Committee against Torture, in its most recent evaluation of
Tunisia, condemned the use of anal examinations as to prove homosexual con-
duct. 
Key International Actors
On September 22 and 23, the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights examined the third periodic report of Tunisia during its 59th session. In its
concluding observations, the committee inquired about the steps being taken to
increase equality among regions and refugees’ access to education, employ-
ment, and basic services. It also expressed concern about the high rate of school
dropouts, among other issues. The committee recommended that Tunisia in-
crease accountability for social and economic rights violations by raising aware-
ness among judges, prosecutors, and lawyers about these rights. 
On September 14, the European Parliament adopted a resolution that voiced
concern about the “current economic and budgetary difficulties inherent to the
instability of the transition period” and called for increased financial support to
Tunisia. It expressed concern at overcrowding, lack of food, and insanitary condi-
tions in prisons, among other issues. 
On October 28, Tunisia was elected to the UN Human Rights Council for a three-
year term beginning in 2017.
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Turkey
On July 15, 2016, elements of the military attempted to carry out a coup d’état
against President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and the Justice and Development Party
(AKP) government. The attempted coup left at least 241 citizens and government
law enforcement dead. During the attempted coup fighter jets bombed Turkey’s
parliament. In the aftermath, the government declared a state of emergency,
jailed thousands of soldiers and embarked on a wholesale purge of public offi-
cials, police, teachers, judges, and prosecutors. Most of those jailed, dismissed,
or suspended were accused of being followers of the US-based cleric Fethullah
Gülen. The government, with the support of main opposition parties, accuses
the Gülen movement of masterminding the coup and labels it a terrorist organi-
zation. However, the crackdown also extended to the pro-Kurdish opposition
party, with two leaders and other MPs arrested and placed in pretrial detention,
along with many of its elected mayors, denying millions of voters their elected
representatives.
The war in Syria continues to impact Turkey, which hosts an estimated 2.7 mil-
lion Syrian refugees. There have been regular bomb attacks in Turkey by individ-
uals allegedly linked to the Islamic State (also known as ISIS). Authorities
blamed ISIS for a June attack in which three suicide bombers targeted Istanbul
airport killing 45, and an August attack on a Kurdish wedding party in Gaziantep
that killed 57. 
In August, Turkish military forces entered the ISIS-occupied Syrian border town of
Jarablus and attacked Syrian Kurdish forces in the area, apparently because of
their links to the Turkey-based armed group the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK).
The PKK and a related armed group, the Kurdistan Freedom Falcons (TAK),
stepped up attacks in 2016, including a March suicide attack killing 37 in central
Ankara, and a June attack in Istanbul killing 11, as well as regular attacks on mili-
tary and police targets. 
Crackdown after the Attempted Coup
The crackdown that followed the coup attempt was symptomatic of the govern-
ment’s increasing authoritarianism. Under the state of emergency, the president
presides over the cabinet, which can pass decrees without parliamentary
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scrutiny or possibility of appeal to the constitutional court. Many decrees passed
contain measures that conflict with basic human rights safeguards and Turkey’s
obligations under international and domestic law. 
These include provisions allowing for dismissal from public service without an
investigation, confiscation of property without judicial review, police custody of
up to 30 days, and the reintroduction of incommunicado detention in which de-
tainees can be denied access to a lawyer in the first five days of custody, giving
rise to heightened risks of ill-treatment. 
Turkey temporarily derogated from (asserted the right to place extraordinary re-
strictions on) many of the protections in the European Convention on Human
Rights and International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, although it is pro-
hibited from derogating from core obligations, including the absolute prohibi-
tion on torture or ill-treatment of detainees. 
The weakening of safeguards against abuse in detention under the state of
emergency was accompanied by increased reports of torture and ill-treatment in
police detention, such as beating and stripping detainees, use of prolonged
stress positions, and threats of rape, as well as threats to lawyers and interfer-
ence with medical examinations. While many allegations arose in relation to
members of the military and police detained in connection with the coup, they
were not the only groups who reported ill-treatment post-coup, and Kurdish de-
tainees in the southeast had reported similar abuses over the past year. 
The scale of dismissals and prosecutions in connection with the coup and weak-
ened safeguards gave rise to serious concerns that the legitimate prosecution of
those suspected of involvement in the coup attempt is being conducted without
due process.   
Over 100,000 public officials and civil servants have been dismissed or sus-
pended. These include around 28,000 teachers alleged to be Gülen supporters
and labelled by the government to be part of a terrorist organization. 
Many detainees—including teachers, police, public officials—are placed in pre-
trial detention despite a lack of evidence of criminal wrong-doing or compelling
grounds for custody. At least 2,200 judges and prosecutors were jailed pending
investigation, reportedly because their names appeared on a list of alleged
Gülen supporters. With 3,400 permanently dismissed for the same reason, their
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assets frozen, over one-fifth of Turkey’s judiciary has been removed. Around
11,000 teachers in the southeast who were mainly members of the left-leaning
Eğitim Sen trade union were also suspended.  
Freedoms of Expression, Association, and Assembly
Government-led efforts to silence media criticism and scrutiny of government
policy in Turkey involved five main trends: the prosecution and jailing of journal-
ists; takeover of media companies—including the daily Zaman newspaper—by
appointing government-approved trustees and seizing assets and the closing
down of media; removal of critical television stations from the main state-owned
satellite distribution platform and their closure; physical attacks and threats
against journalists; and government pressure on media to fire critical journalists
and cancel their press accreditation. Blocking of news websites critical to the
government also increased. Turkey made the highest number of requests to Twit-
ter of any country to censor individual accounts. 
In January 2016, over 1,000 university lecturers who signed a petition criticizing
government policy in the southeast and calling for a return to political negotia-
tions with the PKK, were harshly targeted by Erdoğan in speeches and then sub-
jected to a criminal investigation for “insulting” the Turkish state. The
investigation had not been concluded at time of writing. Some universities dis-
missed signatories of the petition, and 68 were fired by decree in September
and October. 
International pressure, including from the UN Secretary General, helped to se-
cure the release of some journalists from unjustified detention, including Re-
porters Sans Frontieres (RSF) representative Erol Onderoğlu in June. However,
following the coup attempt such pressure appeared to have less effect. 
Following the coup attempt, the government closed down by decree over 160
media outlets, most linked to the Gülen movement or Kurdish media. The num-
ber of journalists in pretrial detention on the basis of their writing and journalis-
tic activities surged to 144 by mid-November, making Turkey once again a world
leader in jailing journalists. Presenting no evidence of criminal wrongdoing, au-
thorities detained many reporters and columnists employed by media outlets al-
legedly linked to Gülen. Among those jailed pending investigation were veteran
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journalists and commentators who have been prominent government critics
such as Nazlı Ilıcak, Şahin Alpay, Ahmet Altan, and Mehmet Altan. 
Authorities detained journalists and writers on charges of links with the PKK but
again presented no evidence to support the charges. Among this group were
novelists Necmiye Alpay and Aslı Erdoğan. Authorities closed down the pro-Kur-
dish daily Özgür Gündem in August and placed dozens of journalists who had
participated in a solidarity campaign with the newspaper under investigation for
“spreading terrorist propaganda.”  
Cumhuriyet daily newspaper editor Can Dündar and the Ankara bureau chief
Erdem Gül were convicted in May and sentenced to over five years’ imprison-
ment for revealing state secrets by publishing evidence of arms being sent to
Syria. Dündar and Gül have appealed the verdict. Dündar is outside Turkey. In
November, authorities arrested Murat Sabuncu who became Cumhurıyet editor
after Dündar, as well as nine writers and board members from the newspaper.
Using state of emergency powers, in November the government suspended by
decree the activities of 370 nongovernmental associations, among them a chil-
dren’s rights group, three lawyers’ associations with a human rights focus, and
women’s rights and humanitarian organizations in the southeast. 
Authorities frequently impose arbitrary bans on public assemblies and violently
disperse peaceful demonstrations. For the second year running, the Istanbul
governor’s office banned the annual Istanbul Gay and Trans Pride marches in
June 2016, citing concerns about security threats and public order.
Escalating Conflict in the Southeast
The breakdown in 2015 of a two-and-a-half-year ceasefire with the PKK and the
Turkish government’s peace process with the PKK’s imprisoned leader Abdullah
Öcalan triggered a rapid escalation of violence in 2016.  
Intense security operations in the period January to May in towns in the south-
east where the city militias linked to the PKK had become entrenched resulted in
displacement of up to 400,000 residents. Amidst heavy clashes, hundreds of
residents, police, soldiers and PKK-linked militants died. 
In Cizre security forces’ attacks killed and injured unarmed residents including
children and destroyed civilian homes. Around 130 wounded militants and un-
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armed activists sheltering in three basements surrounded by the security forces
were killed in circumstances which the state has neither explained nor effec-
tively investigated. 
Blanket curfews continued for many months during security operations in Cizre
and other towns and neighborhoods, impeding access for journalists and human
rights investigators. Authorities demolished large areas of the majority Kurdish
cities of Diyarbakır, Şırnak, Nusaybin, and Yüksekova.   
In June, the government introduced a law making any prosecution of the military
and public officials, including the police, engaged in counterterrorism opera-
tions dependent on administrative permission. The law effectively grants immu-
nity from prosecution to the security forces for abuses committed in the recent
operations in the southeast in violation of Turkey’s duty to investigate such
abuses.  
In May, the government secured the lifting of the parliamentary immunity of 148
deputies, 53 of them members of the pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Democracy Party
(HDP) facing investigation on terrorism charges. In August, the government intro-
duced a decree appointing trustees to take over 28 municipalities (24 of them in
the southeast), removing elected mayors and council members from office. By
mid-November, 53 had been dismissed and 39, including Gültan Kışanak and
Fırat Anlı, co-mayors of Diyarbakır, arrested pending investigation. In November,
nine HDP members of parliament including party leaders Selahattin Demirtaş
and Figen Yüksekdağ were arrested and placed in pretrial detention. 
Refugees and Migrants
Turkey continued to host large numbers of refugees, asylum seekers, and mi-
grants, primarily from Syria, but also from Afghanistan, Iraq, and other countries.
The number of asylum seekers transiting to Greece fell after the March EU-Turkey
migration deal (see European Union chapter). Despite increased aid and some
efforts by authorities, most refugees and asylum seekers lack effective protec-
tion, education, or formal employment, with high rates of child labor and a par-
ticularly precarious situation for non-Syrians. Hundreds of thousands of Syrian
children are still not attending school. A January decree allowing some Syrians to
apply for work permits has had little effect to date. 
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Turkey’s border gates and entire land border with Syria remain closed although
people seriously injured in fighting are admitted to Turkey for medical treatment.
Syrian refugees attempting to cross into Turkey at unofficial crossing points are
summarily pushed back into Syria and some asylum seekers and smugglers at-
tempting the crossing have been shot dead or beaten by Turkish border guards.
Women’s Rights
Following its July review of Turkey, the UN Committee on the Elimination of Dis-
crimination against Women (CEDAW Committee) made many recommendations
to the government to address gender inequality and remove obstacles for
women and girls to access education, employment, justice, and reproductive
health. It noted particular obstacles for Kurdish women and women and girl
refugees and asylum seekers. The committee called on authorities to ensure full
access in state hospitals to legal abortion services that many currently do not
offer. It also noted concerns about changes to the ministry responsible for
women, and the increasing emphasis on women’s role in the family rather than
women’s rights and gender equality. 
Despite the Turkish government’s ratification of the Council of Europe Conven-
tion on Violence against Women and Domestic Violence (Istanbul Convention),
violence against women remains a serious concern, including deaths due to do-
mestic violence and so-called “honor” killings.
Key International Actors
There was international support for the Turkish government in the face of the
coup attempt, although the Turkish government criticized what it saw as late and
weak responses by the European Union and United States.
The EU-Turkey migration deal and desire for Turkey to host asylum seekers who
would otherwise travel to the EU, reinforced the EU’s reluctance to use its declin-
ing leverage with Turkey. In their relationship with Turkey, the EU and its member
states largely appeared to prioritize strategic interests over the promotion of
human rights, while issuing repeated statements expressing concern over the
growing crackdown. The European Commission progress report described nega-
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tive developments over the year yet failed to capture the severity and extent of
the human rights crisis in Turkey. 
With the Obama administration primarily focused on seeking Ankara’s coopera-
tion in the fight against ISIS and other armed militant groups, human rights were
also not a primary focus of relations in 2016.  
The United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Zeid
Ra’ad al-Hussein, spoke out against curbs on media freedom and human rights
abuses committed in the context of security operations in the southeast, press-
ing for a UN fact-finding team to investigate the latter. The Turkish government
extended an invitation to Zeid himself, while repeatedly blocking a fact-finding
mission. Zeid strongly condemned the coup attempt in Turkey while urging
Turkey “to refrain from turning the clock back on human rights protections.”
After the coup attempt, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon urged Turkish author-
ities to do their utmost to ensure that the constitutional order and international
human rights law are fully respected in line with Turkey’s international obliga-
tions, including freedom of expression, freedom of movement and peaceful as-
sembly, independence of the judiciary and of the legal profession, right to fair
trial, and strict adherence to due process.
The UN Committee against Torture, in its April review of Turkey, expressed seri-
ous concern about “numerous credible reports of law enforcement officials en-
gaging in torture and ill-treatment of detainees while responding to perceived
and alleged security threats in the southeastern part of the country.” 
After the Turkish government postponed his planned October visit, outgoing UN
Special Rapporteur on Torture Juan Mendez issued a statement expressing deep
disappointment about a decision saying it “sends the wrong message” in light of
the thousands of arrests after the coup attempt. The visit was scheduled again
for late November under the mandate of the incoming rapporteur. In August, a
group of 19 UN experts and three UN working groups issued a joint call to em-
phasize to Turkey that “one cannot avoid, even in times of emergency, obliga-
tions to protect the right to life, prohibit torture, adhere to fundamental
elements of due process and non-discrimination, and protect everyone’s right to
belief and opinion.” 
WORLD REPORT 2017
606
In October, the Council of Europe’s commissioner of human rights issued a mem-
orandum on the serious human rights implications of the measures taken under
Turkey’s state of emergency.
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Turkmenistan
Turkmenistan is among the world’s most repressive and closed countries, where
the president and his associates have total control over all aspects of public life.
A new draft constitution approved in 2016 allows lifetime presidency. 
The government ruthlessly punishes any alternative political or religious expres-
sion and exerts total control over access to information. Independent critics and
their families, including in exile, face constant threat of government reprisal. Au-
thorities continue to impose informal and arbitrary travel bans on activists and
relatives of exiled dissidents, and others. Dozens of people remain forcibly dis-
appeared presumably in Turkmen prisons. 
Cult of Personality 
Authorities continue to forcibly mobilize citizens to be present for state events
and often take extreme measures in preparation for President Gurbanguly Berdy-
muhamedov’s visits within the country. According to the Turkmen Initiative for
Human Rights (TIHR), a Vienna-based group, in April four families in Akhal region
were not allowed to bury their deceased relatives and hold funerals until after
the president’s visit ended. 
Constitutional Reform 
In September, parliament approved a new constitution that allows President
Berdymuhamedov to remain in power for life by removing the 70-year age limit
for presidential candidates and extending the presidential term of office from
five to seven years. There are no presidential term limits. 
The new constitution does not ban censorship and does not provide for the right
to travel abroad. The Turkmen government did not incorporate recommendations
on the draft made by the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights of
the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE).  
Civil Society
The government does not allow independent groups to carry out human rights
work inside the country. Independent local organizations cannot register, and
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unregistered work by nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) is illegal. Interna-
tional human rights groups are not allowed to enter Turkmenistan.
Civil society activists face constant threat of government reprisal. In October
alone, authorities arrested three activists. Two had monitored forced labor; au-
thorities released on of them after 10 days, and in November a court sentenced
the other to three years on bogus fraud charges. The third, Galina Vertryakova,
was arrested on bogus extortion charges after she had posted comments critical
of the government on Russian social media. At time of writing she was in custody
pending investigation and trial. 
In August, an independent activist reported invasive, humiliating airport
searches by customs officials, and repeated, anonymous telephone threats. Ac-
tivists’ families also received anonymous threats of violence, linking the threats
directly to their relatives’ activism. 
Unknown individuals, presumably acting as government proxies, sought to in-
timidate exiled activists into silence. In August, two masked men in Moscow at-
tempted to abduct Akmukhammet Baikhanov, a Turkmen dissident, one month
after he published a book exposing abuses in Ovadan-Tepe, a prison notorious
for torture, horrific conditions, and for holding political prisoners. In April, au-
thorities in Turkmenistan briefly detained his brother, making clear the detention
was related to Baikhanov’s criticism. 
Authorities harassed family members of Geldy Kyarizov, a prominent horse
breeding expert who fell out of favor with the government. Kyarizov had served
nearly six years in prison in the 2000s, following a conviction on fabricated
charges, and was allowed to leave the country in 2015. In November 2015, after
Kyarizov’s first public interview about his prison ordeal, authorities blocked his
family’s communication with him and threatened his brothers, detaining one on
false drug charges and then releasing him. In March, Kyarizov received repeated
verbal threats against him and his family.   
Freedom of Media and Information
There is no media freedom in Turkmenistan. The state controls all print and elec-
tronic media. Foreign media outlets can very rarely access Turkmenistan, and
local stringers for foreign outlets face harsh government retribution.
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Saparmamed Nepeskuliev, a freelance correspondent for RFE/RL and Alternative
News of Turkmenistan, an exile-run news website, continued to serve a three-
year prison sentence, issued in August 2015, following his conviction on fabri-
cated narcotics charges. In December 2015, the United Nations Working Group
on Arbitrary Detentions recognized Nepeskuliev as a victim of arbitrary detention
for having peacefully exercised his right to freedom of expression. 
In October, police questioned another RFE/RL journalist, Soltan Achilova, after
she took photographs of a supermarket line. Shortly thereafter unknown as-
sailants attacked and robbed her, taking her camera. She suffered light injuries.
The day after Human Rights Watch published a news release about her ordeal,
other unknown people tried to assault her, warning her to stop taking photo-
graphs. 
In August 2016, Turkmen authorities requested that Belarus extradite Chary An-
namuradov, a former dissident and independent journalist. Annamuradov is a
citizen of Sweden, where he has had asylum since 2003, after fleeing persecu-
tion in Turkmenistan. Belarusian authorities arrested Annamuradov upon arrival
for vacation in July, pursuant to an international arrest warrant, and in Septem-
ber denied the extradition request. 
In September, unknown individuals kidnapped Annamuradov’s brother, Altymu-
rad, from his home in Turkmenistan and held him for four days, during which
they severely beat him and questioned him about his brother. Altynmurad Anna-
muradov died shortly after his kidnappers returned him home.
The Turkmen government has forcibly dismantled most private satellite dishes,
and internet access in Turkmenistan remains limited and heavily state-con-
trolled. Internet in Turkmenistan is among the most expensive worldwide, ac-
cording to Stay Mobile, an independent internet industry news aggregator.
Throughout 2016, users faced constant obstacles accessing mobile internet. In
June, access to Skype and Line messengers was jammed. The government moni-
tors all means of communications.
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Freedom of Movement
In June, authorities allowed Aitzhamal Rejepova, the daughter of an exiled dissi-
dent, and her two young children to travel abroad for a family visit, after drop-
ping a 13-year travel ban. 
However, in most other cases, dissidents’ relatives remain barred from foreign
travel in 2016. Examples include the Ruzimatov family, relatives of an exiled for-
mer official, and Aidogdy Kurbanov, son of an exiled, politically active Turkmen
businessman. 
Freedom of Religion
A new religion law adopted in March further tightens requirements for register-
ing religious organizations, for example by increasing from 5 to 50 the number of
required founders. Unregistered congregations or religious groups are banned.
Religious literature is subject to obligatory state censorship. There is still no al-
ternative military service and objectors are subject to persecution.
In February, several congregants of the Greater Grace Church, a Protestant group,
were fined 500 manats (US$140) each for possessing “illegal religious litera-
ture,” and four others were detained, held for questioning, and released. State
service officers confiscated their religious literature, phones, and money.
Political Prisoners, Enforced Disappearances, and Torture 
The number of those jailed on political grounds is impossible to determine be-
cause the justice system is utterly opaque, trials are closed in sensitive cases,
and severe repression precludes independent monitoring of these cases. 
Political dissident Gulgeldy Annaniazov, arrested in 2008, continues to serve an
11-year prison sentence on charges that are not known even to his family. There
had been no information about Annaniazov’s whereabouts in custody until Sep-
tember 2015, when a Turkmen official publicly stated that he had been trans-
ferred to a prison facility where he could be visited. At time of writing, Turkmen
authorities had not directly informed Annaniazov’s family about his transfer. 
Dozens of people, many of whom were imprisoned under former President
Saparmurad Niyazov, remain victims of enforced disappearance. Following their
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arrest, the government denied them access to families, and the fate of many re-
mains unknown. In 2014, the UN Human Rights Committee recognized Boris
Shikhmuradov, the former foreign minister, as a victim of enforced disappear-
ance and stated that the Turkmen government must release him. The Turkmen
government has not replied to the committee or carried out its recommenda-
tions. 
Prove They Are Alive, an international campaign against enforced disappear-
ances in Turkmenistan, confirmed the deaths in custody of three forcibly disap-
peared people. Their bodies were returned to their families. Yolly
Gurbanmuradov, a former deputy minister overseeing the gas industry, died in
December 2015. Annadurdy Annasakhedov, the former head of the department
of counterintelligence, died in February, and Vekil Durdyev, a former state secu-
rity officer, died in August. Both had been sentenced in closed trials in 2003 re-
lating to an alleged coup attempt in 2002. 
Torture is a grave problem, particularly in high-security facilities. The Interna-
tional Committee for the Red Cross does not have full and independent access to
Turkmen prisons and individual prisoners. 
In January, the government approved a National Human Rights Action Plan that
makes no mention of torture. The plan commits to facilitating visits by the UN
special rapporteurs on human rights defenders and on the independence of
judges and lawyers by 2018. They are among the 13 UN experts who have re-
quested, but not received, access to the country. 
Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity
Under Turkmen law homosexual conduct is punishable by up to two years in
prison. Widespread prejudice leads to homosexuality being treated as a disease,
including by medical institutions and judicial authorities. Law enforcement offi-
cials and medical personnel subject persons detained and charged with sodomy
to forced anal examinations, with the purported objective of finding “proof” of
homosexual conduct. 
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Key International Actors
Turkmenistan’s vast gas reserves dominate the country’s relationships with its
international partners whose response to the human rights situation in Turk-
menistan has remained overly muted. In a rare exception to this approach, in
May, the European Parliament Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET) postponed
final ratification of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) that gov-
erns bilateral relations and cooperation between EU and Turkmenistan, citing
human right concerns.
In August, German Chancellor Angela Merkel met with President Berdymukhame-
dov in Berlin. Merkel publicly called for international expert review of the draft
constitution and noted that the two had agreed to allow foreign diplomats to
visit prisons in Turkmenistan, pending further negotiations.
The United States flagged general concerns about human rights during its Octo-
ber 2015 US-Turkmenistan Annual Bilateral Consultations. During his November
2015 visit to Turkmenistan—the first US secretary of state visit since 1992—John
Kerry merely noted that he discussed the “human dimension” with President
Berdymukhamedov. 
During its annual human rights dialogue with Turkmenistan in May, the European
Union raised a range of issues, and urged Turkmenistan to provide information
about the fate and whereabouts of disappeared prisoners and to free a number
of specific prisoners whose names were not made public. 
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Uganda
In February, President Yoweri Museveni, in power for more than 30 years, was de-
clared the winner of the presidential elections. Local observers said the elec-
tions were not free and fair, and international electoral observers argued the
process failed to meet international standards. 
Violations of freedom of association, expression, assembly, and the use of ex-
cessive force by security officials continued during campaigns and into the post-
election period. Opposition presidential candidate Dr. Kizza Besigye from the
Forum for Democratic Change (FDC) was held in preventative detention at his
home for over a month while trying to challenge election results. 
The police used unlawful means including live ammunition to prevent peaceful
opposition gatherings and protests, at times resulting in loss of life. 
After nine years, the Constitutional Court finally ruled in November on a chal-
lenge to a limitation on the mandate of the Equal Opportunities Commission,
which barred it from investigating any matter involving behavior “considered to
be immoral and socially harmful, or unacceptable by the majority of the cultural
and social communities in Uganda.” The judges determined the limitation was
unconstitutional and violated the right to a fair hearing. Perversely, this provi-
sion had meant that the very mechanism designed to protect people from dis-
crimination could blatantly discriminate against women, lesbian, gay, bisexual,
transgender and intersex (LGBTI) people, sex workers, and anyone else who
might not have been perceived to reflect the views of the majority.
Freedom of Assembly 
The police used unnecessary and disproportionate force in 2016 to disperse
peaceful assemblies and demonstrations, sometimes resulting in the death of
protesters and bystanders. 
Police selectively enforce laws, including the 2013 Public Order Management
Act, and unjustifiably arrest, detain, and interfere with the movement of opposi-
tion politicians. While blocking and dispersing FDC supporters in Kampala, po-
lice fired live bullets, killing one person, and injuring many others. Police also
shot and killed 13-year-old Kule Muzamiru in Kasese town while dispersing
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crowds gathered to hear election results. No one had been arrested at time of
writing. 
Police prevented Besigye from accessing campaign venues in Kampala, in the
run up to the February elections on allegations that he was going to “disrupt
business.” Police arrested and briefly detained him several times during cam-
paigns before returning him to his home without charge. 
Between February and May, police raided and sealed off the FDC headquarters,
arrested party officials, and beat supporters on several occasions. The day after
the general elections, police closed the party offices and arrested Besigye, as
well as other party officials. Police confiscated results declaration forms and
computers.  FDC party offices remained under police guard as other opposition
officials and supporters were arrested countrywide. Some were held incommuni-
cado for weeks and released without charge.  
Besigye declared a “defiance campaign” against the government after the elec-
tion and held a ceremony swearing himself in as president. Police then pre-
vented Besigye from leaving his home for 44 days, under a “preventive arrest”
law. Access to Besigye’s home was restricted, and visitors had to seek permis-
sion from police leadership.  
Eventually in May, Besigye was charged with treason and sent to prison. In July,
after the High Court granted bail, police brutally beat Besigye’s supporters and
other bystanders with sticks and batons. Opposition activists brought a private
prosecution for torture against police leadership, but the case eventually failed. 
In June, a newly elected member of parliament for FDC, Michael Kabaziguruka,
and 34 others, including soldiers, were charged with treason. The charges were
pending at time of writing. 
Freedom of Expression and Media
Government officials and police arrested and beat over a dozen journalists, in
some cases during live broadcasts. On election day, the Uganda Communication
Commission, the telecommunications regulator, directed all telecom companies
to block social media networks for “security reasons.” The ban lasted five days. 
In January, a local television station was temporarily banned from covering Mu-
seveni’s campaign rallies after editors did not use aerial video provided to them
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by his campaign team. Soldiers from the Special Forces Command stopped the
station’s reporters from covering some campaign meetings. 
In February, police in Abim, northern Uganda, arrested and detained a BBC corre-
spondent and three others for filming a dilapidated government-run health cen-
ter. All were released without charge. 
Opposition candidates were at times blocked from accessing radios, either for
talk shows or after paying for airtime. In January, police blocked opposition pres-
idential candidate Amama Mbabazi from going on the station, Voice of
Karamoja. The management told him that the District Security Committee had re-
solved not to allow him on air.  
In April, a court of appeal judge issued a temporary injunction stopping the FDC
from carrying out any “defiance campaign” activities pending the hearing of the
government’s motion challenging the campaign’s constitutionality. To imple-
ment the injunction, the government banned media from reporting on all FDC ac-
tivities. The ban eventually ended with the expiry of the court interim order.
Extrajudicial Killings and Absence of Accountability
Security forces continue to use excessive force while policing demonstrations
and conducting other law enforcement operations. Between February and April,
inter-communal fighting prompted in part by local elections in Rwenzori region,
western Uganda, led to the deaths of at least 30 people. Human Rights Watch in-
vestigations into subsequent law enforcement operations concluded that the po-
lice and army killed at least 13 people during alleged arrest attempts. Multiple
witnesses said victims were unarmed when killed. There had been no investiga-
tions at time of writing. 
Freedom of Association 
In February, Museveni signed the Non-Governmental Organisations bill into law.
Despite undergoing significant improvement during parliamentary debates, the
law still includes troubling and vague “special obligations” of NGOs, including a
requirement that groups should “not engage in any act which is prejudicial to
the interests of Uganda or the dignity of the people of Uganda.” Another provi-
sion criminalizes activities by organizations that have not been issued with a
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permit by the government regulator, fundamentally undermining free association
rights. A separate provision provides that violations of the act can lead to jail
sentences of up to three years.
Police have not responded to demands for investigations into more than two
dozen break-ins at the offices of NGOs, all known for work on sensitive sub-
jects—including human rights, corruption, land rights, and freedom of expres-
sion—and for criticizing government policies. In two instances, guards were
killed, but no one has been arrested. NGO leadership and relevant government
bodies held nationwide consultations to draft implementing regulations for the
NGO law, which remained under discussion at time of writing. 
Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity
Same-sex conduct remains criminalized under Uganda’s colonial-era law, which
prohibits “carnal knowledge” among people of the same sex. The new NGO law
raises concerns about the criminalization of legitimate advocacy on the rights of
LGBTI people. 
In August, police unlawfully raided a peaceful pageant that was part of Gay Pride
celebrations in Kampala. Police locked the venue’s gates, arrested activists, and
beat and humiliated hundreds of people, violating rights to association and as-
sembly.
Police continue to carry out forced anal examinations on men and transgender
women accused of consensual same-sex conduct. These examinations lack evi-
dentiary value and are a form of cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment that
may amount to torture.
Lord’s Resistance Army
The rebel Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) remains active in central Africa but with
allegations of killings and abductions on a significantly lesser scale than in pre-
vious years.
Former LRA commander Dominic Ongwen is in the custody of the International
Criminal Court’s (ICC). Ongwen is charged with 70 counts of war crimes and
crimes against humanity as part of attacks on internally displaced persons’
camps, including murder, enslavement, sexual and gender-based crimes, and
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the conscription of child soldiers. Ongwen’s trial was scheduled for December
2016. Warrants for four other LRA commanders have been outstanding since
2005; three are believed to be dead. Joseph Kony is the only LRA ICC suspect at
large.
Former LRA fighter Thomas Kwoyelo, charged before Uganda’s International
Crimes Division (ICD) with wilful killing, taking hostages, and extensive destruc-
tion of property, has been imprisoned since March 2009. His trial has been post-
poned, first to hear challenges to the constitutionality of his prosecution, and
then due to delays in operationalizing ICD regulations, problems in disclosure to
the defense, lack of funding, and a backlog of electoral petitions. The trial was
scheduled to begin by the end of 2016. 
Key International Actors 
Electoral observers from the European Union (EU) and the Commonwealth ex-
pressed concerns over intimidation and harassment of voters and candidates
and a lack of independence and transparency during elections.
The United States publicly raised serious concerns over intimidation and abuse
during the elections, but no changes to assistance occurred. The US provides
over US$440 million annually to support Uganda’s health sector, particularly
provision of anti-retrovirals. The US supports the Ugandan army with at least
US$70 million for logistics and training for the African Union Mission in Somalia
and counter-LRA operations in the Central African Republic, among other efforts.
Additional support goes to the Ugandan police’s counterterrorism efforts. 
The World Bank committed US$105 million to projects in Uganda in 2016, a dra-
matic decrease from US$664 million in 2015. In December 2015, the World Bank
cancelled funding for a US$265 million road-building project and suspended two
others after allegations emerged that construction workers sexually abused chil-
dren. On August 22, 2016, the World Bank suspended all new lending to Uganda.
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Ukraine
The situation in eastern Ukraine remained tense in 2016 despite the Minsk II
Agreements forged a year earlier that called for a ceasefire and withdrawal of
heavy weapons by all sides. Civilians in both Ukrainian and Russia-backed sepa-
ratists’ detention were subjected to serious abuses. Abuses in conflict-affected
areas remain largely unaddressed. The government did not adequately respond
to attacks on journalists by nationalist groups. In Crimea, Crimean Tatars face
further persecution for their peaceful opposition to Russia’s occupation of the
peninsula. 
Hostilities in Eastern Ukraine
The 2015 Minsk II Agreements significantly reduced hostilities, but frequent skir-
mishes and exchanges of artillery fire continued during the year.
According to the United Nations Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine
(UNHRMMU), mortar, rocket, and artillery attacks between April 2014 and May
2016 killed over 9,000 people and injured more than 21,000—including civilians
and combatants on all sides—in Donetsk and Luhansk regions. The UNHRMMU
reported a 66 percent increase in civilian casualties from May to August com-
pared to earlier in 2016, and documented 28 civilian deaths in the summer,
many of which resulted from shelling and landmines.
Cruel and Degrading Treatment and Arbitrary Detention
Ukrainian government authorities and Russia-backed separatists in eastern
Ukraine detained dozens of civilians for collaborating with the other side and
held them in prolonged, arbitrary detention, depriving them of contact with
lawyers and family. Most of those detained suffered torture or other forms of ill-
treatment; some were denied needed medical attention. Both sides have been
implicated in sexual violence, although few cases have been fully documented
due to victims’ reluctance to come forward. 
Human Rights Watch, jointly with Amnesty International, found that 18 people
had been held in secret detention on the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) prem-
ises in Kharkiv through the end of July, one for as long as 16 months. Thirteen
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were later released: at time of writing five remained in detention. The SBU de-
nied allegations of secret detention. The military prosecutor’s office pledged to
investigate. At time of writing, the investigation had yielded no tangible results. 
In the self-proclaimed Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) and Luhansk People’s
Republic (LNR), local security services operate in a total vacuum of rule of law,
which deprives people in their custody of their rights and leaves them without
recourse to any remedies.
Accountability for Conflict-Related Abuses and Political
Violence 
In July, parliament passed a controversial amnesty law, absolving combatants in-
volved in the “security operations” in eastern Ukraine of criminal responsibility
for non-grave crimes. In August, President Petro Poroshenko vetoed the law.
In July, authorities arrested the head of Aidar battalion, Valentin Liholit, on
charges of abduction, robbery, and other violent crimes against civilians. At Li-
holit’s remand hearing, Aidar battalion members blocked the court building,
while several members of parliament disrupted the hearing inside, demanding
his release. The court released him, pending further investigation. 
Also in July, a former member of the Tornado police battalion was sentenced to
six years’ imprisonment for torture and rape. Twelve other former members of the
battalion, including the commander, were under investigation for sexual vio-
lence, robbery, and other violent crimes. At an August court hearing, Tornado
supporters clashed with law enforcement, injuring 27 law enforcement officers. 
Authorities have made some progress toward accountability for abuses during
the 2014 Maidan protests by government forces against protesters. In June, au-
thorities charged four members of the Berkut riot police battalion with killing 3
protesters and injuring 35. At time of writing, the investigation was ongoing.
Trials continued in connection with the 2014 political violence in Odesa. In May
and June, when courts ruled to release “pro-federalism” defendants from pretrial
detention, “pro-unity” activists temporarily blocked the courts and threatened to
harm the defendants. On both occasions police eventually rearrested the defen-
dants. “Pro-unity” activists were not held accountable for disrupting court pro-
ceedings, and in one case, some were invited to testify against the defendant. 
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Freedom of Expression and Media
The government continued to take controversial steps restricting media freedom,
justifying them mostly by the need to counter Russia’s anti-Ukraine propaganda. 
In May, Ukrainian authorities banned 17 Russian journalists and media execu-
tives from entering Ukraine. 
Inter, a television station widely perceived as pro-Russia, was attacked several
times in 2016. The most serious attack occurred in early September, when a
group of protesters tried to set Inter’s building on fire. Several staff had to be
evacuated and treated for carbon monoxide poisoning; one sustained a spinal
injury. Several days prior to the attack, Interior Minister Arsen Avakov, through
his Facebook page, accused the channel of being anti-Ukrainian. 
Media ownership structure remained opaque, despite a 2015 law promoting
media ownership transparency. Most television channels are believed to be con-
trolled by oligarchs, and President Poroshenko continued to own Channel 5. 
Nationalist groups attacked journalists for their work in eastern Ukraine. In May
2016, the website Myrotvorets published the names and personal data of hun-
dreds of journalists and others who had been accredited by the DNR press cen-
ter, accusing them of “cooperat[ing] with terrorists.” Authorities launched an
investigation, but top government officials applauded the publication. Several
reporters received threats after the data dump.
The Ukrainian Institute of Mass Media, an independent monitoring group,
recorded 113 physical attacks against journalists in Ukraine in the first part of
2016.  
In July, a bomb car bomb killed Pavel Sheremet, a prominent investigative jour-
nalist. At time of writing, investigative authorities had not identified suspects.
The trial of suspects in the 2015 killing of Oles Buzina, a journalist known for his
pro-Russian views, continued. 
In a positive development, in July, an appeals court acquitted journalist and
blogger Ruslan Kotsaba, who had been previously convicted on treason charges
for calling for boycotting conscription. 
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Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity
Since 2014, the government has introduced several progressive policies support-
ing lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) people, but anti-LGBT senti-
ment remains strong among high-level government officials and the public. 
In March 2016, about 200 anti-gay, far-right supporters attacked a venue in Lviv
hosting a LGBT equality festival, eventually causing the event to be cancelled.
The Kyiv LGBT Pride march held in June took place without the violence against
participants that had marred it in previous years. Ultra-nationalist groups had
threatened to make the march a “bloody mess.” Around 6,000 police officers
protected the 1,500 march participants. 
The first LGBT Pride march took place in Odesa in August. Local authorities ini-
tially attempted to ban it, but relented when organizers changed the route. Po-
lice arrested four ultra-nationalists who attempted to disrupt the event.
A new draft of the amended labor code does not include an anti-discrimination
provision that would protect LGBT people in the workplace. 
Crimea
Russia continued to prosecute people for publicly opposing its occupation of
Crimea, further shrinking space for free speech and freedom of association. 
Under the pretext of combating extremism or terrorism, authorities harassed and
took arbitrary legal action against some Crimean Tatar activists in apparent retal-
iation for their peaceful opposition to Russia’s occupation. In February 2016, au-
thorities arrested human rights defender Emir Usein Kuku on charges of
terrorism and involvement in Hizb ut-Tahrir, a Muslim political organization that
is banned in Russia but not Ukraine. At time of writing he was in custody pend-
ing trial. In October, the Crimean Office for Juvenile Affairs approached Kuku’s 9-
year-old son and asked him questions about Kuku, implying that his father was
neglecting his parental duties while in detention. Since 2014, fourteen people
were detained on charges of involvement in Hizb ut-Tahrir; in September, four
were sentenced to prison terms ranging from five to seven years. 
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In April, the Supreme Court in Crimea ruled to shut down Mejlis, the Crimean
Tatars’ elected representative body, on grounds of involvement in “extremist”
activities. In September, Russia’s Supreme Court upheld the ruling. 
Akhtem Chiygoz, a deputy chairman of Mejlis arrested in 2015 on charges of al-
legedly organizing mass disturbances, remained in custody; his trial was ongo-
ing at time of writing. Another Mejlis deputy chairman, Ilmi Umerov, was charged
with separatism for stating in a media interview that Crimea should be returned
to Ukraine. In August, Umerov was confined in a psychiatric hospital for evalua-
tion. He was released on September 7 and at time of writing was at liberty, pend-
ing trial. 
In April, Russia’s Federal Security Service in Crimea arrested journalist Nikolai
Semena and searched his home, confiscating computer equipment. He is cur-
rently banned from leaving Crimea and faces criminal separatism charges for ar-
ticles criticizing Russia’s occupation.
In May, Ervin Ibragimov, a Mejlis member, went missing. Security camera footage
showed a group of men forcing him into a van and driving away. His passport
was later found in Bakhchisaray. An investigation was ongoing.
Key International Actors 
The European Union and the United States issued statements recognizing the
territorial integrity of Ukraine. The US State Department called for an investiga-
tion into Pavel Sheremet’s death and criticized the Russian court’s ban of Mejlis.
It also called for an end to human rights abuses in Crimea. 
In February, the United Nations Children’s Fund reported that 1 in 5 schools had
been damaged in the armed conflict. Some 215,000 children have been dis-
placed, significantly affecting their access to education. UNICEF called on all par-
ties to the conflict in eastern Ukraine “to ensure safe movement and unhindered
humanitarian access to help children in need.”
The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) sent rapporteurs to
Ukraine in February and April to meet with key leaders to discuss the conflict and
the human rights situation in eastern Ukraine while also assessing access to
legal remedies for human rights violations since the onset of the war in eastern
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Ukraine. In October, PACE adopted a resolution highlighting the lack of remedies
for victims of abuses in Ukrainian territories “under effective control” by Russia. 
On August 11 and 12, the UN Committee on Elimination of Racial Discrimination
reviewed Ukraine’s compliance with the International Convention on the Elimina-
tion of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. The committee expressed concerns
over “underdeveloped” institutional framework for dealing with minority issues,
noted a rise in hate speech by public figures and racist propaganda by such
groups as Right Sector, Azov Civilian Battalion, and the Social National Assem-
bly. 
The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe’s (OSCE) Special Moni-
toring Mission to Ukraine released several statements raising concern about
civilian casualties in eastern Ukraine due to the conflict, as well as about the
plight of internally displaced persons (IDPs). The chief monitor of the OSCE Spe-
cial Monitoring Mission in Ukraine declared violence to be a “violation of chil-
dren’s rights” and emphasized the importance of abiding by a ceasefire at the
beginning of the school year on September 1. 
In May, the UN torture prevention body had to suspend a visit to Ukraine to in-
spect detention conditions due to travel restrictions in several locations under
SBU authority, but returned in September to complete the visit after Ukrainian
authorities granted full access. 
In September, the UN high commissioner for human rights expressed concern
over lack of protection for civilians living in the conflict-affected area, access to
basic services and humanitarian aid, freedom of movement, and limited ac-
countability for human rights violations. 
Although Ukraine is not a member of the International Criminal Court (ICC), it has
accepted the court’s jurisdiction over alleged crimes committed on its territory
since November 2013. The ICC prosecutor’s preliminary examination as to
whether it should open an investigation into abuses committed during the
armed conflict remained ongoing. In June, parliament adopted a constitutional
amendment package that would permit ratification of the ICC treaty, but included
a transitional provision that delays the relevant amendment from taking effect
for three years.
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In November, the ICC’s Office of the Prosecutor, in its annual report, character-
ized the armed conflict in eastern Ukraine and Russia’s occupation of Crimea as
international armed conflicts to which Russia is a party. The laws of international
armed conflict would continue to apply, the report concluded, and the situation
in Crimea and Sevastopol amounts to an ongoing state of occupation under
those laws.
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United Arab Emirates
The United Arab Emirates’ intolerance of criticism continued in 2016 with the
prosecution of an Emirati academic and a Jordanian journalist, among others, for
exercising their right to free expression. 
UAE courts acquitted several Libyan nationals whom they forcibly disappeared in
2015, and who had made credible allegations of torture in state security deten-
tion. Further evidence emerged regarding the frequent mistreatment of de-
tainees.
The UAE deployed expensive surveillance software to target leading human
rights activists. The government continued to ban international human rights or-
ganizations from visiting the country. Draconian counterterrorism laws continued
to prevent victims and their families from speaking out publicly against abuses. 
Freedom of Expression
UAE residents known to have spoken with international rights groups are at seri-
ous risk of arbitrary detention and imprisonment. The UAE’s 2014 counterterror-
ism law provides for the death penalty for people whose activities are found to
“undermine national unity or social peace,” neither of which are defined in the
law.
The trial of Emirati academic Nasser bin-Ghaith, whom authorities forcibly disap-
peared in August 2015 and whose whereabouts remained unknown at time of
writing, began at the Federal Supreme Court in April 2016. Media reports on the
trial indicate that he is accused of violating various provisions of the penal code,
a 2012 cybercrime law, and a 2014 counterterrorism law. Some of these charges,
according to local media reports, relate to “six tweets and images ridiculing the
Egyptian president and government.”
UAE-based Jordanian journalist Tayseer al-Najjar informed his family that his de-
tention in 2016 related to his online criticism of Israeli military actions in Gaza
and Egyptian security forces’ destruction of tunnels between Gaza and the Sinai
region of Egypt.
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Arbitrary Detention, Torture, and Mistreatment of Detainees
In February, a group of United Nations human rights experts, including the spe-
cial rapporteur on torture, the special rapporteur on the independence of judges
and lawyers, and the chair of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, criti-
cized the UAE’s treatment of five Libyan nationals who had been held in arbitrary
detention since 2014. The special rapporteur on torture said he had received
credible information that authorities subjected the men to torture. In May 2016,
the Federal Supreme Court acquitted the men of having links to armed groups in
Libya.
In another case involving the UAE’s state security apparatus, the son of an ad-
viser to former Egyptian President Mohamed Morsy claimed that UAE authorities
subjected him to “brutal physical and psychological torture” to get him to con-
fess to membership in the Muslim Brotherhood. The allegation echoes numer-
ous others that state security detainees have made since 2012.  
In March, a Dubai court acquitted British businessman David Haigh of charges
brought under the UAE’s cybercrime laws. Haigh claimed after his release that
Dubai police had punched and tasered him in an unsuccessful effort to make
him confess to accusations of fraud. Haigh said that he regularly witnessed
prison officers beating inmates during his two years of incarceration. Haigh said
he was not able to see the evidence against him at his trial and that he was not
able to give evidence or cross-examine witnesses.
Surveillance of Dissidents
A June report from Citizen Lab, a research institute at the University of Toronto
that focuses on internet security and human rights, identified a series of digital
campaigns against UAE dissidents, dating back to 2012. Citizen Lab described
the operator of these campaigns as “a sophisticated threat actor,” and said that
it was implausible that a state-actor was not behind the campaign. The research
identified several pieces of information suggesting a connection between the
operator and the UAE government.
In August 2016, Apple issued a software update to all iPhone users after Citizen
Lab identified flaws in its operating system that an Israel-based software com-
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pany, NSO, had exploited in an attempt to place spyware on the phone of lead-
ing Emirati human rights activist Ahmed Mansoor. 
Migrant Workers
Foreigners account for more than 88.5 percent of UAE residents, according to
2011 government statistics and many low-paid migrant workers remain acutely
vulnerable to forced labor, despite some reforms.
A Labor Ministry decree outlining the rules for terminating employment and
granting work permits to new employees took effect in 2016. These rules partly
govern how the kafala visa-sponsorship system operates in the UAE and should
theoretically make it easier for workers to change employers before their con-
tract ends if their rights are violated.  
Another Labor Ministry decree that took effect in January 2016 could help protect
low-paid migrant workers from the practice of contract substitution, in which
workers receive lower wages than those they initially agreed to, a practice that
can lead to forced labor. The new decrees do not apply to domestic workers, who
are explicitly excluded from UAE labor law protections. 
Women’s Rights
Discrimination on the basis of sex and gender is not included in the definition of
discrimination in the UAE’s 2015 anti-discrimination law. 
Federal law No. 28 of 2005 regulates matters of personal status in the UAE, and
some of its provisions discriminate against women. For instance, the law pro-
vides that, for a woman to marry, her male guardian must conclude her marriage
contract; men have the right to unilaterally divorce their wives, whereas a woman
who wishes to divorce her husband must apply for a court order; a woman can
lose her right to maintenance if, for example, she refuses to have sexual rela-
tions with her husband without a lawful excuse; and women are required to
“obey” their husbands. A woman may be considered disobedient, with few ex-
ceptions, if she decides to work without her husband’s consent. 
In 2010, the Federal Supreme Court issued a ruling—citing the penal code—that
sanctions husbands’ beating and inflicting other forms of punishment or coer-
cion on their wives, provided they do not leave physical marks.
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UAE law permits domestic violence. Article 53 of the UAE’s penal code allows the
imposition of “chastisement by a husband to his wife and the chastisement of
minor children” so long as the assault does not exceed the limits prescribed by
Sharia, or Islamic law. 
Children’s Rights
The law on juvenile offenders provides that the punishment of whipping may be
imposed on children over the age of 16 for murder, assault and battery, alcohol-
related offences, theft, or sexual intercourse outside marriage.
Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity
The UAE’s penal code does not explicitly prohibit homosexuality. However, arti-
cle 356 of the penal code criminalizes (but does not define) “indecency,” and
provides for a minimum sentence of one year in prison. In practice, UAE courts
use this article to convict and sentence people for zina offenses, which include
consensual sexual relations outside heterosexual marriage and other “moral”
offenses, including same-sex relations. 
Different emirates within the UAE have laws that criminalize same-sex sexual re-
lations, including Abu Dhabi where “unnatural sex with another person” can be
punished with up to 14 years in prison, and Dubai which imposes 10 years of im-
prisonment for sodomy.
Foreign Policy
The UAE maintained its military involvement in Yemen, where it is assisting in
the Saudi-led military campaign against Houthi forces, also known as Ansar
Allah. It is unclear if the UAE air force is still taking part in coalition airstrikes,
but Emirati troops remain on the ground in the south of the country.
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United States
The United States has a vibrant civil society and strong constitutional protec-
tions for many civil and political rights. Yet many US laws and practices, particu-
larly in the areas of criminal and juvenile justice, immigration, and national
security, violate internationally recognized human rights. Those least able to de-
fend their rights in court or through the political process—members of racial and
ethnic minorities, the poor, immigrants, children, and prisoners—are the people
most likely to suffer abuses. 
The election of Donald Trump as president in November 2016 capped a cam-
paign marked by misogynistic, xenophobic, and racist rhetoric and Trump’s em-
brace of policies that would cause tremendous harm to vulnerable communities,
contravene the United States’ core human rights obligations, or both. Trump’s
campaign proposals included deporting millions of unauthorized immigrants,
changing US law to allow torture of terrorism suspects, and “load[ing] up” the
Guantanamo Bay detention facility. 
President-elect Trump also pledged to repeal most of the Affordable Care Act,
which has helped 20 million previously uninsured Americans access health in-
surance and to nominate “pro-life” Supreme Court justices who would “automat-
ically” overturn Roe v. Wade, which would allow individual states to criminalize
abortion.
Death Penalty
At time of writing, the United States had executed 18 people in 2016, the lowest
number since 1992. 
Thirty-one states still allow for the death penalty, though in 2016 only five states
carried out executions, led by Texas and Georgia. The Delaware Supreme Court
ruled unconstitutional the state’s death penalty statute, and the Delaware Attor-
ney General announced that he would not appeal the decision. Nebraska rein-
stated its death penalty because of a November popular referendum. California
residents voted to retain the state’s death penalty. 
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Harsh Sentencing
2.3 million people are behind bars in the United States, the largest reported in-
carcerated population in the world. Of those, 211,000 are in the federal system,
and 2 million are in state prisons and local jails.
Congress continues to debate limited reform of federal sentencing laws, but it
passed no significant reforms in 2016. 
At time of writing, President Barack Obama had commuted the sentences of 944
people in 2016 in federal prison for drug offenses; 12,405 other petitions for
commutation were pending. More than one-third of the commutations were for
life sentences—no parole is available for federal crimes committed after 1987. 
The US Sentencing Commission amended its sentencing guidelines in 2016 to
broaden its “compassionate release” criteria, expanding eligibility for release
both on health grounds and for family reasons. 
Policing
Police killings of Alton Sterling in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, and Philando Castile
in Falcon Heights, Minnesota, among others, drew renewed attention to US po-
lice use of excessive force in interactions with black people. Similar to the pro-
gression of events in Ferguson, Missouri, after the shooting of Michael Brown in
2014, protesters in Baton Rouge responding to the shooting of Sterling were con-
fronted by police in riot gear. 
Five police officers were ambushed and killed in Dallas by a lone gunman in July.
Youth in the Criminal Justice System
On any given day, approximately 50,000 children in the United States are held in
correctional facilities. This number represents a 50 percent drop from 1999, but
is still one of the highest rates of juvenile detention in the world. Every US state
allows children to be tried as adults under some circumstances, and approxi-
mately 5,000 child offenders are held in adult jails or prisons at any point in
time. 
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Iowa, Utah, and South Dakota banned sentences of life without the possibility of
parole for child offenders—17 states now ban life without parole sentences for
child offenders.
California’s Proposition 57, which gives judges the sole power to grant or deny a
prosecutor’s request to remove a child from juvenile court to be tried in adult
court, passed in 2016. A similar legislative reform in Florida failed for the second
year in a row. 
Prison and Jail Conditions
Federal agencies submitted proposed reforms to solitary confinement policies to
the White House following a directive from President Obama in March. The Bu-
reau of Prisons also halved the average duration of placements in special man-
agement units, a form of solitary for people believed to have gang ties or with a
history of serious disciplinary infractions.
At the state level, Maryland passed a bill that requires the collection of data on
people in correctional facilities placed in solitary confinement. North Carolina
banned the use of solitary confinement for all offenders under age 18. New York,
New Jersey, Delaware, and other states considered legislative proposals to re-
form the use of solitary. New York City’s main jail complex, Rikers Island, ended
the use of solitary confinement for 16- to 18-year-olds, and New York Mayor Bill
de Blasio announced in October the end to punitive solitary confinement for
people under age 21. 
The US Justice Department announced in August that the Bureau of Prisons
would begin phasing out its use of private contract prisons. The Department of
Homeland Security, responsible for housing immigration detainees, announced
a review of its own use of private facilities, the findings of which were not yet
available at time of writing. President-elect Trump’s proposal to detain and de-
port millions of immigrants would make it difficult for the Department of Home-
land Security to close any facilities, whether private or public.
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Voter Disenfranchisement
In April, Virginia Governor Terry McAuliffe issued an executive order restoring vot-
ing rights to all persons in Virginia who had been convicted of a felony and had
completed their sentences. This restoration of voting rights would have im-
pacted 206,000 people in Virginia. The state supreme court subsequently invali-
dated that order, however, ruling that the governor lacked the authority to issue
such a blanket restoration of voting rights. The governor responded by creating a
process to individually restore voting rights to such individuals, and by late 2016
had restored voting rights to some 67,000 Virginia residents.
Drug Policy
All states and the federal government criminalize possession of illicit drugs for
personal use (though some have legalized medical or recreational marijuana).
Each year, state law enforcement agencies use these laws to make some 1.3 mil-
lion arrests. More than one of every nine arrests by state law enforcement agen-
cies is for drug possession, making drug possession the single most arrested
crime in the US. As a result, hundreds of thousands of individuals cycle through
the criminal justice system every year. Those who are convicted often find that
their criminal records lock them out of jobs, housing, education, welfare assis-
tance, voting, and much more, and subject them to discrimination and stigma. 
Drug enforcement discriminates against black adults. Black adults use drugs at
similar or even lower rates than white adults, yet black adults are more than two-
and-a-half times as likely as white adults to be arrested for drug possession in
the US.
California, Massachusetts, Nevada, and Maine passed ballot initiatives in 2016
that legalized recreational marijuana, following on the heels of prior legalization
initiatives in Colorado and Washington State. Florida, North Dakota, and
Arkansas legalized medical marijuana. The Obama administration emphasized
the need for more public health approaches to drug use, though it stopped short
of calling for decriminalization.
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Gun Violence
In June, an apparent politically motivated mass shooting at a gay nightclub in Or-
lando, Florida that left 49 people dead once again opened up public debate
about gun control and the high frequency of mass shootings in the US. 
In January, Obama announced a series of steps the executive branch would take
to reduce gun violence. However, legislative reforms were stalled in Congress.
Rights of Non-Citizens
The US government continues to detain migrant children from Central America
with their mothers, many of them seeking asylum. Although modest reforms an-
nounced in 2015 reduced the number of families in detention, the US still de-
tains some families for prolonged periods of time. Human Rights Watch has
documented the severe psychological toll of indefinite detention on asylum-
seeking mothers and children and the barriers it raises to due process.
Abusive detention conditions are also a concern. Human Rights Watch released
an analysis of the US government’s own investigations into the deaths of 18 im-
migrants in custody from 2012 to 2015, revealing dangerously substandard med-
ical care in 16 cases, contributing to the deaths of seven people. Other
organizations have documented similar problems in facilities across the country,
indicating severely inadequate oversight over a detention system of 200-plus fa-
cilities, including privately run facilities and local jails.
In June 2016, the US Supreme Court effectively blocked executive actions by the
Obama administration providing a temporary reprieve from deportation to cer-
tain unauthorized immigrants. The court issued a split decision that left a lower
court’s injunction in place. 
In November 2016, President-elect Trump reiterated his campaign promises to
build a wall on the US-Mexico border, and to quickly detain or deport 2 to 3 mil-
lion immigrants with criminal records. The Obama administration, which also fo-
cused on deporting immigrants with convictions, deported a record 2.5 million
people, with and without criminal records, over its two terms. Any push to rap-
idly deport millions of undocumented immigrants would almost certainly exacer-
bate abusive conditions of detention in a sprawling system with poor oversight,
and further undermine already weak due process protections.
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Labor Rights
The US has no national law on paid family leave. A federal bill to establish a paid
family leave program is pending in Congress. Meanwhile, a number of states
have enacted paid family leave insurance programs. In April 2016, New York
State enacted such a program, joining California, New Jersey, and Rhode Island.
Under these programs, workers are eligible for paid leave to bond with a new
child, to care for a seriously ill loved one, or to assist with family obligations
when a family member is called into active military service.
In the US workforce, women who worked full-time, year-round in 2014 earned 79
percent of what men earned, and the gender wage gap was bigger for black and
Hispanic women. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission receives thou-
sands of pregnancy discrimination and sexual harassment claims every year. 
Gaps in US law and regulations allow child farmworkers to work at younger ages,
for longer hours, and in more hazardous conditions than children working in any
other sector. Child farmworkers often work in extreme heat, exposed to toxic
pesticides and other dangers. On tobacco farms, child workers are exposed to
nicotine, and many report symptoms consistent with acute nicotine poisoning.
Some companies ban children under 16 from working on tobacco farms, but
these policies leave older children unprotected. The Obama administration
failed to change US regulations, and Congress has not amended US labor law to
protect child farmworkers. Tobacco companies have not taken sufficient action
to eliminate hazardous child labor in their supply chains. 
Right to Health
The criminal justice system continues to act as a barrier to adequate health care
for those most vulnerable to HIV, particularly people of color, people who use
drugs, sex workers, transgender women, and other heavily policed populations. 
The US is experiencing what the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention has
called an “epidemic” of opioid use, with 78 Americans dying each day from an
opioid overdose. Congress responded with the Comprehensive Addiction and
Recovery Act, legislation that authorizes increased support for drug dependence
prevention, treatment, and overdose prevention programs. Funding, however, re-
mains uncertain, and access to health care remains out of reach for many, partic-
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ularly in the 19 states that continue to reject Medicaid expansion under the Af-
fordable Care Act. 
In June 2016, the US Supreme Court struck down parts of a Texas law that im-
posed onerous restrictions on abortion providers. The Texas law required abor-
tion clinics to meet standards for ambulatory surgical centers and required
doctors who provide abortions to maintain admitting privileges at local hospi-
tals. 
Sexual Assault in the Military
Despite Defense Department reforms, US military service members who report
sexual assault frequently experience retaliation, including harassment, poor
work assignments, loss of promotion opportunities, disciplinary action, and
even criminal charges. In February 2016, the oversight body for US military jus-
tice adopted findings and recommendations aimed at ending such retaliation. A
Defense Department strategy for combatting retaliation released in April 2016
recognizes the problem, aims to gather and share information about how cases
are handled, and emphasizes a range of options for commanders to address re-
taliation against victims. Various versions of the National Defense Authorization
Act would improve transparency and adopt improved protections for whistle-
blowers, among other steps. At time of writing, the bill was still being negotiated
in Congress. 
Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity
In 2016, state legislatures introduced a record number of bills seeking to restrict
the rights of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) people. North Car-
olina eliminated local non-discrimination protections for sexual orientation and
gender identity and required transgender people to use public facilities that cor-
respond to the sex assigned to them at birth. Mississippi passed a law permit-
ting religious believers to discriminate against LGBT people and unmarried
couples. Tennessee passed legislation allowing counselors and therapists to re-
fuse to serve LGBT clients.
In May, the Departments of Education and Labor jointly issued guidance indicat-
ing that discrimination on the basis of gender identity constitutes sex discrimi-
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nation prohibited under federal law. After 22 states and several state and local
officials sued to challenge the guidance, a federal court temporarily enjoined the
departments from enforcing their interpretation. That litigation had not been re-
solved at time of writing. 
Transgender women in immigration detention have been subjected to sexual as-
sault and mistreatment including indefinite solitary confinement imposed on
some purely because authorities lacked appropriate facilities in which to house
them. 
Violence against Women
In 2016, Obama signed into law the Sexual Assault Survivors’ Rights Act, which
focuses on collection and preservation of evidence in sexual assault cases. It
protects survivors’ access to the initial forensic medical examination, and their
right to have a rape kit preserved throughout the statute of limitations and be
notified if a rape kit will be destroyed. 
An estimated 32 percent of women in the US have suffered physical violence
from an intimate partner and approximately 19 percent have been raped, with
nearly half of these at the hands of an intimate partner. Women in the US are
more likely to be killed by a partner, ex-partner, or family member than by any
other type of perpetrator. 
National Security 
The Obama administration made significant gains in releasing detainees at
Guantanamo Bay detention facilities to home or third countries, reducing the
population from 107 at the end of 2015 to 6o at time of writing. It also continued
with plans to hold some 30-40 of the detainees without charge indefinitely,
claiming that they cannot be prosecuted but pose too significant a security risk
to release. The administration did not adequately explained the basis for these
determinations or allow detainees to meaningfully challenge them.
The Obama administration continued to pursue prosecutions against seven men
in the fundamentally flawed Guantanamo Bay military commissions—a forum
that does not meet international fair trial standards. This includes five men al-
leged to have played a role in the September 11, 2001 attacks. On the attacks’
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15th anniversary, the case was in its fourth year of pretrial hearings with a trial
date still years away. The slow progress is the result of government secrecy
about the defendants’ torture in Central Intelligence Agency custody, the novel
nature of the court’s untested rules and procedures, and logistical difficulties as-
sociated with holding hearings at Guantanamo Bay. 
The US did not initiate any new investigations in 2016 into torture committed by
the CIA following the September 11, 2001 attacks, despite overwhelming evi-
dence of violations of federal criminal law. The government has also not pro-
vided redress to victims of CIA torture. Both prosecutions and redress are
required by international law. However, the Justice Department chose not to as-
sert a national security defense known as the “state secrets privilege” in a law-
suit brought by three men against two CIA contractors for their torture in
Afghanistan. Failure to assert the privilege allowed the case, a civil suit for com-
pensation, to proceed further than any previous such case.
The US continued to carry out targeted killings, often with the use of aerial
drones, against alleged militants outside conventional war zones, including in
Yemen, Pakistan, Libya, and Somalia. In July 2016, the director of national intelli-
gence released figures claiming that the US had killed between 64 and 116 “non-
combatants” in such strikes since 2009, a figure that advocacy groups―
including Human Rights Watch, which investigated several of the strikes―said
appeared to significantly undercount the civilian lives lost. When the govern-
ment released its figures, Obama issued an executive order promising to offer
voluntary payments to survivors and families of civilians killed, without regard to
the lawfulness of the strike. It is unclear whether the order has been imple-
mented.
Throughout 2016, the US continued to carry out large-scale warrantless intelli-
gence surveillance programs and failed to address the serious lack of trans-
parency, oversight, and accountability in this area. Federal law enforcement
agencies also campaigned for expanded hacking and monitoring powers. The US
continued to seek the extradition from Russia of Edward Snowden, the whistle-
blower who revealed the scope of US mass surveillance in 2013.
One of the main laws under which the US currently conducts large-scale surveil-
lance, including of people outside its borders, is section 702 of the Foreign Intel-
ligence Surveillance Act. The law is scheduled to sunset at the end of 2017, and
647
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH
congressional debates concerning whether to reform the law are anticipated dur-
ing the year. In July, a federal appeals court heard a challenge to the constitu-
tionality of section 702 in the context of an Oregon criminal case; the court’s
decision remained pending at time of writing. 
Meanwhile, US global communications surveillance practices under a policy di-
rective known as Executive Order 12333 remain shrouded in secrecy, with neither
Congress nor the courts asserting a meaningful oversight role. A longstanding ef-
fort by the independent Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board to review
some of the government’s activities under EO 12333 appeared to generate a
backlash: for example, at time of writing, the Senate was considering laws that
would prohibit the oversight board from considering the privacy or other rights of
anyone other than US citizens and lawful permanent residents.
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) mounted a campaign to force US tech-
nology companies to weaken the encryption they use to protect private commu-
nications—a move that would jeopardize human rights globally. The FBI also
urged Congress to adopt laws that would allow it to demand individuals’ brows-
ing histories and other internet records without a warrant; the measure failed a
procedural vote by a narrow margin, raising the risk of a renewed effort in 2017.
Federal law enforcement was more successful in obtaining a new administrative
rule that expanded its global hacking powers; at time of writing the rule was
scheduled to take effect in December 2016, although legislation had been intro-
duced to prevent or delay its final adoption.
Foreign Policy
In February, Obama made an historic trip to Cuba to mark the restart of diplo-
matic relations. While Obama raised the issue of political prisoners during a
joint press conference with Cuban President Raúl Castro, he did not publicly
push US concerns about arbitrary detention, blocked websites, and laws used to
punish dissent. In March, Obama traveled to Argentina where he announced the
declassification of US intelligence and military documents relating to US involve-
ment during the country’s “dirty war.”
The finalized Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement, which includes side agree-
ments on labor issues in Vietnam, Malaysia, and Brunei, was signed in February
by the United States but did not move forward in Congress before the election.
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Donald Trump’s election victory and his campaign rhetoric against the agree-
ment make it highly unlikely that implementing legislation needed for the agree-
ment will be passed, meaning that the agreement is either dead or will have to
significantly renegotiated. 
US-led efforts at the United Nations Human Rights Council produced the coun-
cil’s first ever joint statement on China’s human rights record in March. However,
Obama did not raise major human rights concerns during his visit to China for
the G20 summit in September. 
Obama traveled to Vietnam in May, where he announced that, despite Vietnam’s
lack of progress on human rights, the US would lift the ban on lethal arms sales
to the country. During Burmese leader Aung Sun Suu Kyi’s visit to Washington,
DC, in September, the administration announced it would significantly ease re-
maining sanctions on Burma in the wake of historic democratic elections there.
In his visits to Kenya and Nigeria in August, Secretary of State John Kerry raised
concerns about links between human rights violations and insecurity but did lit-
tle to press partner governments to live up to their rhetorical commitments. After
President Kabila of the Democratic Republic of Congo made moves to remain in
power for an unconstitutional third term, the US imposed sanctions against sev-
eral senior Congolese officials.
As violence returned to South Sudan’s capital city in July, the US finally began to
push for a UN Security Council arms embargo on the warring parties in an effort
to stem atrocities.
In September, the Senate introduced a bipartisan resolution to halt weapons
sales to Saudi Arabia, as evidence of unlawful airstrikes by Saudi forces in
Yemen mounted. Although the resolution did not pass, it was supported by more
than a quarter of the Senate, reflecting fissures in what had been steadfast sup-
port for Saudi Arabia in the US security establishment. 
The US continues to provide significant financial and technical security assis-
tance to Egypt, despite a report from the US General Accountability Office (GAO)
showing that both US and Egyptian authorities have been negligent in human
rights vetting of security forces and equipment use. 
The US hosted the Leaders’ Summit on the Global Refugee Crisis on the margins
of the UN General Assembly in September, resulting in new commitments from
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donor countries to roughly double the number of refugees resettled globally and
provide an additional $4.5 billion in humanitarian funding over 2015 levels.
In September, Obama waived provisions of the Child Soldiers Prevention Act to
allow six countries—the Democratic Republic of Congo, Iraq, Nigeria, Somalia,
South Sudan, and Rwanda—to continue to receive US military assistance sanc-
tionable under the law, despite their continued use of child soldiers. Obama
also waived the law’s restrictions on Burma, even though Burma is not sched-
uled for US military assistance in fiscal year 2017. The only countries completely
restricted were Sudan, Syria, and Yemen, countries to which the United States
was not planning to offer military assistance. 
The International Criminal Court is analyzing crimes committed in Afghanistan by
non-state armed groups, domestic government forces, and international forces,
including allegations of disappearances and torture of detainees by US armed
forces and the CIA during the Bush administration.
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Uzbekistan
Uzbekistan’s long-serving authoritarian ruler Islam Karimov died in fall 2016 fol-
lowing almost 27 years of rule. But his death and the installation of former Prime
Minister Shavkat Mirziyoyev as president failed to usher in any meaningful im-
provements in Uzbekistan’s abysmal human rights record. The United States and
European Union also continued their longstanding policies of muted criticism
over the government’s abuses.
Authorities maintain rigid control over the population, severely curtailing free-
doms of association, expression, and religion. Thousands of individuals remain
imprisoned on politically motivated charges, torture is widespread, and authori-
ties regularly harass rights activists, opposition members, and journalists. Mus-
lims and Christians who practice their religion outside strict state controls are
persecuted. Authorities force over 1 million adults to harvest cotton every fall
under harsh conditions, netting enormous profits for the government.
New Leader, Same Abuses
Karimov’s death was confirmed by authorities on September 2, following a
stroke. For the previous six days, authorities hid from the public reports he had
already died, announcing the death only after foreign leaders publicly expressed
condolences. Independent journalists and rights defenders such as Daniil Kislov
and Nadejda Atayeva, who reported about the news of Karimov’s death and his
abusive legacy, were subjected to an orchestrated campaign of online harass-
ment, including death threats, during which they were labelled them as traitors.
Although the constitution required Senate Chairman Nigmatulla Yuldashev, to
become interim president for a 3-month period in the event of the president’s
death or incapacitation, the Senate installed Prime Minister Mirziyoyev in the
post, setting presidential elections for December.
In one of Mirziyoyev’s first public addresses as interim president he signaled his
intent to continue Karimov’s repressive policies, vowing to crush any “internal or
external threats to stability and sovereignty.”
Mirziyoyev was officially declared the winner of the presidential election held on
December 4. The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe's Office
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for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) said that "while the elec-
tion administration took measures to enhance the transparency of its work and
the proper conduct of the election, the dominant position of state actors and
limits on fundamental freedoms undermine political pluralism and led to a cam-
paign devoid of genuine competition." ODIHR observers further said that Uzbek
"media covered the election in a highly restrictive and controlled environment,
and the state-defined narrative did not provide voters the opportunity to hear al-
ternative viewpoints." 
Politically Motivated Imprisonment and Harassment of Critics
Authorities have imprisoned thousands of people on politically motivated
charges, mostly religious believers, but also rights and opposition activists, jour-
nalists, and other perceived critics. Authorities frequently subject detainees to
torture and arbitrarily extend their sentences.
Human rights activists in prison include Azam Farmonov, Mehriniso Ham-
damova, Zulhumor Hamdamova, Isroiljon Kholdorov, Gaybullo Jalilov, Nuriddin
Jumaniyazov, Matluba Kamilova, Ganikhon Mamatkhanov, Chuyan Mamatkulov,
Zafarjon Rahimov, Yuldash Rasulov, Fahriddin Tillaev, and Akzam Turgunov. Jour-
nalists in prison include Solijon Abdurakhmanov, Muhammad Bekjanov, Gayrat
Mikhliboev, Yusuf Ruzimuradov, and Dilmurod Saidov. Opposition activists be-
hind bars include Samandar Kukanov, Kudratbek Rasulov, and Rustam Usmanov.
Imprisoned religious figures and other perceived government critics include Ara-
mais Avakyan, Ruhiddin Fahriddinov, Nodirbek Yusupov, Dilorom Abdukodirova,
Botirbek Eshkuziev, Bahrom Ibragimov, Davron Kabilov, Erkin Musaev, Davron To-
jiev, and Ravshanbek Vafoev.
On October 25, prison authorities released a human rights defender, Bobomurod
Razzakov, on medical grounds one year prior to the end of a four-year sentence.
But evidence emerged that Razzakov was seriously ill-treated and denied appro-
priate medical care in prison. In November, following a public appeal for his re-
lease by the US State Department and human rights groups, authorities also
released the long-serving political activist Samandar Kukanov, behind bars since
1993, reversing an earlier decision to extend his term of imprisonment by an ad-
ditional three years. Kukanov, also a victim of torture in custody, was seriously ill
at the time of his release.
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With the exception of the rights group Ezgulik, which was allowed to meet with
four prisoners in July, August, and October, authorities continue to deny diplo-
matic missions, the International Committee for the Red Cross, and human rights
organizations access to prisons and other detention centers.
On January 11, Human Rights Watch discovered that a prominent religious figure,
52-year-old Akram Yuldashev, one of Uzbekistan’s longest held political prison-
ers, died in prison in 2010 of tuberculosis. He had been due for release in Febru-
ary 2016, but no one knew of his fate because authorities forcibly disappeared
him in prison, denying anyone information about his whereabouts or fate since
2009.
In March 2016, long-time rights defender Elena Urlaeva, head of the Tashkent-
based Human Rights Alliance of Uzbekistan, checked into the Tashkent Psychi-
atric Clinic after experiencing multiple traumatic events, including ill-treatment
by police. In late April, Urlaeva’s doctor informed her she was in good health and
would be released on May 2. However, the hospital then refused to release her,
arbitrarily detaining her citing “official orders” rather than a medical reason. The
hospital released Urlaeva on June 1, after significant international pressure. 
After her release, Urlaeva reported ill-treatment during her detention, saying the
“hospital staff turned aggressive patients on me, who beat me and dragged me
by the hair.” 
Imprisoned rights defender Ganihon Mamatkhanov’s 8-year prison term was due
to end on June 4. Days before Mamatkhanov’s release, officials accused him of
unspecified “violations of prison rules”—a practice authorities have used to ar-
bitrarily extend political prisoners’ sentences—and kept him in prison. It is not
known by how many years his term has been extended and his current where-
abouts are unknown.
In August, a Fergana court sentenced the brother of a Radio Free Europe (RFE)
journalist to eight years in prison on drug-related charges, the latest government
action involving persons affiliated with RFE’s Uzbek Service. In court proceed-
ings, Aziz Yusupov was represented by a lawyer assigned to him by Uzbekistan’s
National Security Service, whom Yusupov’s family said persuaded him to make a
false confession to mollify the court. During the trial, no evidence was brought
against Yusupov to corroborate the charges.
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Forced Labor
The government forces more than 1 million adults every autumn to pick cotton in
abusive conditions on pain of punishment. Following a decade of global pres-
sure, authorities did not mobilize children to harvest cotton in 2016, as in 2015,
but instead increased the number of forced adult laborers to meet annual pro-
duction quotas. In several regions, officials also forced children to help toward
the end of the harvest.
Teachers, doctors, nurses, civil servants, and private sector employees were
forced to pick cotton under threat of dismissal from work or loss of salary and
pension and welfare benefits, and authorities detained and threatened citizens
attempting to report on these abuses.
Freedom of Religion
Authorities imprison religious believers who practice their faith outside state
controls. In September, the Initiative Group of Independent Human Rights De-
fenders estimated that more than 12,000 persons are currently imprisoned on
vague charges related to “extremism” or “anti-constitutional” activity, several
hundred of them convicted in the previous year. Authorities banned shared Mus-
lim iftar (breaking of fast) meals in public during Ramadan, severely restricted
the religious literature, and continued to ban people under 18 from attending
mosques.
Prison authorities arbitrarily extended the prison term of Sunni religious believer
Kamol Odilov in late January, just days before he completed his six-year prison
term. He and his fellow Muslims had met to discuss the works of the late Turkish
Muslim theologian Said Nursi. According to Forum 18, four members of a Sufi
Muslim community were imprisoned for four years in Bukhara in June for holding
religious meetings at home, as their community does not have state registration.
Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity
Consensual sexual relations between men are criminalized, with a maximum
prison sentence of three years. Activists report that police use blackmail and ex-
tortion against gay men, threatening to out or imprison them. Lesbian, gay, bi-
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sexual, and transgender (LGBT) people face deep-rooted homophobia and dis-
crimination.
Key International Actors
Despite calls by Uzbek rights activists on the US and EU to seize upon the end of
Islam Karimov’s rule and ensuing transition as an opportunity to push for rights
improvements, Washington and Brussels’ overall stance on human rights in
Uzbekistan remained disappointingly weak. Both failed to articulate publicly
clear expectations for reform such as the release of political prisoners or access
for United Nations human rights monitors. Since 2002, the government has ig-
nored requests by at least 14 UN rights experts to visit the country. In September,
the UN high commissioner for human rights singled out Uzbekistan in a list of
country that failed to cooperate with his office for having refuse access to the
country.
US Secretary of State John Kerry convened a joint meeting with foreign ministers
of the five Central Asian nations in August in Washington following a similar re-
gional meeting in Samarkand in November 2015. While the participating govern-
ments issued a general statement reaffirming a commitment to uphold human
rights, Secretary Kerry did not publicly express concern about any specific
human rights issues with the Uzbek government; it remains unclear whether he
did so privately.
In July, however, the State Department downgraded Uzbekistan’s placement in
the Trafficking in Persons report, a global human trafficking report, from the mid-
dle category, Tier II, down to Tier III—the worst category, acknowledging the gov-
ernment’s responsibility for widespread adult forced labor. For the eighth
consecutive year, the State Department designated Uzbekistan as a “country of
particular concern,” due to its serial violations of religious freedom, but the
White House waived the sanctions envisaged under the statute, citing national
security grounds.
Since April 2015, the World Bank has been working with the government to reju-
venate the irrigation system in several districts of Karakalpakstan, an au-
tonomous republic in northwestern Uzbekistan. Recognizing this directly
benefits Uzbekistan’s cotton industry, the bank agreed with the government that
it would comply with national and international forced labor laws and that
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should there be credible evidence of violations, the bank could suspend the
loan. 
In the face of overwhelming evidence of forced labor in the project area, instead
of suspending its loan, the bank increased its investments in Uzbekistan’s agri-
culture industry, by investing in its joint venture with Indorama Corporation, In-
dorama Kokand Textile, a leading cotton yarn producer in Uzbekistan. The World
Bank’s private sector lending arm, the International Finance Corporation (IFC), in
December 2015 loaned Indorama US$40 million to expand its textile plant,
which uses solely Uzbek cotton.
In December 2015, Germany ended its controversial 13-year military use of
Uzbekistan’s airbase in Termez. In March, German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter
Steinmeier visited Uzbekistan, also in his capacity as chairperson-in-office of the
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. He failed to raise serious
concerns in public on human rights issues.
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Venezuela
Under the leadership of President Hugo Chávez and now President Nicolás
Maduro, the accumulation of power in the executive branch and erosion of
human rights guarantees have enabled the government to intimidate, persecute,
and even criminally prosecute its critics. 
Severe shortages of medicines, medical supplies, and food have intensified
since 2014, and weak government responses have undermined Venezuelans’
rights to health and food. Protesters have been arbitrarily detained and subject
to abuse by security forces. 
Police and military raids in low-income and immigrant communities have led to
widespread allegations of abuse.  
Other persistent concerns include poor prison conditions, impunity for human
rights violations, and continuous harassment by government officials of human
rights defenders and independent media outlets.
Prosecution of Political Opponents
Opposition leader Leopoldo López is serving a 13-year sentence in a military
prison for his alleged role in inciting violence during a demonstration in Caracas
in February 2014, despite the lack of any credible evidence linking him to a
crime. Several others arbitrarily arrested in connection with 2014 anti-govern-
ment protests remain under house arrest or in detention awaiting trial.
In 2016, the Bolivarian National Intelligence Service (SEBIN) detained dozens of
people on allegations of planning, fomenting, or participating in violent anti-
government actions, including some that were in fact peaceful protests. Many
say they have been tortured or otherwise abused in custody, or that they were
unable to see their families or lawyers for hours, occasionally days, after arrest.
In several cases, prosecutors failed to present any credible evidence linking the
accused to crimes. In some, the evidence included possession of political mate-
rials, including pamphlets calling for the release of political prisoners.
On August 29, intelligence agents detained Yon Goicoechea, an activist of the
Popular Will opposition party, as he was driving to a press conference about an
opposition rally scheduled for September 1. Goicoechea’s family and lawyer re-
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ceived no official information about his whereabouts for more than 56 hours. A
judge subsequently charged Goicoechea with several crimes and ordered his
pretrial detention. 
Crackdown on Protest Activity
In early 2014, the government responded to massive anti-government protests
with brutal force. For several weeks, security forces used excessive force against
unarmed protesters and bystanders, and tolerated and sometimes collaborated
directly with armed pro-government gangs that attacked protesters with im-
punity. Detainees were often held incommunicado on military bases for 48 hours
or more before being presented to a judge, and in some cases, suffered abuses
including severe beatings, electric shocks or burns, and being forced to squat or
kneel without moving for hours. 
Protesters continue to be subject to prosecution for participating in peaceful
demonstrations. José Gregorio Hernández Carrasco, a university student, was
detained in May 2016, two days after he participated in an anti-government
demonstration in Caracas. He said he was beaten and tortured and finally agreed
to sign a confession. The torture techniques included electric shocks, choking
him with a plastic bag, and placing a stick on his rectum and threatening to rape
him with it. Hernández Carrasco was released in July, but remains subject to
criminal prosecution.
In 2016, Venezuelans reported being arrested during street protests over food
scarcity—some organized and some spontaneous—and being subject to mis-
treatment while in detention. Doctors and nurses in public hospitals who have
spoken out publicly about the humanitarian crisis report being threatened with
the loss of their jobs.
Operation Peoples’ Liberation  
Beginning in July 2015, President Maduro deployed more than 80,000 members
of security forces nationwide in “Operation Peoples’ Liberation” (OLP) to ad-
dress rising security concerns. Police and military raids in low-income and immi-
grant communities have led to widespread allegations of abuse, including
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extrajudicial killings, mass arbitrary detentions, maltreatment of detainees,
forced evictions, the destruction of homes, and arbitrary deportations. 
In February 2016, Attorney General Luisa Ortega Díaz said that 245 people had
been killed during OLP raids in 2015, in incidents in which “members of various
security forces participated.” Dozens more have been killed since in 2016, ac-
cording to media. Government officials have routinely said that those killed died
during “confrontations” with armed criminals. Yet in at least 20 cases, families
of victims or witnesses said that there was no confrontation. In several cases,
victims were last seen alive in police custody.
Humanitarian Crisis
Severe shortages of medicines and medical supplies make it extremely difficult
for Venezuelans to obtain essential medical care. In August, a network of med-
ical residents working in public hospitals throughout the country reported severe
shortages of basic medicines in 76 percent of the hospitals surveyed, up from 55
percent in 2014 and 67 percent in 2015. 
Official statistics show that infant and maternal mortality rates in 2016 were sub-
stantially higher than in previous years. The infant mortality rate for the first five
months of 2016 was 18.61 deaths per 1,000—45 percent higher than the 2013
figure. The maternal mortality rate for the first five months of 2016 was 130.70
deaths for every 100,000 births, 79 percent higher than the rate reported for
2009, the most recent year for which such data is available. 
Severe shortages of food make it extremely difficult for many people to obtain
adequate nutrition. In a 2015 survey by civil society groups and two Venezuelan
universities, 87 percent of interviewees nationwide—most from low-income
households—said they had difficulty purchasing food. Twelve percent were eat-
ing two or fewer meals a day. 
The Venezuelan government has downplayed the severity of the crisis. Its own
efforts to alleviate the shortages have not succeeded and it has made only lim-
ited efforts to obtain available international humanitarian assistance.
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Judicial Independence 
Since former President Chávez and his supporters in the National Assembly con-
ducted a political takeover of the Supreme Court in 2004, the judiciary has
ceased to function as an independent branch of government. Members of the
Supreme Court have openly rejected the principle of separation of powers, and
publicly pledged their commitment to advancing the government’s political
agenda.
Since the opposition assumed the majority in the National Assembly in January
2016, the Supreme Court, upon President Maduro’s request for a constitutional
analysis, has struck down almost every law passed. In October, it removed the
budgetary authority from Congress, allowing the president to adopt the 2017
budget by a decree to be approved by the Supreme Court. 
Judge María Lourdes Afiuni continues to face criminal prosecution as a result of a
2009 ruling in which she authorized the conditional release of a government
critic. Afiuni’s ruling was in line with a recommendation by international human
rights monitors. After a year in prison and two under house arrest in pre-trial de-
tention, she was released but remains subject to criminal prosecution on
charges including abuse of authority. 
Freedom of Expression
For more than a decade, the government has expanded and abused its powers to
regulate media and has worked aggressively to reduce the number of dissenting
media outlets. Existing laws grant the government power to suspend or revoke
concessions to private media if “convenient for the interests of the nation,”
allow for arbitrary suspension of websites for the vaguely defined offense of “in-
citement,” and criminalize expression of “disrespect” for high government offi-
cials. While some newspapers, websites, and radio stations criticize the
government, fear of reprisals has made self-censorship a serious problem.
Security forces detained, interrogated, and confiscated the equipment of several
journalists in 2016. On September 3, Braulio Jatar, a prominent Venezuelan jour-
nalist born in Chile who directs an independent digital outlet in Nueva Esparta
State, went missing after he covered a spontaneous pot-banging protest against
President Maduro in a pro-government neighborhood on Margarita Island. His
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coverage had received widespread attention in Venezuela and internationally.
His family did not know his whereabouts for more than 36 hours. A prosecutor
later charged Jatar with money laundering—which carries a sentence of up to 15
years in prison—in connection with approximately US$25,000 cash that he al-
legedly had in his car. Jatar says the evidence was planted. At time of writing,
Jatar was in pretrial detention.
Human Rights Defenders
Government measures to restrict international funding of nongovernmental or-
ganizations—combined with unsubstantiated accusations by government offi-
cials and supporters that human rights defenders are seeking to undermine
Venezuelan democracy—create a hostile environment that undermines the abil-
ity of civil society groups to promote human rights. 
In May, President Maduro issued a presidential decree that—in addition to de-
claring a “state of exception” and granting himself the power to suspend rights—
instructed the Foreign Affairs Ministry to suspend all agreements providing
foreign funding to individuals or organizations when “it is presumed” that such
agreements “are used for political purposes or to destabilize the Republic.”
Maduro has extended the state of exception twice, in September and November.
In 2010, the Supreme Court ruled that individuals or organizations receiving for-
eign funding can be prosecuted for treason. The National Assembly that year en-
acted legislation blocking organizations that “defend political rights” or
“monitor the performance of public bodies” from receiving international assis-
tance. 
Political Discrimination
In June, dozens of workers from the customs and tax agency were fired in appar-
ent retaliation for having supported the recall of President Maduro. Media re-
ports say that hundreds of other referendum supporters nationwide were fired
under similar circumstances, and that a government program that distributes
food and basic goods at government-capped prices discriminated against gov-
ernment critics. 
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Prison Conditions
Corruption, weak security, deteriorating infrastructure, overcrowding, insufficient
staffing, and poorly trained guards allow armed gangs to exercise effective con-
trol over inmate populations within prisons. The Venezuelan Observatory of Pris-
ons, a human rights group, reported that 6,663 people died in prisons between
1999 and 2015. As of July, average overcrowding of 210 percent plagued
Venezuelan prisons, according to the Observatory.
In March, four inmates and a prison guard died when detainees and security offi-
cers clashed at the Fénix Penitentiary Center in Lara State. Fifty-two detainees,
four prison guards, and the prison director were injured. The press has reported
other violent prison incidents in 2016, in which at least 20 more people died.
Key International Actors
In May 2016, OAS Secretary General Luis Almagro presented a report on the hu-
manitarian and human rights crisis in Venezuela, and called for invocation of the
Inter-American Democratic Charter—an agreement protecting human rights and
democratic guarantees in OAS member states. The OAS Permanent Council in
June rejected Venezuela’s contention that a debate on the report violated its sov-
ereignty, and a majority of member countries voted to move forward and evalu-
ate Venezuela’s compliance with the charter. In November, Venezuela walked
out of a Permanent Council meeting when the body adopted a resolution sup-
porting dialogue between the government and opposition, arguing the resolu-
tion violated its sovereignty.
A dialogue between the government and opposition that began in early 2016,
led by former Spanish president José Luis Zapatero, failed to deliver meaningful
results. In October, the Vatican announced it would mediate between the sides
and subsequently participated in a series of meetings that led to the November
release of a handful of political prisoners and a vague joint statement on the
need for international assistance to address the humanitarian crisis and for ap-
pointment of new members to the National Electoral Council. 
In September, Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay blocked Venezuela from
assuming the presidency of the regional trading bloc, Mercosur. 
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The government withdrew from the American Convention on Human Rights
(IAHCR) in 2013, leaving citizens and residents unable to request intervention by
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights when local remedies for abuses com-
mitted since that date are ineffective or unavailable. The IACHR continues to
monitor Venezuela, however, applying the American Declaration of Rights and
Duties of Man, which does not require states’ ratification.
In August, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon said Venezuela was facing a “hu-
manitarian crisis.” The UN high commissioner for human rights has expressed
concern regarding deteriorating human rights conditions, including shortages of
medicines and food, government intimidation campaigns against human rights
defenders, and harsh government responses to peaceful expressions of dissent.  
Venezuela’s human rights record was scrutinized at the UN Human Rights Coun-
cil in November. Numerous states urged Venezuela to cooperate with UN special
procedures; address arbitrary detention, lack of judicial independence, and
shortages of medicine and food; release persons detained for political reasons;
respect freedom of expression, association, and peaceful assembly; and ensure
that human rights defenders can conduct their work without reprisals.
In 2015, President Barack Obama issued an executive order imposing targeted
sanctions against seven Venezuelan government officials. In July 2016, the US
Congress extended through 2019 its ability to freeze assets and ban visas of
those accused of committing abuses against anti-government demonstrators
during the 2014 protests. 
As a member of the UN Human Rights Council, Venezuela has regularly voted to
prevent scrutiny of human rights violations, opposing resolutions spotlighting
abuses in North Korea, Syria, Belarus, and Iran. 
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Vietnam
The Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) in 2016 maintained its control over all
public affairs and punished those who challenged its monopoly on power. Au-
thorities restricted basic rights, including freedom of speech, opinion, associa-
tion, and assembly. All religious groups had to register with the government and
operate under surveillance. Bloggers and activists faced daily police harassment
and intimidation, and were subject to arbitrary house arrest, restricted move-
ment, and physical assaults. Many were detained for long periods without ac-
cess to legal counsel or family visits. The number of bloggers and activists
known to be convicted and sentenced to prison almost tripled from the previous
year, from 7 to at least 19.
In January, the CPV held its 12th congress, during which it selected the country’s
new politburo. Of the 19 members, four, including Vietnam’s new president Tran
Dai Quang, were from the Ministry of Public Security. In May, Vietnam held a
tightly controlled and scripted national election in which all candidates had to
be approved by the CPV. Several dozen independent candidates were intimi-
dated and disqualified.
Freedom of Speech and Opinion
The Vietnamese government frequently uses vaguely worded penal code provi-
sions to crackdown on dissent, including “undermining national unity,” “con-
ducting propaganda against the state,” and “abusing the rights to democracy
and freedom to infringe upon the interests of the state.”
During the first nine months of 2016, at least 19 bloggers and activists were put
on trial and convicted. Others continue to be held without trial, including rights
campaigners Nguyen Van Dai, Tran Anh Kim, Le Thanh Tung, and Nguyen Ngoc
Nhu Quynh.
In March, the People’s Court of Hanoi sentenced prominent blogger Nguyen Huu
Vinh (also known as Ba Sam) and his colleague Nguyen Thi Minh Thuy to five and
three years respectively under article 258 for running a politically independent
website.
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Also in March, the People’s Court of Ho Chi Minh City sentenced prominent blog-
ger Nguyen Dinh Ngoc (also known as Nguyen Ngoc Gia) to four years in prison
for publishing articles on the internet. The same court convicted land rights ac-
tivists Ngo Thi Minh Uoc to four years, and Nguyen Thi Be Hai and Nguyen Thi Tri,
to three years each for staging a peaceful protest outside the United States Con-
sulate in Ho Chi Minh City. In October, Nguyen Dinh Ngoc’s sentence was re-
duced to three years on appeal.
In August, the People’s Court of Khanh Hoa sentenced cousins Nguyen Huu Quoc
Duy and Nguyen Huu Thien An to three and two years respectively for “conduct-
ing propaganda against the Socialist Republic of Vietnam” in accordance with ar-
ticle 88 of the penal code. According to state media, Nguyen Huu Thien An
painted reactionary slogans on the outside wall of a police station, while Nguyen
Huu Quoc Duy called for the VCP leadership to be removed. The two were also
accused of accessing “reactionary” websites.
In September, the People’s Court of Dong Da district in Hanoi sentenced land
rights activist Can Thi Theu to 20 months in prison for participating in a public
protest and boycotting the national election.
State Violence against Activists, Dissidents, and Criminal
Suspects
There were frequent physical assaults against human rights bloggers and cam-
paigners at the hands of anonymous men who appear to be acting with state
sanction and impunity. During the first seven months of 2016, at least 34 peo-
ple—including children—reported that unknown assailants beat them.
In February, men threw rocks at the house of former political prisoner, Tran Minh
Nhat, and broke his skull. In April, former political prisoner Nguyen Dinh Cuong
was taken to a police station in Nghe An province where men in civilian clothes
beat ad punched him. In May, police briefly detained 17-year-old rights activist
Huynh Thanh Phat for allegedly participating in pro-environment protests. Two
men wearing surgical masks and civilian clothes attacked him on the way home
from the police station. In June, an unidentified man punched rights activist
Nguyen Van Thanh in a café in Da Nang and bruised his face. In July, men in civil-
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ian clothes attacked rights activist La Viet Dung with a brick in Hanoi and broke
his skull. No one was charged in any of the cases.
Police brutality continued, and detainees were apparently injured and even
killed as a result. For example, in March 2016, Y Sik Nie died from alleged torture
in Dak Lak province after being arrested for theft. In July, Bui Minh Trang, Bui
Minh Truong, and Tran Van Cuong reported that they were detained for five days
without a warrant and then beaten in custody by police in Quang Tri province for
involvement in a dispute. The three men claimed they were forced to write state-
ments saying they volunteered to spend five days at the police station.
Freedoms of Assembly, Association, and Movement
Vietnam bans all independent political parties, labor unions, and human rights
organizations. Authorities require official approval for public gatherings and re-
fuse to grant permission for meetings, marches, or protests they deem politically
or otherwise unacceptable.
In May, police used excessive force to disperse pro-environment marches in
Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City. Many protesters reported that they were beaten and
detained for hours. Several protesters, including Vo Chi Dai Duong, Dang Ngoc
Thuy, Cao Tran Quan, Xuan Dieu, and Nguyen Tan, were taken to administrative
detention centers where they were kept for several days without access to legal
counsel or due process.
Restrictions on freedom of movement are used to prevent bloggers and activists
from attending public events, such as protests, human rights discussions, or tri-
als of fellow activists. In May, police detained prominent rights campaigner
Nguyen Quang A and influential blogger Pham Doan Trang to prevent them from
attending a private meeting with United States President Barack Obama during
his visit to Vietnam. Nguyen Quang A reported that between late March and early
August 2016 police detained him six times to prevent him from meeting with for-
eign diplomats and delegations including Germany, the United States, the Euro-
pean Union, and Australia.
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Freedom of Religion
The government monitors, harasses, and sometimes violently cracks down on re-
ligious groups that operate outside official, government-registered, and govern-
ment-controlled religious institutions. Authorities subject to intrusive
surveillance unrecognized branches of the Cao Dai church, the Hoa Hao Bud-
dhist church, independent Protestant and Catholic house churches in the central
highlands and elsewhere, Khmer Krom Buddhist temples, and the Unified Bud-
dhist Church of Vietnam.
During the first eight months of 2016, the People’s Court of Gia Lai province con-
victed at least nine Montagnards, including Gyun, Thin, Dinh Ku, A Tik, A Jen, Siu
Doang, Ksor Pup, Siu Dik, and Ksor Phit, for participating in independent reli-
gious groups not approved by the government. They were charged for “under-
mining national unity” under article 87 and sentenced to between five and
eleven years in prison.
Another common form of harassment that authorities continue to use against in-
dependent religious groups is forced denunciation of their faith. In April, state
media reported that more than 500 followers of the outlawed Dega Protestants
“voluntarily renounced” their faith in Chu Puh district, Gia Lai province. This con-
stitutes a violation of freedom of belief, which is not subject to limitation under
international human rights law.
Criminal Justice System
Vietnamese courts remained firmly under the political control of the government
and the VCP. Trials of rights bloggers and activists consistently failed in 2016 to
meet international fair standards. Police regularly intimidated and in some cases
detained family members and friends who tried to attend trials.
In March, Hanoi police detained a number of activists, including Nguyen Dinh Ha
and Nguyen Quang A, for trying to attend the trial of blogger Nguyen Huu Vinh. In
August, police in Khanh Hoa province reportedly dragged Nguyen Thi Nay by the
hair and detained her for several hours for trying to approach the court during
the trial of her son, Nguyen Huu Quoc Duy.
671
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH
Drug Detention Centers
Thousands of people who use drugs, including children, continue to be held
without due process in government detention centers, where they are forced to
work in the name of “labor therapy,” a practice that violates prohibitions of
forced labor under Vietnamese and international law. According to state media,
during the first three months of 2016 alone more than 1,000 people were sent to
mandatory centers in and around Ho Chi Minh City. Violations of center rules and
failure to meet work quotas are punished by beatings and confinement to disci-
plinary rooms where detainees are deprived of food and water. 
Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity
In November 2015, the National Assembly approved a bill to legalize sex reas-
signment surgery and to introduce the right to legal gender recognition for trans-
gender people who have undergone such surgery. The law allows people who
wish to undergo gender affirming surgeries to do so in Vietnam rather than
abroad, and to change the gender marker on official documents—a small, but
significant step toward recognizing transgender people’s rights. A UNESCO study
highlighted bullying—usually in the form of verbal insults from peers and teach-
ers—of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) students in Vietnam’s
schools.
Key International Actors
The dynamics of Vietnam’s foreign relations are complex. Although Hanoi main-
tains close economic ties to China, one of its largest trade partners, it is engaged
in major disputes with Beijing over maritime territory. In recent years, it has
forged closer military and economic relations with the US. Vietnam is also an ac-
tive participant in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, and sustains ties
with Japan, the EU, India, and Australia.
In 2016, as in previous years, the US consistently raised human rights concerns
in bilateral meetings and repeatedly called on Vietnam to release political pris-
oners, but has not directly connected human rights improvements to better
diplomatic ties. Even as Vietnam continued to harass and arrest dissidents and
failed to implement meaningful reforms, the Obama administration continued to
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press the US Congress and Vietnam’s National Assembly to ratify the Trans Pa-
cific Partnership, and rewarded the government during President Barack
Obama’s May 2016 visit by lifting a decades-old arms embargo on Vietnam.
The EU and Australia, focusing on commercial relations, made limited efforts to
support detained activists or otherwise advocate for improved respect for basic
rights in Vietnam. In June, the European Parliament adopted a resolution on the
human rights situation in Vietnam. Japan and India continued to remain silent
on Vietnam’s abysmal rights record.
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Yemen
The Saudi Arabia-led coalition’s aerial and ground campaign against Houthi
forces and forces loyal to former President Ali Abdullah Saleh continued in 2016.
The campaign began on March 26, 2015, in support of the government of Presi-
dent Abdu Rabu Mansour Hadi and has been supported by the United States and
the United Kingdom. 
As of October 10, at least 4,125 civilians had been killed and 7,207 wounded
since the start of the campaign, the majority by coalition airstrikes, according to
the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR).
Dozens of coalition airstrikes indiscriminately or disproportionately killed and
wounded thousands of civilians in violation of the laws of war. The coalition also
used internationally banned cluster munitions.
Houthi and allied forces committed serious laws-of-war violations by laying
banned antipersonnel landmines, mistreating detainees, and launching indis-
criminate rockets into populated areas in Yemen and southern Saudi Arabia,
killing hundreds of civilians.
Yemeni warring parties began peace talks in Kuwait in April, following a cessa-
tion of hostilities, but airstrikes and fighting on the ground continued. This latest
round of peace talks broke down in August, subsequent efforts to bring the par-
ties back to negotiations have failed, and coalition airstrikes and ground fighting
continue. 
None of the states’ party to the conflict carried out meaningful investigations
into their forces’ alleged violations. 
Airstrikes
Human Rights Watch has documented 58 apparently unlawful coalition airstrikes
since the start of the campaign, which have killed nearly 800 civilians and hit
homes, markets, hospitals, schools, civilian businesses, and mosques. Some at-
tacks may amount to war crimes. These include airstrikes on a crowded market
in northern Yemen on March 15 that killed 97 civilians, including 25 children, and
another on a crowded funeral in Sanaa on October that killed over 100 civilians
and wounded hundreds more. 
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Repeated coalition airstrikes on factories and other civilian economic structures
raise serious concerns that the coalition deliberately sought to inflict damage to
Yemen’s limited production capacity. Human Rights Watch investigated 18 ap-
parently unlawful strikes, some of which used US or UK-supplied weapons, on 14
civilian economic sites. The strikes killed 130 civilians and wounded 173 more.
Following the attacks, many of the factories ended production and hundreds of
workers lost their livelihoods. 
Cluster Munitions
Human Rights Watch has documented the coalition using internationally banned
cluster munitions in at least 16 attacks that targeted populated areas, killing and
wounding dozens. 
Human Rights Watch has identified six types of air-dropped and ground-
launched cluster munitions in multiple locations in Yemen, including those pro-
duced in the US and Brazil. Amnesty International has further documented the
use of UK-made cluster munitions. 
In May, the Obama administration suspended transfers of cluster munitions to
Saudi Arabia after reports of their use in civilian areas in Yemen. Textron, US-
based manufacturer of the CBU-105, announced it would stop production of the
weapon in August.
Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and other coalition states are not party to the 2008 Con-
vention on Cluster Munitions. At a meeting in Geneva on May 19, a Yemeni offi-
cial said the Hadi-led government is considering ratifying the convention
following use of the weapons in Yemen.
Landmines
Houthi and allied forces laid numerous landmines, including banned antiper-
sonnel mines, in Yemen’s southern and eastern governorates of Aden, Abyan,
Marib, Lahj, and Taizz since the beginning of the current conflict. Landmines
have killed and wounded dozens of civilians, including children. 
Human Rights Watch investigated the cases of five people maimed by antiper-
sonnel mines in Taizz since March 2016, including one man trying to return home
with his brother following months of displacement. Landmines killed at least 18
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people and wounded over 39 in two districts in Taizz governorate between May
2015 and April 2016, according to a local nongovernmental organization. Med-
ical professionals and Yemenis clearing mines told Human Rights Watch the ac-
tual number of mine victims is likely much higher. In June, one doctor said he
had treated 50 people in Taizz who had one or more limbs amputed since April
who he believed were injured by landmines. 
Yemen suffers from a shortage of equipped and trained personnel who can sys-
tematically survey and clear mines and explosive remnants of war.
Indiscriminate Attacks 
Before and since the coalition air campaign, Houthi and allied forces have used
artillery rockets in indiscriminate attacks in the southern cities of Aden, Taizz,
Lahj, and al-Dale’a.
Since March 2015, Human Rights Watch has documented seven indiscriminate
attacks by Houthi and allied forces in Aden and Taizz that killed 139 people, in-
cluding at least 8 children. 
Shelling by the Houthi-aligned Popular Committees and army units loyal to for-
mer president Saleh was responsible for killing 475 civilians and wounding 1,121
between July 1, 2015, and June 30, 2016, according to the UN.
Houthis have also launched artillery rockets into the Najran and Jazan regions in
southern Saudi Arabia. Saudi authorities said 29 civilians had been killed and
300 injured in Najran in August alone due to cross-border shelling, Reuters re-
ported.
Attacks on Health and Restrictions on Humanitarian Access
Human Rights Watch has documented numerous airstrikes that unlawfully struck
or damaged health facilities in Yemen. On August 15, 2016, a Saudi-led coalition
airstrike hit an MSF-supported hospital in Hajja, killing 19 people, and the fourth
on an MSF facility. Following the strike, the organization pulled its staff out of six
hospitals in northern Yemen.
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Houthi and allied forces engaged in military operations around Aden, Taizz, and
other areas repeatedly exposed hospitals, patients and health workers to unjus-
tified risk. 
According to OHCHR, as of 2016, over 600 health facilities have closed due to
damage caused by the conflict, shortage of critical supplies and lack of health
workers.
More than 80 percent of the country’s total population—20 million people—have
been in need of humanitarian assistance. Parties to the conflict have continued
to block or restrict critical relief supplies from reaching civilians. 
Houthi and allied forces have confiscated food and medical supplies from civil-
ians entering Taizz and blocked humanitarian assistance from reaching the city,
contributing to the near collapse of the health system. 
The coalition has imposed a naval blockade on Yemen, limiting the importation
of vital goods like fuel, which is urgently needed to power generators to hospi-
tals and pump water to civilian residences. In August 2016, the coalition sus-
pended all commercial flights to Sanaa. This is “having serious implications for
patients seeking urgent medical treatment abroad,” according to the UN. 
Aid workers have been kidnapped, unlawfully detained, and killed while en-
gaged in humanitarian operations in Yemen. Humanitarian agencies are fre-
quently denied access to areas controlled by Houthi and Saleh-aligned forces.
Children and Armed Conflict 
Among repeated violations against children by parties to the conflict, Human
Rights Watch has documented 58 apparently unlawful coalition airstrikes that
killed at least 192 children, and multiple airstrikes that struck or damaged
schools. The Houthis have also endangered schools and used child soldiers. 
The UN secretary-general included the Houthis, government forces, pro-govern-
ment militias, Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and, for the first time,
the Saudi Arabia-led coalition on his annual “list of shame” for grave violations
against children during armed conflict. 
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The coalition was responsible for 60 percent of the 785 children killed and 1,168
children wounded, and nearly half of the 101 attacks on schools and hospitals,
according to the report. 
Houthi forces, government and pro-government forces, and other armed groups
have used child soldiers, an estimated one-third of the fighters in Yemen. The
UN found in 2015 that 72 percent of 762 verified cases of child recruitment were
attributable to the Houthis, with an overall five-fold increase in recruitment of
children and a shift towards forced or involuntary recruitment. 
Under Yemeni law, 18 is the minimum age for military service. In 2014, the gov-
ernment signed a UN action plan to end the use of child soldiers. Without an ef-
fective government in place, the action plan has not been implemented.
On June 6, 2016, the UN secretary-general’s office announced it was removing
the Saudi-led coalition from its “list of shame,” “pending the conclusions of [a]
joint review” of the cases included in the report’s text after the Saudi govern-
ment apparently threatened to de-fund UN programs, which could have put chil-
dren who depend on these programs at risk.
The US again placed Yemen on its list of countries to which arms sales are re-
stricted by the US Child Soldiers Prevention Act, although President Barack
Obama granted Secretary of State John Kerry authority to restart aid to Yemen
that would otherwise be prohibited by the law.
Terrorism and Counterterrorism 
Both AQAP and armed groups loyal to the Islamic State (also known as ISIS)
claimed responsibility for numerous suicide and other bombings that killed
dozens of civilians. 
The US continued its drone attacks on alleged AQAP militants and began to pub-
lish basic data related to the strikes. By November, the US reported it had con-
ducted 28 drone strikes in Yemen, killing at least 80 people described as AQAP
operatives. The Bureau of Investigative Journalism, a media organization, re-
ported the US had possibly conducted 11 more strikes over the same period.
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Arbitrary Detention, Torture, and Enforced Disappearances
After Houthi and allied forces seized control of the capital, Sanaa in late 2014,
they cracked down on dissent. Houthi authorities closed several dozen NGOs
and barred human rights advocates from traveling. In March, Houthi officials
confiscated the passport of prominent rights advocate Abdulrasheed al-Faqih,
the second such travel ban the Houthis imposed on a rights advocate. By No-
vember, Al-Faqih’s passport had yet to be returned. 
Houthi and allied forces have committed enforced disappearances, tortured de-
tainees, and arbitrarily detained numerous activists, journalists, tribal leaders,
and political opponents. Since August 2014, Human Rights Watch has docu-
mented the Sanaa-based authorities’ arbitrary or abusive detention of at least 61
people. In 2016, Human Rights Watch documented two deaths in custody and 11
cases of alleged torture or other ill-treatment, including the abuse of a child.
Women’s Rights, Sexual Orientation, and Gender Identity
Women in Yemen face severe discrimination in law and practice. They cannot
marry without the permission of their male guardian and do not have equal
rights to divorce, inheritance, or child custody. Lack of legal protection leaves
them exposed to domestic and sexual violence. In the absence of a functioning
government, no advances were made to pass a draft constitution that includes
provisions guaranteeing equality and prohibiting discrimination based on gen-
der, and a draft Child Rights Law that would criminalize child marriage and fe-
male genital mutilation. Forced marriage rates have increased during the
ongoing conflict, according to UNFPA.
Under the 1994 penal code, same-sex relations are outlawed with punishments
ranging from 100 lashes to death by stoning.   
Accountability
None of the warring parties carried out credible investigations into their forces’
alleged laws-of-war violations in Yemen. 
The coalition-appointed Joint Incidents Assessment Team (JIAT) concluded initial
investigations into nine allegedly unlawful strikes. JIAT’s results differed drasti-
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cally from those of the UN, Human Rights Watch and others who documented
some of the same strikes. JIAT did not release full investigation reports nor de-
tailed information on their members, their methodology, including how they de-
termine which strikes to investigate, or whether or not they have the power to
ensure prosecutions of individuals responsible for alleged war crimes. 
The US is not known to have conducted investigations into any alleged unlawful
strikes in which its forces may have taken part. 
In August, the UN high commissioner for human rights recommended establish-
ing an independent, international mechanism to investigate alleged abuses by
all sides in Yemen, finding the coalition-backed Yemeni National Commission
was “unable to implement its mandate in accordance with international stan-
dards.” Three UK parliamentary committees called on the UK to support an inde-
pendent international inquiry “as a matter of urgency” in September.
In September, the UN Human Rights Council passed a resolution laying out two
complementary processes for investigations, through the OHCHR itself, strength-
ened by the allocation of additional human rights experts, and through the
Yemeni National Commission with OHCHR support.  
Key International Actors 
The US has been a party to the conflict since the first months of fighting, provid-
ing targeting intelligence and in-air refuelling. In May, the US said it had de-
ployed some troops in Yemen to aid the United Arab Emirates and its own
campaign against AQAP. In October, the US responded to Houthi missile
launches, which the Houthis later denied, against US warships with multiple
strikes at Houthi-radar sites.
The UK was “providing technical support, precision-guided weapons and ex-
changing information with the Saudi Arabian armed forces,” according to the UK
Ministry of Defence. The UK also prepared first drafts of all UN Security Council
resolutions on Yemen. The Security Council issued resolutions on the crisis in
February and April 2015. 
Foreign governments have continued to sell weapons to Saudi Arabia, despite
growing evidence the coalition has been committing unlawful airstrikes. US and
UK lawmakers, whose governments altogether approved more than $20 billion
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and $4 billion worth of weapons sales, respectively to Saudi Arabia in 2015
alone, have increasingly challenged the continuation of these sales. Human
Rights Watch called on all countries selling arms to Saudi Arabia to suspend
weapons sales until it curtails its unlawful airstrikes in Yemen and credibly inves-
tigates alleged violations.
On February 25, the European parliament passed a resolution calling on the Eu-
ropean Union’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Feder-
ica Mogherini “to launch an initiative aimed at imposing an EU arms embargo
against Saudi Arabia” due to its conduct in Yemen.
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Zimbabwe
During 2016, the government of President Robert Mugabe intensified repression
against thousands of people who peacefully protested human rights violations
and the deteriorating economic situation. It disregarded the rights provisions in
the country’s 2013 constitution, and implemented no meaningful human rights
reforms. 
Police abuse increased, and there was excessive use of force to crush dissent.
Human rights defenders, civil society activists, journalists, and government op-
ponents, were harassed, threatened or faced arbitrary arrest by police. Wide-
spread impunity continues for abuses by police and state security agents. 
The president publicly attacked judges for “reckless” rulings that allowed public
protests against his rule, further eroding judicial independence. He also under-
mined the independence of the Zimbabwe Human Rights Commission (ZHRC),
established as an independent commission under the constitution, when he ver-
bally attacked the institution. 
Attacks on Human Rights Defenders 
In June 2016, police began a campaign of politically motivated abuses against
activists engaged in countrywide protests against poverty, corruption, rights
abuses, and lack of electoral reform. Police resorted to heavy-handed tactics, in-
discriminately using water cannons, teargas, and batons to violently crush
largely peaceful protests. 
At various times since June 2016, hundreds of protesters, including student ac-
tivists, human rights activists, and opposition supporters were arrested, de-
tained, and later released on bail without charge. 
For instance, on July 6, police assaulted and arbitrarily arrested, and charged
with public violence, hundreds of protesters across the country, including 86
people in Bulawayo, 105 people in Harare, and 16 people in Victoria Falls. The
government blocked internet access and WhatsApp text messaging for several
hours to obstruct people protesting under the #Tajamuka/Sesijikile campaign
led by Promise Mkwananzi and the #ThisFlag campaign led by Pastor Evan
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Mawarire. In August, Mawarire and his family fled to the United States after sus-
pected state security agents threatened to kill them.
On August 24 and 26, police arbitrarily arrested over 140 people in Harare on
false public violence charges. According to their lawyers, most of those arrested,
including security guards, vendors, college students taken from class, did not
participate in the protests. Those arrested were later freed on bail after several
days in detention. 
On September 24, police in Mutare arrested and detained 17 members of the
Zimbabwe National Students Union (ZINASU) on charges of allegedly gathering
in contravention of the Public Order and Security Act (POSA). After three nights in
detention, the Magistrate’s Court freed 15 of the 17 ZINASU members and de-
clared their arrest unlawful. At time of writing, two student leaders remain in cus-
tody. 
Freedom of Expression and Media 
Zimbabwe’s Constitution guarantees freedom of expression and media, but jour-
nalists are subject to arbitrary arrest, harassment, and intimidation when report-
ing on protests. Reports by the Media Institute of Southern Africa (MISA,
Zimbabwe) show that from January 2016, police assaulted, harassed, arrested,
or detained at least 31 journalists reporting on protests. They include Garikai
Chaunza, Edgar Gweshe, Chris Mahove, James Jemwa, and Khumbulani Zam-
chiya—whom police arrested in June while they reported on a protest in Harare,
detaining them for six hours before releasing them without charge. 
On July 6, police briefly detained journalists Elias Mambo, Tafadzwa Ufumeli,
Richard Chidza, and Godwin Mangudya at Marimba Station, who were covering
protests in Mufakose. Police ordered the journalists to delete from their cameras
and mobile phones all pictures and video footage of the protests before releas-
ing them without charge. 
On August 3, police used batons to beat up journalists Lawrence Chimunhu,
Haru Mutasa, Tsvangirai Mukwazhi, Christopher Mahove, Tendai Musiyazviriyo,
Bridget Mananavire, and Imelda Mhetu who were covering a protest in Harare.
On August 24, a member of the anti-riot police in Harare harassed and beat jour-
nalist Lucy Yasin with a baton as she covered a protest. On the same day the po-
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lice arrested journalist Tendai Mandimika and detained him for three weeks on
false public violence charges before releasing him on bail.
On August 25, the police briefly detained journalists Obey Manayiti and Robert
Tapfumaneyi. The following day, police arrested photojournalist James Jemwa
while covering protests in Harare. He spent a week in detention on public vio-
lence charges before being released on bail.
Women’s and Girls’ Rights 
In January 2016, the Constitutional Court declared child marriage unconstitu-
tional and set 18 as the minimum marriage age. In March, scores of members of
parliament from the ruling party and the opposition pledged to protect the rights
of girls and to fight to end child marriage. That same month Vice President Em-
merson Mnangagwa announced that the government was developing laws to
make it a criminal offense. 
The government has yet to amend or repeal all existing marriage laws that still
allow child marriage. It also has not put in place structures to implement the
court’s decision and ensure that girls under 18 are not being forced into mar-
riage. 
A Human Rights Watch report found that widows are routinely evicted from their
marital homes and their property confiscated with little recourse to the formal
justice system.
Rule of Law
Authorities continued to ignore human rights provisions in the country’s 2013
constitution. The government did not enact new laws or amend existing laws to
bring them in line with the constitution and Zimbabwe’s international and re-
gional human rights obligations. The government has not repealed or amended
the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA), the Public Order
and Security Act (POSA), and other laws that severely restrict basic rights. In
terms of criminal law, sex between men is punishable with up to one year in
prison and a fine.
On September 3, President Mugabe interfered with the judiciary’s independence
by publicly attacking judges for “reckless” rulings that allowed protests against
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his government. His statements also undermined Zimbabwe’s international
human rights law obligations to respect due process and judicial independence
under the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights and the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
On September 9, Mugabe undermined the independence of the Zimbabwe
Human Rights Commission when he dismissed its report as “absolutely false”
and described its chairperson as “stupid.” The commission had published a re-
port showing that partisan government officials had denied food aid to opposi-
tion supporters. The commission found the government had violated rights to
equality, non-discrimination, and the right to sufficient food. An estimated 4.5
million people needed food aid in 2016.
Authorities have not fully investigated the March 9, 2015 abduction and en-
forced disappearance of pro-democracy activist and human rights defender Itai
Dzamara, who remained missing at time of writing. There has been no progress
toward justice for serious past human rights crimes.  
Key International Actors
In 2016, Zimbabwe’s neighbor and key regional actor South Africa remained
silent in the face of a police crackdown in Zimbabwe. In July 2016, Gwede Man-
tashe, secretary general of South Africa’s ruling African National Congress, la-
belled the Zimbabwe protesters “sponsored elements seeking regime change.”
On September 21, in an interview with Reuters, President Ian Khama of
Botswana said Zimbabwe’s 92-year-old President Mugabe should step aside
without delay and allow new leadership. The government of Zimbabwe said it
was shocked at Khama’s comments. 
The Southern African Development Community (SADC) failed t0 raise concerns
about deteriorating human rights conditions in Zimbabwe in 2016. When SADC
leaders met for their annual summit in Swaziland from August 29 to 31, 2016,
they did not press Mugabe’s government to prevent abuses and respect human
rights in the country. 
In February 2016, the European Union renewed sanctions of asset freeze and
travel bans against President Mugabe, his wife Grace, and Zimbabwe Defence In-
dustries until February 20, 2017. In September 2016, the European Parliament ex-
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pressed serious concern about the increase in violence against demonstrators in
Zimbabwe and called on the government to respect the right to demonstrate
peacefully. It condemned Mugabe’s attacks on the judiciary and urged authori-
ties not to interfere with judicial independence. It drew attention to the plight of
many women in Zimbabwe and the need to respect their rights. 
In August 2016, Australia, Canada, and the United States issued statements in
response to protests registering deep concern over use of violence and other
human rights violations.  
In September 2016, local media reported that the World Bank was preparing an
extensive bailout package for Zimbabwe in disregard of the country’s deteriora-
tion human rights situation. The World Bank however denied the reports, ex-
pressing deep care for the people of Zimbabwe, and said direct funding to
Zimbabwe would only resume after the country clears its arrears with the bank. 
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This  27th annual World Report summarizes human rights
conditions in 90 countries and territories worldwide in 2016. 
It reflects extensive investigative work that Human Rights Watch
staff conducted during the year, often in close partnership with
domestic human rights activists.
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